Harland B.,1 Complainant,v.James N. Mattis, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Commissary Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Mar 27, 2018

0120160292 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 27, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Harland B.,1
Complainant,

v.

James N. Mattis,
Secretary,
Department of Defense
(Defense Commissary Agency),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120160292

Hearing No. 430-2013-00130X

Agency No. DECA-00164-2011

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or
Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 17, 2015, final
decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s
final decision.

BACKGROUND

Complainant worked as a Part-Time Meat Cutter, WG-7407-07, at the Commissary in Fort Lee,
Virginia. On March 14, 2011, Complainant filed EEO Complaint No. DECA-00040-2011, in
which he alleged that various management officials had discriminated against him on the bases
of race (African-American), color (Black), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under
Title VII. Investigative Report (IR) 2. The Agency notified Complainant on March 24, 2011,
that it had received Complaint No. DECA-00040-2011. IR 54. On August 12, 2011,
Complainant filed EEO Complaint No. DECA-00164-2011, which contained substantially the
same claims and allegations as Complaint No. DECA-00040-2011. IR 8. On August 15, 2011,

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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the Agency notified Complainant that it had received Complaint No. DECA-00164-2011, and
that the two complaints would be consolidated under Complaint No. DECA-00164-2011. IR 57.
In its acceptance letter dated September 13, 2011, the Agency informed Complainant that it had
accepted the consolidated complaint, framing Complainant’s allegations as follows:

Whether the Agency discriminated against Complainant based on his race (African-
American), color (black), and reprisal (prior protected EEO activity) when:

1. On November 22, 2011, he received a letter of reprimand (LOR)2;

2. On April 10, 2011, he was not selected for the position of full-time Meat
Cutter; and

3. Since 2008, he had been the victim of continuous harassment and
disparate treatment with respect to terms and conditions of his
employment, including but not limited to denial of leave requests, denial
of training opportunities, and denial of opportunities to earn premium pay
by working on Sundays.

IR 61.3 At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of
the investigative report and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing but on May 26, 2015, the AJ
dismissed the request as a sanction for failure to obey her orders. The AJ remanded the
complaint to the Agency, and the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency
subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

When asked by the EEO investigator what prior protected activity he engaged in, Complainant
replied that he had visited the Agency’s EEO office but did not specify a date. He also
reaffirmed that he filed Complaint No. DECA-00040-2011 on March 14, 2011. He admitted,
however, that he was not aware of when each management official he named in his complaint
had become aware of his EEO activity. IR 423, 447, 453, 464.

2 The acceptance letter erroneously identifies the LOR has having occurred in 2011. The LOR
itself, is dated November 16, 2010 and references an infraction that took place on October 22,
2010. IR 107.

3 Complainant identified the following management officials as being responsible for the alleged
acts of discrimination and reprisal: (1) The Meat Department Manager who served as
Complainant’s first-line supervisor between January 3, 2010 and November 21, 2010 (S1a); the
Meat Department Manager who served as Complainant’s first-line supervisor between February
28, 2011 and July 31, 2012 (S1b); the two store managers who served as Complainant’s second-
line supervisors (S2a and S2b) (dates not specified); and the Store Director who served as
Complainant’s fourth-line supervisor (S4). IR 66-67, 436, 440-41, 447, 453, 464.
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In a memorandum dated November 16, 2010, S1a notified Complainant that he was receiving a
LOR for failure to follow instructions, absence without leave (AWOL), and disrespectful
conduct toward a supervisor. IR 107-08, 428. According to S1a, on October 22, 2010, he had
observed Complainant leaving work one hour earlier than the end of his shift. The following
day, S1a notified Complainant that he would be carried in AWOL status for leaving early the day
before without obtaining approval from management. The LOR further states that Complainant
left S1a’s office in a rage, screaming and cursing, and had continued to make a scene after being
told to calm down. IR 107, 115-17, 453-54. He admitted leaving work early on October 22,
2010, but denied that he had yelled at S1a. IR 425-27. S1a averred that he was not aware of
Complainant’s EEO activity at the time and that he had disciplined both Black and White
employees alike for infractions of the rules. IR 454. A White coworker who had been
disciplined by S1a (CW1) averred that everyone in the department had been written up by S1a at
one time or another, including himself. IR 460. A Human Resources Specialist averred that
S1a’s actions were consistent with the Agency’s guidelines and that she had observed no
deviation from the Agency’s standard policy in Complainant’s situation. IR 480. Complainant
had been counseled about his performance by S1a on February 14, 2010 for failure to follow
procedures specified in his performance plan, and by a previous General Manager on November
14, 2008, for failure to observe written regulations. IR 99, 105-06.

Complainant averred that he applied for a full-time Meat Cutter position on March 13, 2011, but
was notified on April 10, 2011 that he had not been selected. He further averred that the
Selectee, who was White, had been promised the job before the announcement closed and had
received assistance in completing his application from S4. IR 69, 167, 423-24. According to the
documentation of the selection process, Complainant and the Selectee were the only two
applicants and S1b and S2a had conducted the selection process. They interviewed the
applicants and awarded Complainant individual interview scores of 18 and 22 for a composite
interview score of 40 while giving the Selectee individual interview scores of 24 and 22 for a
composite score of 46. IR 155-56, 160-61, 164. S1b and S2a both averred that although the
Selectee had far fewer years of experience than Complainant, he had demonstrated during the
interview that he had a better overall understanding of Meat Department operations than
Complainant, and that he absorbed knowledge very quickly. IR 437, 441-42. S4 averred that
she concurred with the selection and denied that she assisted the Selectee in completing his
application. IR 447-48.

With respect to his third allegation, Complainant identified several incidents he characterized as
harassment and disparate treatment that allegedly occurred between 2008 and 2012. We will
describe each incident individually.

First, Complainant averred that while he and several of his coworkers were all given
performance evaluations of fully successful by S1a, the coworkers were given the opportunity to
change their ratings while he was not. IR 428. S1a had rated Complainant fully successful
during the period from July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010. IR 95-96. He averred that although
Complainant performed all of the job functions that he was supposed to, he did not go above and
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beyond his routine duties in ways that would justify a higher rating. S1a denied that he changed
anyone’s performance ratings. IR 456-57. S2b, who was the approving official at the time,
stated that S1a’s predecessor wanted to rate Complainant below fully successful and place him
on a performance improvement plan, but that she ultimately changed Complainant’s rating to
fully successful without him knowing about it. S2b also averred that there were several
employees whose ratings were changed, but that these employees were Meat Cutter helpers
whose performance standards were different than those of Meat Cutters. IR 465.

Second, Complainant averred that his leave requests had been repeatedly denied. IR 427-28.
S1a and S1b both responded that the Meat Cutters were needed to maintain continuity of
operations and that they both based their decisions to approve or deny leave upon the needs of
the Meat Department at the time the leave requests were submitted. IR 443, 456. CW1 averred
that S1a denied leave for a lot of employees, not just for Complainant, and that he based his
leave approvals on mission requirements, manpower needs, the requestor’s time in service and
whether employees were sick. IR 461. S1b averred that on a number of occasions, Complainant
had requested sick leave because his grandfather was ill, but when she made inquiries she found
out that the individual in question was a close friend who Complainant considered to be “like his
grandfather.” She stated that she made him take annual leave to attend the individual’s funeral.
S1b also averred that leave was approved on a first-come, first-served basis in order to ensure
Meat Cutter coverage. IR 465.

Third, Complainant averred that he was repeatedly denied training opportunities in food safety
and sanitation. IR 427-28, 434. A training record indicates that Complainant requested training
for 40 hours between February 13 and 17, 2012, but that his request was denied by S4. IR 71.
According to S1b, Complainant wanted to attend the food safety course that was given twice
each year, that his request for the first administration was submitted too late and that he was not
selected when he applied for the second administration. IR 443. S1a and S2b averred that when
the Agency has a training class, S4 as the Store Director, would submit the names of employees
to the training coordinator on a first come, first-served basis, and that employees in the Meat
Department received extensive hands-on training after their initial training was completed. IR
455, 464-65. CW1 averred that at some unspecified point in time, Complainant was his
subordinate and that when he talked with S4 about Complainant attending a 40-hour class, S4
explained to him that Complainant was not eligible to take the class because he could not work
more than 24 hours in a week. IR 460-61. S4 averred that she would only deny training requests
if the training was not relevant to the requirements of the requestor’s job, and that when
Complainant requested the food safety course, there were no more slots available. IR 449.

Fourth, Complainant averred that he had been denied the opportunity to earn premium pay by
working on Sundays. IR 427-28. S1a averred that at first, he had removed the Meat Cutters
from the Sunday schedule because they were producing too much meat, which would degrade in
value by the time the store opened on Tuesdays, thereby causing the operation to lose money.
He further stated that he then began rotating employees to work Sundays, but had to abandon
that schedule because too many employees were calling out sick. IR 455-56. S1b averred that
Complainant was indecisive about his work schedule.
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He averred that after Complainant complained about not being allowed to work on Sundays, he
adjusted Complainant’s schedule to include Sundays. He also averred that he had to remove
Complainant from the Sunday schedule because Complainant would call out sick on the Sundays
he was scheduled to work. S1b stated that because Complainant was part-time, he did not have a
set schedule and was consequently scheduled to work as needed. IR 444. S2b stated
Complainant had worked some Sundays and that employees were scheduled based upon the
needs of the store. IR 465. CW1 averred that Complainant had ample opportunities to work on
Sundays but would frequently call out sick on the Sundays he was scheduled to work. IR 461.

Fifth, Complainant averred that he had been the victim of an arbitrary policy change regarding
scheduled training. He stated that another one of his coworkers (CW2), who worked a part-time
schedule of 32 hours per week, approached him with a proposal to trade schedules so that CW2
could reduce his schedule to 24 hours per week. Complainant maintained that after the switch
was granted, S4 refused to let him work the additional 8 hours that were part of CW2’s original
work schedule. IR 428-29, 477. S1a averred that he could not approve the proposed switch and
would have to take the issue to S2b or S4, and that Complainant could not understand that S1a
could not unilaterally give him extra hours merely because another employee was reducing his
hours. IR 456. S4 averred that it was S1a’s decision to reduce CW2’s hours and that approval
from senior management was needed to increase Complainant’s hours in order to ensure that the
department did not exceed its budget constraints. IR 449-50. CW1 averred that Complainant
had not been slotted for an additional eight hours. IR 461. S2b averred that she did not have the
authority to approve an 8-hour schedule increase because the store was not budgeted for a 32-
hour Meat Cutter position. She emphasized that when she needed extra hours for any department
she had to receive prior approval from S4. IR 465.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part
1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review
“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the
parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and
its interpretation of the law”).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). As the first step, he must generally establish a prima facie case by
demonstrating that he was subjected to adverse employment actions under circumstances that
would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
576 (1978).

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The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since S1a, S1b, S2a, S2b,
and S4 had all articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions vis-à-vis
Complainant. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17
(1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997).

Regarding the LOR, S1a stated that he issued Complainant the LOR in November 2010 for
AWOL, failure to follow instructions and disrespectful conduct. As to the nonselection, S1b and
S2a stated that they chose the Selectee for the full-time Meat Cutter position because the
Selectee had performed better during the interview than Complainant. Concerning
Complainant’s performance appraisal, S1a denied changing the ratings of anyone whose
performance he reviewed and S2b averred that those employees whose ratings were changed
were not Meat Cutters. With respect to Complainant’s leave situation, S1a and S1b both stated
that they based their decisions to approve or disapprove leave on the operational needs of the
Meat Department. With regard to training, S1a, S2b, and S4 maintained that Complainant was
either not eligible to take the classes because his job did not require them or because the number
of hours in the training courses exceeded the number of hours in his weekly schedule.
Concerning whether Complainant was able to work on Sundays and thereby earn premium pay,
S1a, S1b, S2b, and CW1 stated that Complainant was given the opportunity to work on Sundays,
but that he often called in sick on the Sundays that he was supposed to work. With regard to the
schedule switch, S1a, S2b, and S4 maintained that even though CW2 was able to reduce his
work-hours, budgetary constraints prevented them from approving an 8-hour increase in
Complainant’s work hours.

To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas
Department of Community. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, supra; Pavelka
v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995). Pretext can be
demonstrated by showing such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the Agency’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact
finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence. Opare-Addo v. U.S. Postal Service,
EEOC Appeal No. 0120060802 (Nov. 20, 2007), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC
Request No. 0520080211 (May 30, 2008).

In nonselection cases, Complainant could demonstrate pretext by showing that his qualifications
for the position were plainly superior to those of the Selectee. Hung P. v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141721 (Dec. 3, 2015). Complainant should bear in mind,
however, that agencies have broad discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates as
long as the selection is not based on unlawful considerations. Complainant v. Dept. of Homeland
Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141478 (Jul. 31, 2015). Agencies may select candidates with
fewer years of experience if they believe that such candidates are best qualified to meet the needs
of the organization. See Complainant v. Dept. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120131151 (Feb.
25, 2015). They may even preselect a candidate as long as the preselection is not premised upon
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a prohibited basis. See Complainant v. Dept. of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No.
0120132858 (Mar. 9, 2015).

When asked why he believed that his race, color, and prior EEO activity were factors in the
decision by S1b and S2a to recommend the Selectee, Complainant responded that it was because
he had more experience than the Selectee, and insisted that the selection was tainted by racism.
IR 423-24. In addition to his own assertions, Complainant presented the affidavit testimony of
CW2 and of another Coworker (CW3). CW2 opined that the Selectee was less qualified than
Complainant, that he was assigned to train the Selectee after he was promoted to the full-time
Meat Cutter position, and that he, CW2 and Complainant had to correct the Selectee’s mistakes.
IR 476. CW3 asserted that the Selectee had been preselected and opined that Complainant’s
race, color, and prior EEO activity were factors in the selection process. CW3 further opined
that when one complains a lot, they get targeted. IR 469-70. None of these assertions by
Complainant, CW2, or CW3 contradict the affidavit testimony of S1b and S2a that the Selectee
had a better interview performance than Complainant. S1b and S2a both acknowledged that
Complainant was more experienced. They both pointed out that the Selectee demonstrated a
grasp of the overall operations of the Meat Department that Complainant did not. Neither CW2
nor CW3 made any statements that contradicted the explanation provided by S1b and S2a for
recommending the Selectee over Complainant or that called the veracity of S1b or S2a into
question. We therefore find, as did the Agency, that Complainant has not presented enough
evidence to establish the existence of an unlawful motivation on the part of S1b or S2a in their
decision to choose the Selectee for promotion to full-time Meat Cutter. We now turn to the
remaining incidents that comprise his claim.

Other indicators of pretext include discriminatory statements or past personal treatment
attributable to those responsible for the personnel action that led to the filing of the complaint,
comparative or statistical data revealing differences in treatment across various protected-group
lines, unequal application of Agency policy, deviations from standard procedures without
explanation or justification, or inadequately explained inconsistencies in the evidentiary record.
Mellissa F. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120141697 (Nov. 12, 2015).

When asked by the EEO investigator why he believed he was being treated differently than other
employees because of his race, color, and EEO activity with respect to the LOR, Complainant
averred that S1a did not reprimand the Selectee for coming to work late. IR 427. He also
presented the affidavit of CW3, who averred that she was present during the argument between
S1a and Complainant that was a factor in S1a’s decision to issue the LOR, and that she did not
hear them arguing in loud voices. She also averred that while she may have heard Complainant
say he was “sick of the place,” she did not hear him utter foul language. When asked if she
believed that Complainant’s race, color, or EEO activity were factors in S1a’s decision to issue
the LOR to Complainant, she stated that she thought his EEO activity was a factor, and that
everyone under S1a thought he was unfair. IR 470. However, CW3, who is African American,
had herself been disciplined by S1a, as had several White employees. IR 454. As the AJ
dismissed Complainant’s hearing request as a sanction for failure to obey his orders, the
Commission does not have the benefit of an AJ’s post-hearing assessment of the credibility of
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CW3 as a witness. Therefore, the Commission can only evaluate the facts based on the weight
of the evidence presented. Moreover, neither Complainant nor CW3 had presented any
documents or sworn statements that undermined or contradicted S1a’s explanation for the LOR
regarding the AWOL charge. Consequently, we find that, as with the nonselection, the
evidentiary record is not sufficient to establish the existence of a discriminatory or retaliatory
motivation on the part of S1a in issuing Complainant the LOR in November 2010.

As to the remaining incidents, Complainant characterized a statement made by S2b that he was a
“special case” as indicative of discriminatory intent on her part. IR 428. S2b responded that
when CW2 informed her that he was requesting to reduce his weekly work hours from 32 to 24,
he mentioned that he was willing to change schedules with Complainant. S2b further stated that
she told CW2 that this was a special case that she needed to discuss with S4, and was never
meant as a derogatory comment toward Complainant. IR 466. CW1 averred that Complainant
complained of being harassed and discriminated against whenever he was given instructions or
corrected on aspects of his work performance. IR 461. When CW3 was asked if she believed
that Complainant’s race, color, or prior EEO activity were factors in any of the incidents, she
replied that she did not know. When asked if she was aware of any hostile work environment, or
of any racial statements made about or toward Complainant, she replied, “no.” IR 471.
However, S1b, who is African-American, was asked whether he believed that Complainant’s
race, color, or prior EEO activity were factors in management’s response to the incidents
described herein, and he replied, “I believe his EEO activity was a factor in management
decisions but I have no proof of that.” IR 441, 444. S1b’s statement is no more than mere
speculation that one of the other individuals named in the complaint might have harbored a
retaliatory motive. Without additional evidence, S1b’s statement is at most a restatement of
Complainant’s prima facie case, which the Agency had already conceded in its final decision.
As we have previously emphasized, to get beyond the prima facie case, Complainant would have
had to present affidavits, declarations or unsworn statements from witness other than himself or
documents that contradicted the explanations provided by S1a, S1b, S2a, S2b, and S4 for each of
the incidents at issue in his complaint or which undermined their veracity. He has not done so.
We therefore find that Complainant has not established that he had been subjected to disparate
treatment on any of his alleged bases.

Complainant characterized the incidents described in his complaint as harassment as well as
disparate treatment. However, since he failed to establish the existence of an unlawful motive
attributable to any of the officials named into his complaint, no further inquiry is necessary as to
whether the incidents were severe or pervasive enough to rise to the level of a hostile work
environment. See e.g.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Tynisha H. v.
Dept. of State, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141395 (March 17, 2017).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the
Agency’s final decision finding that Complainant did not establish that he was discriminated
against as alleged.
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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
Agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The
court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to
File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

March 27, 2018
Date