Harbur Terminal Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 16, 1960

126 N.L.R.B. 659 (N.L.R.B. 1960)

HARBUR TERMINAL COMPANY 659
clearly exists a community of interest between employees in the two
departments Nor does the fact that a little more machine work
is required in mattress manufacturing than in upholstery making,
persuade us' that the overall function has been sufficiently changed
to classify the bedroom operation as a new undertaking It therefore
follows that the Employer's mattress department is a normal accre-
tion to an existing unit, and that the contract of December 1958 bars
the present petition 4 Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition
[The Board dismissed the petition ]
4 Ingersoll Humphreys Division, Borg-Warner Corporation, 117 NLRB 1715, J W Rem
Company, 115 NLRB 775 777, Richfield Oil Corporation, 119 NLRB 1425, of W P
Fuller & Company, 122 NLRB 814
Harbur Terminal Company and Jesse J. Jamerson and Hod
Carriers & Laborers Local Union 116, AFL-CIO, Party to the
Contract . Case No 23-CA-869 (formerly 39-CA-869) Febru-
ary 16, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 21,1959, Trial Examiner James T Rasbury issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning]
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed The
rulings are hereby affirmed The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case and hereby adopts the findings,1 conclusions, and recommenda-
tions 2 of the Trial Examiner
1 The Trial Examiner found, inter ales, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1)
and (3 ) of the Act by maintaining an exclusive hiringhan arrangement with the Union,
without having posted notices relating to the functioning of the hiring arrangement, as
required by Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated Generar Contractors, Inc, at at,
119 NLRB 883 Although it is not clear from the present record whether the Respond-
ent's requirement , that applicants for employment be referred by the Union, resulted
from the application of an exclusive hiring hall agreement with the Union , as found by
the Trial Examiner , or whether such requirement resulted only from a practice uni-
lateraIly adopted by the Respondent, we find that in either event the Respondent violated
Section 8 ( a) (3) and (1) of the Act
a As it is not clear from the instant record that there was an agreement between the
Respondent and the Union for the establishment of an exclusive hiring hall, and as it
126 NLRB No 85
660 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Company, Har-
bur Terminal Company, its officers, agents, successors and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discriminating against applicants for employment by main-
taining or otherwise giving effect to any hiring arrangement or prac-
tice, which requires referral by Hod Carriers & Laborers Local Union
116, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, unless and until said
arrangement comports to the nondiscriminatory requirements of the
National Labor Relations Act and the terms of such arrangement are
posted in a manner and place that will inform all prospective employ-
ees and applicants of the hiring procedure.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees or applicants for employment in the exercise of
their right to engage in or refrain from engaging in any or all of the
activities specified in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by
Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended :
(a) Make whole Jesse Jamerson for any loss of pay he may have
suffered by reason of discrimination against him in the manner pro-
vided in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents upon
request, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social-
security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of back pay
due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Notify Jesse Jamerson in writing that it has no objection to his
employment.
(d) Post at its offices in Texas City, Texas, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix." I Copies of said notice to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region shall,
after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respond-
appears from the record that the Union operated a nondiscriminatory hiring hall in
compliance with the Act, including the posting of notices , we shall adopt the Trial
Examiner ' s recommendation that the Brown - Olds remedy not be applied in this rase.
3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
HARBUR TERMINAL COMPANY 661
ent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order what steps it has
taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL make whole Jesse Jamerson for any loss of earnings
he may have suffered because of the discrimination against him.
WE WILL notify Jesse Jamerson that we have no objection to
his employment.
AVE WILL NOT discriminate against applicants for employment
by maintaining or otherwise giving effect to any hiring arrange-
ment or practice which requires referral by Hod Carriers &
Laborers Local Union 116, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organi-
zation, unless and until said arrangement comports to the non-
discriminatory requirements of the National Labor Relations
Act and the terms of such arrangement are posted in a manner
and place that will inform all prospective employees and appli-
cants of the hiring procedure.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees or applicants for employment
in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, except as permitted by Section 8 (a) (3)
of that Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from
becoming or remaining, members of the above-named or any other
labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected
by an agreement in conformity with Section 8(a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959.
HARBUR TERMINAL COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
662 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding with all parties represented, was heard in Texas City, Texas, on
July 22, 1959, on complaint of General Counsel and answer of Harbur Terminal
Company, herein called the Respondent. The complaint alleged violation of Section
8(a) (1), (2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. More spe-
cifically, the General Counsel contends that the Respondent established and main-
tained an exclusive referral arrangement with Local 116 of the Hod Carriers in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) in that Harbur Terminal Company had not
posted notices as required by the Board to "legalize" an exclusive hiring hall; 1 and
further that pursuant to said arrangement Jesse Jamerson was discriminatively
refused employment. Briefs were submitted by the General Counsel and the
Respondent.
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDING OF FACT
1. BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Harbur Terminal Company, herein called Respondent, is a corporation duly
organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas, having its prin-
cipal office in Dallas, Texas. Respondent operates a terminal at Texas City, Texas,
where it is engaged in the business of filling drums with petroleum and related
products for loading on board ships. Respondent in the course of its business at
the terminal performs services pursuant to a contract with the Department of Defense
from which it will receive payments in excess of $100,000 for the 12-month period
beginning August 1, 1958. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Hod Carriers and Laborers Local Union 116, AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union or Local 116, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent only has three permanent employees at Texas City: the superin-
tendent, John Allen; a foreman, Fred Souleret; and a secretary. This record indi-
cates, as the Board found in an earlier decision,2 that Respondent has no stable
complement of employees. Under its contract with the Department of Defense,
the Respondent, upon demand, fills drums with petroleum and related products
for loading on board ships. As the need dictates, Respondent may hire from a
few to as many as 80 people who may work for Respondent a few hours or a few
days. At the conclusion of this immediate need the employees are severed from
Respondent's payroll without reasonable expectation of working for Respondent in
the future when need for employees again arises. It is a most irregular and spas-
modic type of work for all except the two supervisors and the one clerical mentioned
above. During the early phases of Respondent's operating history it attempted to
obtain employees by contacting the usual employment or unemployment agencies
and by "passing the word" that laborers were needed. Sometimes Respondent
would try to contact a former employee by telephone. It was during the time
these methods were utilized that Jesse Jamerson, the Charging Party herein, worked
on several occasions. According to his testimony he first worked for Respondent
on August 6, 1958. He also worked August 14, 21, and 26. He did not work for
Respondent during September 1958, but did work again on October 9 and again
on October 16, 1958.
It was sometime between October 9 and 16, 1958, that Respondent apparently
changed its method of recruiting or hiring. Jamerson testified that between October
9 and 16, 1958, he learned that Respondent was doing some hiring and he attempted
1 See, Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, Inc., et at.,
119 NLRB 883; enforcement denied, 270 F. 2d 425 (CA 9).
2 Case No. 39-RC-1287, unpublished
HARBUR TERMINAL COMPANY 663
to gain employment, but "I saw the fellows giving slips, and when I approached
the fellow [Fred Souleret] for employment, he said that was all. And 1 said,
`You mean I can't work?' " According to Jamerson, Fred Souleret the fore-
man answered, "No, that it was going union and I would have to report and get a
[referral] slip from [local] 116." On cross-examination Jamerson testified that
Souleret had first said, "That is all." And he [Jamerson] understood that to mean
that "No more [were] being hired for that day." Thereafter in response to a
retort by Jamerson , Souleret had said, "Well, we are going union. You will have
to get in 116. We are going to hire through 116." On direct examination Souleret
testified that he had never told any prospective employee that they had to join the
Union in order to work for Harbur Terminal Company. Souleret had no specific
recollection of having a conversation with Jamerson in October 1958. However
on cross-examination, Souleret testified that about the middle of October 1958
he had been told by the superintendent of Respondent that all the laborers were
going to be hired through Local 116, and that the new men would be required to
have a referral slip from Local 116 to turn in to the guard at the gate. Furthermore
Souleret testified that he told some of the men that they would have to have a
referral slip from the Union before they could come through the gate. When
carefully considered, Souleret's testimony as to what he had been told by the
Respondent's superintendent and what Souleret admits telling some of the employees,
is not substantially different from Jamerson's version of what he was told by Souleret.
Assuming arguendo that Jamerson's testimony that Souleret told him "to get in
116" was an interpretation and was not actually said, we are nevertheless con-
fronted with the inescapable conclusion from the consistent and undisputed testi-
mony of Jamerson and Souleret that the only way to get a job at Harbur Terminal
Company was by a referral slip from Local 116. When such a condition of employ-
ment is imposed on prospective employees it creates an exclusive hiring-hall arrange-
ment which the Board has stated in Mountain Pacific, supra, inherently and unlaw-
fully encourages union membership that can only be negated if "The parties to the
agreement post in places where notices to employees and applicants for employment
are customarily posted all provisions relating to the functioning of the hiring arrange-
ment, including the safeguards that we deem essential to the legality of an exclusive
hiring agreement." As this Trial Examiner reads and interprets what the Board
has enunciated the law to be, the Respondent has by its arrangement with Local 116
and its subsequent failure to post the required notice, violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, even though in fact there was no actual discrimination. Nor is it
necessary for the arrangement to be in the form of a written collective-bargaining
agreement between the employer and the Union. See Nassau and Suffolk Contrac-
tors Association, Inc., 123 NLRB 1393; Walter Rasmussen, 122 NLRB 674 3
The Respondent does not contend that it ever posted such notices as might be
required by Mountain Pacific, supra, but argues in its brief that there can be no
violation unless actual discrimination is shown. According to Jamerson's own
testimony he never went to Local 116 to seek referral. Undisputed testimony indi-
cates that Local 116 actually referred some nonunion employees to the Respondent.
Local 116 never requested Respondent to discharge anyone for failure to belong
to the Union or for failure to pay dues. The Union had complied with the require-
ments of Mountain Pacific, supra, as it related to other employers with whom it
had written agreements.4 In addition the parties stipulated that the Union had
the following notice posted at the union hall in large lettering on a 24- by 24-inch
poster:
3It was stipulated by the parties hereto that the only agreement between the parties
consisted of a letter dated October 14, 1958, from Local 116 to Respondent which set
forth work hours and premium pay conditions to be applied to members of Local 116,
employed by Respondent. The letter was received in evidence as exhibit R-1 There is
nothing contained in the letter itself which I find violative of the Act I conclude. be-
cause of the further evidence admitted without objection by Respondent, that the word
written was intended to appear just before the word agreement in the stipulation While
the letter has value in showing a mutual arrangement between the Union and the
Respondent, nevertheless it is the testimony of Jamerson and Souleret that establishes
the existence of an exclusive hiring-hall arrangement
4 The record was kept open for the purpose of submitting to the Trial Examiner a copy
of the notice posted by the Union No objections were raised by the General Counsel.
Respondent's Exhibit No 3 Is herewith received in evidence.
664 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
NOTICE
A NEW WORK LIST WILL BE MADE EACH
MONDAY MORNING AT 9 A.M.
ANYONE DESIRING TO REGISTER ON THE
WORK LIST THEREAFTER WILL REGISTER
BETWEEN 8 A.M. & 4:30 P.M.
TUE. THROUGH FRI.
W. L. HUGHES,
B.A., Laborers Local Union 116.
Based on the record in this case there is no evidence of actual discrimination by
either the Union or the Respondent but only such unlawful encouragement of union
membership as the Board has found to be inherent in any exclusive hiring-hall
arrangement absent certain safeguards. As the Board stated in its Mountain
Pacific decision, supra:
Although Section 8(a)(3), in words, outlaws discrimination which encourages
union "membership," more is intended than a literal membership require-
ment.4 The contract or hiring arrangement need not explicitly limit employment
to union members to be unlawful. The statutory phrase "encourage member-
ship in a labor organization" is not to be minutely restricted to enrollment on
the union books; rather, it necessarily embraces also encouragement toward
compliance with obligations or supposed obligations of union membership,
and participation in union activities generally. It follows that specific or direct
proof of such unlawful encouragement is not an indispensable element in every
case. If the employer's conduct-whether caused by a union or not-is of a
kind that "inherently encourages or discourages union membership," 5 it is for
this Board to draw the inference of illegality from such conduct alone. This
follows the common law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his action.
Id. Cestone Company, 118 NLRB 669; Acme Mattress Company, Inc, 91 NLRB
1010, enfd 192 F. 2d 524 (CA 7).
'Radio Officers' Union v N L.R.B., 347 U S 17, 45.
The Respondent also sought to defend on the grounds that it had rejected some
referrals by the Union; that it frequently asked the Union for certain named indi-
viduals; that it had on one or two isolated occasions hired people other than union
referrals; and that it had a right to assume that the Union would be nondiscriminatory
as required by ,the law. However, these considerations do not nullify the existence
of an exclusive hiring-hall arrangement, or adequately correct that which illegally
tends to encourage union membership. It is employee freedom of choice that is the
objective of the Act; thus the Board is properly concerned with the understanding
or interpretation by employees of the arrangement. A simple means of insuring
the nondiscriminatory effects of the arrangement on the employees is to require unions
and employers to publicize all the terms of the arrangement .5 In the instant case
the Respondent has not publicized all the terms of the arrangement. Consequently
I find that Respondent has discriminatively encouraged union membership in viola-
tion of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act by maintaining an illegal exclusive
hiring-hall arrangement with Local 116.
Having found that Respondent maintained an unlawful hiring hall arrangement
with Local 116 and consistent with the testimony I have set out -above proving
that Jamerson was told to obtain a referral slip from Local 116, it follows that
Respondent's conduct toward Jamerson was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act. Under similar illegal hiring arrangements the Board has stated that
it is immaterial that there is no proof that there was a job opening at the time
the alleged discriminatee applied to Respondent for work. See Mountain Pacific,
supra. Furthermore I credit Jamerson's testimony to the effect that he was told
by Souleret on the day he last worked that Respondent might hire 50 or 60 men
the next day and they were hiring through the union hall. The Board made it quite
clear in The Lummus Company case, 101 NLRB 1628, that it is violative of the
Act to require an employee to obtain a referral from a union when the employer
knows the work is available. I therefore find that Respondent's conduct toward
5 See the concurring opinion of Board Member Jenkins in Anchor Welding and Manu-
facturing Company, et al., 123 NLRB 1877, for a clear and concise explanation of why
the safeguards are required.
HARBUR TERMINAL COMPANY 665
Jamerson in view of the above finding of an illegal exclusive hiring arrangement
was likewise violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Questions respecting
what work was in fact available and unlawfully denied Jamerson are matters for
investigation in the compliance stage of this proceeding in determining the amount
of backpay due him pursuant to the recommended remedy.
The counsel for General Counsel included an 8(a) (2) allegation in the complaint,
but all the evidence at .the hearing as well as the arguments in the brief were
directed toward the usual 8(a)(1) and (3) violations occurring in the typical
Mountain Pacific case. While Local 116 was not a Respondent herein, and this
Trial Examiner recognizes that the evidence relating to its conduct was limited,
nevertheless all the evidence available herein clearly indicates that Local 116
operated a nondiscriminatory hiring hall in compliance with the Act including the
posting of notices.
Under all the circumstances of this case, and particularly the Board's prior
determination not to direct an election among Respondent's employees,e this Trial
Examiner is of the opinion that an 8(a)(2) determination is unwarranted and
would not effectuate the policies of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent Union set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the employer described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
which I find necessary to remedy the effects of the unfair labor practices and to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The counsel for the General Counsel has urged application of the Brown-Olds
remedy, i.e., reimbursement of union dues and fees collected from the employees of
the Respondent.? Under all the circumstances of this case the Brown-Olds remedy
would seem manifestly unfair and contrary to the Board's efforts to tailor a remedy
in keeping with the violation. The violation herein stems solely from the Respond-
ent's failure to comply with a requisite which the Board has established. In the
Philadelphia Woodwork Company case, 121 NLRB 1642, the Board did not apply
the Brown-Olds remedy because the agreement was only illegal because the "Re-
spondent council failed to conform with the proviso's requirement of compliance
with the Act's filing provisions at the time the agreement was executed or within the
preceding 12 months." This failure to perform something which is quite clearly
spelled out in the Act, the Board regarded as "a serious failure but technical in
nature," which did not warrant the usual reimbursement remedy of Brown-Olds.
Under all the circumstances of the instant case this Trial Examiner is of the opinion
that the Board's reasoning in the Philadelphia Woodwork Company case, supra,
is most apposite. The mere failure to post-absent any other showing of coercion,
discrimination, or interference-is a technical violation that does not warrant the
Brown-Olds remedy .8
The nature of Respondent's work force is such that an order of reinstatement is
not feasible for Jesse Jamerson. The record does not reflect the number of in-
stances or the amounts of actual loss suffered, accordingly this computation becomes
a matter for compliance. The Respondent shall notify Jesse Jamerson that they
have no objection to his employment with Respondent. Such backpay as may be
determined to be due shall be computed in accordance with the formula stated in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. The hiring arrangement between
Respondent and Local 116 must be discontinued unless and until all of the safeguards
required by the Board in the Mountain Pacific case, supra, are complied with.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
9 See footnote 2, supra
7 J. S. Brown-E F Olds Plumbing and Heating Corporation, 115 NLRB 594.
'See also E & B Brewing Company, Inc, 122 NLRB 354, wherein the Board did not
apply the Brown-Olds reimbursement remedy stating, "Here the General Counsel has not
alleged that there was a substantively unlawful contract or hiring (practice."
666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Hod Carriers and Laborers Local Union 116, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By maintaining an exclusive hiring-hall arrangement with Local Union 116 and
the attendant failure to advise employees or prospective employees of all the terms
of such arrangement by an adequate posting of the terms of such arrangement, the
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. By maintaining an illegal exclusive hiring-hall arrangement the Respondent has
acted discriminatively toward Jesse Jamerson in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and
(3) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Food Haven , Inc.' and Food Store Employees Union Local No.
347, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO, Petitioner . Case No. 9-RC-3733.
February 16, 1960
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Theodore K. High, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed?
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
2. The labor organizations I involved claim to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.'
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section
9(c) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
i The name of the Employer appears as amended at the hearing.
9 At the hearing , the Employer moved to strike certain "voluntary" statements made by
a witness for the Petitioner . The hearing officer referred this motion to the Board We
shall deny this motion since we find that , even if the statements were improper, the
Employer was not prejudiced thereby.
8 United Construction Workers , Division of District 50, United Mine Workers, herein
referred to as Intervenor , was properly permitted to intervene at the hearing on the
basis of an existing contractual interest
4 The Employer refused to stipulate that Petitioner is a labor organization . As Peti-
tioner exists for the purpose of representing employees in dealing with employers regard-
ing wages , hours, and conditions of employment, we find that it is a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act
126 NLRB No. 82.