Hanson Aggregates BMC, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 8, 2007

04-CA-034646 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 8, 2007)

JD-70-07
Penns Park, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
HANSON AGGREGATES BMC, INC.
and Case No. 4-CA-34646
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 542, AFL-CIO
Barbara Joseph, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jonathan R. Nadler, Esq., for the Respondent.
Louis Agre, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
GEORGE ALEMÁN, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia, PA
on June 27, 2007, following the issuance of a complaint by the Regional Director for Region 4
of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) on August 31, 2006,1 against Hanson
Aggregates BMC, Inc., herein the Respondent. The complaint alleges that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by failing and
refusing to bargain collectively with International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 542,
AFL-CIO, (the Union),2 which is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
Respondent’s employees in an appropriate unit.3 Specifically, it alleges that the Respondent

1 All dates herein are in 2006, unless otherwise indicated.
2 The unfair labor practice charge underlying the complaint was filed by the Union on
May 18, 2006. The complaint was amended on October 12, 2006, and again on April 27, 2007.
3 The appropriate bargaining unit includes:
“All full-time and regular part-time Motor Operators, Plant Operators,
Truck Drivers, Laborers, Mechanics, Welders and maintenance
employees employed by the Respondent at its 852 Swamp Road,
Penns Park, Pennsylvania facility; excluding all other employees,
including temporary employees, Laboratory Technicians, office clerical
employees, managers, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.”
While the above unit description, as noted, excludes the category of “temporary” employees,
it does not define the term. This question, however, appears to have been the subject of some
discussion by the parties during contract talks that began following issuance of the certification.
For example, in a August 31, letter Union representative Frank Bankard sent to Respondent’s
Labor Relations Manager, Jeff Carey, regarding the Union’s request for information on
temporary employees, Bankard alludes to Carey’s failure to provide him with “a category for
Temporary worker” as Carey purportedly referenced in a “Final Offer” made by Respondent
sometime in January, when negotiations between the parties were ended by the Respondent.
Further, Bankard testified, credibly and without contradiction, that there was some discussion
about the use of temporary workers by Respondent but that such discussion centered on the
use of contractors, noting that no agreement was reached on the use of temporary employees
Continued
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unlawfully failed and refused from on or about February 6, to provide the Union with certain
requested information, and had unreasonably and unlawfully delayed furnishing the Union with
other requested information. In a timely filed answer dated May 11, 2007, the Respondent
denied engaging in any unlawful conduct.
At trial, all parties were afforded a full and fair opportunity to be heard, to present oral
and written evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally on the
record. On the entire record,4 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent is a Delaware corporation engaged in the business of extracting and
processing crushed stone, and manufacturing bituminous asphalt, at a rock quarry in Penns
Park, PA. During the past year, the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business
operation, sold and shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Respondent] admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Issues
At issue here is whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing
and refusing to provide the Union with certain requested information, and by unreasonably
delaying the production of certain other information requested by the Union.
B. Factual background
The record reflects that on September 9, 2004, the Union was certified by the Board as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s employees in the above-
described bargaining unit which, at the time, numbered around 44-45. (Tr. 30). Sometime in
October, 2004, the parties commenced negotiations for an initial contract, subsequently
agreeing, in a writing dated November 10, 2004, that either party may, during the course of
_________________________
to perform bargaining unit work.
4 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion, on brief, to correct certain typographical and
transcription errors in the transcript is granted and made part of the record as GCX-15. The
approved corrections are set forth in the motion.
Following the close of the hearing, the parties and the undersigned were notified by the
court reporting service that, due to a malfunction in the recording equipment, a limited portion of
the testimony of Union organizer, Bankard, did not record and, consequently, is missing from
the transcript. The parties have entered into a stipulation agreeing that, despite this omission,
“a full and complete record was developed to allow a fair and complete determination of the
issues presented,” and waiving “any right to challenge the unavailability of the omitted testimony
or to challenge the completeness of the record in any briefs or other filings or proceedings in
this matter.” I have approved the stipulation and entered it into evidence as JX-1.
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negotiations, change its position regarding any matter originally proposed or tentatively agreed
to, or to delete or modify any of their proposals. (GCX-4). On November 11, 2004, Bankard
wrote to Carey asking to be provided with preferred bargaining dates, and with information
relating to changes that may have occurred in the bargaining unit since September 30, 2004.5
It is undisputed that the Respondent’s practice, consistent with the Union’s request in its
November 11, 2004, letter, was to provide the Union with the updated information at each
bargaining session, and that, for the most part, the Respondent adhered to this practice and
complied with the Union’s prior information requests through at least January 6, 2006, when the
Respondent declared the negotiations at an impasse ending further negotiations. (Tr. 72)
Sometime in December 2005, the Respondent began hiring temporary employees at its
Penns Park facility. According to Bankard, at some point during negotiations the use of
“temporary” or part-time employees was discussed. He contends that the Respondent, at that
time, represented to the Union that it did not have “temporary or part-time employees” and that it
had no intentions of using any temporary or part-time employees. (Tr. 30;96; 98-99). Bankard’s
testimony in this regard is uncontested and accepted as true.
Bankard testified that that same month, e.g., just a few weeks before Christmas 2005,
he was notified by the Board that a decertification petition had been filed regarding the unit
being represented by the Union.6 The parties apparently held numerous bargaining sessions
between October 2004, and January 6, 2006, when the Company declared the negotiations at
an impasse. Negotiations were eventually resumed on or around August 2.
In late January or early February, Bankard learned in separate conversations from unit
employees Bryan Resch and Thomas Herr, both of whom, as discussed elsewhere below,
served as Union stewards at one time or another, that the Respondent had brought in some
15-18 temporary employees from New York State to work at the site. According to Bankard,
Resch and Herr reported seeing the temporary employees performing bargaining unit work.
Both Resch and Herr expressed concern to Bankard that these “temporary” employees may
have been brought in to assist in the decertification drive. The number of employees in the
bargaining unit at that time had dropped from approximately 44 when the certification was first
issued in September 2004, to around 30.
On February 6, apparently in response to a letter he received from Carey, Bankard wrote
to Carey complaining that the Respondent had failed to respond to the Union’s request that it
return to the bargaining table to discuss and bargain over “unsettled” matters, and to provide it
with dates on which the Respondent might be available for bargaining. The letter further
advised that the Respondent was to inform Bankard “of any changes whatsoever that may
affect the Penns Park Bargaining unit and supply all and any information which these changes
may affect or have concurred (sic) to this unit or Facility no later than 48 hours from their
occurrence(s).”7 Bankard made clear in his letter that the practice of permitting the Respondent

5 The Union sought in its November 11, 2004, letter information pertaining to layoffs,
terminations, discipline, new hires, current status of Quarry safety, OSHA and MSHA violations,
and “any and all changes which may effect the Bargaining Unit.” (GCX-5). Bankard described
this last item as being an “ongoing” request…to be kept abreast of any and all changes”
occurring in the bargaining unit. (Tr. 26).
6 A decertification petition was filed in Case No. 4-RD-2055 on December 9, 2005.
7 According to Bankard’s letter, this was a modification of his initial request that the Union be
informed “of any changes pertaining to the bargaining unit which was previously requested to be
given at each bargaining session.” (See, GCX-6).
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to provide it with updated unit information at each bargaining session was being discontinued,
explaining, at the hearing, that this change as to when the information was to be delivered was
necessitated by the Respondent’s January 6, decision to declare an impasse and end
negotiations. (Tr. 75).
The February 6, letter was, in effect, a reiteration of the November 2004, continuing
request by the Union to be provided with updated bargaining unit information, the only
modification being that the information was now to be provided within 48 hours of its
occurrence. Bankard admits that prior to February 6, the Respondent was complying with the
Union’s information requests and had been providing it during bargaining sessions with “any
and all changes” occurring to the unit, such as new hires and rates of pay. He claims, however,
that after February 6, such information regarding changes to the bargaining unit was not
regularly provided until “months later.” (Tr. 34).
Bankard’s above claim that the Respondent did not provide the Union with updated unit
information until “months after” February 6, e.g., late June, was challenged by Respondent’s
assistant plant manager, Douglas Chilson, who testified to having provided such information to
Union stewards in April, May, and June. Thus, he recalled turning over to then Union steward
Resch,8 either in the first or second week of April, information on two individuals, Louis Callahan
and Donald Filkins, who were hired into the unit on February 20, and March 13, respectively
(see RX-5; RX-8, p. 2), and providing Union steward Michael Kleban sometime in mid-May with
notes of an April 4, safety meeting, with a copy of a written warning issued to employee James
Quarles in late April, and with a copy of the employee list he previously gave to Resch.9 (see
RX-6; RX-7). Chilson further testified that in late June, he turned over to Herr, who by then had
returned to work and resumed his Union steward duties, a packet of information in a large
brown envelope that included an updated list of new-hires and terminations and related
employment information, minutes of April and June safety meetings, records of disciplinary
actions taken, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) documents, and medical benefits
information. (Tr. 158-163; RX-8).
According to Chilson, when he delivered the envelope to Herr, the latter accepted it and
thanked him. The following day, however, Herr returned the envelope with the information still
inside. On the envelope, Herr wrote a note to Chilson explaining that some changes had been
made the night before, that the “material” Chilson had given him was not a “steward”
responsibility, that the stewards’ authority had been rescinded, and that the Company was to
“deal directly with” Bankard. The note further explained that Chilson would be sent a fax
regarding the matter. (see RX-8). As further discussed below, Carey indeed received a letter
from Bankard dated June 29, stating, inter alia, that all Union stewards were being removed
from the facility, and that henceforth all updated information regarding the bargaining unit should
be sent directly to him.
Regarding the temporary employees, the record reflects that on February 28, Bankard
raised with Carey the information he had received from Resch and Herr about temporary
employees performing bargaining unit work. This discussion occurred while Bankard was at the
Respondent’s facility for a pre-arranged safety tour of the facility and to review safety data
sheets he had requested. Bankard recalls asking Carey during this conversation if it was true

8 Chilson turned over the information to Resch instead of Herr, who had been Union
steward, because, at the time, Herr was out of work for several months due to medical reasons.
9 Kleban replaced Resch as Union steward following the latter’s resignation from
employment a few weeks earlier.
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that the Company had “15-18 people coming up here doing bargaining unit work.” Carey, he
recalls, answered that these people were “temporary employees and that Bankard was not
entitled to any information about temporary employees as this had been agreed to during
contract negotiations. Bankard replied that no such agreement had been reached between the
parties to allow temporary employees to perform bargaining unit work, and that the only
discussion he recalled having on this matter involved the use of an independent contractor.
He further recalls telling Carey that the latter had even pointed out during negotiations that the
Respondent had never used temporary or part-time employees at the facility. Carey, Bankard
contends, simply reiterated that these were temporary employees and that the Union was not
entitled to that information. Bankard recalls asking Carey if the temporary employees had been
brought in to help the Respondent with the decertification petition filed a few months earlier.
Carey did not respond. Finally, Bankard claims that when he asked how long these temporary
employees planned on being at the facility, if it would be a week, a month, or if any of them had
already left, Carey simply replied, somewhat curtly, that it was none of his business. (Tr. 35-
36). Other than this attempt by Bankard to get some clarification from Carey regarding the
status, e.g., length of employment duration, of these alleged “temporary” employees, it does not
appear that Bankard requested any specific information on these individuals from Carey during
this conversation.
Carey’s recollection is that, as he was leaving for lunch that day, he encountered
Bankard outside of Respondent’s main office as the latter was leaving the facility. He recalls
Bankard, who had the door of his truck opened and was about to leave, making a comment
about “new employees.” When Carey asked Bankard for clarification, the latter remarked
something to the effect that, “I think you have employees doing bargaining unit work.” Carey
then asked if he was referring to the temporary employees, and Bankard answered, Yeah, I
guess they’re temporaries.” Carey questioned Bankard as to why he needed information
regarding the temporary employees, and Bankard purportedly replied, “Because they’re our
guys.” Carey responded that the temporary employees were excluded from the bargaining unit
under the certification, and that, consequently, he would not give Bankard any information
regarding said individuals. When he again asked Bankard why he needed the information on
the temporary employees, Bankard repeated, “They’re my guys.” This, Carey claims, was the
extent of his conversation with Bankard. (Tr. 108-109; 124).
In his version of this conversation, Carey makes no mention of Bankard asking for any
specific information regarding the “temporary” employees. Rather, Carey’s version only shows
Bankard expressing a general belief that the Respondent had “employees doing bargaining
work or something like that,” Carey asking Bankard why he needed “that information,” and
Bankard purportedly replying, “I need that information” because “they’re my guys.”
I credit Bankard’s more detailed version of this conversation over Carey’s account.
Thus, I am convinced that Bankard did ask Carey to clarify how long these “temporary”
employees would remain at Penns Park and whether any had returned to the New York
location, and also expressed his concern that these employees had been brought in to help
with the decertification petition. I also believe Carey told Bankard that any information regarding
these employees, including how long they intended to stay and whether any had already left,
was none of Bankard’s business. I am, however, also convinced that Bankard may have told
Carey that these “temporary” employees were unit employees, e.g., “our guys,” and that this
comment may have been prompted by information he received from Resch and Herr that the
“temporary” employees were performing bargaining unit work, and because the Respondent
had previously assured him during negotiations that it never used and did not intend to use
“temporary” employees at the Penns Park facility.
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The following day, March 1, Bankard sent Carey a letter thanking him for the tour of the
facility, and asking for certain information. He further notes in his letter that an additional tour of
the facility would be needed because the initial tour, consisting of a drive-through, did not give
him an adequate assessment of the facility. (See, GCX-6). In paragraph 9 of his letter, Bankard
asks Carey to provide him with “a list of employees working at the Penns Park facility which
were added on since 12-1-05 working temporary or not which have been employed or still
employed” at the facility,” and for the following information regarding said employees:
a. Name
b. Address
c. Job description and Classification
d. Rate of Pay of start of job
e. Current status of employment.
f. Any rate of pay increase from time period hire to time of information submitted.
g. If no longer working exit rate of pay.
On March 3, Carey wrote to Bankard to follow up on the latter’s visit to the facility. In his
letter, Carey lists and identifies the various documents and materials that had been reviewed
and/or provided to Bankard during his visit, including items such as accident reports, Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) citations, and disciplinary actions taken. Carey tells
Bankard that he expects the documents provided thus far were sufficient to satisfy all of the
Union’s outstanding information requests, and asks Bankard to provide him with dates Bankard
might be available for a second tour of the facility. Finally, Carey, apparently responding to
Bankard’s request that all updated unit information be provided within 48 hours, advised
Bankard that “with respect to all updates reflecting changes in the bargaining unit being
provided immediately, in the future we will copy any such documentation of changes and
provide them to the union steward, Tom Herr.” Nothing in Carey’s March 3, letter, suggests that
Carey objected to, or had no intentions of complying with, Bankard’s request that updated
bargaining unit information be provided within 48 hours. (RX-2). By the same token, at no time
before June 29, did Bankard protest or object to Carey’s decision to turn over to Union stewards
the updated information he had been providing directly to Bankard during bargaining sessions
while the parties were still negotiating. (Tr. 77-78; 110).10
By letter dated March 8, Carey responded to Bankard’s March 1, letter, agreeing to allow
Carey another opportunity to review the materials requested. Carey also questions Bankard’s
need for another tour of the facility, noting that Bankard, following completion of his prior tour,
purportedly indicated that he was satisfied with the tour and did not need to see anything else.
Carey goes on to state that “all items in [Bankard’s] March 1, letter were thoroughly reviewed
and discussed during [his] visit.” Carey, however, did attach some other information to his letter
that had not been available for Bankard to review during his initial tour, and concluded his letter
by informing Bankard that “this fully satisfies any relevant outstanding information requests.”
(RX-3).
In a March 9, response letter, Bankard explained to Carey why his first tour of the facility
was not satisfactory, and provided him with dates Bankard would be available to complete his

10 Bankard, however, did testify, on rebuttal, that both he and Giacin had repeated ad
nauseam to the Respondent, beginning in late May 2005 and continuing “probably throughout
the summer and probably most of the fall,” that information requested by the Union was to be
given directly to Giacin or himself, not to Union stewards because the latter were “not union
officials” and “don’t know much about the Union.”
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tour of the facility. As to the assertion in Carey’s March 8, letter that all outstanding information
requests had been fully satisfied, Bankard tells Carey that he assumes Carey’s remark was
either made in jest, or the latter had not received Bankard’s March 3, letter, “discussing
outstanding information requests, which also has been addressed previously this year and last.”
Bankard concludes by asking Carey to “provide the entire outstanding requests, within 5 days of
receipt of this letter.” (GCX-14).
On June 29, Bankard wrote to Carey explaining that, in his February 6, letter, he had
asked to be kept informed “of all ongoing matters” involving the Penns Park bargaining unit, but
that, since then, he had “received only minimal information.” (GCX-8). He accused Carey or
other Company representatives of “delaying” providing the information in the hopes of obtaining
a ruling from the Board that any charge filed alleging an unlawful refusal to provide the
information was untimely under Section 10(b) of the Act. (Tr. 39). Bankard further advised in his
June 29, letter that all Union stewards were being removed from the Penns Park facility, and
that “any changes, discipline or any matter” should be sent directly to him “as soon as or before
changes are made to [the] unit.” Bankard made clear that his letter was not intended “to reduce
any previous information request made in the past,” but to direct Carey or any other Company
official to correspond with him directly on this matter.
Carey wrote back to Bankard on July 10, acknowledging that the “authority and
responsibilities of all stewards at Penns Park had been revoked, and that Bankard was to be the
sole contact on union-related matters. (RX-1). Carey’s letter advises that because of the above
change, he was sending Bankard certain information that he had tried to give to Union steward
Herr the week before. Carey further notes that in light of Bankard’s insinuation in his June 29,
letter that he had not received the information Carey had previously given to the Union
stewards, he (Carey) was also forwarding to Bankard an updated employee list.
Bankard acknowledged receiving certain information from Carey along with the letter,
and further admitted receiving “other kinds of information from the stewards.” He testified,
however, that the information regarding unit and temporary employees asked for in paragraph 9
of his March 1, letter, such as name, addresses, etc., had not been received from the Union
stewards. (Tr. 41; 47)
On July 13, Bankard wrote to Carey explaining that certain of the information referenced
in the latter’s July 10, letter, which apparently was sent to him by fax, was illegible or otherwise
difficult to interpret. Notably, Bankard questioned why the information faxed to him was not
given to Herr who was working in February, or to him (Bankard) when he toured the facility in
February. Bankard noted that the information showed that some employees had been hired in
mid-February, and complained that he had, since 2004, emphasized that he was to be kept
informed of any changes occurring in the bargaining unit. He further expressed his belief that
the list of hires and terminations given to him was not complete, explaining that he believed, and
had been told, that “a number of employees have worked throughout this year and performed
bargaining unit work which are not recorded in your list.”
The parties, as noted, resumed bargaining on August 2. On August 23, Carey wrote to
Bankard responding to the latter’s information request made at the August 2, meeting on
temporary employees. In his letter, Carey states that in response to Bankard’s clarification
during that session regarding information on temporary employees employed since the
beginning of 2006, he was providing a list of all temporary employees “that either transferred
from another Hanson location or were hired through a local temporary agency.” The information
provided included (1) the person’s name; (2) where they were acquired; (3) dates or
approximate dates of employment; (4) the wage rate paid while working in the temporary
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capacity; (5) the work performed; (6) their current status. Carey explained in his letter that he
did not provide wage rate information for employees hired through the temporary agency
because the Company pays the agency a rate that includes the employees’ wages and
insurance as well as the agency fee, and that it had been unable to obtain the actual wage rates
from them. (See, GCX-10 and attached exhibit). The data provided Bankard showed two of the
temporary employees who transferred from the New York area, and three temporary employees
hired through the temp agency, were eventually hired as regular full-time employees.
Bankard wrote back to Carey the next day, August 24, complaining that Carey’s letter
“did not answer all of my concerns and was rather incomplete.” In his letter, Bankard explained
that he needed the “address of all the temporary employees and their job classification,” as well
as the rate of pay for each “agency employee” broken down into the following categories: (1)
Amount paid to the Agency; (2) Exact amount the employee received; (3) Any amount that was
paid for health & welfare for the employee; and (4) Any other benefits that the temporary
employees were given. (GCX-11). Bankard testified that he needed the names and addresses
of both unit and temporary employees in order notify them that the Union was still there to
represent them, explaining that it had become difficult to communicate with employees at the
facility since the Respondent walked away from the bargaining table in January. He further
pointed out that in light of the decertification petition, it was important for the Union to remain in
touch with the 30 or so unit employees it represented, and to notify the temporary employees of
its presence. As to the temporary employees, Bankard testified that these individuals were
performing bargaining unit work, and that their addresses were needed in order to find out from
them where they came from, what they were doing exactly, and what rates of pay they were
receiving, because it was his belief that these were Hanson full-time unit employees.11 He
further explained that he had no way of knowing if these temporary employees, whom he
believed to be full-time unit employees, were being subjected to the same benefits and
conditions of employment as other unit employees. (Tr. 67-68). He testified that he had no idea
how long these temporary employees were to remain at the Penns Park facility doing unit work,
and that, when he questioned Carey about it, the latter simply told him it was “none of [his]
business.” (Tr. 70).
Carey responded to Bankard’s August 24, letter with another letter dated August 29.
(GCX-12). In his letter, Carey clarifies that the wage rate data shown for each employee in his
prior letter to Bankard “was in effect the same time each employee worked at Penns Park as a
temporary employee,” and that these employees were not assigned a job classification. As to
Bankard’s request for the addresses of the temporary employee, Carey informed Bankard that
“he had failed to provide any explanation as to why such personal and confidential information
regarding individuals outside the bargaining unit is relevant, particularly in light of the detailed
information” that had already been provided regarding these individuals. (GCX-12).
The complaint, as noted, alleges, and the General Counsel contends, that the
Respondent’s failure and refusal to provide the Union with the addresses of its temporary
employees violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1), as did its 4-month delay in providing the Union with
the other information regarding the temporary employees that Bankard first requested in
February but which the Respondent did not provide until August 24. The Respondent admits
not having provided the Union with the addresses of its temporary employees, and having
provided the Union with the other information requested on temporary employees some six
months after the request was made. It contends, however, that, absent a showing of relevance

11 The attachment to GCX-10 corroborates Bankard’s claim that most, if not all, of the
temporary employees performed bargaining unit work while in the Respondent’s employ.
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by the Union as to why it needed the information on the temporary employees, it was under no
obligation to provide the Union with the requested information because the temporary
employees were not unit employees. I agree with the General Counsel.
C. Discussion and analysis
1. The refusal to furnish addresses of temporary employees
It is well-settled that an employer is statutorily required, on request, to provide
information that is relevant and necessary for its employees' bargaining representative to carry
out its statutory duties and responsibilities. Crittenton Hospital, 343 NLRB 717, 719 (2004),
citing NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). Information sought by the bargaining
representative of employees in a bargaining unit it represents that affects their terms and
conditions of employment is deemed to be presumptively relevant and must be provided upon
request. Generally, no such presumption applies when the information being sought by the
bargaining representative pertains to nonunit employees, e.g., those not represented by the
union. In such cases, the burden rests with the bargaining representative to demonstrate the
potential relevance of the requested information. This latter principle, however, is not without
exception, for the Board has held that “information regarding temporary [nonunit] workers
performing bargaining unit work is presumptively relevant.” (emphasis added). Pavilion At
Forrestal Nursing And Rehabilitation, 346 NLRB No. 46, slip op. at 9 (2006), citing United
Graphics, 281 NLRB 463 (1986); see also, Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 337 NLRB
1239, 1244-1245 (2002); As explained by the Board in United Graphics, supra at 465,
information regarding individuals who are engaged in performing the same tasks as rank-and-
file employees within the bargaining unit “relates directly to the policing of contract terms,” an
essential component of a bargaining representative’s statutory duties and responsibilities.
The evidence In this case makes clear, and the Respondent does not otherwise
contend, that the temporary employees who were brought in from Respondent’s New York
location to the Penns Park facility, or hired via a temporary agency, did perform, and were
performing, bargaining unit work when Bankard made his March 1, request for information
regarding said individuals. Bankard so testified, and his testimony, as noted, is corroborated by
the attachment to GCX-10 provided by Carey to Bankard containing the names and bargaining
unit work performed by these temporary workers. Consistent with the above holdings in
Pavilion and United Graphics, the information requested by the Union regarding the temporary
employees who performed bargaining unit work was presumptively relevant. Consequently, the
Union was entitled to such information without first having to demonstrate its relevancy, unless
the Respondent could demonstrate its lack of relevance or that it had some other adequate
reason for not disclosing it.
The Respondent has raised two defenses to its refusal to provide the Union with the
temporary employees’ addresses. First, as earlier pointed out, it argues that the Union failed to
demonstrate why it needed the addresses of the temporary employees. Second, it asserts that
that said information is confidential and need not be turned over. I find both arguments lacking
in merit.
As to its first claim, the Board, as noted, has made clear that it views information
requested by a union relating to temporary nonunit employees performing bargaining unit work
to be presumptively relevant. When information sought is deemed presumptively relevant, a
union need not provide an explanation for its request, a fact readily conceded by the
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Respondent’s counsel at the hearing (Tr. 60).12 The Respondent’s assertion, therefore, that it
did not provide the information sought by the Union, in particular the addresses of temporary
employees performing bargaining unit work, because the Union provided no explanation as to
why it needed said information, is, under the holdings of Pavilion At Forrestal Nursing and
United Graphics; supra, without merit.
I find, in any event, that the Union has demonstrated the potential relevance of the
“temporary” employees’ addresses, and other information sought pertaining to them, to its
statutory role as bargaining representative of bargaining unit employees. Bankard, as noted,
explained that his request for such information was based on his belief that the individuals
brought in by Respondent from its New York facility, and which Carey described to him as
“temporary,” may actually have been part of the bargaining unit represented by the Union.
Bankard’s belief in this regard was not, as the Respondent claims on brief, based on mere
speculation or conjecture, for Bankard, as noted, had been advised by Resch and Herr that
these individuals were performing bargaining unit work, and moreover, had received assurances
from the Respondent during negotiations that it had never used, nor planned on using,
temporary employees at the Penns Park facility. In these circumstances, and as the question of
what criteria the parties would use to define a “temporary” employee had not yet been resolved
during negotiations, Bankard’s suspicion and belief, that the individuals described to him by
Carey as only “temporary” employees were actually part of the bargaining unit, was, I find,
rationally and reasonably based.
Carey might have been able dispel Bankard’s doubt about the “temporary” nature of
these employees by answering the latter’s basic and non-intrusive query into how long the
Respondent planned on having these employees doing bargaining unit work at the Penns Park
facility, and whether any had already returned to the New York facility. However, rather than
explain to Bankard why these individuals were being classified as “temporary” employees,
Carey chose instead to simply and rather tersely tell Bankard that this was none of his business,
a response which, I find, could only have served to fuel Bankard’s suspicion that these
individuals were not “temporary” employees.
Moreover, Carey’s reluctance to provide Bankard with any clarification regarding the
“temporary” employees, viewed in conjunction with the fact that the Union received no notice of
Respondent’s changed intent to have “temporary” workers do bargaining unit work after
assuring the Union it would not do so, and the timing of the temporary workers arrival not long
after the decertification was filed, could only have served to enhance Bankard’s suspicion, made
known to Carey on February 28, that the Respondent was attempting to affect the outcome of
any decertification election by packing the bargaining unit with the New York transferees.
Clearly, Bankard was under no obligation to accept, without some clarification, Carey’s
description of the New York transferees as “temporary” employees for, as noted, that term had

12 Indeed, at one point during the hearing, Respondent’s counsel proffered that the
Respondent was “not challenging the presumptive relevance of information about non-unit
employees.” (Tr. 62). It is unclear if the Respondent was conceding that information about non-
unit employees was presumptively relevant, or whether its counsel simply misspoke, intending
instead to say he was not challenging the presumptive relevance of information pertaining to
unit employees. While no motion to correct the record in this regard was received from the
Respondent, given its stated position on this issue, I am convinced Respondent’s counsel
simply misspoke and was not conceding that the information requested by the Union regarding
the temporary non-unit employees was presumptively relevant.
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not yet been defined by the parties. If anything, Bankard, for reasons previously discussed, and
in light of Carey’s refusal to clarify, had good reason to doubt the legitimacy of Carey’s claim,
thereby prompting him, on March 1, to request that he be provided with certain information,
including the home addresses, of these alleged “temporary” employees.
The reason why Bankard needed the addresses of the “temporary” employees should
have been apparent to Carey following the latter’s failure and refusal on February 28, to explain
to Bankard how or why these transferees from New York were classified as “temporary”
employees, or to provide any other information that might have shed light on how the
Respondent arrived at that decision. Carey, as noted, was made fully aware on February 28, of
Bankard’s suspicion that these individuals, described to him without explanation as “temporary”
employees, may have been brought in to support the decertification petition. It may very well be
that had an explanation or information been provided to Bankard on February 28, as to how the
decision to classify these individuals as “temporary” employees was made, that may have
sufficed to allay Bankard’s concerns regarding the status of these individuals and rendered
unnecessary the Union’s need for the “temporary” employees’ addresses.
Denied such information, however, the Union was left with no other option but to try to
obtain information as to the true employment status of these alleged “temporary” employees
directly from the employees themselves. Bankard testified, credibly and without contradiction,
that attempts to contact the employees directly at the facility would have been very difficult and
highly impractical, given the location and layout of the facility, which he described as a large
quarry extending deep into the ground where the employees worked, surrounded by a tall fence
and devoid of any sidewalks that could otherwise have allowed for handbilling. Given the
obstacles presented in communicating directly with the employees at the Penns Park facility, the
Union sought to contact them at home, ergo, its demand for the “temporary” employees’ home
addresses.
In sum, I am satisfied that following his February 28, conversation with Bankard, Carey
knew, or had good reason to know, why the Union asked to be provided with, inter alia, the
home addresses of the “temporary” employees. Thus, Carey would readily have discerned,
from Bankard’ stated concern that these “temporary” employees had been brought in to “help
out” the Respondent with the decertification drive, and may in fact be unit employees, and from
his own reluctance to explain how these individuals came to be classified as “temporary,” that
the Union needed the “temporary” employees’ home addresses in order to ascertain for itself
the true employment status of these individuals. The information obtained by contacting and
speaking with these alleged “temporary” employees would help the Union ascertain once and
for all whether these alleged “temporary” employees were or were not within the unit it
represented, rendering it relevant and necessary for the Union to carry out its statutory duties
and responsibilities as the unit employees’ statutory representative. See, Tree of Life, Inc., 332
NLRB 170, 172 (2000).13

13 In Leland Stanford Junior University, 262 NLRB 136 (1982), cited by the Respondent in
support of its refusal to furnish the Union with the home addresses of the “temporary”
employees, the Board, inter alia, found that the employer in that case had not unlawfully refused
to turn over the addresses of temporary nonunit employees because the union requesting the
information had “not met its burden of establishing the relevance of the addresses of these
temporary employees to its collective-bargaining responsibilities.” Id at fn. 1. Unlike the Leland
Stanford case, however, the Union here has, as found above, demonstrated that the addresses
of the “temporary” employees are necessary and relevant to the proper performance of its
duties as collective bargaining representative. Accordingly, I find the above holding in Leland
Continued
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Further, if it turned out, after the Union made its inquiries of the “temporary” employees,
that the latter were not “temporary,” then it is quite possible that, as feared by Bankard and the
other stewards, they may have been brought in to assist in the decertification efforts.
Information obtained by the Union directly from these “temporary” employees would, therefore,
also be relevant to Union in ensuring that the integrity of the bargaining unit it was certified to
represent had not been compromised. Accordingly, as the Union has demonstrated that the
addresses of the “temporary” employees were necessary and relevant to the proper
performance of its role as exclusive bargaining representative of all unit employees, I find that
the Respondent’s refusal to comply with the Union’s March 1, request for said information was
unlawful and a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
As to the Respondent’s confidentiality defense, the Supreme Court has held that, under
certain circumstances, confidentiality claims may justify a failure or refusal to provide otherwise
relevant information to a union. Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). Where a claim
of confidentiality is raised, the Board will balance a union's need for the information against any
“legitimate and substantial” confidentiality interest established by the employer. Under this
balancing test, the party asserting a claim of confidentiality bears the burden of proving that
such interests are in fact present and of such significance as to outweigh the union's need for
the information. In short, to trigger the balancing test, the employer must first timely raise and
prove its confidentiality claim. Stated otherwise, the confidentiality claim must be timely raised
and proven before the balancing test is triggered, and a blanket claim of confidentiality will not
satisfy the respondent's burden of proof. The Earthgrains Company, 349 NLRB No. 34, slip op.
at 16 (2007); Mission Foods, 345 NLRB No. 49, slip op. at 5 (2005). Finally, an employer
possessing the information and refusing to disclose it on confidentiality grounds has a duty to
seek an accommodation through the bargaining process. Thus, when a union is entitled to
information about which an employer has legitimately advanced a confidentiality concern in a
timely manner, the employer must bargain towards an accommodation between the union's
need for the information and the employer's justified confidentiality concern. Exxon Company
USA, 321 NLRB 896, 898 (1996).
The Respondent, who bears the burden of proof as the party raising the confidentiality
claim, has not, I find, sustained that burden. First, other than its broad general assertion that
the addresses of the temporary employees are “confidential in nature,” the Respondent has
offered no explanation or produced any evidence to show why it deems said information to be
confidential. There is, for example, no record evidence to show that the Respondent has a
practice or policy of maintaining such information about “temporary” employees confidential,
or that the latter ever requested, or were given assurances, that their addresses would be kept
confidential and not disclosed to third parties, including the Union As noted, a mere blanket
assertion of confidentiality is insufficient to support such a claim.
Nor was the Respondent’s general claim of confidentiality raised in a timely manner, for
while the Respondent was put on notice, as of March 1, that the Union was seeking, inter alia,
the addresses of the “temporary” employees, the Respondent did not assert its confidentiality
claim until August 29, almost six months later, casting doubt on the seriousness of its claim.
Although, during the February 28, Carey-Bankard conversation, there was no specific request
made by Bankard for the addresses of the temporary employees, according to Carey’s version
of that discussion, the latter’s refusal to provide any information regarding the “temporary”
employees was based on his belief that such information need not be turned over because of
_________________________
Stanford to be neither applicable nor controlling here.
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the certification’s exclusion of “temporary” employees from the bargaining unit. Carey never
asserted that some or all of the information pertaining to the “temporary” employees which the
Union might be interested in was confidential in nature and could not be disclosed.
Finally, there is no evidence to indicate that the Respondent, as required by Board law,
made any effort to reach an accommodation with the Union regarding the latter’s request for the
“temporary” employees’ addresses which might have satisfied the Union’s need for the
information while preserving the purported confidentiality of said information. Exxon Company
USA, supra. Accordingly, I find no merit to the Respondent’s claim that it was justified, on
confidentiality grounds, in refusing to provide the Union with the addresses of its “temporary”
employees who performed bargaining unit work.
2. The delay in complying with the Union’s information request
The record, as noted, reflects that with the exception of the temporary employees’
addresses, the Respondent did eventually provide the Union with all the information requested
in the latter’s March 1, request regarding the temporary employees, albeit some six months after
that request was made. The General Counsel contends, and I agree, that this six month delay
was both unreasonable and unlawful. The Board has held that an “unreasonable delay in
furnishing requested information is as much a violation of the Act as an out-and-out refusal to
supply such information.” Amersig Graphics, Inc., 334 NLRB 880, 885 (2001) (3-month delay in
complying with information request found unreasonable and unlawful); also, see, Regency
Service Carts, Inc., 345 NLRB No. 44 (2005) (1½ month delay found unlawful). In determining
whether an employer has unlawfully delayed responding to an information request, the Board
considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident. The Earthgrains Company,
supra, slip op. at 22, citing West Penn Power Co., 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003), enf. in pertinent
part 349 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2005). Recognizing that the duty to furnish requested information
cannot be defined in terms of a per se rule, the Board nevertheless requires that a reasonable
good faith effort to respond to the request be made as promptly as circumstances allow. Thus,
when evaluating the promptness of the response, the Board will consider the complexity and
extent of the information sought, its availability, and the difficulty in retrieving the information. Id.
As previously discussed and found, the information which the Respondent eventually
provided to the Union in response to its March 1, information request was necessary and
relevant to the Union. Other than its rejected claim that the information was not relevant, the
Respondent has not satisfactorily explained why it waited some six months before complying,
sans the temporary employees’ addresses, with the Union’s request. It does not, for example,
claim that the data requested by the Union regarding temporary employees was too complex or
not readily available for production in a reasonably prompt manner following the Union’s March
1, request. Nor has it cited difficulties in obtaining, gathering, or retrieving the information on the
temporary employees as a reason for the almost six months delay in complying with that
request. In light of these facts, I find that the Respondent’s six-month delay in providing the
Union with the information regarding the temporary employees who performed bargaining unit
work was unreasonable and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
I further find that while the Respondent, contrary to Bankard’s assertion, did provide the
Union with updated bargaining unit information between February 6, when Bankard asked that
such information be provided within 48 hours, and June 29, when Bankard rescinded the
steward’s authority to receive such information, it did so in an untimely manner.14 There is no

14 Thus, I credit Chilson’s account that he turned over updated unit information to steward
Continued
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doubting that the Respondent understood Bankard’s demand that updated unit information be
provided in an expedited manner, e.g., within 48 hours, for in his March 3, letter to Bankard,
Carey readily acknowledged Bankard’s request that such information be “provided immediately.”
Nothing in his March 3, letter suggests that Carey objected to, or that the Respondent would
have had difficulty complying with, the Union’s 48-hour time frame for the receipt of updated unit
information. Indeed, Carey’s acknowledgment of the Union’s need to be “provided immediately”
with updated unit information, and his agreement to provide “any such documentation of
changes” to the union steward, suggests, implicitly, that the Respondent had no problem, and
intended to comply, with the 48-hour time frame.
Chilson’s testimony, however, along with the documentary evidence submitted in
support thereof, makes patently clear that the Respondent did not so comply. Thus, the
information on the hiring of unit employees Callahan and Filkins on February 20 and March 13,
respectively, was, by Chilson’s own admission, not turned over until either the first or second
week in April, almost two months later regarding the Callahan data, and about one month later
regarding the information on Filkins. The information provided by Chilson to Kleban in mid-May,
consisting of a written warning issued to unit employee Quarles in late April, was likewise not
provided within 48 hours of its issuance even though, on its face, it appears to have been
prepared and issued by April 28. The information regarding an April 7, safety meeting also
given to Kleban in mid-May, more than a month later, likewise was not provided within the
48-hour time frame even though said information, on its face, appears to have been readily
available for production if not immediately, certainly within 48 hours of the meeting or promptly
thereafter. Finally, much of the updated unit information given to Herr on June 28, contained
changes to the unit, e.g., new hires and terminations, and other data involving matters that
occurred weeks and months prior to June 28.
The Respondent does not cite any factors or reasons why Chilson could not have
provided the information he gave the union stewards in April, May, or June in a more timely and
expeditious manner, even if not within the 48 hours from the occurrence of the event requested
by Bankard. The only explanation proffered by the Respondent in defense of its action is that
the pace at which such information was delivered by Chilson to the stewards was consistent
with the practice established by the parties during their 15 months of negotiations of providing
the Union with such information at the start of each bargaining session. (RB:34). In other
words, the Respondent suggests that the amount of time the Union waited before receiving the
updated unit information from Chilson in April, May, and June was in line with the amount of
time the Union waited during negotiations before receiving the updates at each bargaining
session. In essence, the Respondent’s position, as set forth in its brief, is that because the
_________________________
Resch during the first or second week in April regarding new hires Callahan and Filkins; turned
over other related unit information to steward Kleban in mid-May; and on or around June 28,
gave steward Herr a packet of unit-related information. I reject as without merit, and as wholly
contrived, Bankard’s claim that he and Giacin had, since May 2005, repeatedly instructed the
Respondent that all such unit information was to be given directly to him and not to the
stewards. Undermining Bankard’s claim in this regard is his own June 29, letter to Carey
advising that the stewards were no longer authorized to receive such information and that he
should henceforth forward all such information to Bankard directly, as well as Herr’s note to
Carey, written on the envelope the latter had given to Herr on June 28, containing updated unit
information, stating that the authority of the stewards to receive said information had been
rescinded. Giacin, who might have been able to corroborate Bankard’s testimony in this regard,
was not called to testify. Nor was any claim made that he was unavailable to do so.
Accordingly, Bankard’s testimony in this regard is found not to be credible.
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Union never complained about the pace at which it was receiving the bargaining unit updates
while negotiations were ongoing, it should not be complaining that the information received from
Chilson was untimely since the latter simply adhered to the pre-impasse pace of providing the
unit updates.
First, the purported lack of complaints by the Union as to the pace at which it was
receiving updated unit information from the Respondent during negotiations is easily explainable
and readily understandable. Thus, it would appear from his February 6, letter that Bankard
agreed to this particular arrangement. While not explained in the record, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that the Union found this arrangement acceptable because it knew it
could expect to regularly receive any updated bargaining unit information by a date certain, e.g.,
the next scheduled bargaining session. However, with the Respondent’s January 6, unilateral
decision to end negotiations, it became clear to the Union that the practice of allowing the
Respondent to provide it with updated bargaining unit information at each bargaining session
was no longer tenable, as it was unclear when, or if, the negotiations would ever resume. It was
this factor, I am convinced, which prompted Bankard to notify Carey that this particular practice
was being ended and that Carey should, henceforth, furnish the updated unit information to the
Union within 48 hours of an occurrence affecting the bargaining unit. At no time, as noted, did
Carey object to the 48-hour timeframe demanded by the Union for the Respondent to provide it
with updated information regarding the bargaining unit, nor did he complain that compliance with
the 48 hour time period would be difficult or cause the Respondent any hardship.
In sum, the Respondent here does not claim, or much less shown, that extenuating
circumstances prevented Chilson from turning over to the Union within 48 hours or, at least,
within a short time thereafter, the updated unit information he provided to the stewards in April,
May, and June. That information, as previously discussed, was provided weeks, and in some
cases, months, after it was readily available for production. In these circumstances, I find that
this unexplained delay was unreasonable as well as unlawful, and violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act, as alleged.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent, Hanson Aggregates BMC, Inc., is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 542, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and is the duly certified
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s employees in the following
appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time Motor Operators, Plant Operators, Truck
Drivers, Laborers, Mechanics, Welders and maintenance employees
employed by Respondent at its 852 Swamp Road, Penns Park,
Pennsylvania facility, excluding all other employees, including temporary
employees, Laboratory Technicians, office clerical employees, managers,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
3. By refusing to provide the Union with the addresses of temporary employees
performing bargaining unit work as requested by the Union in its March 1, 2006, letter, and by
unreasonably delaying for six months providing the Union with other information requested by
the Union in the March 1, letter pertaining to said temporary employees, and unreasonably
delaying giving the Union updated information regarding the bargaining unit, the Respondent
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has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1), and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall, as requested by the Union in its March 1, 2006, letter, provide the
Union with the addresses of the temporary employees who performed bargaining unit work
since December 1, 2005. It will also be required to post the attached notice marked “Appendix.”
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended15
ORDER
The Respondent, Hanson Aggregates BMC, Inc., Penns Park, Pennsylvania, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to provide International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 542, AFL-CIO
with information on the temporary employees doing bargaining unit work which is relevant and
necessary to its role as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit employees.
(b) Delaying in providing the Union with information requested regarding temporary
employees doing bargaining unit work, and in providing the Union with updated information
regarding the bargaining unit.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Comply, if it has not already done so, with the Union’s March 1, 2006, request for
information, including the home addresses, of the “temporary” employees who performed
bargaining unit work at the Respondent’s Penns Park, Pennsylvania facility.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Penns Park,
Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice, on

15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since March 1, 2006.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., November 8, 2007.
____________________
George Alemán
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide the Union, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 542, AFL-CIO,
with the home addresses of “temporary” employees” who perform bargaining unit work, which information is
necessary and relevant for the Union to perform its statutory role as exclusive bargaining representative of our
employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time Motor Operators, Plant Operators, Truck Drivers, Laborers,
Mechanics, Welders and maintenance employees employed by Respondent at its 852
Swamp Road, Penns Park, Pennsylvania facility, excluding all other employees, including
temporary employees, Laboratory Technicians, office clerical employees, managers, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT unduly delay furnishing the Union with relevant and necessary information it has requested.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL provide the Union with the home addresses of all temporary employees performing bargaining unit work as
requested in its March 1, 2006 request.
HANSON AGGREGATES BMC, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts
secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, One Independence Mall, 7th Floor
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-4404
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
215-597-7601.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 215-597-7643.
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