Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 9, 2020

15631151 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/631,151 06/23/2017 Richard A. Himmelmann 98171US01;
67036-878PUS1
1852
26096 7590 10/09/2020
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
400 WEST MAPLE ROAD
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
GUGGER, SEAN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2832
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RICHARD A. HIMMELMANN

____________

Appeal 2019-006100
Application 15/631,151
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, JULIA HEANEY and
JANE E. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges.

INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 requests review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–7 and 9–23.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies United Technologies Corp. as the real
party in interest. Appeal Brief filed May 17, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”) at 1.
2 Final Office Action entered November 15, 2018 (“Final Act.”) at 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant claims a propulsion system for an unmanned underwater
vehicle (independent claim 1), a method for propelling an unmanned
underwater vehicle (independent claim 13), and an unmanned underwater
vehicle (independent claim 19). Appeal Br. 2–3. Claim 1 illustrates the
subject matter on appeal and reads as follows:
1. A propulsion system for an unmanned underwater
vehicle comprising:
a turbine engine including a combustor, a turbine, and a
mechanical output shaft;
an electrical generator including a rotational input
connected to the mechanical output shaft, and a poly phase
electrical output;
a direct current (DC) bus connected to the poly phase
electrical output via a rectifier/inverter;
a DC to alternating current (AC) motor drive including a
DC input and a poly phase motor drive output;
a motor connected to the poly phase motor drive output;
and
a controller controllably coupled to the electrical
generator, the rectifier/inverter, and the DC to AC motor drive,
wherein the controller is configured to cause the
propulsion system to operate in a range mode by providing
direct current (DC) power to the DC bus from an electrical
energy storage system, providing DC power from the DC bus to
the DC to alternating current (AC) motor drive, and driving the
motor in the range mode and
configured to cause the propulsion system to enter a
sprint mode of operations by initiating operations of the turbine
engine providing a rotational output to the electrical generator,
thereby providing poly phase AC power to the rectifier/inverter
from the electrical generator, converting AC power to DC
power using the rectifier/inverter, providing DC power to the
DC to AC motor drive, and driving the motor.

Appeal Br. 7 (Claims Appendix) (emphasis and indentation added).
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REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections in the Examiner’s
Answer entered June 14, 2019 (“Ans.”):
I. Claims 1–18 and 21–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite
for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter
that the inventor regards as the invention;
II. Claims 1–7, 10–14, 16–18, and 21–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Barrett3 in view of Herbek;4
III. Claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Barrett in
view of Herbek and Raju;5
IV. Claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Barrett in
view of Herbek and Levedahl;6 and
V. Claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Benavidas7 in view of Herbek.
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Upon consideration of the evidence relied upon in this appeal and
each of Appellant’s contentions, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of
claims 1–7, 9–18, and 21–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Rejections II, III, and
IV), for the reasons set forth in the Final Action, the Answer, and below.
We summarily affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–18 and 21–23
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (Rejection I), and rejection of claims 19 and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Rejection V), because Appellant does not contest

3 Barrett et al., US 2009/0156068 A1, published June 18, 2009.
4 Herbek et al., US 2012/0015567 A1, published January 19, 2012.
5 Raju, US 2008/0143182 A1, published June 19, 2008.
6 Levedahl, US 5,684,690, issued November 4, 1997.
7 Benavides et al., US 9,764,727 B1, issued September 19, 2017.
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these rejections.
We review appealed rejections for reversible error based on the
arguments and evidence the Appellant provides for each issue the Appellant
identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072,
1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the Examiner had
failed to make a prima facie case, “it has long been the Board’s practice to
require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s
rejections”)).
Rejection II
We first address the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7, 10–14, 16–
18, and 21–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Barrett in view of
Herbek.
Appellant presents arguments directed to independent claims 1 and
13, which Appellant argues together, and to claim 6, which depends from
claim 1. Appeal Br. 4–6. We, therefore, select claim 1 as representative of
claims 1–7, 10–14, 16–18, and 21–23, which stand or fall with claim 1, and
address claim 6 separately. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claims 1–5, 7, 10–14, 16–18, and 21–23
Barrett discloses a hybrid propulsion system for a marine vessel
comprising main propulsion engines 10, 10’, auxiliary generators 34, 34’
(electrical generators), motor-generator units 14, 14’ (motors), batteries 24,
24’ (electrical energy storage system), DC bus 20, and energy management
system (controller). Barrett ¶¶ 2, 31, 35, 36, 37, 44; Fig. 1. Barrett discloses
that main propulsion engines 10, 10’ have output shafts (mechanical output
shafts) connected to inputs (rotational inputs) for auxiliary generators 34, 34’
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(electrical generators), and the output shafts includes clutches 15, 15’ that
permit main engines 10, 10’ to be connected or disconnected. Barrett ¶¶ 31,
33, 34, 35, 36; Fig. 1. Barrett discloses that motor-generator units 14, 14’
(motors) have output shafts that include clutches 16, 16’, and Barrett
explains that when clutches 16, 16’ are engaged, motor-generator units 14,
14’ (motors) operate as motors, and when clutches 16, 16’ are not engaged,
motor-generator units 14, 14’ (motors) operate as generators that supply
energy to the system. Barrett ¶ 34; Fig. 1.
Barrett discloses that AC buses 30, 30’ (poly phase electrical output)
link auxiliary generators 34, 34’ (electrical generators) to direct current (DC)
bus 20 through DC/AC converters 32, 32’ (rectifier/inverters). Barrett ¶ 37;
Fig. 1. Barrett discloses that drivers 22, 22’ (motor drives including inputs
and outputs) connect motor-generator units 14, 14’ (motors) to direct current
(DC) bus 20. Barrett ¶ 35; Fig. 1.
Barrett discloses that the energy management system (controller)
“controls many aspects of operation of the propulsion system . . . to operate
the various propulsion sources, and distribute energy throughout the
system.” Barrett ¶ 63. Barrett discloses that the energy management system
(controller) responds to varying load demands by changing operation states
and outputs of main engines 10, 10’, motor-generator units 14, 14’, auxiliary
generators 34, 34’, and batteries 24, 24’. Id. Barrett describes a “low
propulsive power mode of operation” in which “[m]ain propulsive engines
110 and 110’ are not activated,” “energy is shuttled from battery bank 124
[electrical energy storage system] to bus 120,” and motor-generators 114,
114’ (motors) “in a drive motor mode.” Barrett ¶ 49; Fig 2B. Barrett
describes “full power operating mode” in which “both main engines 110,
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110’ provide full power output,” auxiliary generators 134, 134’ (electrical
generators) operate “to provide energy to main energy distribution bus 120”,
and motor-generator units 114, 114’ (motors) operate and draw energy from
bus 120 to provide propulsive power. Barrett ¶¶ 61–62; Fig. 5B.
Barrett does not explicitly disclose that main propulsion engines 10,
10’ are turbine engines, but Barrett discloses that main propulsion engines
10, 10’ may be diesel engines “or other types of prime mover engines.”
Barrett ¶¶ 7, 31. Barrett further discloses that gas turbine engines are used
conventionally as power sources for propulsion systems. Barrett ¶ 4.
The Examiner finds that Barrett does not disclose that marine vessels
in which Barrett’s hybrid propulsion system may be used include unmanned
underwater vehicles. Final Act. 5. The Examiner relies on Herbek’s
disclosure of a propulsion system for an unmanned underwater vehicle for
suggesting use of Barrett’s hybrid propulsion system in an unmanned
underwater vehicle. Final Act. 5–6 (citing Herbek ¶ 3).
Appellant argues that “at no point does Barrett describe entering the
full power mode illustrated in Figure 5B by initiating a turbine, nor is there
any disclosure within Barrett that would have rendered this operation
obvious.” Appeal Br. 4–5. Appellant argues that Herbek also “would not
have rendered this feature obvious.” Appeal Br. 5.
We point out initially that the Examiner does not rely on Herbek for
any disclosure that teaches or would have suggested entering a full power
mode by initiating a turbine. Final Act. 5–6. Appellant’s argument directed
to the asserted lack of disclosure of this feature in Herbek, therefore, does
not identify reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection, because it does not
address the basis for the Examiner’s reliance on Herbek.
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As discussed above, Barrett discloses that the main propulsion engines
in Barrett’s hybrid propulsion system may be diesel engines “or other types
of prime mover engines,” and Barrett discloses that gas turbine engines are
conventional power sources used for propulsion systems. Barrett ¶¶ 4, 7, 31.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from these
disclosures that gas turbine engines could be used as the main propulsion
engines in Barrett’s system. In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(when analyzing obviousness, a prior art reference must be considered “not
only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.”)
As also discussed above, Barrett discloses that in the “low propulsive
power mode of operation” of Barrett’s system, battery bank 124 provides
energy to bus 120 to power motor-generators 114, 114’ (motors). Barrett
¶ 49; Fig 2B. As the Examiner finds in the Answer, Barrett discloses that
“[m]ain propulsive engines 110 and 110’ are not activated in this operating
mode and are thus shown in a light typeface [in Figure 2B], with main
engine clutches 115, 115’ disengaged.” Ans. 4 (citing Barrett ¶ 29; Fig. 2B).
Barrett also discloses a full power mode of operation (discussed above) in
which turbine engines 110, 110’ are connected to Barrett’s system via
clutches 115, 115’. Barrett ¶ 61; Fig. 5B. The Examiner finds that Barrett
discloses that “[i]n the full power operating mode illustrated in FIG. 5B,
both main engines 110, 110’ provide full power output, through appropriate
clutch mechanisms.” Ans. 4 (citing Barrett ¶ 61; Fig. 5B).
In view of these disclosures in Barrett—particularly Barrett’s
statement in paragraph 49 that the main propulsive engines are not
“activated” in the low power mode, and statement in paragraph 61 that the
main propulsive engines are “connected” in the full power mode—the
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Examiner determines that a distinction does not exist between “activating”
main propulsive engines as disclosed in Barrett, and “initiating operations
of” a turbine engine, as recited in claim 1. Ans. 4.
Appellant argues in the Reply Brief that paragraph 38 of Appellant’s
Specification “defines initiation of the turbine as beginning turbine
operations and not merely engaging an already operating turbine via a
clutch.” Reply Br. 2. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s finding that
Barrett discloses entering a full power mode by “activating” main propulsive
engines relies on an “overly broad equivocation of initiating and engaging.”
Id.
Appellant’s Specification, however, explicitly indicates that paragraph
38 describes an exemplary process for initiating operations of a turbine.
Spec. ¶¶ 37, 38. Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the process described in
this paragraph, therefore, does not constitute a definition of “initiating
operations of a turbine” that limits the scope of this phrase as it is used in
claim 1. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.”);
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(claims must be interpreted “‘in view of the specification’” without
importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily
(citation omitted)). Appellant does not direct us to any actual definition or
limiting description of “initiating operations of a turbine” in the
Specification, and we find no such disclosure. We, accordingly, interpret
“initiating operations of a turbine” according to its plain and ordinary
meaning. In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (During prosecution of patent applications, “the PTO must give
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claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification. . . . Therefore, we look to the specification to see if it provides
a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad interpretation.”); In
re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (the words of a claim must be
given their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent with the
specification.).
“Initiate” is defined as “to cause or facilitate the beginning of; set
going.” Merriam-Webster.com (accessed September 27, 2020),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/initiate. Accordingly, under a
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with Appellant’s Specification,
“initiating operations of a turbine” as recited in claim 1 refers to any process
that causes or facilitates the beginning of, or sets going, operations of a
turbine.
As discussed above, one of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood that gas turbine engines could be used as the main propulsion
engines in Barrett’s hybrid propulsion system. Engaging clutches 115, 115’
to activate main propulsive engines 110, 110’ (gas turbine engines) as
disclosed in Barrett is a process that causes or facilitates the beginning of, or
sets going, operation of main propulsive engines 110, 110’ (gas turbine
engines), corresponding to “initiating operations of a turbine” as recited in
claim 1.
Appellant’s arguments to the contrary, therefore, do not identify
reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–5, 7, 10–14, 16–18,
and 21–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, which we accordingly sustain.
Claim 6
Claim 6 depends from claim 2, which depends from claim 1. Claim 2
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recites that the electrical energy storage system (battery) is connected to the
DC bus and configured to provide electrical power to the DC bus. Claim 6
recites that a magnitude of power provided by the electrical energy storage
system (battery) to the DC bus is at least one order of magnitude less than a
magnitude of power provided to the DC bus from the electrical generator.
The Examiner finds that Barrett discloses that in the full power
operating mode of Barrett’s hybrid propulsion system, the magnitude of
power provided by battery bank 24 (electrical energy storage system) to DC
bus 20 is less than the magnitude of power provided by auxiliary generators
34, 34’ (electrical generators) to DC bus 20. Final Act. 6. The Examiner
finds that Barrett, however, does not explicitly disclose providing a
magnitude of power by battery bank 24 (electrical energy storage) to DC bus
20 that is at least one order of magnitude less than the magnitude of power
provided by auxiliary generators 34, 34’ (electrical generators) to DC bus
20. Id. The Examiner explains that “it has been held that discovering an
optimum value of a result effective variable involves only routine skill in the
art. Final Act. 6 (citing In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618 (Fed. Cir. 1977)). The
Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art to find the optimum magnitude of power provided by each of
Barrett’s battery bank 24 (electrical energy storage system) and auxiliary
generators 34, 34’ (electrical generators) to DC bus 20 “to adequately design
the system, based on [power] requirements.” Final Act. 6–7.
Appellant argues that the Examiner does not provide “any evidence
establishing that the ratio between the magnitude of power provided by the
electrical energy storage system and the electrical generator is a result
effective variable.” Appeal Br. 5. Appellant argues that “the examiner’s
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assertion that the claimed ratio is a result-effective variable is not sufficient
to establish that the ratio is a result effective variable.” Appeal Br. 5–6.
Barrett discloses, however, that during the full power operating mode
of Barrett’s hybrid propulsion system, auxiliary generators 134, 134’
(electrical generators) operate “to provide energy to main energy distribution
bus 120,” and excess energy available on DC bus 20 is returned to battery
bank 124, which “operates in a charging mode.” Barrett ¶ 61; Fig. 5B.
Barrett’s Figure 5B depicts this operating mode, and uses arrows to show
energy flowing from auxiliary generators 134, 134’ (electrical generators) to
DC bus 120, and from DC bus 120 to battery bank 124. Notably, when
describing this operating mode, Barrett does not indicate that any energy
flows from battery bank 124 to DC bus 120, and Figure 5B does not include
arrows that would indicate any such energy flow. Barrett ¶ 61; Fig. 5B.
Rather, as discussed above, Barrett explicitly discloses that during this
operating mode energy flows from DC bus 120 to battery bank 124. Id.
Barrett thus discloses that during the full power mode of operating
Barrett’s system, energy flows from auxiliary generators 134, 134’
(electrical generators) to DC bus 120, and energy does not flow from battery
bank 124 to DC bus 120, but, rather, flows from DC bus 120 to battery bank
124. Based on this disclosure, one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably
would have understood that the amount of power provided by battery bank
124 to DC bus 120 during this operating mode is at least one order of
magnitude less than the amount of power provided by auxiliary generators
134, 134’ (electrical generators) to DC bus 120, due to the fact that no
energy flows from battery bank 124 to DC bus 120. KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) ([A]n obviousness analysis “need not
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seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for [an examiner] can take account of the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”); see
also In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take
into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the
inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
therefrom.”).
Barrett’s disclosures thus support the position the Examiner takes in
rejecting claim 6. We, accordingly, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Rejections III and IV
To address the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Barrett in view of Herbek and Raju (Rejection III), and
rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Barrett in
view of Herbek and Levedahl, Appellant relies on the arguments Appellant
presents for Rejection II (discussed above), and argues that the additional
references applied in these rejections fail to cure the deficiencies of Barrett
and Herbek. Appeal Br. 6. Because Appellant’s arguments do not identify
reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 for the reasons
discussed above, Appellant’s arguments also do not identify reversible error
in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 15, which we accordingly
sustain.
Rejections I and V
We summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–18 and
21–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (Rejection I), and rejection of claims 19 and
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20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Rejection V), without further comment because
Appellant does not contest these rejections. Appeal Br. 3–4; 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) §
1205.02 (9th ed. Jan. 2018) (“If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner
is not addressed in the appellant’s brief, appellant has waived any challenge
to that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain it, unless
the examiner subsequently withdrew the rejection in the examiner’s
answer.”).

CONCLUSION

Claims

35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–18, 21–
23
112(b)  Indefiniteness 1–18, 21–
23

1–7, 10–
14, 16–18,
21–23
103 Barrett, Herbek 1–7, 10–
14, 16–18,
21–23

9 103  Barrett, Herbek,
Raju
9
15 103  Barrett, Herbek,
Levedahl
15
19, 20 103  Benavidas, Herbek 19, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–7, 9–23

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED