Halliburton Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 31, 1977

227 N.L.R.B. 1908 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

1908 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Halliburton Services , a Division of Halliburton Com-
pany and International Union , United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW). Case 16-CA-5837
January 31, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On February 27, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Martin S. Bennett issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the
Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and Respondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARTIN S. BENNETT, Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard at Duncan, Oklahoma, on July 15, 16, 17,
and 18 and on August 19, 20, 21, and 22, 1975. The
complaint, issued May 22, 1975, and based upon a charge
filed on November 8,1974, by International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of America, (UAW), herein the Union, alleges that
Respondent, Halliburton Services, a Division of Hallibur-
ton Company, has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act. Able
briefs have been received.'
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
I Originally consolidated with this matter were objections to an election
in Halliburton Services, a Division of Halltburton Company, Case 16-RD-640,
which the Union lost 355 to 808 This matter was severed poor to the start of
the hearing
2 The bargaining unit involved in the discussion below would appear to
include approximately 1,600 eligible employees
227 NLRB No. 279
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Halliburton Services, a Division of Halliburton Compa-
ny, is a Delaware corporation which maintains its principal
office at Duncan, Oklahoma, where it is engaged in the
production and sale of oil well service equipment. It has
10,000 employees located in Duncan and other locations in
the United States .2 The parent company, Halliburton
Company, has over 70,000 employees in the contiguous 48
States , as well as in other countries, and its headquarters are
at Dallas, Texas. Respondent manufactures and directly
ships products valued in excess of $50,000 per annum to
customers located outside the State of Oklahoma. I find
that the operations of Respondent affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union , United Automobile , Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America , (UAW), is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction,• The Issues
On August 31 the Union narrowly won an election and
was thereafter duly certified on or about September 10,
1973, as the representative of all production and mainte-
nance employees of Respondent's manufacturing center
and Plant No. 2 at Duncan, Oklahoma, including truckdriv-
ers, lab and electrical technicians and plant clerical
employees, excluding office clerical and professional em-
ployees, engineers , guards, watchmen and supervisors. The
appropriateness of this unit under Section 9(b) of the Act is
not in dispute, and the Union's majority status at the times
material herein within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act is obviously conceded.
The parties held approximately 33 bargaining sessions
thereafter, commencing on November 14, 1973, although a
preliminary meeting was held on October 30. On November
1, two union representatives were taken on a tour of the
plants as requested by them.3
The principal issue in this case is whether a strike, which
commenced on May 6 and terminated on September 22,
1974, became an unfair labor practice strike. The General
Counsel perforce concedes that the strike was economic at
its inception, this due to the fact that the charge, as noted,
was not filed until November 8, 1974. The General Counsel
specifically attacks Respondent's conduct and positions
taken at meetings held on May 13 and July 18, 1974;
Respondent's unilateral change on or about August 1, 1974,
during the strike, of existing plant practices as to lunch and
3 This followed a request by the Union on September 17, 1973, for
information which Respondent duly supplied. It should also be noted, as
appears below, that on December 14 the parties agreed to form a subcommit-
tee to meet on certain issues, and this was done It consisted primarily of
Phillip Leonard, a company staff attorney, and one, Tucker, a union
committeeman
HALLIBURTON SERVICES 1909
break periods ; and certain conduct allegedly infringing
upon the rights of returning strikers on September 23.
B. Prestrike Negotiations
Over Respondent 's objection that events before the strike
were irrelevant , and with some reservations , I received as
background evidence testimony concerning the prestrike
negotiations on the theory advanced by the General
Counsel that they shed light on Respondent's position at
two key meetings on May 13 and July 18 , which took place
beyond the May 8 cutoff date under Section 10(b) of the
Act.
The earliest item related to an automobile trip to
Oklahoma City, where Staff Attorney Leonard brought
employee Rafael Quatrell for a working man's compensa-
tion hearing as a result of a back injury to Quatrell. This
took place in mid-August 1973, and, as is apparent, this was
prior to the election . According to Quatrelll, Leonard asked
if he thought the Union would win the election and what
were the "gripes" of the employees . Quatrell then predicted
that it would make no difference how the election turned
out because President Ed Paramore of Respondent would
never sign a contract, would shut down the plant, would
farm out the work , and would move out whatever equip-
ment was necessary.
Leonard then allegedly told a story of a small unidenti-
fied plant with 12 or 13 unionized employees purchased by
Respondent . After a year, the plant was rearranged with the
result that there was no longer a union contract and no
unionized employees. I fail to see how this assists the
General Counsel herein. The other background evidence
pertains to the prestrike negotiations commencing in
November 1973 up to the strike date of May 6, 1974; as
noted, May 8 was the cutoff date under the statute of
limitations prescribed in Section 10(b) of the Act.
On November 14, 1973, there was a bargaining session at
Duncan . Conducting this were Jerry Bale, from Detroit, as
the chief negotiator for the Union and Respondent's
counsel , Edward Soule , from Oklahoma City , some 80
miles distant . It may be noted that Soule attended every
bargaining session and Bale did not. Bale presented various
topics for inclusion in a contract and stated that further
proposals would be presented at the next meeting on
November 21.
On November 21 Soule met with International Represen-
tative Bob Kirby in behalf of the Union. It appears that
Bale was ill and was unable to fly in . They did discuss dues
checkoff and Soule stated, according to Committeeman
Geary Burton , that Respondent did not wish to be a dues
collection agency for the Union. They then agreed to meet
again on December 7 and 14 , this decision based upon the
availability of Soule , an attorney with other clients.
On December 7 the parties met again with Bale present.
Respondent presented a draft of the introductory articles,
the recognition article, and a grievance and arbitration
procedure . The Union, in turn, presented a proposal for a
cost-of-hying clause . The parties did discuss other issues,
including union representation and stewards, and they
agreed to some changes in the grievance and arbitration
procedure.
Prior to the next scheduled meeting on December 14, the
Union, on December 12, distributed to its members a
handbill announcing that the parties had enjoyed "real
collective bargaining" and that "real progress was made."
The parties next met , as scheduled , on December 14,
1973. Various issues such as grievance and arbitration and
assignment of stewards were discussed. There was some
agreement on the grievance and arbitration procedure, and
the parties did then agree to set up a subcommittee to
discuss certain topics . The principal committee did agree to
meet again on January 11 and 15. In the interim , subcom-
mittee meetings were held on December 18 and 21, 1973,
and on January 3 and 7, 1974, by the parties, with Leoanrd
and Tucker representing them respectively.
On January I1 the parties duly met in Duncan. The
Union presented a proposal concerning holiday dates. On
Janury 15, Soule and Bale met again in Duncan. Respon-
dent provided information requested by the Union con-
cerning the age and sex of the employees in the bargaining
unit . Among other matters , they did discuss union security
which Soule opposed. They agreed that there would be 12
union stewards in the shop and that they would meet again
on January 21 and on February 7, 11, 21, and 25.
On January 21 the parties met again with Kirby repre-
senting the Union . Respondent presented a proposal on
seniority and leaves of absence, and these were discussed.
On February 7 Soule and Bale met . Respondent offered the
Union a 7-percent wage increase , stating that it had been
authorized for employees outside the bargaining unit and
this was accepted. On February 11 Soule again met with
Kirby . They reviewed the areas in stewards would operate.
Respondent presented proposals on work assignments and
the waiver of the right to reopen negotiations. They
discussed various features of a contract, including overtime,
nondiscrimination , leaves of absence, grievance and arbi-
tration procedure, holidays , strikes , and walkouts.
Soule and Kirby next met in Duncan on February 21, as
agreed. They reviewed the agreed -upon areas for stewards
and Respondent presented a proposal concerning the use of
bulletin boards and union membership . The Union, on this
occasion , delivered a proposal concerning strikes and
lockouts . The parties also discussed various issues, includ-
ing jury pay, and they agreed upon severance pay and the
use of bulletin boards. They further agreed to meet again on
March 5, 14, and 21. It may be noted that, on February 24,
the Union notified its membership that there had been
"progress in our negotiations."
On February 26 Soule and Kirby met again in Duncan.
Respondent agreed that the financial secretary of the
Union could have 3 days off to attend a union convention.
Various issues were discussed and there was no firm
resolution thereof. On March 5, Soule and Kirby again met.
Respondent presented proposals on nondiscrimination,
strikes, and lockouts . The parties discussed various provi-
sions of the contract , including strikes and lockouts and
agreed upon a nondiscrimination clause.
On March 14 the parties met, as agreed , in Duncan with
Julius Frazier representing the Union. Respondent present-
ed a proposal concerning shift work , reemployment of
veterans , military leave, hours, overtime , and reporting
procedures. Some of these issues were discussed . On March
1910 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
21 Respondent, represented by Soule, met with Bale and
Frazier. Respondent presented a draft concerning shift
assignments which the Union later agreed to on April 5.
Various aspects of employment were discussed and Re-
spondent did ask the Union to take a position on the
various proposals submitted by Respondent. The union
representatives stated that, as to most, they would respond
thereafter. On March 22 Respondent furnished, as request-
ed on March 21, a roster of its employees.
On March 27 the parties met in Duncan with Soule and
Bale present. Respondent submitted a proposal concerning
strikes and lockouts, shift assignments, and educational
assistance, these replacing prior proposals by Respondent.
The Union also presented a proposal concerning truckdnv-
ers and work assignments . Numerous issues were dis-
cussed , including work assignments , management rights,
drivers, the reporting of absences, strikes and lockouts,
educational assistance, and seniority. The parties did agree
to meet again on April 3, 12, and 16. The parties next duly
met on April 3 at Duncan, with Soule and Bale respectively
representing the parties. Respondent submitted new propo-
sals on work assignments, management rights, and holidays
as well as a list of occupational family groups. Sickness,
shift assignments, hours and overtime, bereavement pay,
contract labor, reporting of absences, vacations, and
management rights were discussed. Bale agreed to furnish a
checklist of matters of agreement and disagreement.
On April 5 Bale and Soule again met in Duncan. It would
appear that there was give and take on both sides.
Respondent presented new proposals concerning shift
assignments, vacations, overtime, and job posting. The
Union delivered a proposal concerning temporary layoffs
and the parties discussed bereavement pay, overtime, and
arbitration procedure. The date of the next meeting had
already been set for April 12.
On April 12 Soule and Bale met again at Duncan.
Respondent delivered a proposal on work assignments,
seniority, and the use of personal equipment. The Union
delivered a draft concerning 7-day operations and the
parties discussed issues such as job posting, seniori ty, and
the union shop. The Union responded that it was not yet
ready to discuss its position on various issues . On April 16
Soule and Bale next met in Duncan. They discussed
numerous issues, including transport drivers, union repre-
sentatives, seniority, the reporting of absences, leaves of
absence, holidays, vacations, death in the immediate
family, and overtime. They agreed upon military leave and
also agreed to meet again, as scheduled, on April 22.
On April 22 Soule met with Julius Frazier of the Union.
Respondent furnished Christmas bonus data and insurance
rates which had been requested by the Union. Respondent
also presented a proposal concerning medical leaves of
absence and seniority. The parties did discuss various issues
such as supervisors performing rank-and-file work, seniori-
ty, medical disputes, job posting, leaves of absence, and
they also agreed upon overtime, union leaves of absence,
and medical disputes. They did agree that a Federal
mediator should be invited to attend further meetings. The
Union, on this occasion, did advise Respondent that it had
voted for a May 5 strike deadline. The Union did later
strike on May 6, but did not submit proposals concerning
wages, insurance, sick pay, and profit sharing until May 3.
Soule and Julius Frazier next met in Duncan on April 26
with Federal Mediator Libbey present. Respondent pre-
sented a proposal on seniority, contract labor, occupational
family groups, and progression. The parties next did discuss
contract labor, overtime records, and agreed upon seniori-
ty, occupational family grouping, and progression.
On May 3 the Union delivered to employees arriving at
work a notice of a union meeting to be held on May 5 which
proposed a strike deadline on that date. As Respondent
points out, the Union had not yet made a proposal to it
concerning sick leave, profit sharing, group insurance and,
significantly, wages. Soule and Bale met on May 3 at
Duncan with Federal Mediator Libbey in attendance.
The Union on this occasion, without cost figures, made a
verbal proposal as to group insurance, sick leave, and profit
sharing. Various contract proposals were discussed and, in
the afternoon, the Union came forward with an initial
proposal on wages . Respondent demurred, stating that it
needed several days to study the Union's economic
proposals. The Union adhered to its May 6 strike deadline
and the strike commenced on that date, although the
mediator did schedule a meeting for May 13. As noted, the
General Counsel relies specifically on the May 13 and July
18 meetings and one other matter as converting the
concededly economic strike to an unfair labor practice
strike.
C. The Alleged Refusal To Bargain on May 13
The General Counsel alleges that on May 13, 1974,
Respondent presented an ostensibly complete contract
proposal to the Union, but simultaneously declared that it
was not prepared to sign same . While Respondent did
submit two documents seriatim on this occasion, in my
judgment this is not to be equated with a refusal or denial to
sign a contract. I find, on a preponderance of the credible
evidence, that Respondent was willing to sign the agree-
ments submitted to the Union, if the latter had accepted
them.
This meeting was held at the Holiday Inn in Duncan,
Oklahoma. There is a major credibility resolution herein.
Soule delivered the first document to the Union at
approximately midmorning; this document, General Coun-
sel's Exhibit 11, did not cover wages , shift premiums,
insurance, profit sharing, or duration of the contract.4
Upon the presentation of General Counsel's Exhibit 11,
Soule pointed out that this obviously was not a complete
contract proposal because of the lacking clauses. Union
Negotiator Joe Davis later deposed to a Board agent that
Soule stated that wages, profit sharing, and insurance
would supplement the foregoing offer and the combination
would make a complete package.
Several minutes after General Counsel's Exhibit 11 was
presented Soule, as he testified, handed to the union
representatives and read a proposal, General Counsel's
Exhibit 12, to the effect that this covered the items not
4 As noted , the Union did not come up with a wage proposal until May 3,
this resulted from prompting by a Federal mediator
HALLIBURTON SERVICES 1911
treated in General Counsel's Exhibit 11 and flatly stated
that Respondent was prepared to sign a contract on that
basis. General Counsel's Exhibit 12 included language as to
the proposed settlement of the contract; it also included
language previously agreed upon by Respondent as to
items previously in dispute and an article as to sick pay. It
next proposed that Respondent's existing profit-sharing
plan would continue in its existing form.
In General Counsel's Exhibit 12, Respondent next
proposed continuation of its existing insurance program.
Following this was a proposal that the contract commence
upon signature by the parties with a termination date of
April 30, 1977. Next in order was a proposal that existing
shift premiums be continued and that they be set forth in
the contract. Lastly, Respondent proposed that the existing
wage scales be continued and included in the contract.
Respondent further proposed that there be a wage increase
of 7 percent effective March 1, 1975, and a reopening of the
contract for wages only on March 1, 1976.
Union Negotiator Burton recalled that when Soule
presented General Counsel's Exhibit 12, he stated that these
clauses were lacking in the earlier proposal viz, General
Counsel's Exhibit 11. After receiving General Counsel's
Exhibit 12, the Union requested a recess that morning to
evaluate the two proposals and this was done.
Soule then prepared and presented a press release for the
Duncan Banner, the only local paper of general circulation
in Duncan. That afternoon, the Banner carried a story that
Respondent had advised the Union as to the basis upon
which it was willing to sign a contract with the Union. It
may be noted, contrary to a suggestion by the Union at the
hearing, that the latter was a larger advertiser with the
newspaper than Respondent.
As stated, there is a major credibility resolution as to May
13. Union Negotiators Burton and Davis testified that
Soule stated that General Counsel's Exhibit 12 was not a
contract offer. Davis testified further that Soule stated
Respondent was not ready to sign the proposals at that
time . On the other hand, Respondent's negotiators, Soule
and Richardson, testified most candidly, in my observation,
that General Counsel's Exhibits 11 and 12 were presented
to the Union as a package offer to settle negotiations.
The General Counsel relies on the testimony of Burton
and Davis that on May 13 Respondent converted the strike
to an unfair labor practice strike. A number of factors
preponderate against such a resolution.
Burton submitted an affidavit to a Board agent which
gives less than full faith and credit to his testimony herein.
He originally, in his affidavit, deposed consistently with his
testimony at the hearing, but he later struck out the
supporting language. He ultimately stated therein that
Soule presented a document ostensibly reflecting settlement
of the union contract and further stated that this was all
that Respondent had at that time. The testimony of Burton
and Davis is not documented. Indeed, the notes of Burton
as to the May 13 bargaining meeting do not support his
testimony. Moreover, on May 15, the Union submitted a
proposal settlement, obviously a counterproposal to Re-
spondent's proposals in General Counsel's Exhibits 11 and
12 on May 13.
I find that, although not presented in the customary form
of collective-bargaining negotiations, Respondent made a
complete contract proposal on May 13 which it was ready
to sign. I do not accept, upon a preponderance of the
credible evidence, the claim that Soule stated this was a
contract it was not ready to sign. Needless to say, it is a
truism that bargaining for an introductory contract, as this
was, is hard bargaining and an employer may understand-
ably bargain hard as to conditions of employment which
manifestly may become more favorable to the bargaining
representatives in future years. I note again that May 3 was
relatively late in the day for the Union to come forward
with an initial wage proposal after previously voting for a
May 5 strike deadline and then struck early on May 6.5
D. The Alleged Refusal To Bargain on July 18
On May 17 the Federal mediator convened the parties in
Oklahoma City, but there was no confrontation between
them. On May 30 the parties met again in Duncan,
Oklahoma, with Soule and Bale present, and they discussed
picket line violence. On the same date, Judge Willis of the
District Court for Stephens County of Oklahoma issued an
order limiting the picketing.
Next in order is a meeting on July 18 in Oklahoma City
which the General Counsel also reties upon heavily. Soule
represented Respondent and Julius Frazier, rather than
Bale, represented the Union. It would seem that as of July
18 the chief outstanding issue , although there were others,
was the Union's demand for a union shop and a dues
checkoff, according to the General Counsel. The latter also
alleges that Respondent withdrew its agreement as to shift
schedules; this is treated below.
Witnesses Burton and Davis testified for the General
Counsel as to their unilateral talks with Federal Mediator
Libbey, at which no representative of Respondent was
present. They also testified that Union Spokesman Julius
Frazier told Soule they would take back to the membership
an agreement without a checkoff of union dues, but that
this would not be recommended; Frazier did not testify
herein. Union Official Kirby, also present on July 18,
likewise did not testify.6
Indeed, the complaint in paragraph 11(d) concedes that
there were other unresolved issues in Respondent's propo-
sals for a contract without checkoff which had been on the
bargaining table since May 13.
On July 18 Soule informed the union representatives that
Respondent was willing to sign a contract with modifica-
tions as to shift schedules. Soule and Manager of Manufac-
turing Cecil Richardson , of Respondent, both testified that
the Federal mediator indicated that the Union might
withdraw its demand for the checkoff of dues. Frazier, in
turn, advised that the Union was firm in its demand for a
checkoff of dues. It may be noted that the parties were
5 This is totally aside from the fact that the Duncan Banner, on May 13, offer, in obvious response to the proposals to the Umon on May 13, after
printed the story emanating from Respondent that the latter had submitted Respondent was struck.
an offer on the basis of which it was willing to sign a contract. Respondent 6 Glossed over, herein, is the fact that under the Act any dues checkoff
aptly points out , as noted, that on May 15 the Union submitted its settlement must be authorized in writing by the involved employee.
1912 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
apart in substantial areas, such as wages, profit sharing, and
insurance.
Burton and Davis did testify that the Union abandoned
its checkoff demand on July 18, but Richardson and Soule
testified that it did not. I credit the testimony of the latter
for reasons, inter alia, set forth below.
Burton's notes of the July 18 conference disclose that the
Union took the position that it would drop union-security
demands, as it did, "but we still wanted checkoffs." Several
days after the July 18 meeting , Frazier advised the
executive editor of the Duncan Banner , Buckley, that the
Union would modify its position on union security "with
voluntary checkoff of monthly dues."
In mid-August, President Bishop of the Local Union told
a reporter that negotiations at an August 12 meeting 7 had
been broken off because of a disagreement concerning the
checkoff of union dues. As is apparent, had this demand
been withdrawn on July 18, this would not have been an
issue on August 12.
On September 8 the Union ran a full-page ad in the
Duncan Banner to the effect that it sought a clause whereby
Respondent would deduct union dues from employees who
authorized it.8 In essence, both sides held firm on the issue
of checkoff of dues and the Union never withdrew its
demand for such a checkoff. This is manifest from the
public utterances of the Union and its newspaper advertise-
ments.
Davis and Burton admitted that there were numerous
unsettled issues and that it was not only the checkoff that
blocked settlement of the contract, although I deem this to
be the key issue herein. Wages were always an unsettled
issue and other items were still in dispute on July 18.
Another item relied on by the General Counsel is the shift
schedule issue on July 18, 1974. During the prestrike
negotiations, the parties agreed to include in the contract
the Company's existing shift schedules. At the July 18
bargaining conference, Respondent advised the Union that
improvisations, necessitated during the strike, had disclosed
to Respondent that its previous shift system was not the
most efficient way to operate the plant. It further advised
that Respondent had experimented with various different
shifts and that Respondent would submit revised language
as to the shift schedules for some employees. Respondent
had not yet concluded which shift system would be the
most efficient.
When the parties met again on August 12 in Duncan,
Respondent advised the mediator that it was prepared to
come forward with the most efficient shift system and the
mediator responded that there was no point in proceeding
with the meeting that day if Respondent was not prepared
to concede a checkoff of union dues to the Union. They did
not meet face to face that day.
As Respondent points out, the revision of the shifts
amounted to some minor changes, but the witnesses for the
General Counsel grossly exaggerated what took place.
Thus, Burton testified that the changing of shift schedules
"would affect the major portion of the contract" and Davis
I The Federal mediator scheduled such a meeting at Duncan on August
12, but there was no confrontation between the parties Interakq Respon-
dent refused to agree to a checkoff of dues
testified that such a change would affect probably every
major part of the contract and would tear it down.
These statements do not withstand scrutiny. On cross-
examination Davis was asked about each of the 31 articles
and conceded that 27 of the 31 would not be affected by
shift changes. He had other reasons why three other articles
would be affected, but his explanation simply does not
stand up. As Burton testified, only the taped section of the
machine shop was mentioned on July 18 as being involved
and the number of affected employees was estimated as
being from 58 to 60.
It would seem that Respondent had a reasonable basis
for its revision of shift schedules, particularly in the face of
a long-drawn strike. Its explanation for the revision of shift
schedules would certainly seem plausible and this would
not warrant an inference of bad-faith bargaining. Food
Service Company, 202 NLRB 790 (1973). See also Clinton
Foods, Inc., 112 NLRB 239 (1955), and Caroline Farms
Division of Textron, Inc. v. N.LRB., 401 F.2d 205, 211
(C.A. 4, 1968).
The General Counsel further alleges in paragraph 11(e) of
the complaint that Respondent converted the strike to an
unfair labor practice strike by unilaterally changing break
times and lunch periods, commencing on or about August
1, 1974. In all candor, little evidence was offered as to this
allegation and it was not impressive.
Thus, Vice President James Detrick of the Union testified
that prior to the strike a whistle would blow to announce
the start and termination of a 10-minute morning break as
well as a similar afternoon break. The whistle would blow
likewise to announce the beginning and end of a 30-minute
lunch break, which was staggered by departments.
During the strike, according to Detrick, and this is not in
dispute, the use of the whistle was abandoned and the
employees were given more leeway to take their breaks and
lunches, although for the same periods of time. At some
point, Detrick, who returned to work on September 23,
discerned that the use of the whistle had been resumed at
lunchtime.
Detrick also testified that Temporary Foreman Shelton
told him that he could take his breaks when he chose,
although the length of the break was unchanged; namely,
10 minutes in the morning and 10 minutes in the afternoon.
Another striker, Preston Sparks, testified in essence to the
same effect.
Respondent's manager of manufacturing, Cecil Richard-
son, testified, and I find, that the May 6 strike perforce left
Respondent with fewer employees, that as a result they
were placed on two 12-hour shifts, that regular set break
times were suspended, that breaks were duly taken at
random by production convenience, that the whistle which
had been automatically set was discontinued as it did not fit
the work schedules and that lunchtimes were accordingly
changed.
As is readily apparent, Respondent adopted these rela-
tively minor changes as the strike dictated its efforts to
maintain production. This is a far cry from replacing
economic strikers which it was entitled to do. I am at a loss
8 It may be noted that Respondent was a smaller advertiser in the paper
than the Umon
HALLIBURTON SERVICES 1913
to see how these minor changes made to maintain produc-
tion at a plant struck for over 4 months, until September 22,
could have converted a concededly economic strike into an
unfair labor practice strike.
As Respondent points out, it was beset with a long and
difficult strike and was entitled to improvise conditions of
production without negotiating with a recalcitrant labor
organization concerning same . Indeed, when the RD
petition was filed on or about September 12, as noted
above, Union Official Frazier advised the Duncan Banner
that this action barred further contract negotiations. To
sum up , the parties bargained hard for an initial contract.
The General Counsel claimed that Soule was not available
as often as the Union desired, but his other commitments in
a law practice some miles distant do not impress me as
excessive . Indeed, the Union shuttled negotiators from
greater distances. Accordingly, I see no merit to this
allegation and recommend the dismissal of the basic 8(a)(5)
issue . See H. K Porter Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99
(1970); N.L.R.B. v. American National Insurance Co., 343
U.S. 395 (1952); and Times Herald Printing Company, 221
NLRB 225 (1975).
E. Remaining Allegations
The remaining allegations of the complaint lend them-
selves to discussion in the order of their listing in the
complaint and this is now done.
(1) It is alleged that Respondent discriminated as to the
reinstatement and placement of returning strikers. Hun-
dreds of exstrikers arrived at the plant on Monday
morning, September 23, following a telegram from the
Union on the previous evening announcing the end of the
strike. Some had a form supplied by the Union wherein
they applied for their former positions or for any position.
Due to strike replacements, there were not enough job
openings available for all of them.
It is readily apparent that Respondent was aware of its
obligations under The Laidlaw Corporation, 171 NLRB
1366 (1968). The returning strikers were requested to sign in
at the plant in the sequence of their arrival and numbers
were duly assigned. They were then processed by the
personnel department in that sequence. There is no dispute
as to the truth of the fact that there had been strike
replacements during the course of the strike. There is
evidence that if the prestrike job of an employee was
available he was returned to it, and these returnees included
Union Negotiators Geary Burton and Joe Davis.
If the prestrike job was not available, the employee was
offered any comparable job which was available and for
which he was qualified. These included President Bishop
and Financial Secretary Stephens of the Union. The
employee would be offered his former job or a lesser job
such as was available if there was no comparable job. In
this situation, where he accepted a comparable job, a lesser
job, or neither, he remained on a preferential waiting list for
return to the prestrike job. Witnesses for the General
Counsel, Schaffner and Pennington, were among those who
9 There is evidence that one employee, by oversight, was not requested to
sign this form, but later signed it without objection. This is consistent with
the testimony of Gates McPhail of the personnel department who processed
accepted lesser jobs and later returned to their prestrike
jobs.
Respondent had devised a form which the returning
striker was requested to sign if his prestrike job was not then
available. This was for the purpose of keeping records and
communications and was so explained to the employee.
Signing of the form was not mandatory, although some
refused to sign it; this did not affect their return to work.9
It is clear, and I find, that every returning striker who
signed up for return, whether or not he signed the form, was
offered reinstatement. Ultimately, the sign-in list was
exhausted and the Company contacted those strikers who
could be located, who had not reappeared after the strike
and offered available jobs to them. A number of these
forms are in evidence. As Respondent points out, although
there are references throughout the hearing that these were
"agreements" required of the employees, the language of
the form amounts merely to an acknowledgment of what
the employee had been told upon returning to the plant; in
essence, he was told that Respondent would comply with
the Laidlaw rules and there is evidence that Respondent did
maintain a preferential list as required by Laidlaw in
exhibits submitted by it.
Some of the witnesses for the General Counsel referred to
a commitment by them to take a pay cut after 60 working
days following their reinstatement. However, the form
provides only that "I have been advised that if this job
involves a lesser payscale, my pay will not be reduced to the
maximum of the lesser payscale for sixty (60) working
days." This is consistent with a policy of Respondent of
longstanding that when a reduction is made to a lesser job,
the former rate is retained for 60 working days. It may be
noted that as to employees who worked a 10-hour shift, this
constituted 48 working days, namely, 480 hours, the
equivalent of sixty 8-hour shifts.
(2) George W. Lane was a senior warehouseman before
the strike and upon application, his prestrike job having
been filled, was offered a lesser job as a helper in the
chemical warehouse and he accepted this. While he claimed
that he had no option about signing the form, he admitted
that he read it before he signed it and McPhail testified that
Lane was not told that this was mandatory and, further,
that Lane did not object to signing the form. I credit
McPhail.
(3) J. N. Bishop was a layout man before the strike and
was classified as a general sheet metal machine operator.
On September 24, after the strike, he returned to work as a
general assembler wherein he enjoyed the same rate of pay
as he had previously. He was advised that no jobs were
open in his prestrike classification and Bishop was returned
to the sheet metal shop 4 months later.
(4) A. W. Hare, prior to the strike, was a general saw
operator. Upon returning from the strike, he was advised
that his prestrike job had been filled and he was offered a
job in the warehouse and accepted it. Actually, Hare had
worked in the warehouse for many years, until approxi-
mately 2 months before the strike began, and he acknowl-
edged that he had the opportunity to read the form before
these forms; he denied, and I fmd, that no employee was required to sign the
form as a condition of reinstatement.
1914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
he signed it. Much of this is reflected in the testimony of
Warehouse Superintendent Granville Ward.
(5) Cladie Mathews drove a dumpster in the plant hauling
trash prior to the strike. He admitted that he was aware that
his former position had been filled during the strike and
accepted an offer as ajamtor. Thereafter, on December 27,
he accepted an offer of a job as helper in the machine shop.
It is noteworthy that, on May 7, 1975, Mathews refused an
opportunity to return to his prestrike job because he wanted
to remain in the machine shop.
(6) Although not specifically alleged, the parties litigated
the case of Georgia May Grant. She had worked prior to
the strike as a janitor in the office of the manufacturing
center and, after the strike, accepted a job as janitor in the
shop at the tech center at which she enjoyed the same rate
of pay, although she maintained that the latter position was
more difficult. The manufacturing center is within walking
distance of some four blocks from her home and the tech
center is 2 miles from her home, but she testified that she
drove her car to work both before the strike as well as after,
and still does so.
(7) Joe Don Arrington had worked for 3 years in the steel
warehouse and, prior to the strike, worked in the L and N
section of the warehouse. Upon his return after the strike,
he retained the same classification and rate of pay, went
back to the steel warehouse because his prestrike job had
been filled, and was later moved to the big warehouse.
The complaint alleges that he was assigned to perform
more arduous or less agreeable tasks, this due to his
complaint that he had to cleanup and sweep when he was
not hauling steel . Initially, J. W. Helton, foreman over the
steel haulers, testified that all six of them were required to
perform cleanup work when they were not hauling steel,
and indeed, Arrington acknowledged that in the big
warehouse, where he was later moved, everybody swept his
own area.
(8) Jack Reeves was a general saw operator prior to the
strike and, his job having been filled, he was offered and
accepted a job as warehouseman where he had previously
worked for many years. Here, as well, I see no evidence that
he was not accorded his rights under Laidlaw.
(9) Terry Pennington had been a production assembler
prior to the strike but, upon his return, his former position
had been filled, and he was offered and accepted a position
as a helper in the truck shop. On October 4, he was offered
a job comparable to his prestrike job, but turned it down
because he wished to wait for his former position to open.
Moreover, on January 7, 1975, he was returned to his
prestrike job and later received a merit increase.
(10) Billie Richey Coyle had been an inspector's helper
prior to the strike and also had done some bench work for
some 2 months before the strike. Upon her return, she
returned to the same classification and rate of pay, but was
not assigned to bench work, which she apparently pre-
ferred, because the bench jobs had been filled by others
during the strike and no such position was open. There is
testimony by Inspection Superintendent James Edgar that
during the 4-1/2 months of the strike, the strike replace-
ments had acquired more experience in bench work than
Coyle had acquired before the strike; this would appear to
be supported by the fact that her bench work had been
limited to approximately 2 months before the strike. Coyle
ultimately was returned to bench work in May 1975 and
also received a prior merit increase in February as well as in
May 1975.
(11) Herman Schaffner, as a general painter before the
strike , painted furniture, offices, and performed cabinet
work. In July 1974 he sought return to his former position,
this during the strike, and was told that the job had been
filled, but that he could have another job as a painter. He
rejected this and rejoined the strike.
Schaffner did come back to the plant again after the
strike, was told that his prestrike job was not available and
was offered and accepted a job as a helper. He was later
offered a position to paint rolling stock which he refused;
this position would have paid the same rate as his prestrike
pay. He later became a warehouseman and was returned to
his prestrike job on July 28, 1975.
(12) Allen Goodin, also spelled in the complaint as
Goodwin, was a heat treater prior to the strike, returned
and was told that his former position had been filled. He
was offered and accepted a job as machinist's helper and
was later promoted to the job of machinist.
(13) The complaint alleges that Respondent has improp-
erly contracted out work previously performed by bargain-
mg unit employees, the thrust of this being that this was a
strike innovation, but the record will not support such a
finding. It is undisputed that a local labor contractor,
Stokes, has for many years furnished contract labor to
Respondent. Indeed, Union Negotiator Geary Burton
conceded that to his knowledge this had taken place for at
least 10 years. Manager of Manufacturing Cecil Richard-
son testified that Stokes has provided labor on a day-to-day
basis as specific jobs required and he recalled that this
practice had existed for at least 7 or 8 years.
According to Richardson, and this is not contradicted,
the number of Stokes laborers was no greater after the
strike than before the strike; indeed, some of the present
employees of Respondent had first worked at the plant as
contract laborers for Stokes and this included Cladie
Mathews. Stated otherwise, there was an existing practice
of using Stokes labor and this is not a situation where, in a
strike situation, Respondent contracted out work customar-
ily performed by strikers.10
(14) This next section alleged that returning striker J. W.
Hare was told that he would have to await death or
retirement to get his former job. It is also alleged that
Supervisor J. W. Helton demed him his accrued vacation
time until everyone in the department had taken his
vacation. It appears that Hare had 3 weeks' and 3 days'
accrued vacation due him when the strike ended. He
claimed that he asked Granville Ward if he could have the 3
days and that Ward told him that he could not until every
man in the department had already received his. Hare
admitted that he had discussed his vacation with Helton.
10 G C Exh I I provides that employees of labor contractors shall not sections so long as the aggregate total in all other sections at any one time did
perform work customarily performed by bargaining unit employees except in not exceed five Moreover, Burton conceded that this contract language was
four specified sections It further provides that they may be used in other applicable to the use of Stokes labor
HALLIBURTON SERVICES 1915
Ward, the warehouse superintendent, testified that when
Hare returned to work after the strike, he asked Ward
about his vacation and was referred to Helton because
Ward does not schedule vacations. Ward flatly denied
telling Hare that his vacation could not be enjoyed until
every other man in the department had taken his. The
company records do show that Hare took his 3 days of
vacation on October 22 and 31 and November 4.
Helton testified that several days after the return of Hare,
the latter chose his 3 vacation weeks, these being the weeks
beginning November 21 and the second and third weeks in
December. Hare was later allowed to change November 21
and 22 to December 2 and 3 so that he would not miss
overtime work on Saturday, November 23. Early in
December, Hare wished to make another change and to
take one of his weeks at Christmas time . This was denied
because an excessive number of employees had already
been scheduled for Christmas vacations. According to
Helton's uncontroverted testimony, and I so find, this
request would have been granted had it been timely
made."
As to the other portion relating to him, the testimony of
Hare leaves much to be desired. He testified that when
Helton issued a disciplinary order to him for not doing his
work and sleeping on the job, Helton stated that he would
like to see him get his old job back and there was a
possibility that someone might retire. In response to a
question, at least partly leading, Hare testified that Helton
had told him someone might die or retire. Helton denied
telling Hare or anyone else that he would have to wait until
someone died or retired before he received the job he
wanted. On balance, and in view of the nature of the
testimony, I credit Helton.
(15) It is alleged that Supervisor Olen McClenny refused
to allow employees Joe Davis and Ray Tilley to talk to each
other while Davis was operating his machine. McClenny,
the foreman of Davis, described an incident on or about
October 15, 1974, when Tilley and one, Scifres, both
maintenance men, came to the section of McClenny to
repair a machine which happened to be next to the machine
where Davis was assigned.
While Scifres worked, Tilley visited with Davis. After
watching this visitation for more than 30 minutes, McClen-
ny, as he testified, told Tilley he was supposed to be
working. Tilley responded that if he was "bugging"
McClenny he would leave; McClenny agreed that he was
"bugging" him and Tilley left. The version of Davis did not
differ greatly. This bears on another incident treated below
where McClenny found it necessary to transfer Davis to
another machine.
As Respondent points out, neither Davis nor Tilley was
disciplined or reprimanded. They at best were irritated at
the curtailment of social visitation on working time. Davis
did testify about several instances in which he thought other
employees were visiting on working time, but could not
specify whether they were discussing personal or business
matters.
(16) It is next alleged that in August, prior to the end of
the strike, Supervisor Bill Young referred a striker to Local
Attorney John Green and was alleged to have solicited his
withdrawal from membership in the Union as a condition
of the employee's return to work. It may be noted that
Attorney Green was active in the filing of the RD petition
heretofore referred to. As noted, objections to this election
were severed from the instant case.
Preston Sparks testified for the General Counsel that in
late July he telephoned Young about returning to work.
The name of Green was mentioned, but Sparks could not
recall whether he or Young first mentioned the name.
Sparks also testified that he went to see Green "because I
wanted to" and Green prepared a letter of resignation for
him from the Union to sign and charged him a $5 fee.12
Sparks signed the letter and mailed it to the Union. Jerry
Stephens, financial secretary of the Union, testified that the
Union received about 150 withdrawals of membership,
some of which had been prepared by Green.
When Sparks returned to work, he reported to Johnny
Robinson of the personnel department, nothing was said by
either of Sparks' resignation from the Union and he was
duly put back to work. Sparks admitted on cross-examina-
tion that it was common knowledge among strikers that
there was a risk of being fined by the Union if they returned
to work during the strike and that some strikers had visited
Attorney Green to have such letters of resignation pre-
pared.
Another witness who testified for the Union, over the
objection of Respondent, Gene Hendricks, testified that
Gates McPhail told him he would have to see Green to find
out the procedure as to returning to work. Hendricks
claimed that Green told him how to resign from the Union
which he did and that he returned to work 2 weeks before
the strike ended. Hendricks, with reluctance, admitted on
cross-examination that he had heard about Green from
other strikers who had returned to work and, further, that
he had known Green for more than 4 years.
McPhail denied that he ever referred a striker to Green
and, further, that he ever conversed with Green about the
strike or returning strikers. Likewise, McPhail testified that
he had never heard that any company official had referred
anyone to Green, although several strikers brought up
Green's name in telephone conversations with McPhail. To
these McPhail replied that at Halliburton their old jobs
were available and they were welcome to return to work.
The parents of Hendricks are employees of Respondent,
outside the bargaining unit , and neither participated in the
strike. The mother had telephoned McPhail several times
about the return of Hendricks to work, with concern about
his insurance coverage. Indeed, before the strike ended,
Robinson processed the strikers who returned to work and
McPhail was involved only with regard to their insurance.
As is apparent, the testimony of Sparks is ambivalent as
to this episode. Moreover, Hendricks admitted that he was
fully aware of the role of Green in the return of strikers to
work. Needless to say, the fine of a striker for crossing a
picket line and returning to work, more specifically a union
member, is axiomatically approved under current law.
Moreover, on a posture more favorable to the General
Counsel, the Board has recently found nothing amiss in this
11 This name also appears in the complaint as Hilton 12 Green was not directly involved in the instant case
1916 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
procedure. Baker Machine & Gear, Inc., 220 NLRB 194
(1975). See also Clothing Workers v. N.LR.B., 527 F.2d 803
(C.A.D.C., 1975).
(17) The complaint alleges that Supervisor Tate Hunt
imposed a ban on a returning striker against talking. Jerry
Stephens testified that Hunt told him it would be "best if I
didn't get talking to anybody." Stephens, as noted, was the
financial secretary of the Local and the Company had
previously allowed him 3 days off to attend a union
convention in Denver.
According to Hunt, Stephens, who had been an overhead
crane operator before the strike, was assigned thereafter to
be a forklift operator, a job which involves travel into all
departments and contact with numerous employees. He
testified that he gave Stephens the same instructions given
to all forklift operators, namely, that they would have
contact with a lot of people and that people would want to
stop and talk with them and that he was not to get into
conversations or let people stop him. According to Hunt, if
they stopped and engaged in conversations, the aisles
would be cluttered with parked vehicles, the vehicles would
be out of use and this would interfere with the work of other
employees . I see nothing amiss here.
(18) The General Counsel alleges that Supervisor Jim
Edgar warned employee Billie Coyle on the day she
returned to work after the strike not to discuss unions or
anything about the strike on company premises. She
claimed that Foreman J. W. Bradley was present during
part of the conversation. According to Bradley, he was
present throughout the conversation between the two and
he flatly denied that Edgar told her not to discuss the strike
or the Union on company premises.
Coyle admitted that Edgar told her he was glad to see her
back and that she had a right to express her feelings as to
the Union as long as she did not cause any "confusion."
Edgar testified that he told both nonstrikers and former
strikers that they should not be argumentative about the
strike and he denied telling Coyle not to discuss the Umon
or the strike on company premises.
Edgar did recall a previous conversation with Coyle
which did refer to company premises . On this occasion, and
this apparently is not in dispute, Coyle had been beaten by
the wife of another employee in the company parking lot.
He admonished her not to permit such incidents to happen
on company premises. Respondent argues that the term
"company premises" was apparently fixed in the mind of
Coyle as the result of the beating episode in which, as Coyle
told Edgar, she had been struck with a pop bottle. I credit
Edgar herein.
(19) It is urged that Supervisor Harold Joe Shelton
promised employees that they would receive wage increases
if they rejected the Union. Stephen Gleghom testified that,
on October 21, Shelton asked him if he had heard the news
that they would receive another raise if the election came
out right. He testified further that he said he had seen a
paper to this effect that his brother-in-law had received
from MRD, a division of Respondent.
Shelton had been a temporary foreman for a few weeks,
but his assignment to that post expired on the previous day,
October 20, and Gleghom admitted that, on October 21,
Shelton was just another machinist in the shop, as appar-
ently was the fact, according to Shelton.
Shelton denied making such a statement as to a wage
increase and further testified that he has two brothers-in-
law who live in Texas and New Mexico and that neither has
ever worked for Respondent. He further testified that he
never told anyone he had a brother-in-law in the MRD
section of Respondent. As Respondent points out, aside
from the credibility shortcomings of Gleghorn, the alleged
statement was made by a former temporary supervisor.
(20) There has been previous reference to the tendency of
employee Joe Davis to visit with other employees during
working time. It is next alleged that he was moved from his
machine to reduce visiting with other employees; Respon-
dent contends, to the contrary, that it did not do this to
enable it to improve surveillance of his activities.
Owen McClenny, the foreman of Davis after the strike,
assigned him to work at a machine which was located at the
intersection of an aisle in the section of McClenny and an
east-west aisle some 20-feet wide . This, it is undisputed, was
a primary traffic artery in the plant. According to McClen-
ny, and I so find, Davis had excessive visitation with people
passing up and down the main aisle and Davis, on cross-
examination, did admit that this visitation did occur.
Indeed, in his affidavit to a Board agent, he deposed that
many of the other employees on that shift and many
making shift changes would stop and talk with him.
McClenny spoke to Davis about this and claimed that he
had seen Davis motion these people over and that he was to
stop this. Davis did not.
McClenny then moved Davis to another machine, away
from the line of traffic, and this reduced the visitation of
Davis by other employees. Two other named employees
thereafter replaced Davis at this machine, both strikers, and
they did not have the visitation that Davis had at this
machine. It would seem, and this is not in dispute, that the
machine to which Davis was transferred to was no more
difficult to operate than the machine at the intersection.
According to McClenny, his sole purpose in moving
Davis to another machine was to get him away from a
congested traffic area. According to Davis, his new assign-
ment was just outside the office window of McClenny
where McClenny allegedly could observe him at all tunes.
McClenny testified, and this is not controverted, that he
spends only 2 hours in his office and, during that limited
period, he is performing paperwork and not looking out the
window. He spends the remainder of his shift on the plant
floor, moving among the approximately 21 machines he
supervises and observes the work of the operators, includ-
ing Davis. McClenny testified, and I find, that he could not
see all of the machine operated by Davis through his office
window even by raising and twisting his body. Indeed, there
are four other machines in the section of McClenny which
are directly in front of his office window, all of which are
easier to see from his desk than is the machine of Davis. I
see no merit to this issue.
(21) The complaint contends that Supervisor Kenneth
Morgan interrogated an employee about his union sympa-
thies and union desires. Stephen Gleghom testified that on
October 30 his temporary foreman, Kenneth Morgan,
asked him how he thought the election would come out and
HALLIBURTON SERVICES 1917
how he wanted it to come out. Gleghorn responded that it
looked about even and that he told Morgan that Morgan
had known him long enough to know how he felt about it,
because he had been his foreman for a couple of years
before the strike started. Gleghorn admitted on cross-
examination that Morgan knew he had participated in the
strike for its duration.
Morgan denied that he asked Gleghorn or any other
employee any questions about their union sympathies and
confirmed that he knew that Gleghorn had participated in
the entire strike. Indeed, Morgan admitted seeing a decal of
the Union on the toolbox of Gleghorn. I see nothing
adverse to Respondent herein.
(22) It is next alleged that Supervisor S. E. Clifton told an
employee that his wage increase had been denied because
he was a striker. Employee Jack Bob Queen testified that he
received a wage increase in February 1974 and admitted
that he would not be eligible for another increase until 6
months later. He further testified that further increases can
be received at intervals of 6 months of work until the
maximum of the rate range is reached and time on strike is
not counted as time calculated to such a wage increase.
McPhail of the personnel department explained this to
Queen when he returned to work after the strike and
assured Queen, as McPhail testified, that he would get
credit for time worked before the strike toward his next
wage review. There is no serious dispute that not counting
strike time as time worked in considering entitlement to a
wage increase is recognized. N.L.R.B. v. National Seal,
Division of Federal-Mongul-Bower Bearing, Inc., 336 F.2d
781 (C.A. 9, 1964).
(23) It is alleged that Supervisor Randall Tidwell threat-
ened an employee with discipline because of his participa-
tion in the strike. George W. Lane testified that, after the
strike, but prior to his return to work, Tidwell told him he
would "chew him out" if he slowed up in his work and
mentioned the fact that he had done a lot on the picket line
that people did not like. Lane testified that he responded to
Tidwell that he would not take any oral discipline from
Tidwell, stated more graphically in the transcript. Lane
then testified that Tidwell said that this was water under the
bridge and they would "start out clean." Lane placed this
conversation on November 15 and did not testify as to
difficulty with Tidwell after that. I see nothing more to this
than an exchange of personalities in a poststrike situation.
(24) Much has been made of the alleged statements made
by President Ed Paramore of Halliburton Company, the
parent of Respondent, in October 1974 to a bartender at the
Holiday Inn in Duncan named Willie B. "Johnny" Turner,
who was then a striker. Turner had been a tool grinder at
the plant, before and after the strike, and had previously
worked occasionally as a bartender at parties in the home
of Paramore in Duncan before Paramore moved to Dallas
in July 1973.
As Respondent points out, Turner was much confused in
his testimony and I agree . Indeed, on the witness stand, he
was most vague as to dates and circumstances. It was
finally established that Turner had a conversation at this
bar with Paramore in August 1974, although his affidavit to
the Board agent, signed on November 26, 1974, placed the
conversation on October 17, approximately 2 weeks prior to
the election held on October 31.
Turner testified that Paramore entered the bar where
Turner was serving as a bartender, asked why Turner went
on strike, said he could not understand it, said that Turner
had messed up a good job and career with the Company,
and further said that Turner could have done better with
the Company if he, Turner, had moved to Dallas. Paramore
then allegedly added that he could not hire him back
because Turner had done him a "bad deal" by striking, that
Paramore could not sign a contract with the Union, and
that if he had to do so he would move the plant to Kansas.
Turner deposed that Paramore was upset and excited, was
"slapping the bar" and that he would not let Turner
respond to him.
Turner also testified that others in the club at the Holiday
Inn were within hearing distance during the alleged
conversation and included Jim Lawler, an engineer for Sun
Oil Company in the area, an unnamed waitress and one,
Jessie Anderson. Turner also testified that a man named
"Turner" entered the clubroom with Paramore.
Of the three so-called earshot witnesses, the General
Counsel produced Anderson, who was a former Hallibur-
ton employee who was discharged after the strike and
admitted that a charge was then pending in his behalf
against Respondent alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act; it would appear that this charge was later
dismissed by the Regional Director on August 4, 1975.
Anderson claimed that he had been in the Holiday Inn
drinking beer and had heard part of the conversation, as
bartender Turner described it, but his testimony was
contradictory. He initially testified that he heard the first
portion of it when Paramore asked bartender Turner why
he had gone out on strike, but shortly thereafter testified
that Paramore did not answer any questions. Anderson did
not refer to anyone slapping the bar which, according to
Respondent, would have been well remembered if done by
the president of Respondent.
Respondent produced one of the witnesses identified as
present by bartender Turner, namely Lawler, who is still an
engineer with Sun Oil Company. Lawler was frequently in
Duncan and stayed at this motel. He testified, and I find,
that he visited the club at the Holiday Inn and knew
bartender Turner but did not know Paramore. The record
discloses that this club is a small room with about eight
seats at a bar and some small tables and that Lawler usually
sat at the bar. According to Lawler, and I so find, he had
conversations many times with bartender Turner, but never
heard a conversation in which a patron spoke the words
Turner attributed to Paramore and never saw a patron
slapping the bar.
In resolving the credibility resolution between Turner, an
unimpressive witness, and Lawler, it may be noted that
Lawler testified that he was never in the club when anyone
pointed out to him an individual as Paramore and that no
one in the club ever identified to him a patron who had just
departed as Paramore.
Paramore acknowledged that he had seen Turner in the
club in August 1974 and that he was accompanied by
Armstrong, of a division of Respondent Paramore ob-
served no one in the club except a waitress and commented
1918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to Turner that business was slow . He recounted his
conversation with bartender Turner, who told him that he
was disappointed that the Company would not sign a
contract with the Umon and Paramore replied that he was
disappointed that they had a strike.
According to Paramore , he did not ask Turner why he
went on strike, did not tell him he messed up a good job and
career, did not slap the bar, did not say he would not rehire
Turner, did not tell Turner that he had made an error by
striking, did not say he would not sign the contract, and did
not make any reference to the plant moving to Kansas or to
a job in Dallas for Turner.
According to Paramore, at a social event in Duncan
during the previous Christmas of 1973 where Turner was
tending bar, he mentioned to Turner the possibility of a job
in Dallas, but Turner seemed uninterested. This would have
involved the work of a handyman, such as picking up mail
for the corporate office and also tending bar at company
functions. Paramore did not offer Turner the job, but only
inquired about his possible interest.
The subject of the Dallas job did not come up again until
Turner called Paramore from Duncan at his home in Dallas
on a Saturday some 2 weeks after the conversation at the
Holiday Inn in Duncan. Turner asked if the job in Dallas
was still open and Paramore replied that it was not.
Paramore testified , and this is not disputed , that it had been
filled at one time, but the arrangement did not work out
well so the job was eliminated. This took place prior to the
telephone call by Turner to the home of Paramore on this
occasion.
It is obvious that a major credibility issue is raised by the
testimony of Turner and Paramore. Respondent submits,
and I agree , that the testimony of Paramore is the more
reliable. Turner was a badly confused witness who, on the
witness stand , was quite vague as to dates even after
pressure as to submitting a date. His affidavit to a Board
agent was erroneous by 2 months to say the least.
Respondent further points out that the resentment of
Turner at Respondent was evident because he was not
recalled to work until late March 1975, almost 11 months
after the strike began.
The only corroboration of Turner, and this is partial, was
from discharged employee Anderson, who had a discrimi-
nation charge pending against the Company at the time he
testified and could not be considered an impartial witness.
James Lawler of Sun Oil , a disinterested witness on this
record whom Turner claimed to be an earshot witness of his
conversation with Paramore , denied the whole story. I find,
on a preponderance of the credible evidence, that Paramore
accurately told what took place on this occasion and that
Turner did not.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Halliburton Services , a Division of Halliburton
Company, is an employer whose operations affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union, United Automobile , Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America , (UAW),
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5), (3), and ( 1) of the
Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 13
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings , findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 waived for all purposes.