Haleyville Textile Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 23, 1957

118 N.L.R.B. 1157 (N.L.R.B. 1957)

HALEYVILLE TEXTILE COMPANY, INC. 1157
2. By interfering with , restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning union activities ; threaten em-
ployees with reprisals; or promise or grant wage increases, a reduced workweek,
improved working conditions, or other economic favors to our employees for the
purpose of interfering with their choice of a bargaining representative or as
an inducement to reject and refrain from activities in support of Truck
Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 941, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor
organizations, to join or assist Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers, Local Union 941, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organi-
zation, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any, or all of such activities,
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment , as author-
ized in Section 8 (a) .(3) of the Act.
UNION FURNITURE COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Haleyville Textile Company , Inc. and International Ladies'
Garment Workers ' Union, AFL-CIO. Case No. .10-CA-2684.
August 03, 1957
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 7, 1957, Trial Examiner Albert P. Wheatley issued
his Intermediate, Report in the above-entitled proceeding finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act and accordingly
recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety as set
forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. There-
after, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, the
Charging Party herein, filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report
and a supporting brief.
118 NLRB No. 159.
1158 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board' has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner 2
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint issued herein be,.
and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and
Members Murdock and Jenkins].
2 Assuming, as argued by the Union, but without deciding, that the interrogation of'
Mrs. Nichols by Karl Baehr on July 9, 1956, under the circumstances described in the
Intermediate Report is not free of all coercive implications, it remains, nevertheless, an
isolated instance of misconduct, insufficient to warrant a finding of restraint and coercion
violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act and a remedial order.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The above-captioned proceeding concerns allegations that Haleyville Textile Com-
pany, Inc., herein called Respondent,' discharged Lavona Mitchell because of her
membership in, and activity in behalf of, International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, and allegations that Respondent (1)
interrogated its employees as to their membership in, and activity in behalf of, the
Union; (2) enforced an oral rule forbidding its employees from engaging in union.
or concerted activity on its time and property; and (3) threatened to discharge its
employees if they engaged in union activity on Respondent's time or property. Re-
spondent denies that it violated the Act 2 and asserts that Mitchell was discharged
for "cause."
Interrogations
In support of the contention that Respondent unlawfully interrogated employees.
as to their membership in, and activity in behalf of, the Union, the General Counsel
offered the following: (1) The testimony of employee Coralee Porter that in May
or June 1956, Supervisor Emmy Cockrill "asked me if I was still eating over there
[at the union hall across the street from Respondent's place of business] with that
[Union] bunch"; and (2) a stipulation that Etoile Nichols, if called to testify,
would testify as follows:
That on July 9, 1956, she was called into Mr. Behr's [sic] office by Marie
Cole.
That when she arrived in Mr. Behr's office, Mr. Behr said, "I want to know
how you feel about this union deal"; that Mrs. Nichols replied, " well, it's just
like this, I'm not going to do a thing against it"; that Mr. Behr just sat there
and looked at Mrs. Nichols for two or three minutes until she finally said,.
"Is that all you want to ask me," and Mr. Behr said, "yes."
Assuming, arguendo that the stipulated testimony is credited, the Trial Examiner
believes and finds that, under the current decisions of the courts and this Agency,
the interrogations noted above were not hostile inquiries carrying a coercive impli-
cation and were not in violation of the Act.
1 Respondent engages in the manufacture of garments at a plant located in Haleyville,
Alabama, and in the course of its business annually sells and ships In interstate commerce
products valued in excess of $50,000. There is no issue herein concerning jurisdiction.
2 The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act.
HALEYVILLE TEXTILE COMPANY, INC. 1159
Rule Proscribing Union or Concerted Activities on Company Property
In October or November 1955 3 a committee of approximately 9 employees,
including Mitchell, called upon Jack Hutto, a supervisory official for Respondent,
and advised him that the Union was initiating an organizing program and that they
would be active in such a program.
Mitchell testified that Hutto "looked around slowly, noticing each individual,
and said, `I think I have talked to most of you before. You have your laws to
protect you, and we have our laws to protect us, but now you can't do this on com-
pany time or property.' " Ethel Smith testified that Hutto "looked the bunch over"
and told them there were company rules and union rules and that they "could not
work for the Union on company time and property." Smith further testified she
was not sure whether Hutto said they could not work for the Union on company
time and property or whether he said they could not work for the Union on com-
pany time or property. No other employee testified about this matter. Hutto
testified he told the employees that he "was not interested particularly" as long
as they "did not cause any disturbance or solicit union membership while they were
on the job and while they were working for the Company, and during the Company's
time and on the company property."
During August 1956 Karl Baehr, manager of the lingerie department, called a
group of employees, including Ethel Smith, to his (Baehr's) office to inform them
that "things were looking good" and they could anticipate steady work. As the
employees entered Baehr's office, Smith asked "what did you call us in here for,
why are you being so good to us, is it because we are going to have an election?" 4
Baehr remarked that Smith's comments were "out of order" and then told the em-
ployees that Respondent did not anticipate any further shortages of materials and
that plenty of work for the future could be anticipated. At the conclusion of these
remarks all of the employees except Smith left Baehr's office. Smith remained at
Baehr's request. Baehr then called Smith's attention to Respondent's rule re-
garding visiting and told her "he could terminate me for talking and working
[on behalf of the Union] on company time and property."
Respondent's rules, which were posted on the bulletin board, prohibited inter
alia, "habitual visiting in departments other than your own, except on company
business, too much time away from your job."
The evidence reveals that during lunch periods employees did engage in activities
on behalf of the Union and that Respondent was aware of these activities and did
not interfere therewith.
The General Counsel argues that by virtue of Hutto's remarks in October or
November 1955 Respondent promulgated a rule proscribing union or concerted
activities on Respondent's property during noncompany time and that by virtue of
Baehr's remarks in August 1956 Respondent enforced such a rule. The Trial
Examiner believes and finds the evidence adduced herein insufficient to support these
contentions.
Threats
As noted above under the section of this Report entitled "Rule proscribing union
or concerted activities on company property," during August 1956 Karl Baehr told
Ethel Smith, inter alia, that he could terminate her for talking and working on be-
half of the Union on company time and property. The General Counsel contends
that this evidence supports the allegation of the complaint that Respondent unlaw-
fully threatened to discharge employees if they engaged in union activity on Respond-
ent's time or property. The Trial Examiner hereby rejects this contention. Con-
sidering Baehr's statement in the context in which it was made, this statement does
not constitute a threat of economic reprisal for engaging in union or concerted
activity on Respondent's property during noncompany time.
Discharge of Mitchell
Mitchell was employed by Respondent from March 1951 to July 13, 1956. She
worked as a sewing machine operator and at the time of her discharge operated
a Merrow sewing machine. There is no issue herein concerning her competency
or efficiency as a sewing machine operator.
Mitchell's husband left the employ of Respondent on or about April 1, 1955, and'
became a paid business agent for the Union. At the time of the hearing in this matter
'More than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge involved herein.
"Apparently at that time the election .scheduled in Case No. 10-RC-3517 was
anticipated.
1160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
.he was an organizer for the Union. Mrs. Mitchell actively assisted her husband in
promoting interest in the Union among Respondent's employees and there is no
doubt from this record that Respondent was aware of her union activities. While
there is some evidence indicating Respondent was not pleased with the advent of
the Union, as noted above, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish hos-
tility on the part of Respondent. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Respondent
.made statements or engaged in conduct indicative of a resentful attitude toward
Mitchell or her husband because of their union activities.
On July 12, 1956, the "looper" on the machine which Mitchell was operating
broke and the machine stopped operating. This machine was removed to a repair
shop in the plant and Mitchell was assigned to another machine for the remainder
of that day. At the beginning of the work shift on the following day (July 13)
Mitchell was taken to the repair shop, shown certain parts from the machine which
had been badly burned, and told that this damage resulted from her failure to oil
the machine. Mitchell asserted that she had oiled the machine. At the conclusion
,of this conversation Mitchell went to her working place. About 11:20 a. m. she
was sent to Karl Baehr's office (the office of the manager of the lingerie department).
Baehr told Mitchell that the machine had been badly damaged from lack of oil and
that he was holding her responsible for this condition and terminating her for
negligence in that she failed to oil the machine. Mitchell protested that she had oiled
the machine. Baehr stated that if the machine had been properly oiled, it would not
have broken down and told Mitchell that he was terminating her because "you were
negligent." Baehr asked Mitchell if she wanted her pay then or wanted to come
back and get it. Mitchell said "I'll take the check now" and was told to pick it up
at the front office.
As indicated above there is a dispute herein as to whether Mitchell in fact oiled
the machine in question. However, it appears to be undisputed that the parts involved
herein were burned, that Respondent held Mitchell responsible for this burning and
-discharged her, telling her that she was being discharged because she caused these
parts to burn. The General Counsel asserts that, nevertheless, Mitchell was not
responsible for this burning, that Respondent should have made a more thorough
investigation into the matter of whether Mitchell properly oiled the machine and
that the asserted reason for the discharge was not the true reason but a pretext to
eliminate from the scene a union protagonist. The General Counsel asserts that
other employees responsible for damaging machines who were not members of
the Union were not discharged and that Mitchell was discriminated against because
she was an active union member. The record reveals, however, that damages in
other situations were not comparable to the damage involved herein, that the degree
of damage involved herein was far greater, that the damage herein was more extensive
and that the cost of repair involved herein was considerably more than involved in
other situations. Assuming, however, that certain nonunion employees damaged
machines to a comparable extent and were not discharged therefor, the Trial Exam-
iner, noting the evidence adduced fails to establish a background of hostility toward
Mitchell because of her union activities or even to establish a background of hostility
to union activities in general, believes and finds that the evidence adduced herein does
not establish a pretext situation.
Furthermore, upon the basis of the record herein, it appears unlikely that the
machine in question would have burned as it did if it had been properly oiled.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Schick , Incorporated and District No. 98, International Associa-
tion of Machinists , AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Cases Nos. 4-RC-3251
and 4-IBC-3°52. August 03,1957
DECISION AND CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS
OF ELECTION
Pursuant to a stipulation for certification upon consent election, an
election was conducted on March 6 , 1957, under the direction and
supervision of the Regional Director for the Fourth Region, among
118 NLRB No. 152.