Hahn Motors Inc., And Hahn Truck Sales & Service Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 6, 1987

283 N.L.R.B. 901 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

HAHN MOTORS 901
Hahn Motors, Inc., and Hahn Truck Sales & Serv- NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543 (3d Cir.
ice Corp . and United Steelworkers of America , 1983), enfg . 260 NLRB 128 (1982). Accordingly, as
AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 4-CA-13275
6 May 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 30 September -1983 Administrative Law
Judge Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached deci-
sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross-
exceptions and a brief in 'support.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this _ proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions and 'to adopt the recommended Order.
In adopting the judge's findings of violations and
his finding that the Respondents, Hahn Motors,
Inc. (HMI or Hahn Motors) and Hahn Truck Sales
& Service Corp.' (HTS or Hahn Sales), are a single
employer, we find it unnecessary to reach the ques-
tion whether an alter ego relationship exists. In
making the 'single employer finding we rely, as did
the judge, on Robert Stavin's role as chief execu-
tive officer in each company; his exercise of virtu-
ally unrestricted operational, financial, administra-
tive, and labor relations control over both compa-
nies; the substantially similar ownership of both
companies, i.e., Robert Stavin and his wife Marion
owning Hahn Sales outright as, well as 35 percent
of Hahn Motors, with practically the entire remain-
der inuring to the beneficial , interest of Marion
Stavin, her mother, and her sister;" and the interre-
lation of the two companies' operations, as evi-
denced by the functional integration of their busi-
nesses, the extensive financial and operational sup-
port provided Hahn Sales by Hahn Motors, the
centralized telephone ' and accounting systems, and
the deliberate extension of Hahn_ Motors' goodwill
to Hahn Sales by virtue of Stavin's.letters of intro-
duction to customers, the similarity , of their corpo-
rate , names, and the use of the same company sta-
tionery and corporate logos. We find that these
factors establish that Hahn Motors and Hahn Sales
do not maintain an arm 's-length relationship such
as is found among unintegrated companies. See
i Of the 1000 shares of HMI stock, Robert and Marion Stavin own 384
outright with Marion Stavin possessing beneficial interest in one-half of a
trust whose corpus includes 510 shares. The next largest , singly owned
block is held outright by Robert Stavin's mother -in-law, Mrs. R, J. Stein-
hauer. Only four shares are owned by individuals not related to the Sta-
vms
noted, we find that HMI and HTS constitute a
single employer.
Further, we find that the relocation of the serv-
ice department employees to a new facility did not
destroy the community of interests that had existed
within the plantwide Hahn Motors unit to justify
depriving these employees of continued representa-
tion. Indeed, the only, significant difference in
working conditions that the relocated employees
experienced was the move to a different facility 7
miles away. At the time Hahn Sales commenced
operations, all its employees were former Hahn
Motors service department unit employees. Those
employees shared single unit status with the other
Hahn Motors employees and were represented by
the Union until Stavin formed Hahn Sales. As
Hahn Sales employees, they continued to work the
same hours under the same clock numbers they had
used at Hahn Motors and to perform substantially
the same work they had performed as service de-
partment employees, using much of the same
equipment and skills, and working under the same
immediate supervisor, Harry Close.. 2 The work
performed at the two facilities continues to be
highly integrated, with Hahn Motors manufactur-
ing the parts used by Hahn Sales and Hahn Sales
performing predelivery and warranty work on
Hahn Motors-produced trucks. Employees at both
locations are covered by a single life and medical
insurance policy and the employees of Hahn Sales
enjoy the same benefits as the Hahn Motors em-
ployees.
We find that these factors demonstrate that the
Hahn Sales employees continue to share a commu-
nity of interests with the existing Hahn Motors unit
and that the Respondent's efforts to fragment that
unit by unilaterally imposing a geographic separa-
tion of 7 miles is inadequate to defeat the service
employees' right to continued union representation.
Accordingly, we find that the Respondents unlaw-
fully failed to continue to recognize the Union as
the bargaining representative of the unit employees
2 Thus, day-to-day supervision has remained unchanged . At Hahn
Motors these employees had been under the direct supervision of Close,
who was the "service department" manager there. At Hahn Sales they
continued under his direct supervision as its "general manager " Further-
more, the former service department employees of Halm Motors who ac-
cepted jobs with Hahn Sales were not required to file new employment
applications.
Despite the fact that the service employees are now performing their
duties at Hahn Sales rather than Hahn Motors, the differences between
their duties and those performed by the production and maintenance em-
ployees have remained unchanged . It is also important to bear in mind
that the question here is not whether the service employees might also
constitute a separate appropriate unit. It is whether the overall unit're-
mamed an appropriate unit when the Respondent moved the employees 7
miles down the road.
283 NLRB No. 141
902 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
working at the Hahn Sales location and to apply
the contract terms to them.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondents, Hahn
Motors, Inc., Hamburg, Pennsylvania, and Hahn
Truck -Sales & Service Corp., Shartlesville, Penn-
sylvania, their officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
3 Because we have adopted the judge's finding that the Respondent's
relocation of a part of the established unit does not relieve it of its obliga-
tion to recognize and apply the contract to the new site, we place no
reliance on the judge's separate analysis under the now-overruled Mil-
waukee Spring Division, 265 NLRB 206 (1982). See Milwaukee Spring Divi-
sion, 268 NLRB 601 (1984), affil. sub nom Auto Workers v. NLRB, 765
F 2d 175 (D.C. Cir 1985).
Daniel E. Halevy, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Robert -T Miller, Esq., of Reading, Pennsylvania, for the
Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge. This
proceeding was heard by me in Reading, Pennsylvania,
on, April 14, 1983, on an initial unfair labor practice
charge filed on October 15, 1982, and a complaint issued
on November 29, 1982, alleging that Hahn Motors, Inc.
and Hahn Truck Sales & Service Corp. (the Respondent)
constitute an alter ego and single employer within the
meaning of the Act, and that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by dealing directly
with certain employees in the appropriate collective-bar-
gaining unit, and further violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) of the Act by relocating these employees and refusing
to apply the applicable collective-bargaining agreement
at the new worksite. In its timely filed answer the Re-
spondent denied that any unfair labor practices were
committed. After close of the hearing, briefs were filed
on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondent.
On the entire record in this proceeding,' including my
opportunity directly to observe the witnesses while testi-
fying and their demeanor,2 and on consideration of the
posthearing briefs, it is found as follows
' Certain errors in the transcript are noted and corrected
2 The fact that my credibility rulings are accompanied by objective ra-
tionale does not discount, but merely serves to reinforce, impressions
gained from my first-hand observation of the witnesses Furthermore, al-
though it should go without saying, testimony, whether or not contra-
dicted, is rejected by implication to the extent that it includes matters
that might not be reconciled with expressly credited evidence. Cf Her-
bert F. Darling Inc., 267 NLRB 476 (1983)
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
II. JURISDICTION AND THE SINGLE EMPLOYER ISSUE
A. Preliminary Statement
Hahn Motors, Inc. (HMI) is, and has been at all times
material, a Pennsylvania corporation engaged, in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of firefighting appara-
tus from its facility located in Hamburg, Pennsylvania.
Prior to May 1, 1982,3 the operations of HMI included a
service department. During that same period, 'United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC represented a
production and maintenance unit, numbering some 100
employees, including 7 who were assigned to the service
department. These employees at that time were covered
by a collective-bargaining agreement not scheduled to
expire until April 30, 1984.
On May 1, 1982, a new corporation, Hahn Truck Sales
& Service Corp. (HTS) commenced operations in
Shartlesville, Pennsylvania, only 6-8 miles distant from
Hamburg. This new firm, as of the date of the hearing
and since the inception of, its operations, has been en-
gaged almost exclusively in "servicing" firefighting
equipment.
Contemporaneous with the opening of HTS' Shartles-
ville facility, HMI terminated ' its service operations.
Prior thereto, however, all seven of the latter's service
employees were offered employment with HTS; six ac-
cepted. HTS refused to recognize the Union or honor
HMI's subsisting collective-bargaining agreement as
binding with respect to .these Shartlesville employees.
The resulting partial curtailment of the established bar-
gaining relationship is challenged by the instant com-
plaint on the premise that HMI and HTS constitute an
alter ego or, single employer and, hence, all that was in-
volved was a single entity's relocation of unit work to a
nearby, newly established facility. See, e.g., Westwood
Import Co., 251 NLRB 1213 (1980), enfd. 681 F.2d 664
(9th Cir. 1982). It also is argued that the removal of the
service operation was designed to evade bargaining and
that the Respondent thereby violated Section' 8(a)(1), (3),
and (5) of the Act. See, e.g., Los Angeles Marine Hard-
ware Co., 235 NLRB 720 (1978); Milwaukee Spring Divi-
sion , 265 NLRB 206 (1982); Oak Cliff-Golman Bakery
Co., 207 NLRB 1063 (1973). By way of remedy, it is
urged that the ,Respondent be directed to recognize the
Union at the Shartlesville site, and to apply the existing
collective-bargaining agreement to the employees at that
location, while making them whole for lost benefits. Also
sought is compensation for the Union with respect to
dues not remitted on behalf of employees who had-
exe-cuted valid checkoff authorizations.
3 Unless otherwise indicated all dates refer to 1982
HAHN MOTORS
On behalf of the defense it is asserted that the two
firms possessed qualities of independence , sufficient to
negate alter ego or single employer status, and , hence,
HMI simply terminated the service end of its business,
action that is not subject to any obligation to bargain
under either the Supreme Court's decision in First Na-
tional Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U . S. 666 (1981),
or the management-prerogative clause of the subsisting
agreement.
The "single employer-alter ego" issue is plainly deter-
minative here . Thus, neither the pleadings, controlling
precedent , the manner in which this proceeding was liti-
gated, nor the posthearing briefs „suggest that this com-
plaint might be salvaged if HMI and HTS are deemed
legally independent persons in the statutory sense.
Indeed, the jurisdictional allegations appear to concede
the point . For the commerce facts are alleged, and ad-
mitted , under conditions presupposing that HTS and
HMI are a single entity, and there is no basis for ascer-
taining whether either firm independently met the
Board 's jurisdictional standards . Clearly , dismissal of the
complaint on that ground alone would be impelled
should the General Counsel fail to establish that HTS
and HMI constitute a single entity.4
At the same time, the Respondent raises a number of
defenses that would lack vitality and require no consider-
ation if single employer status is substantiated. Within
this category is the Respondent 's reliance on First Na-
tional Maintenance Corp. v. 1VLRB, supra, and other cases
reconciling management 's right to terminate a segment of
its business . For, if HMI and HTS are deemed to be a
single entity, this case would involve a transfer within a
single enterprise , rather than a discontinuance, of the
service operation. Hence, First National Maintenance
would be plainly inapposite . Falling within that same cat-
egory would be the Respondent's further contention
that, by virtue of article 6 of the contract with HMI, the
Union waived its interest in collective bargaining with
respect to the events in issue here . In this regard, section
I thereof ; in material part, merely recites as follows:
The management of the plant and the direction of
the working force including . . . the right to relieve
employees from duty because of lack of work or for
other legitimate reasons . . . the right to determine
the extent to which the plant shall, be operated, the
products to be manufactured , the method of manu-
facturing . . . and to extend, limit or curtail its op-
eration, is vested exclusively in+ the Company.
Here again, if HTS and HMI are to be regarded as a
single entity, the matter under scrutiny would be limited
to a "relocation" or "transfer" of unit work, action
which transcends the broad, general language of the
above-cited management -prerogative clause. Under long-
standing Board policy, a waiver on the part of a labor
organization under such a generalized provision is not to
4 The admission of jurisdiction in the Respondent 's answer, considering
the manner in which the pleadings are framed, only admits that both
firms collectively are engaged in commerce It is an admission condi-
tioned on the ability of the General Counsel to substantiate the single em-
ployer allegation
903
be "lightly inferred ." Rather , it must be manifested by
"clear and unmistakable" evidence . See, e .g., Park-Ohio
Industries, 257 NLRB 413-414 (1981).
Thus, for the above reasons, the waiver defense as
well as that arising under the Supreme Court decision in
First National Maintenance, supra , will prove either su-
perfluous or nonmeritorious depending on final resolu-
tion of the single employer issue, and, hence, there will
be no further discussion of either.
B. Conclusions on the Single Employer Issue
The principles pertaining to analysis of single employ-
er issues were summarized recently by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals as follows:-
Four criteria have been used by the Board in de-
termining whether separate entities constitute a
single employer : interrelation of operations,
common management, centralized control of labor
relations, and common ownership . Radio & Televi-
sion Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v.
Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256
.... The Board finds no one factor controlling, al-
though it has stressed the first three factors, particu-
larly centralized control of labor relations, which
tend to show "operational integration.". . . Ulti-
mately, single employer status depends on all the
circumstances of the case and is characterized by
absence of an "arm's length relationship found
among unintegrated companies."
On this record , as shall be seen, little question arises in
the area of centralized control or operational interde-
pendence. As for ownership and control„ as of May 1,
1982, the members of the board of directors of HMI
were : Robert Stavin; Marion Stavin (Robert Stavin's
wife); Thomas F . Confer, Esq. (president of Hamburg
Savings & Trust); Lulu Ann Sheetz (Marion Stavin's
sister); and Mrs. R. J. Steinhauer (Marion Stavin's
mother).
Of the 1100 shares of outstanding HMI stock , Robert
Stavin and his wife , Marion , own 384 outright, with the
latter also possessing beneficial interest in one-half of a
trust, whose corpus included 510 shares. Of the remain-
ing outstanding shares, only 4 are owned by individuals
who are not related to the Stavins , and the next largest
singly owned block is the 146 held outright by Robert
Stavin's mother-in-law, R. J. Steinhauer.
The board of directors of HTS consisted solely of
Robert and Marion Stavin , who jointly owned 100 per-
cent of that firms outstanding stock. Robert Stavin and
Larry Hummer were president and secretary-treasurer,
respectively , of both firms, with Stavin serving as presi-
dent and Larry Hummer secretary-treasurers
5 NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F 2d 543, 551 (3d Cir. 1983)
6 Robert Stavin testified that with respect to HMI he and Hummer
were the only corporate officers This testimony was afforded while
Stavin had access to the articles of incorporation and bylaws of HMI.
Nonetheless, the parties entered a stipulation to the effect that Frank Cle-
ments was HMI's vice-president of manufacturing , a fact confii med by
Clements' own testimony Beyond this, the only other difference between
Continued
904 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As would seem to be characteristic of corporations
having strong familial ties, emergence of HTS did not
create differences in ultimate control , nor was the busi-
ness objective of the overall venture altered materially.
Thus, prior to the establishment of HTS, HMI was en-
gaged in the manufacture of fire trucks on a fully inte-
grated basis, including production, service, sales, and dis-
tribution. With the establishment of HTS, the service ac-
tivity was splintered off from HMI and transferred to
HTS. However, day-to-day supervision of those engaged
in service operations remained unchanged. Harry Close
was transferred from his former job as "service depart-
ment" manager to become "gener" al manager" of HTS.
Six service department employees of HMI, formerly su-
pervised by Close, were offered, accepted, and granted
employment, without need for the filing of new employ-
ment applications. They continued under the direct, im-
mediate supervision of Close.
As suggested, the move did not involve any real, sub-
stantive change in authority at the highest level. As
president of both firms, Stavin's control continued. His
domination of the affairs of HMI and HTS is evident
from the fact that it was his-decision to acquire the real
property, to establish a separate corporation, to spin off
the service function previously provided through HMI
to the new corporation, and to retain Harry Close as
general manager'of this latter operation.
Stavin also had the final say, in the area of labor rela-
tions.? He signed the collective-bargaining agreement
covering the production and maintenance unit. Admit-
tedly, it was his decision to offer the HMI service de-
partment employees jobs with HTS, and it was he who
conceived the terms and conditions under which 'they
would work, including the fact that neither the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement nor the Union's status as ex-
clusive employee representative would be honored at
HTS.
Common control is also manifested by the degree to
which HMI and HTS are integrated in both administra-
tive and operational areas . Thus, the service department
of HMI historically was engaged in three basic functions.
The first entailed inspection and predelivery repair work
on newly manufactured fire trucks. The second involved
servicing Hahn vehicles still under warranty. The' third
consisted of service and repair operations with respect to
out-of-warranty fire trucks manufactured by HMI.' Only
on occasion would the HMI service department work on
alien vehicles, i.e., fire trucks manufactured by a compet-
the corporate officers of HMI and HTS is signified in the Respondent's
brief, in which it is suggested that an individual named Phil Rossi is
HMI's vice president in charge of engineering Nowhere is this represen-
tation confirmed on the record
7 Stavin, in an unpersuasive attempt to mitigate his influence over deal-
ings with the Union, testified that Clements and Hummer over the years
had "a free hand in this area " He acknowledged that, as president, the
"buck" stopped with him, but then attempted to turn this aside, indicat-
ing that he always went along with Hummer and Clements, never over-
riding them. Notwithstanding the Respondent's testimony to the con-
trary, from observation of Stavin, I was impressed with the relative
strength of his presence and I stand convinced that he was the abiding,
dominant influence within both HMI and HTS with respect to the eco-
nomic destiny of employees of both firms
itor.8 Stavin testified that through HTS it was his intent
to establish a complete truck service business, incorporat-
ing the operations formerly provided through HMI, but
at a level expanded to include alien fire trucks and com-
mercial tractor-trailer rigs. The latter would be solicited
from an interstate highway and other routes proximate to
the Shartlesville site.9 However, Stavin admitted that, as
of the date of the hearing, HTS had been engaged exclu-
sively in the servicing of "fire equipment and apparatus."
Thus, HTS as established will carry on many services
identical to those historically performed by HMI.
Indeed, insofar as HMI clientele or potential customers
are involved, HTS will continue to represent a vital link
between HMI and the reputation in the market place for
serviceability of HMI products. For example, final in-
spection of vehicles manufactured by HMI now is per-
formed by HTS. In the course of those functions, service
personnel of HTS, as was true at HMI, correct minor
discrepancies themselves. As always, in the event that
HTS discovers a major problem with the vehicle, it is re-
turned to the HMI manufacturing department for correc-
tion. Thus, HTS continues to perform work which is a
vital link in the overall manufacturing, inspection, and
delivery activity of HMI. This, together with the postde-
livery service provided by HTS on HMI warranties,
would naturally tend to influence the "good will" of
HMI and, indeed, involves work, the quality of which
will likely impact on future HMI sales. At present, of the
340 customers serviced by HTS, 305 were customers of
HMI and might well continue to be, at least in connec-
tion with the purchase of new fire trucks.
The relationship between HTS' performance and the
success of HMI's marketing program is evidenced by
several factors suggesting an intent to pass off HMI and
HTS, in the eyes of the public, as related firms. This was
reflected in the name given Hahn Truck Sales & Service
(HTS), which, though incorporating the name "Hahn"
and the term "Sales," was utilized to label a company
not structured to perform truck sales. The need for
common identification was carried further by the fact
that HTS and HMI utilized, the same basic trademark
and letterhead. Finally, the business interest served by
maintenance of an "association" between service and
sales functions was acknowledged in the testimony of
Stavin set forth below:
[W]e're trying to ... have a good reputation for
a product, because sales and service-that's why we
8 The limited amount of work on alien fire equipment impressed me as
being a byproduct of space limitations rather than a shortfall in skills,
equipment, or managerial ability at HMI.
9 Any intent to broaden HTS operations to the competitive field of
commercial tractor-trailer rigs, as of the date of the hearing, had not been
implemented forcefully. There had been no formal advertising. HTS does
not even appear in the yellow pages Indeed, the signs erected on the fa-
cility are not subject to observation by vehicles on the adjacent interstate
highway until they have passed the Shartlesville access ramp. In addition,
HTS has neither tow truck nor a "tire buster," both of which would
appear to be required equipment for full scale servicing of over-the-road
carriers. Finally, provision had not been made for 24-hour service by a
mechanic As for the future, the Respondent did adduce testimony that
steel poles had been purchased for the purpose of erecting signs that
would be visible to trucks using the interstate highway
HAHN MOTORS
call it Hahn Trucks Sales and Service. I realize that
they go hand in hand. And that's why we tried to
disguise that as totally foreign from Hahn Motors.
We try to give an association between the two
companies so they felt they were dealing, even
though it was a different company, we tried to
make some association.
Other evidence reveals HTS' considerable operational
dependence on HMI. For, in addition to parts obtained
from vendors,10 as was true of the HMI service depart-
ment in existence prior to May 1, HTS routinely ordered
from HMI parts manufactured in the latter's production
department. 111
Finally, it is my observation that HTS was an operat-
ing shell with little in the way of administrative auton-
omy. It had no accounting department, and was com-
pletely dependent on HMI for those services. Indeed, at
one time, HMI employed a clerical who was primarily
engaged in performing accounting functions on behalf of
HTS. As for the processing of orders, when HTS in-
voices were received from vendors, they were checked
by Close, and then forwarded to HMI for payment. Al-
though HTS maintained its own savings and checking
accounts in a bank different from that used by HMI,
Close was not authorized to sign the checks. 12 In all
cases, they were signed by either Stavin himself or
Hummer.' 3 Accounts receivable of HTS are maintained
on the HMI computer. HMI provides Close with a
weekly printout of the receivables balance. However,
Close is responsible for collection of receivables and tes-
timony indicated that he prepared billings, which he for-
warded to HMI for entry on the computer.
Beyond the clerical work in connection with ordering,
purchasing, invoice verification, and collection of ac-
counts receivable, it does not appear that HTS, performs
10 Since its inception , HTS has used many vendors formerly utilized
by HMI. Thus, of the 136 vendors from whom HTS purchased goods
and service, 106 had done business previously with HMI and continue to
do so.
' 1 Staves testified that among the reasons prompting elimination of
HMI's service operation and establishment of HTS was a rivalry between
the service and production departments and a conflict between Service
Manager Close and Production Manager Clements. This rift was appar-
ently caused by the fact that parts requested by the service department
would frequently be disruptive of production, while at the same time
delays in providing the part requested would produce delays in the serv-
ice department. Notwithstanding the corroborative testimony of Cle-
ments and Close as to this source of friction, because HTS continued to
order parts from the HMI production department, while performing
some assembly work, it is difficult to fathom just how the establishment
of HTS eliminated or mitigated this problem.
12 It is noted that the Respondent's witnesses, at various points in their
testimony , seemed to imply ' that Harry Close possessed almost total au-
tonomy in running the affairs of HTS. Any such view would be an exag-
geration Close was not on the board of directors, nor did he serve as an
officer of HTS It is found that he had been a "hired" manager at HMI,
and that he had no higher status when employed at HTS
12 Hummer testified that HTS in the beginning had no credit reputa-
tion and no financial statement, and therefore certain vendors refused to
sell direct to HTS. He hardly appeared resolute in responding to ques-
tions whether there were occasions when HMI was impelled to tell a
vendor to bill HMI in order for HTS to obtain delivery of special parts.
Hummer did concede, however, that on certain sales to HTS, HMI was
billed. When this occurred, HMI processed the invoice but paid it, as far
as Hummer could remember, on a HTS check.
905
or is' capable of performing other administrative duties.
Thus, it was not shown to have any independent sales
representative, but, according to Close, utilizes doe
Zeller, a sales representative of HMI. Although HTS
and. HMI have separate phone numbers and are billed
separately by the phone company, they have an intercon-
nected system whereby a customer calling HMI for serv-
ice would be switched automatically to FITS without the
customer having to hang up and make it second call. It
also appears that the personnel records of employees of
HTS are maintained by HMI. Finally, employees of both
HTS and HMI are covered by a single group policy for
purposes of health and welfare.
Consistent with the foregoing, a number of factors
belie the notion that HMI and HTS were operated in a
fashion representative of separate firms pursuing distinct
economic interests. Unlike the typical arm's-length busi-
ness relationship, HMI made valuable concessions in sub-
stantial areas whereby it absorbed expenses for services
rendered to HTS. For example, the means by which
HTS compensated HMI for accounting services merely
required that a HMI clerical employee tabulate the time
spent when working on behalf of HTS. The hourly cost
of those services was the sole charge levied against HTS.
Thus, overhead costs, including those derived from
office equipment, office materials, fair rental value of the
premises, and the HMI computer were not defrayed by
any charges levied against HTS. In the same category is
the proportionate share of services rendered by Hummer
in connection with HTS' operation. Hummer is paid no
salary from HTS, but oversees the HMI accounting op-
eration and apparently himself administers health and
welfare programs on behalf of HTS,personnel. HTS does
not compensate HMI for Hummer's contribution to the
discharge of its administrative responsibilities.
Beyond these privileges, additional monetary conces-
sions on the part of HMI were associated with the estab-
lishment of HTS. Thus, in May, after an inventory, HTS
removed HMI service parts to HTS. To compensate
HMI in this respect, an unsecured, interest free note in
the amount of $50,000 was given by HTS. These liberal
terms, although clearly advantageous to HTS, appear
less prejudicial to'HMI than the circumstances surround-
ing the removal by HTS of HMI's equipment." For it
14 Close was evasive in testifying concerning the transfer of equip-
ment. The attempt to downplay the matter first emerged when Close was
asked by his own counsel to describe "the type and nature of equipment
acquired from HMI." Close demeaned the quality of the equipment, and,
in contrast to the more specific definition given about equipment that
HTS acquired from other sources, Close barely identified that taken from
HMI, testifying merely as follows:
Most of the equipment was extremely,old. In terms of service
shops we were quite equipped. The newest thing we brought with us
was the floor jack.
And some other small air tools and equipment of that nature.
However, on cross-examination by counsel for the General Counsel,
Close admitted that HTS also removed from HMI "two very old drill
presses," an "old wood saw," "a very old hydraulic press," "very old
homemade work benches," "several floor jacks," "one dipstick welder,"
and, "one stick welding machine [ofl questionable quality." Aside from
the foregoing, it took three inquiries from me before Close was willing to
admit that nothing was left behind that could be used. Although I have
Continued
906 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
does not appear that HTS compensated HMI,, even to
the extent of paying salvage value for this equipment.15
Moreover,- because of the "good offices" of HMI, it has
been unnecessary for -HTS to acquire vehicles in its own
behalf. Instead, HMI has provided a 1973 station wagon
and a "Bronco," both of-which possess dealer plates-reg-
istered to and owned by HMI. In exchange, HTS is sub-
ject to a charge of $50 monthly, a fee which also licenses
HTS to unmonitored and unlimited access to HMI's pho-
tocopying equipment.
The absence of cash exchanges between the two firms
is also in keeping with the General Counsel's position.
For, although valuable services- and parts routinely are
subject to exchange between HMI and HTS, cash is
never involved in those transactions. Instead, an open-
ended system of credit is utilized. Pursuant thereto, com-
pensation for the warranty service provided by HTS and
parts built by HMI for the account of HTS is accom-
plished through reciprocal bookkeeping entries, whereby
the-account founded on the $50,000 unsecured note pay-
able from- HTS to HMI is increased or reduced depend-
ing on which firm is providing the service.
By way of conclusion,, it is considered that the forego-
ing fails to furnish a basis for regarding HTS as a distinct
entity insulated from obligations which the Act imposes
on the, labor relations of HMI. Through HTS it appears
that Stavin effectuated little more than the relocation of
a department under the guise ' of a separate corporate
veil. Thus, HTS, by having acquired additional equip-
ment and additional employees, might well have broad-
ened the scope of the market served. Nonetheless, it has
continued -to ' remain captive to ' the established business
objectives of HMI . It is true that through HTS Stavin
sought to expand the service market to include alien fire
trucks and more comprehensive rehabilitation and main-
tenance work, but it does not appear that HTS had any
independent marketing facility, and indeed, from all indi-
cations on this record, it appears that to a substantial
extent it remained dependent on the market previously
`forged and developed by HMI .16 ' In short, ' I am con-
vinced that HTS," though a separate corporation, was
created without sacrifice in control of labor relations and
overall management or to'the basic business objectives of
HMI. The two firms continued as an interdependent and
no doubt that the HMI service equipment was not in the best of shape,
from all appearances it was still in use at the time of the hearing. In the
circumstances, the effort by Close to mitigate the value and extent of the
transfer was as understandable as it was unpersuasive. I believe that
Close's sensitivity in this area was attributable to concern over the degree
of HTS' dependence on equipment taken from HMI, which I infer to
have been substantial.
15 According to Hummer, after the removal of this equipment, it was
not carried on the books of either HMI or HTS.
rs Close made an attempt to differentiate between the services provid-
ed through HTS and the former service department at HMI. Basically,
however, subject to one exception, the mechanical work involved did not
appear to entail a difference in skills and was plainly related to other
work performed historically by HMI. The exception relates to painting,
sand blasting, and body work, none of which was available through
HMI. However, in the period preceding the hearing, painting had been
limited to two vehicles and the record fails to disclose the percentage of
HTS' revenue what would be attributable to body work. In any event,
the addition of these services would seem a normal adjunct of mechani-
cal, maintenance, and repair work and, thus, was not unrelated to serv-
ices traditionally available through the HMI service department.
integrated family venture dominated by Robert Stavin.
In such circumstances, the establishment of HTS -and the
concomitant withholding of representation rights of the
service personnel was the equivalent of "an economic
benefit at the expense of statutory employee rights, up-
setting and undermining the balance of power between
labor and management created to reflect national labor
policy." Cf. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the criteria set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Radio Union Local 1264 v. Broadcast
Service, 380 U.S. 255 (1965), have been substantiated and
based thereon it is concluded that Respondents HMI and
HTS constitute .a single employer within the meaning of
the Act. -
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the Respond-
ent in the course and conduct of the business operations
heretofore described,,during the 12-month period preced-
ing issuance of the complaint, a, representative period,
sold and shipped products, goods, and materials valued
in excess of $50,000 to points located directly outside the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits,, and it is
found that the- Respondent is, and has been at-all times
material, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1. Quite independent of the single employer issue, the
complaint alleges that the Respondent, -through HMI's
president, Robert Stavin, violated Section 8(aX5) and -(1)
by engaging in direct dealing with employees.- This asser-
tion is substantiated'by undisputed evidence. For, shortly
before May 1, Stavin met with HMI service department
employees. The Union received no formal notification
and was not invited or given the opportunity to partici-
pate in this meeting. At the meeting, Stavin informed' the
HMI service employees that as of May 1, 1982, HMI
would no longer be engaged in service work, and that as
of that date HTS would embark on a service operation
in Shartlesville. All were offered positions at HTS by
Stavin, who indicated that HTS would operate on a non-
union basis, but that employees were free to organize if
they wished. The seven employees involved were told
that they would lose their seniority and pension benefits
if they accepted employment at HTS. Finally, it was in-
dicated that those electing to remain with HMI would
have a job, though the exact nature thereof was unspeci-
fied. That meeting left open.the question of whether any
service employee refusing to accept employment at HTS
might have imperiled his job security in the event of pos-
sible future cutbacks at HMI. In any event, the offers ar-
ticulated by Stavin represented an effort unilaterally to
alter conditions of work of employees at the Hamburg
facility in derogation of the Union's status as exclusive
representative of the' employees. The Respondent there-
by violated Section 8(a)(5)'and (1) of the Act. See,_e.g.,
Otis Elevator Co., 255 NLRB 235, 242, 247-248.(1981).
2. The complaint further alleges that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the Act by trans-
ferring employees to the Shartlesville facility and failing
to abide by the governing collective-bargaining agree-
HAHN MOTORS
ment covering these employees. Having found that the
Respondent, for purposes of the Act, shall be treated as a
single entity, its bargaining obligation is subject to scruti-
ny under two independent theories.
First is the line of cases exemplified by Milwaukee
Spring Division, 265 NLRB 206 (1982).17 By virtue there-
of, an employer's transfer of unit work, during the term
of a collective-bargaining agreement and without union
assent, to another of its facilities where employees are
not represented by a union has been deemed conduct in-
herently destructive of employee rights and violative of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. See, e.g., Los An-
geles Marine Hardware Co., 235 NLRB 720 (1978), enfd.
602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979); Brown Co., 243 NLRB 769
(1979); Milwaukee Spring Division, supra. The rationale
underlying this line of precedent views the removal of
unit work as a mid-term modification of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement and, hence, absent concurrence of the
employee representative, such action violates Section
8(d) and constitutes a refusal to bargain violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5). Those cases stand for the further proposition
that prejudice to employment terms sustained by unit
employees in consequence of such a loss of work is "in-
herently destructive of employee interests" and violative
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967). This is so even in the
absence of specific proof of union animus or, indeed, in
the face of credited evidence that the, employer pleaded
an inability to afford terms of the contract and unsuc-
cessfully sought relief therefrom through renegotiation.
With these considerations in mind, it is noted that here
the relocation of the service function was unaccompa-
nied by any claim of economic distress derived from the
Hamburg contract. Instead, the removal of unit work
does not appear to have been based on anything other
than acquisition of a new facility and the Respondent's
having seized on that acquisition as an opportunity to
perform the service function at a nearby location on a
nonunion basis."' It follows on the cited authority that
by discontinuing the service function At Hamburg and by
relocating that operation at Shartlesville, while refusing
to recognize the exclusive employee representative and
failing to extend the terms of the unexpired contract to
that location, the Respondent, on authority of Milwaukee
Spring, supra, violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the
Act.
Second, and in the alternative, the same basic remedy
on the instant facts would be warranted quite independ-
ent of the reasoning set forth in Milwaukee Spring, supra,
17 On August 4, 1983, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on re-
quest of the Board, remanded Milwaukee Spring for reconsideration. On
September 20, 1983, oral argument was conducted before the Board in
that case.
rs The Respondent insists that Stavin acted on a legitimate business
consideration in creating HTS, acquiring the Shartlesville site, leasing it
to HTS, and in effect transferring HMI's service function to HTS. The
assigned business justification related to past conflicts between manufac-
turing and service that had arisen because both functions were performed
at the same facility. Although this defense might well support the remov-
al and transfer of the service function, those actions were not incompati-
ble with continued recognition. Hence, the economic defense fell short of
excusing Stavin's further determination that recognition be withheld and
the collective-bargaining agreement dishonored at Shartlesville.
907
and related decisions. For, under long-established Board
policy, mere relocation of a segment of an established
collective-bargaining unit will not necessarily alter the
scope of the unit so as to relieve an employer of the obli-
gation to recognize and apply the contract to the new
site. See, e.g., Rittling Corp., 203 NLRB 355 (1973); Ro-
bertshaw Controls Co., 240 NLRB 1260 (1979); Westwood
Import Co., 251 NLRB 1213 (1980), enfil. 681 F.2d 664
(9th Cir. 1982); Marine Optical, 255 NLRB 1241, 1244
(1981), affd. 671 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Royal
Oak Tool & Machine Co., 320 F.2d 77, 83 (6th Cir. 1963).
Expanding on the policy reflected in these decisions, the
Board in Westwood Import Co., supra at 1214, stated as
follows:
[A]n existing and effective collective-bargaining
agreement remains in effect following a relocation,
provided operations and equipment remain substan-
tially the same at the new location, and a substantial
percentage of the employees at the old plant trans-
fer to the new location.
Here, the Shartlesville facility was located a mere 6-8
miles distant from the historic site of the appropriate
unit . 19 Operations commenced at Shartlesville with
equipment formerly utilized by the service department at
Hamburg to an extent which on this record cannot be
considered insubstantial . 20 Furthermore, six of the seven
unit employees engaged in service work at Hamburg ac-
cepted transfers to Shartlesville and constituted a majori-
ty of the work force at that location until December
1982 . Later, as of the date of the hearing , when the pay-
roll of HTS had grown to 13 employees , the original
transfers constituted no less than 46 percent of the over-
all work force. 21 Moreover, the Shartlesville service op-
eration was initiated and continued without change in
the identity of immediate management. In the circum-
stances, including the continued integration of the work
performed by employees at both locations , the changes
attendant in the relocation failed to create new and dis-
tinct business operations unrelated and distinct from
those historically performed at Hamburg through HMI.
Cf. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 174 NLRB 636 (1969).
Instead , the relocation to Shartlesville entailed it mere
expansion, amounting to a normal evolution within the
framework of an established venture, which failed to
produce a material change in the class of jobs , functions,
or community of interests within the historic collective-
bargaining unit . In the circumstances, as the relocation
is The Respondent makes no serious claim that the contract contains
any language limiting the geographic scope of the established bargaining
unit . Thus, the collective-bargaining unit in art. 3, sec. 2, of the contract
is defined without qualifying language, in the following terms:
The term "Employee," as hereinafter used in this agreement , refers
to production and maintenance employees and watchmen who con-
stitute the appropriate bargaining unit.
Thus, the contract on its face fails to limit the scope of the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit to the Hamburg worksite. See Los Angeles
Marine Hardware Ca. V. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir 1979)
20 See fn. 14, supra
21 See Westwood Import Co., supra at 1214 fn. 8, and cases cited therein
to the effect that the 46-percent figure satisfies the requirement that "a
sufficiently large number of employees [be] transferred "
908 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
occurred at a ^ time when the existing collective-bargain-
ing agreement constituted a bar to an election, the . Re-
spondent was obligated to continue recognition of the
Union at Shartlesville as a part of the established collec-
tive-bargaining unit,22 and to honor the terms of the sub-
sisting contract with the Union at the Shartlesville locar
tion as part of the appropriate collective-bargaining unit
covered thereby.23 Accordingly, this alternative ground
independently supports the conclusion that in each of
these several respects the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Hahn Motors, Inc. and Hahn Truck
Sales & Service Corp. collectively constitute a single em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act. '
3. The unit appropriate for purposes of collective bar-
gaining is:
All production and maintenance employees and
watchmen, excluding professional ' employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. At all times material, United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO-CLC has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the above-
described unit within .the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act.
5. By dealing directly with employees concerning
terms and conditions of employment, and thereby by-
passing their exclusive statutory representative, the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By relocating its service operation to Shartlesville,
Pennsylvania, by refusing to recognize United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive
representative of employees at that location, and by fail-
ing and refusing to apply the terms and conditions of the
current collective-bargaining agreement to those employ-
ees, the Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain in
good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3),,and (5) of
the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, it shall be recommended that
it be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain af-
firmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
22 See Hexton Furniture Co, 111 NLRB 342 (1955). The Respondent
did not raise a doubt of majority status On the facts, it was not free to
do so, as, at times material , The collective-bargauung agreement would
constitute a bar to the raising of a question concerning representation
See Sanson Hosiery Mills, 92 NLRB 1102, 1103 (1950), enfd. 195 F 2d- 350
(5th Cir 1952). See, e .g, Pioneer Inn, 228 NLRB 1263, 1265-1266 (1977),
enfd 578 F 2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978).
23 Oak Clif)=Golman Baking Co , 207 NLRB 1063 (1973), enfd. 505
F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974). Westwood Import Co., supra at 1216
Affirmatively, consistent- with the General Counsel's
request, the Respondent shall be ordered to recognize
the Union as the representative of its-employees engaged
in the performance of unit work at its Shartlesville facili-
ty as part of the established appropriate collective-bar-
gaining unit and to apply the current collective-bargain-
ing agreement to those employees. It shall be further rec-
ommended that the Respondent make whole employees
for any loss of benefits sustained by reason of the Re-
spondent's repudiation of the subsisting collective-bar-
gaining agreement at that location, and that the Re-
spondent be ordered to -make the Union whole for dues
owing in the case of those,Shartlesville employees who
had executed checkoff authorizations prior to the com-
mencement of operations at that location.24 All mone-
tary sums due shall include interest as prescribed by Flor-
ida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).25
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed26
ORDER
The Respondent, Hahn Motors, Inc. and Hahn Truck
Sales & Service Corp., Hamburg, and Shartlesville,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discouraging membershipin a labor organization
by abrogating contract benefits, withholding negotiated
terms, or in any other manner discriminating with re-
spect to wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive
bargaining representative of employees in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit, 'by bypassing the Union and
dealing directly with employees concerning terms and
conditions of employment, by refusing to recognize the
Union for a relocated segment of the appropriate unit,
and by repudiating and refusing to apply the unexpired
contract to employees in the appropriate unit at the new
location. The appropriate collective-bargaining unit is as
follows:
24 It is noted in this connection that, even if precedent in line with
Milwaukee Spring Division , supra, were to be rejected, -the remedy here
for the most part would not be affected. Thus, with the exception of the
notice and additional language in the cease-and -desist portion of the
remedy, the 8(a)(3) and '( 1) finding sanctioned by that case is dispensable.
In short, such a finding is unnecessary to the terms of the affirmative
remedy recommended here Beyond that , as the relocation did not alter
the scope of the appropriate unit , the Board's conventional remedy, ap-
plied most recently in similar circumstances in Westwood Import C0,
supra at 1214 fn. 7, would warrant relief that would not be substantively
different from that which would derive from Milwaukee Spring, supra.
25 See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
25 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions , and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 45 of the Rules , be adopted' by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
HAHN MOTORS
All production and maintenance employees and
watchmen, excluding professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively with United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees employed in
the above-defined appropriate collective-bargaining unit,
including those employed at the Shartlesville, Pennsylva-
nia facility.
(b) Apply the terms and conditions of the current col-
lective-bargaining agreement to all employees employed
in the aforesaid collective -bargaining unit, including
those who are employed at the Shartlesville facility.
(c) Make whole employees for any loss of pay or ben-
efits that would have accrued to them under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement but for the failure to apply the
terms and conditions of that agreement to all employees
employed in the aforesaid collective-bargaining unit, in-
cluding those located at the Shartlesville, Pennsylvania
facility.
(d) Make whole United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC for dues not remitted on behalf of
Shartlesville employees who had executed valid, unre-
voked checkoff authorizations.
(e)' Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents all payroll and other records necessary to com-
pute the backpay or value of other benefits, including in-
terest, due under the terms set forth in the remedy sec-
tion of this decision.
(f) Post at its Hamburg and Shartlesville, Pennsylvania
facilities copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."27 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by the' Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including,all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
24 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
909
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC as the
exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in
the following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees and
watchmen, excluding professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT deal directly with any of the employees
in the aforedescribed appropriate collective- bargaining
unit under conditions bypassing United Steel Workers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC as their exclusive representa-
tive.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO-CLC as the exclusive representa-
tive of the employees in the aforedescribed unit, includ-
ing those located at our Shartlesville, Pennsylvania facili-
ty.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to apply the terms and
conditions of our collective bargaining agreement with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-C[O-CLC to all
the employees in the above-described bargaining unit, in-
cluding those located at our Shartlesville, Pennsylvania
facility, without the written consent of that Union.
WE WILL NOT deny benefits to you under the govern-
ing collective-bargaining agreement or in any manner
discriminate against you for engaging in activities on
behalf of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-
CLC.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and bargain collectively with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC. as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all the
employees in the above-described bargaining unit, includ-
ing those located at our Shartlesville, Pennsylvania facili-
ty.
WE WILL apply the terms and conditions of our cur-
rent collective- bargaining agreement with United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC to all employees
910 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the above-described bargaining unit , including those in the appropriate collective-bargaining agreement set
employees at our Shartlesville, Pennsylvania facility. forth above , including those employees at our facility lo-
WE WILL make whole all employees for any losses sus- cated in Shartlesville, Pennsylvania.
tained by our failure to apply the terms and conditions of
our collective -bargaining agreement with United Steel- HAHN MOTORS, INC. AND HAHN TRUCK
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC to all employees SALES & SERVICE CORP.