Hadley Manufacturing Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1954

108 N.L.R.B. 1641 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

HADLEY MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 1641
3. Since prior to April 10 . 1950, the Union has been , and now is , the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing at all times since September 22, 1952 , to furnish the Union with
information as to the names identified with the dollar amounts of the respective merit in-
creases , if any , received by said employees during the preceding year, and the respective dates
on which such merit increases were granted to the employees in said unit , the Respondent
failed and refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the aforesaid unit, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices areunfair labor practices affecting commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
HADLEY MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONand AMALGAM-
ATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO. Case No.
11-CA- 566. June 30, 1954
DECISION AND ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, herein referred to as
the General Counsel and the Board, respectively, by the Regional
Director for the Eleventh Region (Winston-Salem, North
Carolina), issued his complaint on May 25, 1953, against
Hadley Manufacturing Corporation, Burlington , North Carolina,
herein referred to as Respondent or Company , alleging that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 ( a) (3) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29
U. S. C., Supp. V, Secs. 141 et seq., hereinafter referred to as
the Act. Copies of the complaint, the charge, and notice of
hearing were served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint
alleged in substance that the Respondent ( 1) interrogated
certain of its employees with respect to their union activities
and membership and had thereby interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights gua-
ranteed them in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8
(a) (1) of the Act; (2) on February 4, 1953, and at all times
thereafter until February 16, 1953, refused to employ Mary
Evans upon proper application for employment, because of
her membership in and activity on behalf of the Union; and (3)
108 NLRB No. 224
1642 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
discharged Betsy Ann Whittemore on January 30, 1953,1 because
of her membership in and activities on behalf of the Union, in
violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Prior to the hearing, the Respondent moved for a bill of
particulars, which was granted in part, and a motion for dis-
covery of documents which was denied.
In its answer, duly filed, Respondent admitted the allegations
of the complaint concerning its corporate existence and the
nature and extent of the business transacted by it. The answer
generally denied all allegations alleging unfair labor practices,
and pleaded as an affirmative defense that Respondenthad dis-
charged Betsy Whittemore for proper cause and in the due and
regular course of business, and that such discharge was reason-
ably necessary in the normal conduct of Respondent's business
and was the exercise of proper management prerogative.
Pursuant to notice, including a notice of change of place of
the hearing from Burlington, North Carolina, a hearing was
held in Graham, North Carolina, on July 27, 28, and 29, 1953,
before Trial Examiner Loren H. Laughlin, the Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Respondent,
the Union, and the General Counsel were represented by
Counsel. All parties participated in the hearing and were
afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the
issues. At the close of the hearing the Trial Examiner granted,
without objection, the General Counsel's motion to conform
the pleadings to the proof with respect to minor variations
between the pleadings and proof. The Trial Examiner reserved
his decision on Respondent's motion made duffing the course of
the hearing and again at its conclusion , to strike evidence that
materially departs from the bill of particulars and on Respond-
ent's motion to dismiss the complaint on its entirety.
Various rulings were made by the Trial Examiner during the
course of the hearing on other motions and objections to the
admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of
the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was com-
mitted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. All parties were
afforded an opportunity to file briefs and proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The Respondent filed a brief with
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On September 24, 1953, the Trial Examiner issuedhis Inter-
mediate Report, copies of which were duly served on the
parties, in which he found that the General Counsel had failed
to maintain his required burden of proving by a preponderance
of substantial evidence each and all of the alleged violations of
the Act by Respondent, and therefore recommended dismissal
1 Through inadvertence the complaint lists January 30, 1952, as the date of discharge. Re-
spondent admitted in its answer that it had discharged Whittemore on January 30, 1953. The
record testimony indicates that Respondent did not commence operations in its Burlington,
North Carolina, plant until September 1952. There is no question but that Whittemore's dis-
charge occurred on January 30, 1953.
HADLEY MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 1643
of the complaint in its entirety. Thereafter the Union filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the excep-
tions and brief , and the entire record in the above case.
The Union' s Exceptions
The Union excepts to the Trial Examiner's failure to find
that Respondent violated the Act as alleged in the complaint
primarily on the ground that the Intermediate Report demon-
strates that the Trial Examiner was biased and prejudiced
against the Union and in favor of the Respondent; that the Trial
Examiner's credibility findings are the result of adeep-rooted
bias; and that therefore the Union has been denied due process
of law.
We do not agree that the Union has been denied due process
of law. Insofar as the conduct of the hearing is concerned, no
charge of bias or prejudice is made and we find none. Nor do
we find merit in the claimthatthe Intermediate Report indicates
that the Trial Examiner was biased and prejudiced against the
Union and in favor of the Employer. We are constrained to find
some merit in the Union's exceptions insofar as they attack the
basis on which the Trial Examiner made his credibility finding.
We do not find it necessary to order a rehearing before another
Trial Examiner, however.
As the Board said in Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544,
In all cases, save only where there are no exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's proposed report and recommended
order, the Act commits to the Board itself, not to the
Board's Trial Examiners, the power and responsibility
of determining the facts, as revealed by the preponderance
of the evidence.' Accordingly, in all cases which come
before us for decision we base our findings as to the facts
upon a de novo review of the entire record, and do not
deem ourselves bound by the Trial Examiner's findings.
Nevertheless, as the demeanor of witnesses is a factor
of consequence in resolving issues of credibility,' and as
1 See Sec , 10 (c) of the Act, and compare Sec. 4 (a). See also Consumers Power Co.
v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. 2d 38, 43 (C. A. 6); N. L. R. B. v, Air Associates, Inc., 121 F.
2d 586, 588 (C. A. 2); N. L. R. B. v. Botany Worsted Mills, 133 F. 2d 876, 882-883
(C. A. 3); N. L. R. B. v. Laister-Kauffmann Aircraft Corp., 144 F. 2d 9, 16 (C. A. 8);
N. L. R. B, v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F. 2d 433, 437 (C. A. 5); N. L R. B. v.
Universal Camera Corp., 179 F. 2d 749, 752-753 (C. A. 2). cert. granted May 29, 1950,
339 U. S. 962.
t But only one of the many factors by which credibility is tested. See Eastern Coal
Corporation. 79 NLRB 1165, 1166, affd. 176 F. 2d 131 (C. A. 5). Compare V Wigmore,
Evidence, Sec. 1396 (1940). See also N. L. R. B. v. Sartorius , 140 F. 2d 203, 205 (C. A. 2),
enforcing 40 NLRB 107, in which no Intermediate Report was issued; N. L. R. B. v.
Brown Paper Mills Company, Inc., 133F. 2d 988, 990 (C. A. 5); N. L. R. B. v. Tex-O-Kan
Flour Mills Co., 122 F. 2d 433, 437 (C. A. 5).
1644 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Trial Examiner, but not the Board, has had the
advantage of observing the witnesses while they testified,
it is our policy to attach great weight to a Trial Examiner's
credibility findings insofar as they are based on de-
meanor. 3
3Lancaster Foundry Corporation, 75 NLRB 255, 256; Robbins Tire & Rubber Company,
Inc., 69 NLRB 440; Vermont American Furniture Corp., 82 NLRB 408; Minnesota
Mining & Mfg., 81 NLRB 557. Compare: Security Warehouse and Cold Storage Co., 35
NLRB 857, 883-884, end. 136 F. 2d 829 (C. A. 9); Bahan Textile Machinery Co., 43 NLRB
97, 100; Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corp., 67 NLRB 847, 849; Cedartown Yarn Mills,
76 NLRB 571, 573.
In the case before us we have adhered to this general policy,
but we have come to the conclusion that the Trial Examiner's
credibility findings cannot be relied on. The Intermediate Report
is so drafted that we are unable to determine whether in making
credibility findings the Trial Examiner relied on his objective
appraisal of the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and such
other
demonstrable factors as the inherent probability or lack
of probability of testimony, contradiction of a witness on
a material matter by his own contrary statement or by
another witness called by the same party; failure to offer,
produce on request, or account for the absence of support-
ing records ; and failure to call material witnesses.'
or on other entirely irrelevant factors which are reflected in
the injudicious statements appearing throughout his Inter-
mediate Report.' Accordingly, we do not adopt the Trial
Examiner's credibility findings in this case. However, we find
no prejudicial error has resulted therefrom , for, in our opinion,
the issues involved can be resolved without reliance on the
z Eastern Coal Corporation, 79 NLRB 1165, pp. 1166-1167.
s For example, with reference to employee Sarah Ward, the Trial Examiner said, "it
is very evident to me that Mrs. Ward was a volunteer , a rattled busybody , who had some
vague notion about being a 'cloak and dagger' woman , and not having been so employed,
testified mistakenly in this proceeding out of pique and frustration," With respect to certain
testimony of employee Mary Evans . he concluded "Among the other reasons I infer from the
evidence for her hostility to the employer andMorrow in particular , the following seem to me
to be paramount : First, her failure to ever make production and increase her earnings, even
after the advent of the Union, in the service of which she had apparently sacrificed her unborn
baby, small wonder , since she was keeping house, working at a machine all day, and then at
night was busy holding meetings at her home and serving refreshments to a group of women.
on some 14 evenings in about 3 weeks prior to her miscarriage; and second, her failure to
receive unemployment compensation for the month, following the beginning of her illness. I
am sure that Mary sincerely lays these matters at her employer's door, and in her immaturity
will never understand the facts of life in those regards ." And with respect to employee Betsy
Ann Whittemore, he said, "To credit her, youthful, buxom and attractive as she was, and to
disregard the contradictory testimony of many less fancy, but more solid people would re-
quire the trier of the fact to be completely 'bewitched, bothered and bewildered."'
These are but a few of the injudicious statements contained in the Intermediate Report.
HADLEY MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 1645
Trial Examiner ' s observation of the demeanor of the witnesses
on the witness stand . The Union' s request for a new hearing is
therefore denied.
In view of our rejection of the Trial Examiner's credibility
findings , we make our own findings , conclusions , and order, as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Respondent is a New York corporation , having its principal
place of business in Burlington , North Carolina , where it is
engaged in the manufacture of textile products. It annually
purchases from points outside the State of North Carolina, for
shipment to its Burlington plant, materials valued in excess
of $100,000 , and annually ships to points outside the State of
North Carolina , products valued in excess of $100,000.
We find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Amalgamated Clothing workers of America, CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act,
admitting to membership employees of Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Union organization of Respondent ' s employees
Respondent began operations at its Burlington plant on Sep-
tember 1, 1952, with approximately 8 employees . At the time of
the hearing Respondent employed approximately 80 employees.
Mary Evans was employed by Respondent in the middle of
October 1952 . She testified that she contacted the Union ' s office
in Burlington , and as a result of such contact Lucille Witt, an
organizer for the Union , came to her house in December, right
after Christmas, at which time Evans joined the Union . There-
after , about 15 or 16 meetings were held at Evans' house
between the time she joined the Union and the time of her mis-
carriage on January 24, 1953 , when she turned over the organ-
izing activities to employee Betsy Ann Whittemore. Evans
further testified that she distributed membership cards at the
plant , during nonworking hours. Whittemore also distributed
membership cards at the plant during nonworking hours, and
did not in any way openly identify herself to management as a
union adherent . The organizing campaign which was carried on
principally in employees ' homes in the evening and weekends,
culminated in a Board -directed election held on May 5, 1953,
pursuant to which the Union was certified as the representative
1646 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of Respondent ' s employees .4 Respondent denied any knowledge
of the union activities of its employees until approximately
February 1, 1953, when it became aware of the union activities
of one of its supervisors . Respondent further deniedknowledge
of the union membership or activities of employees Evans and
Whittemore until February 19, 1953, the date on which Respond-
ent received a copy of the charges filed in this case.
B. Events relating to specific alleged unfair labor practices
Sarah Ward: Employee Sarah Ward testified that "about the
middle or sometime early in January , sometime about the first
of January, about the middle of January," Roy Morrow, Re-
spondent ' s plant manager , directed her to come to his office
where he asked her if she had gone to any of the union meetings;
that she told him she had been to some meetings , whereupon he
asked her how many "about twenty?" and she said "no about
ten." On cross -examination , when asked the date of this con-
versation with Morrow, Ward said that she remembered it was
after the first or second union meeting she had gone to and that
she had told Morrow that she had been to 1 meeting , and after
that meeting she talked to Morrow in the middle of January.
She could not remember whether it was the first , second, or
third week in January that she spoke to Morrow , or whether it
was in the morning or afternoon , or what day of the week it had
been . She admitted she was not clear enough in her memory to
deny that she called Morrow over to her place of work and told
him she had something to tell him about the Union and desired
to speak with him in his office.
Morrow denied that he ordered Ward to come to his office,
but stated that she called him to her machine and asked him if
he was going to be in his office in a little bit , and he said yes.
She then said, according to his testimony , that she had some-
thing she wanted to talk to him about . A few minutes after he
returned to his office, Ward came in carrying a pajama top on
which she had been working and said , " Mr. Morrow there is
some union activity going on, and I think you should know about
it; those girls out there have a lot of confidence in me, and I
am on your side . They are going to have a meeting this weekend
and I can get some information for you." Morrow testified
further that he told Ward that any information she got would be
voluntary, and that she could go to the meeting if she wished or
she could stay away, she could join or not join as she wished.
Morrow did not remember the date of this occurrence. His
testimony was not shaken in any particular on cross-examina-
tion.
Ward ' s testimony as to the conversation with Morrow is vague
and inconclusive . She admitted she could not remember with any
degree of exactness the time the conversation took place, nor
'Hadley Manufacturing Corp., 106 NLRB 620.
HADLEY MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 1647
did she deny that Morrow's version of the incident was the
correct one . On cross-examination she contradicted her sworn
testimony on direct examination as to the number of meetings
she had told Morrow she had attended. In our view, it seems
obvious that this vague, inconclusive, and self-contradictory
testimony of Ward whose memory admittedly "was not all the
best" unsupported by any corroborative evidence is not a
sufficient basis for finding a violation of the Act.
We find therefore that the General Counsel has failed to meet
the required burden of proof with respect to this incident.
Billie Williamson: Employee Billie Williamson testified
that at sometime between March 1 and 10, 1953, she was called
into Morrow's office; that Morrow told her he had heard that
someone had "threatened her against her job" if she did not
sign a union card. She answered that there was nothing to it.
After further talk Morrow told her "he didn't want us to be
influenced about the Union, that she had only heard the one side
of it, that we had not heard his, and that later on he would see
that we heard his side too, and then he didn't think there was
anyone in the plant that would go to the Union after they heard
both sides." He also said, according to her testimony, that he
thought he knew who threatened her but he named no one.
Morrow did not contradict Mrs. Williamson's testimonyandwe
credit her testimony.
On this state of the record we find no violation of Section 8
(a) (1). Respondent had a legal right to inquire about alleged
discrimination against his employees in the enjoyment of
their rights guaranteed by Section 7. There were no threats or
promises of benefit direct or implied in his remarks, which we
find were privileged under Section 8 (c) of the Act.
Lillian Cook: Employee Lillian Cook was employed by Re-
spondent on October 27, 1952. In the first week of February
1953, she went to Morrow's office to complain about a work
ticket, which she apparently believed had been wrongly credited
to some other employee , thus resulting in a loss of 15 cents
wages to her. She went into Morrow's office and told him she
thought she was being picked on for union activities. According
to her testimony, Morrow then asked her if she had been to any
union meetings, and she told him yes, she had gone to one out
of curiosity. He then asked where the meetings were held, and
she told him she did not know because she was not too well
acquainted with too many of the girls in the plant. To his
question as to which girls were there she said she did not know
because that was her first trip. She also testified that Morrow
said he did not think the Union was coming in there and he was
doing all he could to keep it out. In response to the General
Counsel's question as to whether that was all the conversation,
she testified "Well I told him the same thing, and then we got
back on to the bundles ticket, and he told me just to forget about
the bundle rates, that I would be paid my hourly wage."
1648 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On cross-examination she stated that she went to Morrow's
office to find out whether she was being picked on for union
activities because she had heard some remarks among her
fellow employees that they thought she had something to do
with contacting employees. She admitted that Morrow told her
she was not being picked on for union activities and that at no
other time was she ever questioned by Respondent about her
union activities.
Morrow testified that Cook came into his office during the
first week of February , and she was in tears and he tried to
console her as best he could and tried to find out who it was
that had been picking on her and she said no particular one;
that he told her that he would check into this thing and see what
was going on ; that he did not know what she was talking about
and did not know anyone who would be picking on her. He denied
asking Mrs. Cook whether she attended any union meetings, or
that he questioned any of his employees concerning their
membership in, sympathies with, and activities on behalf of the
Union.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the credibility issue
presented by the conflict in Cook's and Morrow's testimony.
Even if we credit Cook's testimony and thus find that Morrow
interrogated her concerning her union activities, such inter-
rogation was an isolated incident , not occurring in a pattern of
coercion, interference, or discrimination with the rights of the
employees as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. We therefore
find no violation of Section 8 (a) (1) in this instance.
Mary Evans: The complaint alleged in substance that Re-
spondent discriminatorily refused to employ Mary Evans on
February 4, 1953, and thereafter, until February 16, 1953, and
that Respondent unlawfully interrogated Mary Evans concerning
her union activities and membership on or about February 16,
1933.
Mary Evans was employed by Respondent from mid-October
1952 until January 16, 1953, when she became ill and had to go
to the hospital where she had a miscarriage. Evans' husband
who came to the plant on or about January 22 told Forelady
Tutterow he did not know if or when Evans would be able to
return to work. On February 4, 1953, Evans reported for work
but was told by Forelady Tutterow that she had been replaced
and that Evans would be called as soon as another job could
be found for her replacement. Evans testified that on February
6 she returned to the plant with Betsy Whittemore and spoke
to Morrow in his office asking him if he had any work; that
Morrow told her that he did not have any at the present time
but he would call her; that she returned on February 9, again
with Betsy Whittemore, at which time Morrow asked for a
doctor's permit, which she obtained and brought back to
Morrow on the same day; that Morrow told her to give it to
Margaret Thompson, an office girl; that she then asked Morrow
for unemployment compensation papers and Morrow said he
HADLEY MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 1649
would give her the same papers he gave to Whittemore but
that he never gave her the papers ; that she returned on Febru-
ary 13, but Morrow did not have anything for her and said he
would call her; that when she returned on February 16, Morrow
questioned her as to her union sympathies and activities and then
called Mrs. Tutterow in and said "Mrs. Tutterow, I have asked
Mary everything, I think she is telling the truth, take her out
there and put her to the machine." Mary was then put to work.
Morrow's version sharply contradicts Evans' testimony in
several important particulars . He testified that it was on
February 6 he suggested to Evans that she get a doctor's per-
mit and that Evans brought it to him on that date. In this he
seems to be confirmedby the doctor's permit dated February
6, which stated that Evans was able to go back to work on
February 9. Also the two office girls testified that it was on
February 6 that Evans was in the office several times and not
on February 9, as Evans stated. Margaret Thompson said that
she believed it was on February 6 that Evans gave her a
doctor's permit for the files. Morrow testified that he next
saw Evans on February 9 when he told her he would do his best
to have the new girl placed by February 16; that he did not see
Evans again until February 16 when he put her to work. He
testified that he talked to her about her previous failure to
make production and that he expected her to make production
and that Evans told him she would try. Mrs. Tutterow testified
that on February 16 she was called in to Morrow's office
and, in Evans' presence , Morrow told her of the conversation
he had with Evans and Evans said "I will do my best." She
denied that the Union was mentioned. The two office girls each
testified that they did not see Evans at all on February 13.
Evans had testified that she had seen them on every occasion
that she went to see Morrow. Nor was Evans' testimony that
Betsy Whittemore accompanied her to Morrow's office on
February 6 and 9 , corroborated by Whittemore.
Evans admitted that she never made her production quota
as long as she had been working for Respondent . In these
circumstances it appears much more probable that before
Morrow put her to work on February 16, 1953, he brought
this fact to her attention and advised her of the necessity to
make production, than that he questioned her about her union
activities. This, together with the failure of Whittemore to
corroborate Evans' testimony that Whittemore had accom-
panied her on two visits to Morrow's office, and because the
doctor's certificate, dated February 9, 1953, introduced into
evidence, the testimony of Forelady Tutterow, Margaret
Sullivan, and Esther Dunne all tend to corroborate Morrow's
testimony , casts sufficient doubt on Evans ' testimony to pre-
clude us from finding a violation of the Act based solely
thereon. We find, therefore, that Plant Manager Morrow did
not interrogate Evans with respect to her union activities and
member ship.
339676 0 - 55 - 105
1650 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Alleged 8 (a) (3) violations
The complaint, as noted above, alleges that Respondent
discriminatorily refused to employ Mary Evans on February
4, 1953, and at all times thereafter until February 16, 1953,
and that it discriminatorily discharged Betsy Ann Whittemore
on January 30, 1953, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the
Act. A necessary prerequisite for the proof of such allegation
is the proof that Respondent had knowledge of the union
activities for which it allegedly discriminated against the
named employees.
As noted above, the major part of the organizing activities
carried on among Respondent's employees was carried on in
the evenings and during weekends, at employees' homes.
Though it is clear that Evans and Whittemore engaged in
organizing activities at Respondent's plant, they testified
without contradiction that such activity was carried on during
nonworking hours, Respondent denied knowledge of the union
activities of Evans and Whittemore before the date it received
copies of the charges which initiated this proceeding. The
General Counsel admitted on the record that a finding that
Respondent had such knowledge must be inferred from the
small size of Respondent's plant. However, the mere fact
that Respondent's plant is of a small size, does not permit
a finding that Respondent had knowledge of the union activities
of specific employees, absent supporting evidence that the
union activities were carried on in such ^a manner, or at
times that in the normal course of events, Respondent must
have noticed them.5
As there is a lack of such supporting evidence in this case,
we do not impute to Respondent knowledge of the union
activities of Evans and Whittemore, at the time the alleged
discriminatory action occurred, and we find that Respondent
did not have knowledge of the union activities of Evans and
Whittemore, before February 19, 1953, the date on which it
received copies of the charges in this case. Absent such
knowledge it follows that the General Counsel has not made
out a prima facie case with respect to the allegations in the
complaint that Respondent unlawfully discriminated against
Evans and Whittemore with respect to their hire and tenure
of employment. We shall, therefore, dismiss these allegations
of the complaint.
D. Concluding findings
As we have found that Respondent has not engaged in the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint , we shall dis-
miss the complaint in its entirety.
5 Popeil Brothers , Inc., 101 NLRB 1083, 1086, 1086; Goode Motor Company , 101 NLRB
43, 51; Trinmfit of California , Inc., 101 NLRB 706, 719 ; Falls City Creamery Company, 101
NLRB 692, 703 ; Stokely Foods, Inc., 91 NLRB 1267 , 1271 ; Soerens Motor Company, 106
NLRB 652.
C. P. EVANS FOOD STORES, INC. 1651
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the
entire record in this case , the Board makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Hadley Manufacturing Corporation is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
3. Hadley Manufacturing Corporation has not engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 8 (a) (3) and Section 2 (6) and
(7) of the Act.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
C. P. EVANS FOOD STORES, INC. and AMALGAMATED MEAT
CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA,
AFL, LOCAL 408 andEVANS FOOD STORES EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION , Party to the Contract . Case No. 39-CA-267.
June 30, 1954
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 19 , 1954; `Trial Examiner Max Goldman issued his
Intermediate Report in the above - entitled proceeding , finding
that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act for the
Board to'assert jurisdiction in this case, and recommending
that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety , as set forth
in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto . There-
after, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Exam-
iner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error
was committed . The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board
has considered the Intermediate Report , the exceptions and
brief, and the record in the case, and hereby adopts the find-
ings, conclusions , and recommendations of the Trial Exam-
iner.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
Member Murdock , dissenting:
I disagree with the majority ' s refusal to assert jurisdiction
in this case , because such refusal is both contrary to unreversed
precedents and to logic . Because of a seeming inability to
distinguish between operations in interstate commerce and
operations which affect interstate commerce the majority has
108 NLRB No. 237.