H. & F. Binch Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 19, 1967

168 N.L.R.B. 929 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

H. & F. BINCH CO.
H. & F. Binch Co. and Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO and Glens Falls Independent
Textile Workers Union , Party to the Contract
Glens Falls Independent Textile Workers Union (H.
& F. Binch Co.) and Textile Workers Union of
America , AFL-CIO. Cases 3-CA-2916 and
3-CB-961
December 19, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On August 28, 1967, Trial Examiner Harry H.
Kuskin issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondents had engaged
in and were engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that they cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
Company had not engaged in certain unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint, and recom-
mended that such allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter, the Respondent Company filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, as well as
supplemental exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed its exceptions and a brief
in support.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby af-
firmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions, supplemental
exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that Respondents, H. & F. Binch Co., Glens
Falls, New York, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, and Glens Falls Independent Textile
Workers Union, Glens Falls, New York, its of-
ficers, agents, and representatives, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order.
929
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HARRY H. KusKIN, Trial Examiner: This case was
heard at Glens Falls, New York, on March 7, 8, and 9,
1967. A complaint issued herein in Case 3-CA-2916 on
November 14, 1966; an order consolidating Case
3-CA-2916 with Case 3-CB-961 and a consolidated
amended complaint issued herein on January 4, 1967,
and was thereafter amended at the hearing. With respect
to H. & F. Binch Co., herein called Respondent Com-
pany, the questions presented are whether, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, it (a) threatened employees
with various reprisals if they became or remained mem-
bers of Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, or gave any assistance or support
to the Union; (b) interrogated employees concerning
their union membership, activities, and desires; (c) kept
under surveillance the Union or concerted activities of its
employees and created the impression that it was engaged
in surveillance of its employees concerning their union
membership and activities; (d) prohibited the solicita-
tion and distribution of literature by employees in behalf
of the Union on "Company premises and on Company
time"; and (e) interfered with its employees by seizing
from them, as they entered the plant, literature which had
been distributed to them by the Union outside the plant;
also whether, in violation of Section 8(a)(2), it has since
about November 2, 1965, rendered unlawful aid,
assistance, and support to Glens Falls Independent Tex-
tile Workers Union, herein called Party to the Contract,
Respondent Independent, or the Independent, by (a)
disparity of treatment on plant premises between Respond-
ent Independent and the Union; (b) prematurely extend-
ing an existing contract with Respondent Independent
and granting immediate increased benefits to its em-
ployees thereunder in order to forestall and counteract
the Union's organizational campaign among its em-
ployees; and (c) implementing and giving full force to said
premature extention agreement notwithstanding the fact
that the Union thereafter, on July 25, 1966, filed a timely
petition with the Board for an election in a unit of em-
ployees covered by the existing contract and the exten-
sion agreement; and further, whether, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3), it diminished and ceased to provide overtime
to employee Glenn Foreman on about April 16, 1966,
and did thereafter until about May 7, 1966, continue to
diminish and cease to provide him with overtime because
he joined and assisted the Union and engaged in other
concerted activity. And with respect to Respondent Inde-
pendent, the questions presented are whether, in violation
of Section 8(b)(1)(A), it (a) threatened employees of
Respondent Company that it would cause the 'latter to
discharge them or take other reprisals against them unless
they joined or assisted Respondent Independent and/or
renounced their assistance and support of the Union; and
(b) otherwise restrained and coerced employees by telling
them that it would not represent them as bargaining
representative if they supported the Union, and by
threatening them that any employee caught passing out
authorization cards for the Union in the plant or on com-
pany time would be discharged. Respondent Company
and Respondent Independent deny in their respective an-
swers that they have committed any of the aforesaid al-
leged unfair labor practices.
168 NLRB No. 128
930 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
Upon the entire record ,' including my observation of
the witnesses , and after due consideration of the brief of
Respondent Company,2 I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT COMPANY
The complaint alleges, and Respondent Company ad-
mits, that it is a New York corporation engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of yarn, thread, lace,
rubber tricot, and related products at its plant facilities in
Glens Falls, New York; that during the preceding 12-
month period it sold and shipped directly outside the
State of New York products valued in excess of $50,000;
and that during the same period it purchased directly from
outside the State of New York goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000.
I find, upon the foregoing, as Respondent Company
further admits, that Respondent Company is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Respondent Company and Respondent Independent
admit, and I find, that Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO, as well as Glens Falls Independent Tex-
tile Workers Union are each labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Some Background Facts
Respondent Independent has been the certified exclu-
sive bargaining agent of Respondent Company's produc-
tion and maintenance employees and truckdrivers since
1948. Respondent Independent has enjoyed a contractual
relationship with Respondent Company during this
period. When the events material herein began to unfold,
there was in effect a collective-bargaining contract for the
2-year period between October 15, 1964, and October
15, 1966. Thus, on April 14, 1966, the Union first ap-
peared on the scene and held its first meeting among
Respondent Company's employees . Thereafter, the
Union embarked upon an organizational campaign at the
plant among Respondent Company's employees, which
included distributing handbills to them on April 17 and 21
and soliciting their membership in the Union . Respondent
Independent responded, in part, to this organizational ef-
fort by holding a special meeting of its membership on
April 19, 1966, in two sections, one early in the morning
and one in the afternoon , in order to better accommodate
the various shifts of employees . During these sessions,
David F. Beaupre , president of Respondent Independent,
indicated to the membership that efforts were being made
to get a new contract which would be the best one they
ever had. He also sought and got from the assembled em-
ployees a vote of confidence in Respondent Independent
over the rival union. During the morning session, there
' As corrected by my order correcting transcript, dated July 26, 1967.
2 Neither the General Counsel nor Respondent Independent filed a
brief.
3 Two such petitions were circulated and they are in evidence as G. C.
Exh. 9(a) and 9(b).
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was a heated exchange between Beaupre and several ad-
herents of the Union among whom was employee Glenn
Foreman, the alleged discriminatee herein. Whether
Beaupre made coercive remarks during this exchange is
an issue herein and will be discussed hereinafter. About
this time, Respondent Independent retained Thomas J.
Angelo, its counsel herein. Angelo suggested to Respond-
ent Independent that a determination first be made as to
whether the membership wanted Respondent Indepen-
dent to go ahead with negotiations and would support the
endeavor. To this end he drafted the following petition to
be circulated among the membership for their signatures:3
Date:
April 21, 1966
City of Glens Falls
County of Warren
State of New York
We, of the undersigned employees of H & F Binch
& Co., Inc. of Glens Falls, New York and members
of the Glens Falls Independent Textile Workers
Union do hereby certify that we desire to remain as
members of the foresaid Independent Union and
further desire that said union continue to represent
us in future dealings with the management of said
company. We further certify that we have no interest
in joining any National Labor organization such as
the AFL-CIO Labor organization.
It would appear, and I find, that these petitions were cir-
culated in the plant here involved during working hours
by officers, stewards, and members of Respondent Inde-
pendent.4 Since, inter alia, this circulation was open and
extensive, I infer, and find hereinafter, that Respondent
Company was also aware thereof. At the conclusion of
the circulation, the petitions bearing the signatures of ap-
proximately two-thirds of the employees in the unit were
forwarded to Angelo. Thereupon, Angelo called Walter
Cormus, vice president of Respondent Company, and
said that Respondent Independent was "interested and
rather anxious to open up negotiations concerning wage
increases and other benefits at this time and would his
Company be receptive to such negotiations." The exist-
ing contract did not make provision for reopening during
its term. Cormus asked for time to check into the matter.
After about 2 weeks, Cormus advised Angelo that "they
would be receptive to reopening negotiations at this early
date." By letter to Respondent Company, bearing date of
Friday, May 6, 1966, Angelo indicated that "recent
developments concerning [labor] contracts of
[Respondent Company's] associated southern state
mills" made it imperative to have immediate negotiations
concerning revision of the terms of the present outstand-
ing contract between Respondent Company and Respond-
ent Independent, and asked to be advised of the first
date agreeable to Respondent Company for the com-
mencement of negotiations. On the following Monday,
May 9, negotiations began, and on Wednesday, May 11,
a memorandum of understanding was signed which was
4 Thus, there is credible testimony that William Colvin , a shop steward,
approached employees Fosmer, Gann, and Sutliff, individually, in the
work area , either while at work or during a break , and that Sullivan, vice
president of Respondent Independent , approached employees Marcellus,
Nelson, and Wallace under similar circumstances.
H. & F. BINCH CO. 931
to become effective on May 15. Thereupon, Respondent
Independent called a special meeting of its membership
for the evening of May 14, 1966, at the Knights of
Columbus Hall in Glens Falls, "for the purpose of secur-
ing approval and ratification of a new contract" between
it and Respondent Company. Notices of the special meet-
ing were distributed to employees in the plant while they
were at work, and those who accepted the notice had to
sign a receipt therefor.5 Angelo thereafter advised
Respondent Company that "the proposed contract exten-
sion agreement executed by the Executive Committee of
[Respondent Independent] on May 11th, 1966, was duly
ratified at a meeting of [Respondent Independent] held
on May 14th, 1966. The affirmative vote was 154 to 11
negative." The extension agreement, as already noted,
became effective on May 15, 1966, thus overlapping the
existing contract which expired on October 15, 1966; it
also extended the term of the existing contract to October
15, 1969. Like the extended agreement, it had a union-
security provision. The new arrangement provided many
benefits for the employees in the unit. Thus, it put into ef-
fect forthwith higher rates of pay and increased hospital
and maternity expense benefits; it provided that, after
October 15, 1967, life insurance coverage would be in-
creased from $1,000 to $3,000 for all employees, and that
employees with 15 years of service as of May 31, 1967,
would receive a third week of paid vacation; and it pro-
vided further for the adoption by Respondent Company
of a pension plan, which the latter was to fund and ad-
minister.
It was during the period from the date of the first meet-
ing of the Union on April 14, 1966, to the consummation
of the aforesaid extension agreement that Respondent,
according to the allegations of the complaint , as amended,
engaged in acts of interference, restraint, and coercion of
employees and engaged in discrimination against em-
ployee Foreman, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act, respectively. Also, during this period, as well
as antedating and extending beyond it, Respondent Com-
pany is alleged to have given aid, assistance , and support
to Respondent Independent in violation of Section 8(a)(2)
of the Act. And with respect to the allegations in the com-
plaint , as amended, of restraint and coercion in violation
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act relating to Respondent
Independent , they encompass the period beginning after
the meeting of the Union on April 14 , 1966 , and extend-
ing to about the end of July 1966.
I note also that the Union filed a representation petition
with the Board on July 14, 1966, for a unit of employees`
embraced by the above-mentioned contractual relation-
ship. This petition was clearly untimely under established
Board principles since it was filed more than 90 days be-
fore October 15, 1966, the terminal date of the extended
contract.6 It was thereafter withdrawn with the approval
of the Regional Director for Region 3. A timely petition
was then filed on July 25, 1966. In any event, it is clear,
and I find , that at the time of the execution of extension
agreement herein and its ratification there was no
question concerning representation pending before the
Board.
B. The Specific Allegations of the Complaint and
Conclusions Thereon
1. The 8(a)(1)
In the interest of an orderly presentation of the 8(a)(1)
issues herein , I shall group the relevant evidence, wher-
ever feasible , according to the representative or agent of
management involved , all of whom are admittedly super-
visors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
a. DonaldJ. Plude
Employee Gary Sutliff testified that, on Saturday,
April 16, 1966 , Plude approached him in the work area
and asked him if he had signed a card for the AFL-CIO
and when he answered affirmatively, Plude retorted that,
"if he, [Plude] caught him with any more union literature
or signing of the cards, he could be fired ." He testified
further that on April 18 or 19, as he entered the plant
holding a union leaflet , Plude snatched the leaflet, told
him that he , Plude , did not want him to pass out literature
or read literature like that on company time, tore up the
leaflet, and threw it into the wastepaper basket ; and that,
later that same day, Plude came over to him in the work
area, reached into his shirt pocket , and pulled out the
authorization cards that he had placed there.
Employee Glenn Foreman testified that, after he had
distributed union literature outside the plant on the morn-
ing of April 18 , he reported for work and had a conversa-
tion with Plude concerning a raise, in the work area, but
Plude denied his request with the comment that "so long
as he [Plude ] was foreman in the plant or worked there,
that he would see to it that [Foreman] never got another
raise. And if [Foreman] did get it, they would be far and
in between because ... when [Foreman] started sup-
porting the AFL-CIO, it put a black mark on his record
that would always be there."
Employee Charles Fosmer also testified that on May
6, 1966 , he was stopped by Plude while he was on his way
to get a part for his machine and Plude said , "I have a re-
port that you 've been sitting around on your machine and
I don't want to hear any more of this." When he protested
that he was already doing more work than he should,
Plude answered, "It doesn't matter how much work you
do, you do your work and you will be all right."7 By way
of answer to all the foregoing , Plude denied making any
of the remarks attributed to him by either of these wit-
nesses for the General Counsel. While he did admit hav-
ing a conversation with Foreman in which he refused
Foreman a raise, he testified that he told Foreman that he
had shortly before that received a merit raise, told him
that he would have to "do a little better" to get another
raise, and indicated that he could take the matter up as a
grievance through Respondent Independent. The
testimony of each of the witnesses for the General Coun-
sel was not persuasive . Thus, Sutliff appeared unsure as
to when and where he signed an authorization card for the
Union , and he acknowledged that he did not mention in
5 Two shop stewards for the Independent were identified as distributors
of the notices , viz, George Stephens and William Colvin.
6 Leonard Wholesale Meats , Inc., 136 NLRB 1000
7 During cross-examination by counsel for Respondent Company,
Fosmer testified that Plude said on this occasion that "if [Fosmer] kept
his nose clean [he] would be all right."
336-845 0 - 70 - 60
932 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
his pretrial affidavit to the General Counsel that Plude
had taken literature or cards away from him. The omis-
sion of such a significant detail from this affidavit casts
doubt on whether it did, in fact, occur. As to Foreman, I
note that, during cross-examination, he acknowledged
that he did not remember anything that was said during
his conversation with Plude, and further asserted that
whatever appeared in a signed pretrial statement which
was thereafter delivered to the General Counsel was the
fact. Yet, that statement, in evidence as Respondent
Company's Exhibit 3, placed the incident on April 13
rather than a few days later as in his testimony, made no
mention concerning a raise , nor did it refer to Plude say-
ing anything about a "black mark" against him, nor did it
attribute to Plude any direct reference to the Union.' And
as to Fosmer, he admitted, during cross-examination,
that, during his conversation with Plude, Plude made no
mention of any union , TWUA or Independent, and he
also acknowledged that, in his pretrial affidavit to the
General Counsel, he did not attribute to Plude any re-
marks as to the quantity of work he, Fosmer, was doing.
In all these circumstances, including (1) the absence of
any corroborating testimony as to these events which al-
legedly took place during working hours in work areas,
and which would, in all likelihood, have been observed by
other employees, (2) the differences between their record
testimony and their statements in their pretrial affidavits
acknowledged by them to be true when made, and (3) the
denials by Plude, I am persuaded, and I find, that the
8(a)(1) allegations of the complaint with respect to Plude
have not been established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
b. Anthony Marino
Sutliff testified that, on April 16, 1966, only a few
minutes after the incident with Plude referred to above,
Marino spoke to him in the work area. Marino asked him
if he had anything to do with passing out literature and the
signing of cards. When he answered in the affirmative,
Marino said that if he (Marino) caught him signing any
more cards or passing out literature, (he) could be
suspended from the Company. During cross-examina-
tion, Sutliff admitted that Marino referred to doing the
above on company time. Marino testified that he had a
conversation with Sutliff in April 1966, "around the time
all this goings on" in which he asked Sutliff whether he
had been passing out literature on company time on com-
pany property. However, he denied asking whether Sut-
liff had signed a card or threatening Sutliff with suspen-
sion if he passed out literature or signed a union card.
While he testified further that he asked Sutliff on that oc-
casion whether he had read the notice posted on the bul-
letin board over the timeclock, it is apparent that Marino
was in error, as the notice to which he had reference was
signed by Walter Cormus, vice president of Respondent
Company, and was dated May 2, 1966, and could not
have been posted at that time.9
There is also testimony by Foreman as to a conversa-
tion he had with Marino on May 7, the day he quit his em-
ployment, during which Marino inquired as to why he
was quitting. According to Foreman, upon his complain-
ing about his being harassed beyond endurance by
management, Marino expressed regret at his leaving and
asked him "what [he] thought he was going to get out of
this." As to this, Marino testified that the only conversa-
tion he had with Foreman occurred on the Tuesday of the
last week of Foreman's employment, that all that trans-
pired was that Foreman told him that he would finish out
the week and was going to work elsewhere for more
money; he specifically denied that Foreman said that he
could not take it any more and further denied asking
Foreman what he thought he would get "out of this
AFL-CIO thing." I am unpersuaded that these incidents
occurred either as Sutliff or as Foreman testified. Rather
do I find on the basis of the portions of the testimony of
Sutliff and Marino, which I credit, that Marino inquired
from Sutliff whether he, Sutliff, had been passing out
literature on company time and property and that he
warned him, in effect, that he could be subject to im-
mediate discipline up to and including discharge. In this
latter respect, I find Marino was taking his cue from a
provision in the contract between Respondent Company
and Respondent Independent and from the Company's
shop rules. And in regard to what actually happened
between Foreman and Marino, since Marino impressed
me as a more credible witness than Foreman, I credit
Marino's version.
c. John Armstrong
According to the testimony of Foreman , he was in-
volved in an incident with Armstrong on April 18, 1966,
as he was leaving work , during which Armstrong urged
him to abandon the AFL-CIO as there might still be time
for him to advance with Respondent Company, and Arm-
strong further told him that "there would be a lot of un-
pleasantness for the people that were supporting the
AFL-CIO if [they] didn 't drop it and get out." In view
of Armstrong 's denial of any such conversation with
Foreman, the lack of certainty on the part of Foreman as
to the date of this incident , the fact that Armstrong im-
pressed me as a reliable witness whereas Foreman did
not, I find that this 8(a)(1) allegation as to Armstrong has
not been sustained.
d. Anthony J. Seigfried
Employee Martin Woodell Nelson, who worked under
the supervision of Seigfried in the greige goods depart-
ment , testified that Seigfned told him on April 18 or 19,
1966, that he , Seigfried , had a telephone call the night be-
fore that Nelson was passing out TWUA cards and that
he, Seigfried , wanted to find out for himself. When he ad-
mitted to Seigfried that it was true, Seigfried asked,
"didn't you know that you could get fired for doing this?"
and that Seigfried cautioned him not to do this. Nelson
8 For these and additional reasons set forth hereinafter , and taking into
consideration background evidence as to Foreman appearing in the
record, I find Foreman to be an unreliable witness and not worthy of
credit.
' The notice , when posted, read as follows:
Notice to Employees
The Union contract provides as follows:
"Except as provided for in this Agreement, the Union agrees that
there will be no Union activity on Company Premises and on
Company time "
Any employee found violating this rule will be subject to immediate
disciplinary action, up to and including discharge.
H. & F. BINCH CO. 933
testified to a second incident in the first week of May
1966 in which Seigfried asked him, while at work,
whether he was passing out blue cards.1° To Nelson's
protestation that he was doing this only on "his own time
and during breaks and during noon hours and lunch
periods," Seigfried answered that he, Nelson, was "hind-
ering the new recruits." And when, also according to
Nelson, he indicated that he would be helping them and
himself to get more money, Seigfried responded that if he
wanted more money he should go somewhere else where
they pay more money. It is apparent from Seigfried's
testimony that, on both occasions, he was alerted to the
fact that Nelson was giving out literature by a secretary
to Cormus, vice president of Respondent Company, that
he had these conversations with Nelson, and that he, in
turn, sought to convey to Nelson, and also to employee
Earl Marcellus," that what they were doing offended
against company policy and that company property was
out of bounds for the distribution of union cards or litera-
ture. Thus, when asked, on direct, as to the scope of his
injuction to Nelson and others, that is, whether he "in fact
[told] them that they could not pass out [the aforesaid
items] on their coffee breaks, or their lunch breaks, be-
fore working time, after working time?" his reply was, "It
was merely on Company property during their regular
working hours. The coffee break is regarded • as regular
work as far as they were paid for it."12 In view of Seig-
fried's admitted reference to company policy13 in his re-
marks to Nelson, I credit Nelson's testimony, which
Seigfried denied, that Seigfried told Nelson that he could
get fired if he passed out cards or literature on company
property on his own time. Although I also credit Nelson
rather than Seigfried and find that Seigfried accused Nel-
son of "hindering the new recruits," I view Seigfried's re-
marks as too ambiguous to constitute a threat of reprisal
to Nelson or to the "new recruits."
e. Walter Cormus
According to the testimony of Foreman, during the
latter part of April 1966, Cormus approached employee
Tommie Burke and him while they were in conversation,
and, upon learning from them that they were talking about
damages on their machines, said, "Let's see to it that
that's all you talk about," and Cormus added, inter alia,
that "he beard that [Foreman] was campaigning for the
AFL-CIO and that he wanted it stopped and if
[Foreman] didn't like it [he, Foreman] could punch
[his] timecard because he would be all through right
then." It is noteworthy that, during cross-examination by
counsel for Respondent Company, Foreman gave two
versions of the conversation with Cormus, one in which
no mention was made of any reference to the AFL-CIO
by Cormus and another , after this discrepancy was called
to his attention , in which the reference was attributed to
Cormus. However, I note, too , that when Foreman's at-
tention was called to the fact that his pretrial affidavit to
the General Counsel said that Cormus did not actually
mention the AFL-CIO, Foreman replied, "if my state-
ment says he didn't then he must not have ." 14 Although
Cormus did not testify in this proceeding , counsel for
Respondent Company and the General Counsel stipu-
lated that, if he were called as a witness , he would deny
that he made the statements attributed to him by
Foreman. It was further stipulated that I was to make
credibility findings on the record so made and that the
parties waived any right to except to any determination
herein for want of a chance to observe Cormus on the wit-
ness stand . However, apart from the stipulation and
based on Foreman 's testimony above, I am unable to find
that Cormus made the remarks attributed to him by
Foreman . I rely, in this connection , on the differing ver-
sions given by Foreman of his conversation with Cormus
and on my prior findings herein that Foreman was not a
reliable or credible witness, and on the absence of any
corroborating testimony.15
f. John Elliott
According to employee Gerald Leslie Wallace, Elliott
spoke to him in the dyehouse office in the presence of
Foreman John Cassidy and asked him if he had passed
out literature and blue cards to somebody. Upon his deni-
al, Elliott said that he, Wallace, had no right to do so on
"company time or company property." He testified
further that Elliott also asked him whether he had passed
out a blue card at the other end of the dyehouse and he
answered in the negative. Elliott admitted, on direct ex-
amination, that he had a conversation with Wallace after
he had heard that Wallace was giving out cards in the
dyehouse, that he told Wallace not to do it during working
hours and that he might have said to Wallace that he did
not have the right to pass out cards on company time and
property.16 During cross-examination, Elliott admitted
that he had told other employees who were distributing
literature outside the mill that they were not to distribute
literature on company property. Wallace impressed me as
a reliable witness and I credit his testimony over Elliott's
denial and find that he was interrogated by Elliott as to
whether he had distributed a blue card at the other end of
the dyehouse. I also find that Elliott, like Seigfried and
Marino, sought to convey to employees of Respondent
Company that company property was out of bounds for
the distribution of union cards or literature.
10 The reference was to authorization cards for the Union.
11 During his direct examination, Seigfried admitted having a similar
conversation with Marcellus during which he told Marcellus that "[he]
didn't want - him going around passing out cards on Company property
during working hours; he had enough work to do."
11 On cross-examination by counsel for the General Counsel, the scope
of Seigfried's injuction to employees was further underscored by the fol-
lowing:
Q. Let's try to clarify this. Did you tell them that they were not to
pass out cards on Company time or on Company property?
A. If I have to say how I said it, I would say on Company time and
property, specifically both.
Q. Did you elucidate what you meant by this?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What did you tell them?
A. I told them it was contrary to Company policy to be allowed to
distribute any kind of literature on Company property and during
working hours, or during working hours, not and; and they had to
stop it. [Emphasis supplied.]
13 See Cormus' notice to employees, fn. 9, supra.
14 Foreman also testified that he did not have any present recollection
as to whether Cormus said anything about the AFL-CIO.
15 Burke did not testify
16 Cassidy testified as a witness for Respondent Company but he was
not interrogated about this incident.
934 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
g. James Ball
Ball denied Foreman's testimony that on April 19,
1966, he snatched a document from Foreman's hands,
looked at it, threw it at Foreman, and said, "You guys are
going to get yourselves in a lot of trouble reading trash
like this, and if I see you, I'll get you fired." In these cir-
cumstances , plus the fact that I have heretofore found
Foreman not to be a credible witness, I do not credit
Foreman and find that the allegations of the complaint, as
amended, have not been sustained in this respect.
h. Hans Hartung
It is not disputed that Hartung was involved on April
21, 1966, in an incident with Hartwell D. Rhodes, one of
the chief organizers for the Union. At that time, Rhodes,
together with employees Foreman, Fosmer, Marcellus,
and one or two others, was standing in the road in back of
the Raschel Department or knitting plant distributing
leaflets. At one point, the group noticed Hartung walking
in their direction. Hartung was then on his way to the
Raschel Department. Thereupon, Rhodes detached him-
self from the group, walked about 10 to 15 feet to reach
Hartung, and asked Hartung if he would like to take one
of the handbills. Hartung took the handbill and engaged
in conversation with Rhodes. The burden of the conver-
sation revolved around the following statement appearing
in the upper part of the leaflet: "Ask yourself why your
present dependent (on the Company) union is working
hand and glove with the Company." The exact nature of
this conversation is in issue. According to Rhodes, Har-
tung stood aside and appeared to be reading the leaflet.
Hartung then said, "Yes, that's right, we play hand and
glove. If you fellows get in, we'll move the plant." Em-
ployees Foreman, Fosmer, and Marcellus corroborated
Rhodes in large part, except that Foreman and Marcellus
attributed to Hartung a threat to close the plant if the CIO
got into the plant and that Fosmer attributed to Hartung
a threat to close the plant and move it to another place.''
Hartung, on the other hand, gave this version. When
handing him the pamphlet, Rhodes inquired as to how he
liked it. As to the "hand and glove" remark attributed to
him, Hartung testified, "it did not come from me. I
presume it was in the pamphlet at the time and to me,
hand and glove meant co-operation and to me I didn't
mean anything wrong with it." He testified further that he
"might have" used the words, "Yes, that's right we play
hand and glove together." Hartung specifically denied
that he said that if the TWUA gets in Respondent Com-
pany will move the plant. Hartung impressed me as a reli-
able witness. In view of the fact that Hartung was ap-
proached by Rhodes with the handbill and pressed by
Rhodes for his appraisal of the handbill, the fact that he
merely parroted the language in the handbill, the implica-
tion from Foreman 's and Marcellus ' omission from their
pretrial affidavits to the General Counsel of any reference
to such a remark that they did not regard such a remark to
be of consequence, I am persuaded that Hartung was af-
firming the fact that there was cooperation between
Respondent Company and Respondent Independent, the
incumbent union, and that his remark carried no implica-
tion that such cooperation exceeded permissible bounds.
Under all the circumstances, and in view of the diver-
gence in the testimony of the witnesses for the General
Counsel with respect to the alleged accompanying threat
by Hartung, I credit Hartung's denial thereof and find
that he did not threaten to move or close the plant if the
AFL-CIO were successful in organizing the employees.
i. Sheridan Thomas Cavanaugh
It is clear that-there was a meeting in Cavanaugh's of-
fice on or about May 4, 1966, to consider Foreman's
complaint about not getting enough overtime and that
Foreman, Plude, Beaupre, and Cavanaugh were present.
The substance of the allegation as to denial or curtailment
of overtime to Foreman will be considered at another
point. The instant reference is to certain remarks al-
legedly violative of Section 8(a)(1) attributed to
Cavanaugh by Foreman. Cavanaugh denied Foreman's
testimony that the AFL-CIO was mentioned in connec-
tion with the discussion of overtime, that he spoke about
a "black mark" on Foreman's record, or that he inquired
about the filing of unfair labor practice charges as to over-
time by Foreman. As to the latter, Cavanaugh denied that
he knew anything about such charges. In fact, charges
were not filed herein by the Union until May 13, 1966.18
In these circumstances, plus the fact that Plude cor-
roborated Cavanaugh in the above respects, and the
further fact that I have heretofore not credited Foreman,
I credit Cavanaugh's denials and find that the allegations
of the complaint, as amended, have not been sustained in
this respect.
j. The company shop rules and the notice to employees
As part of the 8 (a)(1) allegation , the complaint, as
amended, alleges interference with employees by
prohibiting union activity, solicitation, and distribution of
written literature "on Company premises and on Com-
pany time." In support thereof, the General Counsel
points to the company shop rules which were current dur-
ing the times material herein and to the notice to em-
ployees. The shop rules, in relevant part, set forth
prohibitions against soliciting or collecting contributions
and against distributing any written or printed literature
on "Corporation premises" without authorization, and
provide for a warning for the first offense; another warn-
ing for the second offense plus a layoff up to 1 week; and
a discharge for the third offense. The notice to employees
has been set forth in full heretofore. It was signed by
Walter Cormus, vice president, was dated May 2, 1966,
and was posted on the bulletin board over the timeclock
in the Raschel Department. It set forth the actual provi-
sion in the existing contract between Respondent Com-
pany and Respondent Independent enjoining union ac-
tivity on "Company premises and on Company time" and
threatened immediate disciplinary action, up to and in-
cluding discharge for its violation. The penalty aspect of
this notice, I find, was a reiteration of the penalties set
forth in the company shop rules. It is also apparent, as I
11 Both Foreman and Marcellus acknowledged that their respective
pretrial statements to the General Counsel made no mention of a "work-
ing hand and glove " remark by Hartung.
18 Foreman's testimony was, in part, that, when asked by Cavanaugh,
he had told Cavanaugh that he had filed such charges. When, on cross-ex-
amination, counsel for Respondent Company pointed out to Foreman that
it would have been chronologically impossible for charges to have been
extant at the time of the May 4 meeting with Cavanaugh , Foreman an-
swered , mockingly , "that's nice."
H. & F. BINCH CO. 935
have heretofore found, that during the time of organiza- the Steelworkers case, the Supreme Court held that an
tional activity herein by the Union, Supervisors Elliott, employer - even without a contract prohibition gained
Seigfried, and Marino took action to prohibit the distribu- through collective bargaining - could enforce a no-sol-
tion of union cards or literature on company property. icitation no-distribution rule against employees on com-
pany property unless the General Counsel shows the
k. Conclusions as to the 8(a)(1) allegations
It is apparent from my findings above that the 8(a)(1)
aspect of the General Counsel's case narrows itself down
to whether Respondent Company's shop rules and the
provision in its contract with Respondent Independent,
relating to union activity on company premises and on
company time, as well as the enforcement thereof, vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. With respect to the shop
rules, the Board has held that a rule, which prohibits sol-
icitation during nonworking time in either work or non-
work areas or which prohibits the distribution of litera-
ture during nonworking time in nonwork plant areas, is
presumptively invalid, absent special circumstance which
would rebut the presumption. The shop rules herein, in
effect, impose such prohibitions as to both solicitation
and distribution and no special circumstances were ad-
vanced by Respondent Company to support the breadth
of it shop rules.19 It is also clear that the fact that a rule
relating to union activity is set forth in the collective-bar-
gaining agreement between an employer and a union
renders the rule valid only to the extent that it applies to,
or was intended to apply to, activity on behalf of the in-
cumbent union, and invalid to the extent that the rule ap-
plies to or was intended to apply to, (1) solicitation during
nonworking time in opposition to the incumbent union or
in favor of, or in opposition to, any other labor organ-
ization20 and (2) to distribution during nonworking time
in nonwork areas in opposition to the incumbent union or
in opposition to, or in favor of, any other labor organiza-
tion.
In its brief, Respondent Company recognizes, in effect,
that current Board authority holds that the fact that an
employer and an incumbent union have agreed by con-
tract to outlaw union activity on company time and com-
pany property is not a defense to employer conduct which
seeks to prohibit union activity on such a broad basis, as
here. However, it points to the reversal of the Board by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the Gale
Products case, supra, and by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in the Armco Steel Corporation case, supra,
and argues that "the difficulty the Board is having with
the Circuit Courts in enforcement concerning this issue
is a failure to properly apply the necessary principle set
out by the U. S. Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. United
Steelworkers of America, CIO [357 U.S. 357, 363]. In
11 See Midwest Timer Service, Inc., 163 NLRB 810; and Stoddard-
Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615
20 Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 156 NLRB 872; Armco Steel Cor-
poration, 148 NLRB 1179, enforcement denied 344 F.2d 621 (C.A. 6);
Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142 NLRB 1246, en-
forcement denied 337 F 2d 390 (C A. 7).
21 See, in this connection, General Motors Corporation, 158 NLRB
1723, where the Board said, "There surely are limits to a union's power to
waive the individual statutory rights of employees; a provision in a con-
tract, however otherwise advantageous to the employees, in which the
union promised that the employees would not, during the term of the con-
tract, file a petition for decertification, would be clearly invalid. The
present effort to debar employees, in a significant way, from their legal
right to encourage a change of union representative similarly infringes
upon a right deeply rooted in the Act: the employees' freedom to change
their bargaining agent This attempt to impede that free choice, un-
mitigated as it is by any persuasive countervailing considerations, must be
absence of an alternative means of communication."
However, Respondent Company's reliance upon this
case which was decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1958 is misplaced. That case did not involve the
validity of a no-solicitation no-distribution rule, as here,
but rather, as the Circuit Court for the Second Circuit
said in N.L.R.B. v. UnitedAircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128,
131 (C.A. 2), "the `very narrow and almost abstract
question' whether, when an employer engages in antiu-
nion solicitation in a manner forbidden to his employees
by an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule, it is an unfair
labor practice to enforce the rule against them. In this
context the [United States Supreme] Court held the con-
sideration of available alternatives to be relevant. This is
clearly distinguishable from a case where the justifiable-
ness of the no-solicitation rule is in question, rather than
the propriety of the employer' s use of the means he had
forbidden to the employees." Furthermore, in the Armco
case, supra at p. 1185, decided in 1964, the Board con-
sidered and rejected the alternative means of communica-
tion argument in the context present here, pointing out
that, "The presumption of invalidity is not overcome by
the fact emphasized by Armco that its employees may ef-
fectively be reached through other communications
media. This is not a relevant argument in the case where
the statutory rights of employees, as distinguished from
nonemployees, are affected by a no-distribution rule. '121
In all these circumstances, I find that the contract clause
is invalid insofar as it prohibits any distribution of litera-
ture during nonworktime in nonwork areas and any sol-
icitation of membership on nonworktime in behalf of the
labor organization other than Respondent Independent,
because it interferes with the employees' right to freely
select their representative as guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act. And, similarly, Respondent Company's shop
rules which prohibit, irrespective of the union involved,
solicitation or collecting contributions or distribution of
any written or printed literature on "Corporation
premises" without authorization, likewise interfere with
such employee rights because of their broad application,
without any special circumstances being shown. I also
find further that Respondent Company by enforcing these
shop rules and the contract clause through acts of inter-
rogation and threats further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Thus, I have found that Seigfried told employee Nel-
son that he could get fired if he passed out cards or litera-
held invalid."
Also applicable is the observation in N.L.R B. v. United Aircraft Corp.,
supra, p. 130 that, "The chances are negligible that alternatives equivalent
to solicitation in the plant itself would exist . In the plant the entire work
force may be contacted by a relatively small number of employees with lit-
tle expense. The solicitors have the opportunity for personal confronta-
tion, so that they can present their message with maximum persuasive-
ness. In contrast , the predictable alternatives bear without exception the
flaws of greater expense and effort , and a lower degree of effectiveness.
Mailed material would be typically lost in the daily flood of printed matter
which passes with little impact from mailbox to wastebasket. Television
and radio appeals, where not precluded entirely by cost, would suffer from
competition with the family 's favorite programs and at best would not
compare with personal solicitation . Newspaper advertisements are sub-
ject to similar objections. Sidewalks and street comers are subject to the
vicissitudes of climate and often force solicitation at awkward times, as
when employees are hurrying to or from work."
936 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ture on company property on his own time; that Elliott in-
terrogated employee Wallace as to whether he had dis-
tributed a blue card at the other end of the dyehouse; that
Elliott, like Seigfried, told employees that company pro-
perty was out of bounds for the distribution of union
cards or literature, and that Marino inquired from em-
ployee Sutliff whether he had been passing out literature
on company time and property and warned him, in effect,
that he could be subject to immediate discipline up to and
including discharge, and, finally, Respondent Company
posted its "Notice to Employees" over the timeclock in
the Raschel Department, and therein warned employees
that a breach thereof would result in discipline up to and
including discharge.
2. The 8(a)(2)
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Respondent
has, since November 2, 1965, rendered unlawful aid,
assistance , and support to Respondent Independent in
various ways, in addition to, but not limited to, the con-
duct alleged as Section 8(a)(1). I shall treat with the
evidence under topical headings corresponding to each
aspect of the allegation.
a. The revenues realized by Respondent Independent
from vending machines
There have been vending machines in the two
buildings , which comprise the plant operations at Glens
Falls, for over 18 years. During that period , Respondent
Independent has, under an oral agreement with Patrick
Vending Company , policed these machines by taking
general care of them , remedying complaints from the
vending company, guarding against abuse , and making
refunds. Five percent of the revenue from these machines
has gone to Respondent Independent and another five
percent to the individual who operates the cafeteria on
the premises to compensate for business lost by him to
the machines . Respondent makes available the space on
the plant floor for the machines , but is not a party to the
arrangement with the vending company and receives no
revenue from the machines . In the summer of 1965, as a
result of talks initiated by Respondent Independent with
Patrick Vending Company and after getting permission
of Respondent Company, the number of machines in the
plant was increased . There have been no changes in the
arrangements described above . However , the increased
revenue has made it possible for Respondent Independ-
ent to start its own retirement fund ; it allots half of the
revenue thereto . Revenues to Respondent Independent
for a yearly period have totaled about $ 1000 for the
retirement fund and about $ 1000 for general use. In con-
trast , membership dues normally have totaled about
$9000.
It is thus apparent that Respondent Company has, as
alleged in the complaint , as amended , permitted Respond-
ent Independent to utilize revenues from vending
machines in the plant . However , because the increased
revenues in 1965 antedated the critical period herein by
about a year and because this was merely an extension of
a longstanding arrangement between Respondent Com-
pany and the Independent, I draw no conclusions from
such permission adverse to Respondent Company.
b. Circulation on plant premises of Respondent
Independent's petition renewing employees support
for it and rejecting the Union
Credited testimony22 establishes that two identical
documents, referred to above, expressing renewal of sup-
port for Respondent Independent and rejecting the Union
was prepared by counsel for Respondent Independent
herein , and, on his advice , was circulated among the em-
ployees on or about April 21, 1966, that employees were
approached to sign these documents either while on their
work breaks or while at work by officers and members of
Respondent Independent. Among the latter were Sul-
livan, its vice president, and Colvin, a shop steward. In
all, about 238 signatures were obtained among the ap-
proximately 370 employees of Respondent Company.
While there is no direct testimony that supervisors ob-
served the petitions being circulated, credited testimony
also establishes that Supervisors Seigfried and Plude
were in the immediate vicinity of such circulation at times
and that Foreman Cassidy's attention was called to the
circulation activity by Wallace.23 In all these circum-
stances, I am persuaded, and find, that Respondent Com-
pany was aware of the circulation by representatives of
Respondent Independent of the aforesaid petitions on
plant premises to employees either at work or on their
breaks and acquiesced therein.
c. Circulation on plant premises of notice advising
employees of a special meeting of Respondent
Credited testimony24 also establishes that notices of a
special meeting of Respondent Independent on May 14,
1966, for the purpose of getting ratification by the mem-
bership of the new extension agreement just reached with
the Respondent Company were circulated at the direction
of Beaupre , president of Respondent Independent, to em-
ployees, and that Shop Stewards Colvin and George
Stephens approached employees while at work and
handed such notices only to employees who were willing
to sign a receipt therefor. Here, too, I infer, and find, that
management was aware of this open activity by repre-
sentatives of the Independent during working hours in
the plant and acquiesced therein.
d. Disparity of treatment between Respondent
Independent and the Union
Jack Rubenstein, the State director of the Union,
testified credibly, and without contradiction, that about
the middle of April 1966, he requested of Vice President
Cormus25 the same free access to the plant ' premises
which he claimed Respondent Company was then ac-
cording to the Independent. He pointed to the Company's
shop rules and said that if, despite the no -solicitation rule,
22 By Marcellus , Fosmer, Gann, Sutliff , Nelson, and Beaupre
23 Wallace testified that on the occasion when Sullivan brought the peti-
tion to him while he was at work , he took the petition to Foreman John
Cassidy and said to him , "Sullivan is up there trying to get us to sign"; and
that Cassidy had a grin on his face and handed the petition back to him.
While I realize that Wallace omitted any reference thereto in his pretrial
affidavit, I nevertheless credit him over Cassidy's denial, because I was
more impressed by Wallace's testimony than by Cassidy's denial and C
have heretofore found that Wallace was a reliable witness.
24 By Beaupre , Marcellus, Sutliff, and Nelson.
25 Cormus did not testify, as already indicated.
H. & F. BINCH CO. 937
Cormus was allowing solicitation in the plant for the In-
dependent, Cormus ought to allow the Union the same.
Cormus' reply was an outright denial, and to Ruben-
stein's question as to why he, Cormus, was allowing this
privilege to Respondent Independent, Cormus answered
that the Company had a contract with the Independent.
There is testimony by Fosmer, which I find to be more
credible than Plude's denial'26 that shortly after the Inde-
pendent had circulated its petition to gain renewed sup-
port for itself and rejection of the Union, he, together with
Wilson and others, approached Plude in the plant, and
Wilson asked if they could have access to the mill to cir-
culate a petition in behalf of the Union, that Plude went
to his office for a few minutes and returned saying that the
Union "could not put a petition through the mill on com-
pany time or company property." It is thus apparent, and
I find, that Respondent Company accorded disparate
treatment to the Union by denying it permission to circu-
late a petition or to solicit on behalf of the Union on com-
pany time and property, while acquiescing in such action
by the Independent.
e. The extension agreement between both Respondents
As already found, within a week or so of the com-
mencement of organizational activity by the Union,
Respondent Independent made overtures to Respondent
Company to open up negotiations concerning wage in-
creases and other benefits. Although the existing 2-year
contract with Respondent Independent still had more
than 5 months to run and had no provision for a wage
reopening during its term, Respondent Company, after
about 2 weeks' delay, indicated that "they would be
receptive to reopening negotiations at this early date."
This elicited a letter dated May 6, 1966, from the Inde-
pendent urging immediate negotiations, and led to the
commencement of negotiations on Monday, May 9, and
the signing of a memorandum of understanding on May
11, to become effective on May 15, 1966. The extension
agreement extended the term of the existing contract until
October 15, 1969, overlapping 5 months of the term of
that contract, and provided for higher rates of pay and
fringe benefits, some of which became effective im-
mediately and so far as appears have been put into effect.
While Respondent Company was aware of the recogni-
tional activity of the Union during the entire period from
the overture by the Independent for a reopening of the ex-
isting contract until the consummation of the premature
extension of that contract on May 15, 1966, it is also true,
as I have found, that it was not until more than 2 months
thereafter, namely, July 25, 1966, that a timely petition
for an election among the contract employees was filed
with the Board.
f. Conclusions as to the 8(a)(2) allegations
The General Counsel contends, in effect, that by enter-
ing into the aforesaid extension agreement, Respondent
Company aided and assisted Respondent Independent in
violation of the Act in that it did so with the purpose and
intent of counteracting and forestalling the Union's or-
ganizational campaign and securing the entrenchment of
Respondent Independent as bargaining representative.
Respondent Company contends, on the other hand, that
the continued recognition of Respondent Independent
and the grant by it of contract benefits, regardless of in-
tent, did not violate Section 8(a)(2) of the Act because no
question concerning representation existed. It relies
heavily on the decision by the Board in B. M. Reeves
Company, Inc., 128 NLRB 320. However, I am not per-
suaded that the Reeves case is dispositive of this issue. It
is true that there, as here, the incumbent union had been
the bargaining representative for many years and the ex-
isting contract had been prematurely opened and contract
and other benefits were granted. Also, there, as here, it
was not contended that the incumbent union was not the
majority representative when the new contract was
negotiated, executed, and ratified by the employees, and,
further, no question concerning representation existed
during this critical period. But, unlike the Reeves case,
where the contract was entered into in a context devoid
of any unfair labor practices, there is present here specific
conduct violative of the Act. Thus, I have already found
that Respondent Company had, during the critical period
herein, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, inter-
fered with the employees' rights to freely select their
representative as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act,
through the clause in the 1964 contract and in the exten-
sion thereof prohibiting union activity "on Company
premises and on Company time" and through the broad
prohibition against union solicitation and distribution of
union literature in its shop rules, as well as by the enforce-
ment of both through interrogation and threats. And I
have further found that Respondent Company, during
this critical period, rendered assistance to the Independ-
ent through its disparate treatment of the Union, in that
it permitted Respondent Independent to engage in sol-
icitation and distribution of union petitions, etc., during
working hours and at work stations, while categorically
denying the Union permission to use its premises for
union solicitation or distribution among its employees.27
The disparity of treatment cannot, in this context, be ex-
plained away on the ground that Respondent Company's
conduct vis-a-vis Respondent Independent, was the
cooperation to be expected between the employer and the
representative of its employees. Accordingly, as there is
present here specific and independent conduct violative
of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, I am persuaded, and
find, that the Reeves case is not controlling herein, and I
find further that by prematurely opening the existing
agreement with Respondent Independent and agreeing to
increased wages and other contract benefits and by
thereafter implementing and giving effect to such changes
as accrued forthwith, Respondent Company also aided
and assisted Respondent Independent. I also find that the
purpose and effect of this action was to counteract and
forestall the Union's organizational campaign and to
secure the entrenchment of Respondent Independent as
bargaining representative in violation of Section 8(a)(2)
and (1) of the Act.
3. The 8(b)(1)(A)
Here, too, in the interest of an orderly presentation of
the 8(b)(1)(A) issues herein , I shall group the relevant
21 Foreman corroborated Fosmer in all important respects and I credit
his testimony here, only because Fosmer's credible testimony lends this
testimony credibility
27 Respondent Company thus disregarded the express prohibition of
such conduct by the Independent, set forth in the prevailing collective-
bargaining agreement.
938 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
evidence, whenever feasible, according to the officer or
agent of Respondent Independent involved.
a. David Beaupre
Fosmer testified that Beaupre, the president of
Respondent Independent, spoke to him at his machine in
the plant on April 16 after he had handbilled for the
Union outside the plant, telling him that he, Beaupre, did
not want to see him handbilling or passing union literature
out "on company time or company premises or that [he]
could be fired." There is also testimony by Sutliff that,
during the first or second week in May, he was telling em-
ployee Wilson in his work area that he had just been
asked by Beaupre whether he had signed an AFL-CIO
card, not knowing that Beaupre was then behind him, and
that Beaupre then said, "I could kick you out of the
[Independent] and have the Company therefore take the
matter and you can be dismissed from the Company."28
There is also testimony by Foreman that the day after he
handbilled for the Union outside the plant for the first
time, Beaupre spoke to him in the work area and said that
he better quit supporting the AFL-CIO and, if he did not
stop, "steps would be taken to see that [he] didn't get
away with it and that he [Beaupre] would kick him out of
the [Independent] and the Company would take care of
[him] and that he [Beaupre] wouldn't represent [him]
any more in the [Independent]." On cross-examination,
Beaupre, at first, denied talking to any employee other
than Foreman about passing out cards or literature for the
AFL-CIO in the plant. However, when shown his pretri-
a] affidavit to the General Counsel, he acknowledged that
he had talked to Fosmer, Foreman, and Wilson, separate-
ly, about their distributing cards and literature in the
plant. In his revised version, he stated that he discussed
what action he would take only with Foreman29 and that,
as to the other two, he merely let them know that he had
seen them with the cards and said that they should not be
passing them out during working hours. As to his conver-
sation with Foreman, he testified further that he told
Foreman that he, Foreman, was doing something very
wrong against the Independent and as president of the
Union it was his duty to try to take-some action in some
form. Beaupre added that he did not know the exact
words he used "but this is the feeling." In view of
Beaupre's shifting testimony, his evasiveness, and his
partial corroboration of the testimony of Fosmer, Sutliff,
and Foreman, I credit Fosmer, Sutliff, and Foreman30
and find that Beaupre, in effect, threatened each of them,
and also employee Wilson, with expulsion from the Inde-
pendent and thereafter dismissal from their jobs for en-
gaging in activity in behalf of the Union on company time
or company property.
It is clear from the record that, during July 1966,
Respondent Independent passed out white cards outside
the mill for signature by employees.3I These white cards
authorized the executive committee of the Independent
to get back the signatory's blue card; i.e., his signed
authorization card to the Union. Employee Lynn Lewis
testified, and was corroborated by employees Gordon
Lomax and Gerald Leslie Wallace, that Beaupre ap-
proached him during the middle of July 1966 while he was
on company time in the dyehouse and asked him'to sign
a white card, that he returned it to Beaupre unsigned and
added that Beaupre should give it to somebody who
wanted it. Whereupon, also according to Lewis, Lomax,
and Wallace , Beaupre said , "I'll remember you." Beaupre
denied in general terms making any of the statements at-
tributed to him by Lewis and Lomax, among others.
Because Lewis impressed me as a more reliable witness
than Beaupre and because Lewis was corroborated by
Lomax and Wallace, I credit Lewis rather than Beaupre
and find that the incident occurred as he testified.32 In
view of my further finding hereinafter that Shop Steward
Converse of the Independent threatened about the same
time to get Caldwell discharged if she did not sign a white
card, I conclude, and find that Beaupre's remarks to
Lewis implied a similar threat.33
b. Richard Clear
Mary Frances Gann (known as Mary Foreman, wife of
Glenn Foreman, when she worked at the plant) testified
that, in the latter part of April, Clear, a shop steward for
the Independent, asked her at her place of work to have
her husband, Glenn Foreman, drop out of the Union
because he did not want to see either of them hurt and
that he would talk to Beaupre "to have the matters
dropped if he would get out of the campaigning." She
testified further that Clear also said that "previous em-
ployees had tried the same thing before and were soon
after dismissed." Although Clear testified concerning
other shatters discussed hereinafter, Gann's testimony is
unchallenged in the record. In these circumstances and
because Gann impressed me as a reliable witness, I find
that Clear threatened Gann that unless Glenn Foreman
stopped his campaigning, Respondent Independent
would take action against both Glenn Foreman and her
which would lead to their dismissal from their jobs.
c. Barry Converse
Employee Laura Caldwell testified that on July 26,
Converse, an admitted steward of the Independent, ap-
proached her at her work table and asked her to sign a
white card, that she refused, and that Converse thereupon
said that he was going back and tell them in the office and
that she would be fired for not signing the white cald.34
Converse denied ever handing her a white card, adding
that he did hand her a yellow paper "something like you
have with a list, everybody put their names, home ad-
dresses and telephone numbers down for a file, to bring
the Independent's file up to date," that Caldwell refused
to sign and he thereupon walked away. A copy of the yel-
low paper was not produced at the hearing, neither was
28 As already found, the 1964 agreement between the Company and the
Independent, as well as its extention, had a union -security provision.
zs Beaupre volunteered that Foreman "was the main instigator of these
three; he was the one that started it as far as I know."
30 I credit Foreman only because of the partial corroboration of his
testimony by Beaupre and the consistency between his testimony and that
ofFosmer and Sutliff.
ii A white card is in evidence as G. C. Exh 10.
ss In this connection , I do not credit the testimony of Foreman Cassidy
and Shop Steward Clear, who were also present , that Beaupre did not pass
a white card to Lewis.
as See W. J. Graham, John Graham, II, and Martin Gracey, a partner-
ship d/b/a Graham Engineering, 164 NLRB 679.
34 As already found , the white card authorized the Independent's ex-
ecutive committee to withdraw the signatory 's blue card , an authorization
card for the Union. Beaupre acknowledged that white cards were passed
out outside the mill , but he did not recollect their being given out in the
plant during working hours.
H. & F. BINCH CO. 939
there any other testimony concerning such a paper.
Furthermore, Converse did not specifically deny making
the threat attributed to him by Caldwell. In all these cir-
cumstances, plus the fact that Caldwell impressed me as
a reliable witness while Converse did not so impress me,
I find that Converse did threaten her that he would get
Respondent Company to discharge her if she did not sign
the white card withdrawing her authorization to the
Union.
d. The meeting of Respondent Independent on April 19,
1966
As already found, Respondent Independent responded,
in part, to the organizational effort of the Union by hold-
ing a special meeting of its membership on April 19,
1966, in two sections, one in the early morning and one in
the afternoon, and that during these sessions , Beaupre in-
dicated to the membership that efforts were being made
to get a new contract, the best one so far, and that the In-
dependent was seeking from the assembled employees a
vote of confidence in it over the rival union. I have also
found that there occurred during the morning session a
heated exchange between Beaupre and several adherents
of the Union and, according to testimony of the witnesses
for the General Counsel, coercive remarks were made by
Beaupre. More specifically, the record reveals that there
were discussions at the meeting concerning the accom-
plishments of the Independent and the size of the wage in-
crease to be obtained by the Independent under a new
contract with Respondent Company. In the course
thereof, an individual in attendance raised the question as
to whether action could be taken against those people
who had turned against the Independent in favor of the
Union. This individual also asserted that when the
AFL-CIO was the bargaining agent in the plant some 20
years ago, money had disappeared from the AFL-CIO
treasury. Foreman, thereupon, rose to the defense of the
AFL-CIO, claiming that it was not the AFL-CIO that
was to be blamed for the disappearance of funds but the
union-elected officials. The tension mounted at this point,
and according to the composite testimony of Fosmer,
Gann, and Foreman for the General Counsel, Beaupre,
by way of answer to the question posed from the floor,
said that all the agitators for the AFL-CIO were going to
be expelled from the independent and they would no
longer be represented by the Independent and then
Respondent Company would take care of them. In con-
trast to this was the testimony of employees Robert
Mumblo, Walter Fleming, Joseph Richard Edwards, John
Kelly, Frances Brower, and Richard Clear35who were
also in attendance. A composite of the testimony of these
witnesses for Respondent Independent is that Beaupre
stated to the, assemblage that he believed action could be
taken against those who had gone against the Independ-
ent, that Beaupre cited in this connection the section of
the bylaws referring' to disciplinary action'36 and that
Beaupre did not say that they would be expelled from the
Independent and that Respondent Company would then
terminate them . Beaupre's testimony in this regard was
not forthright or convincing. Thus, Beaupre testified that
he "might have went a little further," in answering the
question from the floor concerning dissident members,
than to indicate that steps could be taken according to the
Independent's constitution and bylaws, but he could not
recall any more. And when specifically asked whether he
had told the assemblage that he could throw these dis-
sidents out of the Independent and Respondent Company
would let them go, Beaupre 's answer was , "I don 't think
so, not that I can recall." Yet, a little later in his
testimony, he was pretty certain that he said that "we can
even dismiss them from the [Independent]." I note, too,
that at one point in his testimony Beaupre indicated that
"it's possible" that he told an employee or individual that
it was his understanding that if a member was expelled
from the Independent, the Company would have to let the
member go. In this latter connection, Rhodes, who is pre-
sident of the Glens Falls Trades and Labor Assembly,
AFL-CIO, and took an active part in the Union's or-
ganizational activity, testified credibly that Beaupre told
him during a telephone conversation, which he initiated
on the evening of April 17, 1966, that if he caught mem-
bers of the Independent distributing blue cards for the
Union or distributing handbills or in any way assisting the
Union he would dismiss them from the Independent and
they would have to be fired by the Company.
I have heretofore found that, on other occasions,
Beaupre separately threatened Fosmer, Sutliff, Foreman,
and Wilson, who were all union adherents, with expulsion
from the Independent and dismissal thereafter from their
jobs for engaging in activity on behalf of the Union on
company time or company property. In the light of these
threats by Beaupre and their similarity to the threats at-
tributed to him at the meeting by Gann, Fosmer, and
Foreman, and in view of Beaupre's reluctant admissions
on the witness stand that he stated that the dissidents
could be dismissed from the Independent, his evasive
answer as to whether he mentioned dismissal from the job
as a consequence of such action by the Independent, his
demeanor on the stand , and the credible testimony of
Rhodes, I am persuaded that the mutually corroborative
testimony of Gann, Fosmer, and Foreman as to what oc-
curred at the meeting is more credible than the mutually
corroborative testimony to the contrary of Mumblo,
Fleming, Edwards, Kelly, Brower, and Clear and the less
than forthright testimony of Beaupre. Accordingly, I find
that Beaupre, during the meeting on April 19, 1966,
threatened dissident employees , who were against the In-
dependent and for the Union, with expulsion from mem-
bership in the Independent, with loss of representation by
the Independent during its incumbency,37 and with
dismissal by Respondent Company thereafter.
In sum , therefore , I find that Respondent Independent,
by the following conduct of Beaupre , its officer and agent,
and of Clear and Converse, its shop stewards and agents,
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act: (1) Beaupre's
threat during the meeting of the Independent on April 19,
1966 , to dissident employees, who were against the Inde-
as Mumblo was chief steward at the time of the meeting ; Edwards was
then vice president of the Independent ; and Richard Clear was , as already
found, a shop steward . So far as appears , Fleming, Kelly, and Brower
were just members of the Independent at the time.
31 Article VIII of the Independent's Constitution and By Laws defines
discipline to "include without limitation , a fine , removal from offices,
disqualification to run for office, or suspension or expulsion from member-
ship" and it includes among specified acts subject to discipline "miscon-
duct or conduct , individually and/or in association with others , that is
detrimental to the welfare of [the Independent]." The article further pro-
vides for charges to be filed, for a hearing to be held, and for rights of ap-
peal from the initial decision by the executive committee.
39 Beaupre denied threatening such loss but I do not credit him.
940 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pendent and for the Union, that in addition to expulsion
from membership in the Independent, they would suffer
the loss of representation by the Independent as their col-
lective-bargaining agent during its incumbency and of
dismissal by Respondent Company thereafter; (2)
Beaupre's separate threats to Foreman, to Fosmer, and
to Sutliff and Wilson, while they were engaged in conver-
sation, that, in addition to expulsion from membership in
the Independent, they would suffer dismissal from their
jobs for engaging in activity in behalf of the Union on
company time or company property; (3) Beaupre's im-
plied threat to Lewis that he would cause Lewis to be
discharged by the Company if he did not sign a card
authorizing the Independent to withdraw from the Union
his signed authorization card to the Union; (4) Con-
verse's similar threat to employee Caldwell; and (5)
Clear's threat to Gann, also known as Mrs. Glenn
Foreman at the time, that unless Glenn Foreman stopped
his campaigning, Respondent Independent would take ac-
tion against both Glenn Foreman and her which would
lead to their dismissal from their jobs.
4. The alleged 8 (a)(3) in the denial or curtailment of
overtime to Glenn Foreman
Glenn Foreman quit his employment with Respondent
Company on Saturday, May 7, 1966,38 after having been
employed for about 1-1/2 years. During that period, he
received a couple of raises, the last one occurring about
the first part of 1966.
According to Foreman, until the first time he hand-
billed for the Union outside the plant, he had been work-
ing 10 to 15 hours a week overtime, but thereafter, i.e.,
for about a 3-week period, women who had not worked
overtime for a long time were getting overtime while he
was assigned overtime once, and only for 2 hours. It is the
claimed denial of overtime which is alleged to be dis-
criminatory; no allegation is made that Foreman's
quitting was a constructive discharge in violation of the
Act.
It is apparent that Foreman worked only 2 hours of
overtime during the period. However, I am persuaded, in
the light of the following, that Foreman was not free of
responsibility in the matter. Thus, Foreman could not re-
call whether he worked the Monday of the week in which
he quit;39 could not recall whether he took some time off
the week before that; did remember that "right near the
end" of the union activity he took some time off when his
wife was in the hospital; and specifically acknowledged
that he took time off during one of those weeks com-
plained about. In addition there is testimony by Foreman
which belies his claim that, during his employment tenure
antedating the last 3 weeks, he had been working 10 to 15
hours a week of overtime. Furthermore, I am persuaded
by the testimony of Plude, his foreman, that an operative
factor in the matter of overtime assignments during this
period was Foreman's work habits of moving around in
other areas of the plant and the need, on Plude's part, to
go get him from time to time. I note, in this connection,
that Foreman, in effect, corroborated Plude's testimony
concerning his work habits. Thus, he testified that when
he denied to Beaupre and Plude, during the meeting con-
cerning his grievance as to overtime in Cavanaugh's of-
fice during the first week in May, that he was engaging in
activity for the Union in the plant on company time, he
had "just a few days before then" stopped doing so. In all
these circumstances, including testimony by Cavanaugh,
which I credit, that there was not a great deal of work in
the plant on the day that Foreman worked 2 hours of
overtime, and the fact that I have heretofore found that,
contrary to Foreman's testimony, Cavanaugh did not
inquire of Foreman during the overtime grievance meet-
ing whether he had filed unfair labor practice charges with
the Board concerning overtime and did not speak about
a "black mark" on Foreman's record due to his activity
in behalf of the Union, I am persuaded that the record
does not preponderate in favor of a finding that Respond-
ent Company denied or curtailed overtime work to
Foreman during the last 3 weeks or so of his employment
tenure for discriminatory reasons. I conclude further that
the allegations of 8(a)(3) in the complaint, as amended,
have not been sustained and that Respondent Company
did not violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the entire record, I make the follow-
ing:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Respondent Independent and the Union are each
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. Respondent Company, by maintaining in effect a
collective-bargaining agreement and an extension thereof
prohibiting union activity on "Company premises and on
Company time," violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.40
4. Respondent Company, by enforcing said prohibi-
tion in its contract and extension thereof to the extent that
it applied to, or was intended to apply to, (1) solicitation
during nonworking time in opposition to Respondent In-
dependent, the incumbent Union herein, and (2) distribu-
tion of literature during nonworking time in nonwork
areas in opposition to said incumbent Union, violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. Respondent Company, by maintaining in effect and
enforcing shop rules that prohibited solicitation in the
plant during nonworking time and distribution of litera-
ture during nonworking time in nonwork areas of the
plant violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. Respondent Company, by contributing unlawful
assistance and support to Respondent Independent, has
engaged in and is engaging in violations of Section 8(a)(2)
of the Act.
7. Respondent Independent, by threats to employees
33 This was approximately 3 weeks after the Union held its first meeting
among employees at the plant
3° Foreman's timecard for that week, in evidence as Company Exhibit
8, shows that Foreman did not work that Monday or the following Satur-
day. The entry as to the latter date is "quit "
90 The complaint, as amended, did not include, among the specific al-
legations of 8(b)(1)(A), an allegation attributing to Respondent Independ-
ent similar conduct to that mentioned above. Because of this, and the
further fact that the remedy hereinafter set forth requires Respondent
Company, inter alia, to cease giving effect to the clause of the contract
here in question and also requires Respondent Independent, in addition to
ceasing and desisting from specific acts of interference, restraint, and
coercion of employees, to refrain from any like or related conduct, I find
it unnecessary to, and do not make a finding that Respondent Independent
also violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) in this respect.
H. & F. BINCH CO. 941
that because of their activity in behalf of the Union or
because of their failure to refrain from such activity, they
would (in addition to being expelled from membership)
suffer the loss of representation by it as their collective-
bargaining representative and dismissal from their jobs by
Respondent Company, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
9. Respondent Company has not violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
10. Respondent Company has not committed unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint other than those
found herein.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Company has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, and that Respondent Independ-
ent has engaged in such practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(1)(A), I shall recommend that Respondent
Company and Respondent Independent cease and desist
therefrom or from any like or related conduct..I shall also
recommend affirmatively that Respondent Company
withhold all recognition from Respondent Independent as
the exclusive representative of its plant employees for the
purpose of dealing with it concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
other terms and conditions of employment, unless and
until such labor organization shall have been certified by
the Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of
such employees and further that it cease giving effect to
the existing contract with Respondent Independent. I am
aware that Respondent Independent has been the bar-
gaining representative of the plant employees for approxi-
mately 20 years. However, as found, Respondent Com-
pany's conduct-the premature opening of the existing
collective contract and the signing of a new and improved
contract-was designed to forestall the pending organiza-
tional campaign of the Union and to secure the en-
trenchment of Respondent Independent as bargaining
representative, thereby precluding the free expression of
the desires of the employees as to a change of representa-
tives, In these circumstances, I am persuaded that the
purposes of the Act will be better served by requiring
Respondent Company to withhold recognition from
Respondent Independent unless and until it has been cer-
tified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining represent-
ative of such employees and also to cease giving effect to
its existing contract with Respondent Independent.41
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case,
I recommend that:
A. Respondent Company, its officers, agents, succes-
sors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Maintaining in effect the extended 1964 collective-
bargaining agreement with Respondent Independent;
provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed
as requiring Respondent Company to rescind, abandon,
or vary any economic benefits or any term or condition of
employment unrelated to union membership or activity.
(b) Maintaining and enforcing its shop rules to the ex-
tent that they apply to solicitation for or against a labor
organization during nonworking time, and to distribution
of literature for or against a labor organization during
nonworking time in nonwork areas.
(c) Contributing assistance and support to Respondent
Independent or any other labor organization of its em-
ployees.
(d) Threatening employees with economic reprisal
because of their activity in opposition to Respondent In-
dependent or in favor of the Union, and interrogating
them concerning such activity.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Withhold all recognition from Respondent Inde-
pendent as the exclusive representative of its employees
for the purpose of dealing with it concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or other terms and conditions of employment, unless and
until such labor organization shall have been certified by
the Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of
such employees.
(b) Post at its Glens Falls, New York, plant, copies of
the attached notices marked "Appendix A" and "Appen-
dix B."42 Copies of said notices, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 3, after being duly signed
by representatives of Respondents, shall be posted by
Respondent Company immediately upon the receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 con-
secutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
Company to insure that such notices are not altered, or
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 3 signed
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A," for
posting by Respondent Independent, copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director, shall, after
being signed by a representative of Respondent Com-
pany, be returned forthwith to the Regional Director for
such posting.
(d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Trial
Examiner's Decision , what steps Respondent Company
has taken to comply herewith.43
B. Glens Falls Independent Textile Workers Union,
its officers , agents, and representatives , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees that because of their activi-
4' See Arden Furniture Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc., 164 NLRB
1163, for the Board's comments on granting a cease-recognition remedy
during the term of an agreement.
42 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
41 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond-
ent has taken to comply herewith."
942 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
ty in behalf of the Union or because of their failure to
refrain from such activity they would suffer the loss of
representation by it as their collective-bargaining
representative and dismissal from their jobs by Respond-
ent Company.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its business office and usual membership
meeting places copies of the attached notices marked
"Appendix A" and "Appendix B."44 Copies of said
notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 3, after being signed by representatives of
Respondents , shall be posted by Respondent Independ-
ent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to members are usually
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
Independent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced , or covered by any other material.
(b) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 3 signed
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B," for
posting by Respondent Company. Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by said Regional Director , shall, after
being signed by a representative of Respondent Inde-
pendent , be returned forthwith to the Regional Director
for such posting.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Trial
Examiner 's Decision , what steps Respondent Independ-
ent has taken to comply herewith.45
94 See fn. 42, supra.
95 See In. 43, supra.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT maintain in effect the extended 1964
collective-bargaining agreement with Glens Falls In-
dependent Textile Workers Union; provided, how-
ever, that nothing herein shall be construed as re-
quiring us to rescind, abandon, or vary any economic
benefits or any term or condition of employment un-
related to union membership or activity.
WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce our shop rules
to the extent that they apply to solicitation for or
against a labor organization during nonworking time,
and to distribution of literature for or against a labor
organization during nonworking time in nonwork
areas.
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT contribute assistance and support to
Glens Falls Independent Textile Workers Union or
any other labor organization of our employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
economic reprisal because of their activity in opposi-
tion to Glens Falls Independent Textile Workers
Union or in favor of Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, and WE WILL NOT interrogate
them concerning such activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL withhold all recognition from Glens
Falls Independent Textile Workers Union as the ex-
clusive representative of our employees for the pur-
pose of dealing with it concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or other terms and conditions of employment, unless
and until such labor organization shall have been cer-
tified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining
representative of such employees.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of Textile
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, except to the extent that this right may
be affected by an agreement executed in conformity with
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
H. & F. BINCH Co.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fourth Floor,
The 120 Building, 120 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New
York 14202, Telephone 842-3100.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF GLENS FALLS
INDEPENDENT TEXTILE WORKERS UNION
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that because of
their activity on behalf of Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, or because of their failure to
refrain from such activity, they would suffer the loss
of representation by us during our incumbency as
their collective-bargaining representative and dismis-
sal from their jobs by H. & F. Binch Co.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
H. & F. BINCH CO.
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
GLENS FALLS INDEPEND-
ENT TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
943
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, Fourth Floor,
The 120 Building , 120 Delaware Avenue , Buffalo, New
York 14202 , Telephone 842-3100.