Gunn & Briggs, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 26, 1983

267 N.L.R.B. 944 (N.L.R.B. 1983)

GUNN & BRIGGS, INC.
Gunn & Briggs, Inc. and United Union of Roofers,
Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local 123.
Case 16-CA-10617
26 August 1983
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND HUNTER
On 14 April 1983 Administrative Law Judge
Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,'
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Gunn &
Briggs, Inc., Fort Worth, Texas, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the said recommended Order.
In the fifth paragraph of the section of his Decision entitled "Argu-
ments and Conclusions," the Administrative Law Judge refers to the
Union's "grievance letter of July 17." The correct date of the letter is 21
July. In "The Remedy" section, the Administrative Law Judge refers to
"August 30, 1983." The correct date is 30 August 1982. We hereby cor-
rect these inadvertent errors.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HUTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was heard before me in Fort Worth, Texas, on
February 22, 1983. The charge in the case was filed by
United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied
Workers, Local 123, herein called the Union, on August
30, 1982,1 and the complaint was issued on October 4 al-
leging violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the
Act, by Gunn & Briggs, Inc., herein called Respondent.
The issue presented is whether Respondent refused to
bargain with the Union within the meaning of the Act
by declining to supply the Union with requested payroll
information concerning Respondent's employees, their
rates of pay, and wages paid.
I All dates are in 1982 unless otherwise stated.
267 NLRB No. 150
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consider-
ation of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Re-
spondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Texas corporation with a principal
office located in Fort Worth, Texas, where it is engaged
in business as a roofing contractor. During the 12 months
preceding issuance of the complaint Respondent, in the
course and conduct of its business, purchased and re-
ceived goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
directly from points outside the State of Texas. The com-
plaint alleges, Respondent by its answer admits, and I
find that Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act. The complaint also alleges, Respondent admits, and
I find that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALL EGED UNFAIR L ABOR PRACTICES
A. Material Facts
The complaint alleges, and Respondent admits, that
the Union is the exclusive representative of the employ-
ees of Respondent in the following unit appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All journeymen roofers, apprentices and helpers
who the Union lawfully represents in the employ of
Respondent in the performance of the duties set
forth in Article 11, Section 1, of the collective bar-
gaining agreement in effect from May 13, 1982
through April 30, 1985 within the following coun-
ties: Archer, Baylor, Brown, Clay, Cook, Coman-
che, Coleman, Callahan, Denton, Erath, Eastland,
Foard, Hardeman, Haskell, Hood, Jack, Jones,
Johnson, Nox, Montague, Parker, Palo Pinto, Run-
nels, Shackelford, Stephens, Sommervell, Tarrant,
Taylor, Tom Green, Throckmorton, Wilbarger,
Wichita, Wise and Young excluding all other em-
ployees, office clerical employees and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
As the unit description reflects, the most recent collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between the parties is effective
from May 13 until April 30, 1985. The agreement on its
face was negotiated by the North Texas Contractors As-
sociation on behalf of the Western Division Roofing and
Waterproofing Contractors, representing the employer-
members. Similar prior agreements dating back to 1980
had been negotiated between Respondent and a different
local of the Union, Local 148. However, Local 148
merged with the Union in 1980 and, thereafter, the
Union undertook representation of Respondent's employ-
ees in the unit described above.
According to Monroe Brooks, business manager of the
Union, he first raised the issue of Respondent's noncom-
pliance with the wage provisions of the contract between
944
GUNN & BRIGGS, INC.
the parties in late 1981. In this regard, Brooks testified
that he and Robert Banks, an International vice president
of the Union, met with Robert Gunn, president and
owner of Respondent, in late 1981 and complained about
wages that were "not being properly paid" and the fact
that Respondent was not using the Union's hiring hall. 2
The record reflects no disposition of the Union's com-
plaints at that time. The same individuals met again, ac-
cording to Brooks, in early 1982 at the same place and
the Union again raised an issue with respect to the im-
proper payment of wages and Respondent's failure to use
the hiring hall. With respect to the subject of wages,
Brooks testified that he had an employee complain to
him on more than one occasion about not receiving
proper wages. Moreover, Brooks testified that he had
visited a number of Respondent's jobs and had found ap-
prentices performing journeymen's work who were
being paid only apprentice wages. Again, the record
shows no specific disposition of the issues as a result of
the meeting.
No further action was taken by the Union regarding
its wage complaint, 3 and on March 17 negotiations on
the current collective-bargaining agreement began.
Brooks testified without contradiction that during such
negotiations a "controversy" regarding wages again was
raised and Gunn stated that it was not the proper place
and time to discuss the wages. Apparently the subject
was dropped, but after the contract was negotiated, ac-
cording to Brooks, he checked back on some of Re-
spondent's jobs and again was not satisfied that Respond-
ent was complying with the agreement. Accordingly, on
July 21, the Union filed a grievance alleging that Re-
spondent had willfully violated provisions of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement relating to Respondent's fail-
ure to use the union as a source for employees, failure to
use the appropriate ratio of apprentices to journeymen,
and nonpayment of the appropriate wage rates called for
by the collective-bargaining agreement.
Pursuant to the grievance machinery provided for in
the collective- bargaining agreement, a grievance meet-
ing was held on August 9, at the North Texas Contrac-
tors Association (NTCA) office. Representing the Union
were Brooks, Odis Johnson, an International representa-
tive of the Union, and Barbara Gray, secretary of the
Union, while Respondent was represented by Gunn,
Harold Moore, John LeClercq, and Jim Schwinkendorf,
the latter three being representatives of NTCA. Johnson,
who was the main speaker for the Union at the meeting,
testified herein that in response to the Union's complaint
about Respondent refusing to use the union hall, Gunn
agreed that he would use the Union as a source for em-
ployees, but not exclusively. Brooks protested that Re-
spondent had made the same statement in the past but
had not lived up to it. At this point, and because Re-
spondent had refused to use the hall, Johnson admittedly
2 The current collective-bargaining agreement contains a nonexclusive
hiring hall provision. According to Brooks, the preceding collective- bar-
gaining agreement was substantially identical to the current one.
3 Brooks did testify, however, that the Union had instituted a civil suit
against Respondent, but that suit related to apprenticeship fund contribu-
tions by Respondent which were called for under the collective-bargain-
ing agreement That suit was settled with Respondent prior to negotia-
tions on a new collective-hargaining agreement in 1982
requested that all employees of Respondent be terminat-
ed and be hired through the union hall. Gunn rejected
the request stating that it would be unlawful. Johnson
testified he repeated his request because it had been 3
years since Respondent had called the Union for any re-
ferrals. Again Gunn refused. They then discussed the ap-
prenticeship ratio and Johnson contended that the Com-
pany had 43 employees only 14 of whom were journey-
men and the rest apparently apprentices. He then argued
that the journeymen-apprentice ratio should be one-to-
one. Gunn responded, however, that Respondent did not
have a registered apprenticeship program and when they
had one they would abide by the contract. Johnson,
however, relying on the contractual provision providing
that roofing crew makeup would be in accordance with
the ratio of apprentices to journeymen as established by
the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship
Training, argued that the Bureau standard was one-to-
one. Johnson, therefore, requested Respondent to go
back 3 years and "classify these people in the right per-
spective and . . . pay the back wages." Gunn rejected
that contention.
Johnson testified that he also argued that the Company
was not paying the employees the correct wages in ac-
cordance with the contract. According to Johnson,
Gunn neither admitted nor denied the Union's claim, but
stated that he would not pay back wages but would go
from that day forward in accordance with the contract.
Johnson suggested that an auditor be hired to audit Re-
spondent's payrolls for the preceding 3 years to deter-
mine if there were any discrepancies in the wages that
were being paid the employees. Johnson proposed that if
there were no discrepancies found the Union would pay
for the audit. That proposal was rejected even though
Johnson contended that they had proof that apprentices
were not drawing the scale and the journeymen were not
drawing the wages they should have been drawing as
journeymen. Gunn asked for the names of the people
that Johnson claimed were not getting appropriate pay.
Johnson refused to supply the names expressing the fear
that the employees involved might be terminated.4
Moore supported Gunn's request for the names of the in-
dividuals, and the issue was not resolved. Johnson re-
quested that the matter be sent to arbitration. The meet-
ing concluded with the parties agreeing to extend the
contractual time allowed for the selection of an arbitra-
tor.
Johnson's testimony was corroborated by the testimo-
ny of Brooks and the notes taken by Barbara Gray,
which were received in evidence as General Counsel Ex-
hibit 7. Respondent's version of what transpired at the
August 9 meeting was expressed through the testimony
of John LeClercq, labor relations analyst for NTCA. Le-
Clercq's testimony is largely in accord with that of John-
son and Brooks. His independent recollection of the
statements at the meeting, however, were clearly less
certain than that of Brooks and Johnson, and was based
primarily on resort, prior to testifying, of notes which he
I No evidence was supplied in the record that Respondent had on any
previous occasion engaged in retaliatory action against employees for
filing a grievance.
945
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
took at the meeting. LeClercq's notes, which were re-
ceived in evidence, appeared to be an incomplete attempt
at a verbatim record of the comments made at the meet-
ing. Because of the vagueness of LeClercq's independent
recollection and the incompleteness of his notes, I find
the testimony of Brooks and Johnson more credible than
that of LeClercq. I specifically reject the testimony of
LeClercq to the effect that Johnson explained that he
wanted an audit of Respondent's records "because Bob
Gunn would not fire the 43 people that weren't referred
out of the union hall." Such an assertion finds no support
in LeClercq's notes, and I conclude that LeClercq's testi-
mony in this respect is simply conclusionary. Moreover,
LeClercq's testimony on the point was contradictory be-
cause he also stated on cross-examination that Johnson
wanted an audit of books "because he believed that there
were people at Gunn & Briggs who weren't being paid
proper wages."
Notwithstanding the earlier agreement to extend the
time in which to select an arbitrator, Respondent admit-
tedly refused to arbitrate the Union's grievance without
the Union supplying names of individuals it contended
had been improperly paid. There were, however, further
communications between the Union through its attorney
and Respondent through its attorney. Thus, on August
17, the Union's Attorney, Marvin Menaker, in a letter to
Respondent's counsel, Steve Carsey, referring to an earli-
er telephone conversation between the two, agreed that
the issue with respect to the use of the hiring hall was
resolved by Respondent's assertion that it would in the
future use the Union as a source for employees. The
letter also referred to the Union's contention that the
ratio of journeymen to apprentices was to be one-to-one,
and noted the position stated by Respondent's counsel
that he wanted time to review the matter before taking a
position. Finally, with respect to the wage issue the
letter stated:
It is our view that we are entitled to see the payroll
books and records concerning the roughly 43 em-
ployees that your client has utilized in performing
roofing work over the past period of time. It is my
understanding of the law that we are entitled to any
records that are necessary to intelligently process a
grievance. Therefore, I request that you make avail-
able to the Business Agent the books and records of
your client for the last six months with regard to
the payroll of roofers. We will need that to deter-
mine whether or not an arbitration is actually neces-
sary on that point.
The letter ended with a formal request for arbitration.
Respondent continued in its opposition to supplying
the Union with wage data and records. The Union's at-
torney, by letter dated October 20 to Respondent's attor-
ney, again pressed its demand for records and expressed
the Union's intention to enforce payment of the correct
wages if the record revealed wage payment below what
was called for in the collective-bargaining agreement.
The letter further stated:
We take this position because a number of employ-
ees of your client have complained to us about not
receiving the proper scale as set out in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. That was the original
basis for our request for the records. Thus, our dis-
pute is not only about the providing of the records
which we have demanded, but also for payment of
the proper wage scale.
Respondent's counsel replied by letter dated October
25, acknowledging the Union's right to seek to collect on
behalf of individual employees any moneys which Re-
spondent "improperly failed to pay them contrary to the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement .... "
However, the letter asserted that the complaint about
employees not receiving proper wage scale as originally
stated by the Union on August 9 had been taken as face-
tious. The letter went on to state, however, that if the
Union provided Respondent with "some indication of the
nature of the alleged wage discrepancies," Respondent
would be willing to allow the Union to examine relevant
payroll records. But it was not willing to allow inspec-
tion of its records without the details concerning the al-
leged grievance concerning the wage rates. The letter
concluded by stating:
If Local 123 were to explain the nature of the al-
leged violations of the contract, it appears that the
grievance arbitration machinery provided for by the
contract could once again get on track and resolve
the disputes between the parties concerning the
issues of contract compliance, as it was designed to
do.
B. Arguments and Conclusions
The General Counsel argued in her brief that under
Board and court precedent, a union is entitled to infor-
mation from an employer which is relevant and neces-
sary to a union's obligation to represent bargaining unit
employees, and that an employer is generally obligated
to provide information to a union necessary to the per-
formance of the union's duties in this regard. It was fur-
ther argued that relevance of wage data is presumed and
that the payroll information here sought by the Union is
clearly relevant because of complaints received by the
Union from employees concerning failure to receive ap-
propriate pay under the contract, and because the pay-
roll information was necessary to the Union to determine
the accuracy of the complaints and to present an appro-
priate case, if necessary, in a grievance procedure. Re-
spondent, according to the General Counsel, never con-
tradicted the Union's claim of employee complaints, and
its refusal to supply the Union with the information with-
out being first supplied names of employees, dates, and
locations of the alleged failure to pay contractual rates
cannot be an excuse for the failure to furnish the infor-
mation requested.
Respondent's defense is based simply on its contention
that the Union in its blanket request to audit the payroll
was attempting to harass Respondent, and, under such
circumstances, Respondent need not supply the requested
payroll records unless and until the Union supplies it
with the periods of times involved or the job classifica-
946
GUNN & BRIGGS, INC.
tions and/or names of the employees whom the Union
feels have not been properly paid. In attacking the
Union's good faith in seeking the payroll audit, Respond-
ent contends that if the Union truly believed that there
had been a violation of the wage provisions of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement it would have sought infor-
mation relevant to the particular alleged violation and
then would have filed a grievance concerning that par-
ticular violation instead of a general grievance. More-
over, Respondent contends that the Union's intent to
harass is demonstrated by its willingness to forgo receipt
of any wage information based on alleged pay violations
identified to Respondent while it pursued "this silly
unfair labor practice charge." Finally, Respondent con-
tends that some need for the requested data must be
shown by the Union before there is a corresponding obli-
gation to provide that data, that the Union has "wholly
failed to establish any need for the data requested, and
that its refusal to make any specification concerning the
nature of its grievance with the Company is prima facie
evidence of its bad faith in making the request."
It is well established that an employer is obligated to
provide a union which represents its employees with in-
formation requested by that union which is relevant and
necessary for the proper performance of the union's
duties as a collective-bargaining representative. NLRB v.
Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). The obligation to supply
requested information extends not only to information
which is useful and relevant for the purpose of contrac-
tual negotiations, but also to information necessary to ad-
ministration of a collective-bargaining agreement.
Safeway Stores, 252 NLRB 1323 (1980); Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 239 NLRB 106 (1978). Disclosure by an
employer of requested information "necessary ... to
enable [a] union to evaluate intelligently grievances
filed" or contemplated, and thus "sift out meritorious
claims" is an aid to the arbitral process. NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., supra at 435, 437-438. However, before
the obligation to produce arises, it must be shown that
the requested information is relevant and reasonably nec-
essary for the labor organization's proper performance of
its role as a collective-bargaining representative. The De-
troit Edison Co., 218 NLRB 1024, 1033 (1975), reversed
and remanded on other grounds, 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
Relevancy is to be determined by a liberal standard, and
it is necessary to establish only "the probability that the
desired information is relevant, and that it would be of
use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and
responsibilities." NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.. supra at
437. "[W]age and related information pertaining to em-
ployees in the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant,
for, as such data concerns the core of the employer-em-
ployee relationship, a union is not required to show the
precise relevance of it, unless effective employer rebuttal
comes forth . . . "Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347
F.2d 61 at 69 (3d Cir. 1965). Thus, wage data of bargain-
ing unit personnel is "considered presumptively relevant"
and "the employer has the burden to prove a lack of rel-
evance." San Diego Newspaper Guild Local No. 95 v.
NLRB, 548 F.2d 863 at 867 (9th Cir. 1977).
Respondent does not argue with any of the foregoing
legal principles. Rather, its defense is predicated upon its
claim that the Union's request to audit the payroll was
made in bad faith and simply to harass Respondent.
Clearly, the bona fides of the Union's request for the in-
formation is a relevant issue, and in NLRB v. Abbott Pub-
lishing Co., 331 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964), the court found
valid an employer's defense that a union's request for in-
formation was simply to embarrass and humiliate the em-
ployer.
Respondent's claim herein that the Union was not
acting in good faith in making its request is based on the
broadness of the request to audit the entire payroll, the
Union's failure to identify to the Employer people
making the complaints about failure to receive contrac-
tual rates and the fact that the Union did not make the
request until after Respondent had rejected the Union's
improper request that all employees be discharged and
hired through the union hall. Having considered the evi-
dence thoroughly, I cannot ascribe to the Union the im-
proper motivation urged by Respondent. True, the re-
quest for the audit covering a period of the prior 3 years
coming as it did after Respondent's rejection of the
Union's clearly improper request for dismissal of bargain-
ing unit employees who had been hired outside of the
hall, indeed casts doubt on the good faith of the Union's
request for the payroll information. However, there are
countervailing considerations. I note initially in this
regard that while the Union refused to identify to Re-
spondent those persons making complaints to it regard-
ing failure to receive proper wages, no union witnesses
at the hearing were asked to identify such complainants.
Thus, neither Brooks nor Johnson were put to the test
regarding the validity of their general testimony that
complaints from employees had been received. On the
other hand, their testimony on the whole impressed me
not only as sincere, but very candid, and I could per-
ceive no demeanor basis for rejecting their contention
that complaints had been received. Second, in view of its
contention that the journeymen-apprentice ratio should
have been one-to-one,and since the Union had received
reports that Respondent was utilizing only 14 journey-
men out of 43 unit employees, an obvious basis existed
for the belief that at least some employees were not re-
ceiving the journeymen wages to which they were enti-
tled. Third, the uncontradicted testimony of Brooks es-
tablishes that on at least two prior occasions, in 1981 and
again in 1982, Brooks had talked to Gunn about wages
not being properly paid. Moreover, the Union even insti-
tuted a civil action against Respondent with respect to its
complaint that certain apprentice fund contributions
were not being forwarded to the Union. Without regard
to the legal merit of the suit, the institution of the suit
demonstrates the Union's belief that Respondent was not
complying with certain monetary provisions of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement. Fourth, the Union's offer
at the August 9 meeting to pay for the audit should it
reveal compliance with the collective-bargaining agree-
ment substantiates its good faith in requesting the audit.
If the Union had no reasonable belief of Respondent's
improper payment of wages, it is unlikely it would have
947
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
been willing to underwrite the cost of a fruitless (from its
point of view) audit. Last, it is quite clear that the
Union, in its grievance letter of July 17 citing the con-
tractual provisions on wages, was raising an issue regard-
ing Respondent's alleged noncompliance with the pay
provisions of the contract. The issue with respect to
wages, if not the request for the payroll audit, was,
therefore, raised to Respondent's knowledge long before
Respondent rejected the Union's improper request for
termination of unit employees which Respondent now
claims prompted the Union's request for the payroll
books and records.
Considering the foregoing, I find the Union's request
for the payroll books and records was made in lgood
faith. I further find that the payroll books and records
requested by the Union were relevant and necessary to
determination by the Union of whether Respondent,
under the circumstances of this case, was complying
with the pay provisions of the collective-bargaining
agreement. The Board has previously found employer re-
fusals to provide payroll records relevant and necessary
to a determination of whether appropriate payments
under the collective-bargaining agreement were being
paid constituted a refusal to provide information, and
were, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. See Ellsworth Sheet Metal, 232 NLRB 109
(1977), and 224 NLRB 1506 (1976); L & M Carpet Con-
tractors, 218 NLRB 802 (1975). Accordingly, and in the
absence of any defense 5 other than Respondent's conten-
tion regarding the absence of the Union's good faith in
making the request for information, which defense was
rejected above, I find that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged in failing and refus-
ing to grant the Union's request.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF L.AW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All journeymen roofers, apprentices and helpers
who the Union lawfully represents in the employ of Re-
spondent in the performance of the duties set forth in ar-
ticle 11, section I of the collective bargaining agreement
in effect from May 13, 1982, through April 30, '985,
within the following counties: Archer, Baylor. Brown,
Clay, Cook, Comanche, Coleman, Callahan, Denton,
Erath, Eastland, Foard, Hardeman, Haskell, Hood, Jack,
Jones, Johnson, Nox, Montague, Parker, Palo Pinto.
Runnels, Shackelford, Stephens, Sommervell, Tarrant,
Taylor, Tom Green, Throckmorton, Wilbarger, Wichita,
Wise, and Young excluding all other employees, office
I The October 25 letter of Respondent's counsel claimed the Union's
request for all payroll records was "unreasonable and burdensome." No
evidence was presented herein, however, to establish such claims. More-
over, it is to be noted that the Union modified its request to the extent it
sought records only for the 6-month period prior to its request On its
face, such a request in a unit of approximately 41 employees would not
appear to impose an unreasonable problem for Respondent in production
of the requested books and records.
clerical employees and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
4. At all times material herein, the Union has been the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees described above in paragraph 3 within the mean-
ing of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union payroll
books and records in order to determine Respondent's
compliance with the pay provisions of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order that
Respondent cease and desist therefrom, and that it take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. Having found that Respondent has failed
to provide the Union with payroll books, records, and
information relevant and necessary to the Union to carry
out its bargaining representative obligations, I shall order
that Respondent make available for examination by the
Union, Respondent's payroll books and records for the
period beginning 6 months prior to August 30, 1983,to
the date that such books and records are submitted to the
Union for examination in compliance with this Order.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER6
The Respondent, Gunn & Briggs, Inc., Fort Worth,
Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Union
of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local
123, by refusing to furnish the payroll books and records
requested by the Union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Furnish to United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers
and Allied Workers, Local 123, or its agents, for exami-
nation, the payroll books and records requested by it for
the period from February 28, 1982, to the date such
books and records are supplied.
I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
948
GUNN & BRIGGS, INC.
(b) Post at its place of business in Fort Worth, Texas,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."7
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by an au-
thorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
7 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied
Workers, Local 123, by refusing to furnish it pay-
roll books and records requested by it.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in-
terefere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request furnish United Union of
Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local
123, or its agents, with payroll books and records
requested by it for the period from February 28,
1982, to the date such books and records are sup-
plied.
GUNN & BRIGGS, INC.
949