Gruppo Cimbali S.p.A.v.Mamani Flores, Martin Nazario, aka Martin Mamani

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 18, 2013

No. 91203495 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed: December 18, 2013

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Gruppo Cimbali S.p.A.
v.
Mamani Flores, Martin Nazario, aka Martin Mamani
________
Opposition No. 91203495
against Serial No. 85414282
_______

Frank P. Presta of Nixon & Vanderhye, P.C. for Gruppo Cimbali S.p.A.
Martin Mamani, an individual, proceeding pro se.
_______
Before Bucher, Mermelstein and Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Mamani Flores, Martin Nazario, aka Martin Mamani (hereinafter
“applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the stylized mark
for the following goods:
carpet cleaning machines; clothes washing machines;
dishwashers; drilling machines; electric food blenders;
electric food processors; electricity generators; juice
extractors; sewing machines; vacuum cleaners
in International Class 7; and
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air conditioners; air purifiers; clothes dryers; electric
coffee makers; electric fans; electric rice cookers; electric
sandwich makers; electric toasters; gas stoves; hand-held
electric hair dryers; lamps; light bulbs; microwave ovens;
refrigerators; water filters; water heaters
in International Class 11.1
Gruppo Cimbali S.p.A. (hereinafter “opposer”) has opposed registration of
applicant’s mark, asserting as its ground for opposition, that registration
of applicant’s mark in connection with goods legally identical to opposer’s own coffee
machines would lead to a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Opposer claims prior use and ownership of
registrations for the standard character mark FAEMA2 for “commercial coffee
machines, such as machines for making espresso coffee, and coffee grinders” in
International Class 7 and of the design mark depicted below:
3
for “power-operated coffee grinders for commercial institutional and residential use
and dosers for use therewith, sold as a unit” in International Class 7 and
“commercial, institutional, and residential non-coin operated coffee making

1 Application Serial No. 85414282, filed pursuant to Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b) (intent to use). The application also includes goods in International Class 9 that
have not been opposed, namely “apparatus for recording, transmission, processing and
reproduction of sound, images or data; audio speakers; batteries and battery chargers;
blank optical discs; blank USB flash drives; computers and computer hardware; digital
video cameras; DVD players; earphones; electronic memory card readers; flash memory
card; optical disc players; portable media players; radios and telephones; smartphones;
televisions and monitors.”
2 Reg. No. 0773489; registered July 21, 1964; renewed.
3 Reg. No. 1325440; registered March 19, 1985; renewed.
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machines; water conditioning units” in International Class 11. Opposer further
claims prior use of the FAEMA mark on dishwashers, mini refrigerators, ice cube
makers, and water softeners. In his answer, applicant denied the salient
allegations to opposer’s claim under Section 2(d). Only opposer has filed a brief.4
The Record
Pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.122(b), the record includes applicant’s
application file and the pleadings. In addition, the record consists of copies of
opposer’s notice of reliance on its pleaded registrations and the testimony deposition
of Ms. Enrica Nava, opposer’s legal services manager, accompanied by attached
exhibits. Applicant did not submit any evidence or testimony.
Standing and Priority
Because opposer has properly made its pleaded registrations of record,
showing that the registrations are in full force and effect, and has filed appropriate
assignment documents showing opposer as owner of the pleaded registrations,5
opposer has established its standing, and priority is not in issue with respect to the
goods covered by opposer’s registrations. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d
943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982); King Candy Co. v.

4 Additional grounds for opposition were stated in the notice of opposition but were not
maintained by opposer in its brief; they are considered waived. Applicant likewise asserted
the affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, and acquiescence; these
were not pursued trial and are likewise considered waived. See Research in Motion Limited
v. Defining Presence Marketing Group Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1187 (TTAB 2012) (affirmative
defenses not pursued at trial deemed waived).
5 The registrations were assigned to opposer on December 15, 2005, and recorded at
Reel/Frame 3275/0244 on March 23, 2006.
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Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974).
Moreover, the record demonstrates opposer’s continuous use of its marks in
connection with commercial coffee makers since the 1950s6 and use of its marks on
coffee grinders, coffee grinder-dosers, dishwashers, mini refrigerators, ice cube
makers, and water softeners.
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Trademark Act § 2(d) is based on an analysis of the
probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on a likelihood of
confusion. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563
(CCPA 1973). See also Palm Bay Imp., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Majestic
Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003); and In re Dixie
Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In considering the
evidence of record on these factors, we keep in mind that “[t]he fundamental inquiry
mandated by Section 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976); see also In
re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999).
A. Comparison of the Marks
We first consider the du Pont factor of the similarity of the marks, keeping in
mind that “[w]hen marks would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the

6 See, e.g., Nava dep. p. 14-16, 10 TTABVUE 17-19; exhibits 16, 17 and 18, 10 TTABVUE
124-160.
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degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.”
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d
1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In comparing the marks, we must consider the marks
in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression,
to determine the similarity or dissimilarity between them. Palm Bay, 73 USPQ2d
at 1692. The test, under the first du Pont factor, is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the
marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that
confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely
to result.
Applicant’s mark is ; opposer’s marks are FAEMA and
. Each of the word marks, and the literal portion of opposer’s
design mark, begins with the distinctive letter combination “FAE.” As the first
portion of each mark, it is most “likely to be impressed upon the mind of a
purchaser and remembered,” Presto Products, Inc. v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 9
USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988), particularly because “FAE” is a highly unusual
letter combination.7 Although the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is
determined based on the marks in their entireties, there is nothing improper in

7 We may take judicial notice of its rare appearance in print dictionaries. In The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, the preface “fae-” is used in only seven words,
the most notable being “Faenza,” a city and ceramic-producing center in northern Italy.
William Morris, The America Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 470 (1976). It
appears in Merriam-Webster in the following additional words: “faecal” (variation of fecal);
“faena” (a series of final passes leading to the kill made by the matador in a bullfight);
“faerie” (fairyland or fairy); as part of the “Faeroe islands” and “Faeroese” (a resident of the
Faeroe islands). At www.merriam-webster.com. At http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/, the
online Oxford Dictionaries lists only “faeces,” “Faenza,” and “faerie.”
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giving more or less weight to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re National
Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The focus is on the
recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a
specific impression of trademarks. See Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190
USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975). The single letter difference (“m” instead of “d”) does not
distinguish the marks in appearance, as it is buried in the middle of the word
between the “fae-” prefix and the same final letter, “-a.” See, e.g., In re Dean S.
Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198, 1200-1201 (TTAB 2009) (no difference in perception
between URBANHOUZING and URBANHOUSING). Further, the slight variation
in spelling does not impact whatever meaning attaches to the parties’ respective
marks, as each word appears to be fanciful and without a recognizable connotation.
In his answer,8 applicant argues that the Office commonly registers marks
that differ by only a single letter, and attached copies of two such sets of
registrations, Reg. Nos. 2409327 and 1566766 for the marks WEIDA for “drill
chuck” and WEIMA for “woodwaste handling machinery” and Reg. Nos. 2930411
and 1616442 for the marks FADA for “plumbing fixtures” and FADAL for “vertical
machining centers.” However, third-party registrations attached to pleadings are
not of record unless they are properly introduced during the party’s testimony

8 An answer is not a platform for argument, and inasmuch as applicant did not file a brief,
his arguments are technically moot. We have discussed them here solely for sake of
completeness.
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period. Trademark Rule 2.122(c).9 Even if these registrations had been properly
introduced, they would not prove that applicant’s mark is dissimilar to opposer’s
marks because there are only four of them, they are not evidence that the marks are
in use, and the marks and goods listed in each registration are clearly dissimilar to
each other and to the goods at issue herein. Applicant further argues that confusion
is avoided because his mark is stylized. Applicant is mistaken. Opposer’s word
mark is registered in typed format,10 and could be presented in any font, including
that in which applicant’s mark appears. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group,
Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1353, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011). With respect to
applicant’s argument that there can be no likelihood of confusion because the
examining attorney did not cite opposer’s marks against applicant’s application, we
remind applicant that the Board is not bound by an examining attorney’s prior
determination as to registrability. See McDonald’s Corp. v. McClain, 37 USPQ2d
1274 (TTAB 1995).
As for opposer’s design mark, the word FAEMA dominates the mark because
it is the only portion that is pronounceable; the design is an abstraction, possibly of
a building, and does not lend itself to a simple verbal description by which
prospective customers would call for opposer’s goods. When a mark comprises both
a word and a design, the word is normally accorded greater weight because it would
be used by purchasers to request the goods or services. See In re Appetito Provisions

9 For the same reason, the single third-party registration (for the mark for
agricultural machines) that applicant submitted with his answer is not admissible
evidence; even if it were, it is of no probative value.
10 “Typed drawing” form is now known as standard character form. See Trademark Rule
2.52 (a): “Standard character (typed) drawing.”
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Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987). For the same reasons as discussed above, the
single letter difference between the dominant FAEMA portion of opposer’s design
mark and applicant’s mark does not avoid likely confusion. Nor does the single
letter difference sufficiently distinguish the marks in terms of pronunciation.
Although pronunciation may vary from individual to individual and even differ from
that intended by either party (because of potential uncertainty as to how the prefix
FAE- is pronounced), the two marks will likely be verbalized in a similar manner by
consumers, given that they both start with the letter string FAE, are made up of
only two syllables, and the final syllable ends in the letter “a” in each mark. As for
connotation, there is no evidence in the record as to the meaning, if any, of the term
FAEDA. The term FAEMA is an acronym for the phrase “Fabbrica Articoli
Elettromeccanici Meccanici Affini,” but opposer does not use the phrase in its
advertising entered into the record and it is unlikely that opposer’s consumers are
aware of the underlying meaning of the acronym. It is more likely that consumers
would consider the marks to be arbitrary terms with a foreign “flair,” as suggested
by opposer in its brief. Overall, the marks convey similar commercial impressions,
particularly in light of their shared unusual prefix and similar overall appearance.
This du Pont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity of the Goods, Channels of Trade, and Conditions of Sale
We turn next to the similarity or dissimilarity, and nature of, the goods
described in the application and registrations, basing our evaluation on the
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identifications of the goods as listed therein.11 Octocom Systems, Inc. v. Houston
Computers Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See
also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001
(Fed. Cir. 2002). It is settled that it is not necessary that the respective goods be
identical or even competitive in order to support a finding of a likelihood of
confusion. That is, the issue is not whether consumers would confuse the goods
themselves, but rather whether they would be confused as to the source of the
goods. See In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984). The goods need only be
sufficiently related that consumers would be likely to assume, upon encountering
the goods under similar marks, that the goods originate from, are sponsored or
authorized by, or are otherwise connected to the same source. See In re Martin’s
Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re
Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386 (TTAB 1991).
In International Class 11, applicant’s goods include “electric coffee makers.”
These goods are legally identical to the “commercial coffee machines, such as
machines for making espresso coffee” in opposer’s registration for the standard

11 On February 23, 2012, applicant electronically filed an amendment to the identification
of goods of his application through the TEAS system. The proposed amendment is
unacceptable and will not be entered. In the first instance, the filing is procedurally
improper because it was filed not with the Board, but with the Trademark Examining
Operation. See TBMP § 514 (June 2013) (request to amend application involved in a Board
proceeding must be filed with the Board). Further, a pending application that is involved in
a Board proceeding may not be amended except with opposer’s consent and the Board’s
approval, or upon motion granted by the Board. Trademark Rule 2.133(a), 37 C.F.R.
2.133(a). Clearly, opposer did not consent to applicant’s proposed amendment. If construed
as a motion to amend, it must be denied; applicant did not consent to the entry of judgment
on the question of a likelihood of confusion with the goods to be deleted. Drive Trademark
Holdings LP v. Inofin, 83 USPQ2d 1433, 1435 (TTAB 2007) (consent to entry of judgment is
necessary before amendment will be entered). Accordingly, the issue of likelihood of
confusion has been determined on the basis of the identification of goods as filed.
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character mark FAEMA, and to the “commercial, institutional, and residential non-
coin operated coffee making machines” in opposer’s registration for the mark
. Because of the legal identity between the parties’ goods in this class, it
is unnecessary to consider whether there would also be a likelihood of confusion
with respect to the other goods of Class 11 in applicant’s application. See Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988
(CCPA 1981) (a likelihood of confusion must be found if there is likely to be
confusion with respect to any item that comes within the identification of goods or
services in the class). The second du Pont factor, similarity of the goods, favors a
finding of likelihood of confusion with respect to Class 11.
In International Class 7, applicant seeks registration for the following goods:
carpet cleaning machines; clothes washing machines;
dishwashers; drilling machines; electric food blenders;
electric food processors; electricity generators; juice
extractors; sewing machines; vacuum cleaners.
Opposer’s registration for the mark FAEMA covers: “commercial coffee
machines, such as machines for making espresso coffee, and coffee grinders.” Its
registration for the mark covers “power-operated coffee grinders for
commercial institutional and residential use and dosers for use therewith, sold as a
unit” and “commercial, institutional, and residential non-coin operated coffee
making machines; water conditioning units.” In addition, opposer claims use of its
marks on dishwashers, mini refrigerators, ice cube makers, and water softeners.12

12 Opposer’s witness testified that opposer has sold “dishwashers” under the mark FAEMA
in the United States. Nava dep., p. 17, 10 TTABVUE 20. She also testified that opposer
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Although opposer did not directly address the relationship, if any, between its
and applicant’s Class 7 goods, several of the goods in applicant’s application are
common kitchen appliances, as are opposer’s coffee makers, grinders and grinder-
dosers. It is commonly known that kitchen appliances used for food production,
such as electric food blenders and food processors, are likely to be manufactured or
sold by the same entity as would sell coffee machines and juice extractors.
Although applicant’s identification of goods also includes dishwashers, goods that
are legally identical to opposer’s dishwashers, opposer has failed to establish that
its sale of dishwashers in the United States pre-dates the filing date of applicant’s
application. Accordingly, with respect to Class 7, the second du Pont factor,
similarity of the goods, is considered to only slightly favor opposer.
Turning first to the International Class 7 goods, regarding channels of
distribution and likely purchasers, opposer’s registration for the standard character
mark FAEMA is restricted in that it only recites commercial coffee machines.
However, applicant’s identification of goods does not contain any trade channel or
purchaser limitations and could be sold either at retail, through distributors or
wholesalers, or directly to commercial establishments. Thus, there is potential for
trade channel overlap. With regard to the International Class 11 goods, because
there is partial legal identity of the goods, we may presume the channels of trade
and classes of purchasers for these goods are identical. See American Lebanese
Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research Institute, 101 USPQ2d

uses the mark FAEMA on “mini refrigerators, ice cube makers, water softeners.” Nava
dep., p. 10, 10 TTABVUE 13.
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1022, 1028 (TTAB 2011); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1532 (TTAB
1994) (“Because the goods are legally identical, they must be presumed to travel in
the same channels of trade, and be sold to the same class of purchasers.”). As
further proof that the trade channels for the goods in International Class 11
overlap, opposer’s witness, Ms. Nava, testified that in addition to its professional
commercial line of coffee makers sold to “restaurants, café, hotel, and the food
service industry in general,”13 a “small coffee machine” is also sold at the retail
level.14 As to the goods in Class 7, Ms. Nava testified that these are the types of
goods that could be sold through the same distribution channels as would be
opposer’s products in the United States.15
Accordingly, these du Pont factors weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of
confusion. As for conditions of sale, although the record shows that opposer’s goods
are relatively expensive and typically sold to a professional class of buyers, who may
be presumed to be generally sophisticated, because there are no restrictions in
applicant’s identification of goods, we must presume that applicant’s customers
would include the same class of buyers. Further, opposer’s registration for its mark
is not restricted to commercial sales, and the identification of goods for
applicant’s mark in the application is not restricted or limited to any particular
class of purchaser. Thus, this factor also favors opposer.

13 Nava dep., p. 24, 10 TTABVUE 27.
14 Id.
15 Nava dep., pp. 34-35, 10 TTABVUE 37-38.
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C. Strength of Opposer’s Mark FAEMA
Opposer’s predecessor, FAEMA (“Fabbrica Articoli Elettromeccanici
Meccanici Affini”), was established as a factory in 1945, manufacturing various
electro-mechanical appliances in Italy.16 Ms. Nava testified that the company
“started to use [the] trademark in [the] United States in the ‘50s with a
distributor.”17 Her testimony is reinforced by one of opposer’s brochures set forth at
exhibit 4 to her deposition, dated 1957. Although printed in Italian, the brochure
lists a United States trading company, including its address. Exhibit 5 to the same
deposition, a brochure dated 1960-1970, includes the tagline “Faema in America”
and a picture of an American flag.18 At least by the 1970’s, opposer’s predecessor
had a presence in the United States selling coffee machines under the FAEMA
mark in the United States through a network of distributors; exhibit 2 shows a map
that includes three United States distributors and is identified as “the leaflet of the
‘70s.”19 Furthermore, the pleaded registration for the standard character mark
FAEMA was filed in 1963, upon which date opposer may rely as the date of first use
of the mark in the United States for the goods identified in opposer’s registrations.20
In 1977, FAEMA declared insolvency and was reorganized into three new
companies, one of which was La Nuova Faema S.p.A., which continued the

16 Exhibit 1, 10 TTABVUE 48-58.
17 Nava dep., p. 12, 10 TTABVUE 15.
18 Exhibit 4 is at 10 TTABVUE 66 and exhibit 5 is at 10 TTABVUE 67.
19 Nava dep., p. 13, 10 TTABVUE 16.
20 Absent evidence establishing the asserted date of first use in the registration, a
registrant may rely on the filing date of the registration’s underlying application.
Trademark Act § 2(d), 7(c) and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1057(c) and 1127; See T.A.B.
Systems v. PacTel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372, 37 USPQ2d 1879 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Intersat Corp.
v. International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 226 USPQ 154 (TTAB 1985).
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production of coffee machines. This company was merged into Gruppo Cimbali
S.p.A. in 2006.21 Coffee machines, coffee grinders, and coffee dosers22 have been
continuously manufactured by opposer and its predecessor from the reorganization
to the present.23 Ms. Nava further attested to use of the mark FAEMA on
dishwashers, water softeners, and mini-refrigerators, and that opposer currently
sells “mini-refrigerators” under both the standard character mark and the design
mark.24 From 1995 to 2012, opposer’s approximate gross sales in the United States
of products bearing the mark FAEMA exceeded $24,000,000.25 Advertising
expenses for the period 2005 to 2010 totaled $145,000.26 These sales and
advertising figures are indicia of the strength of the mark, which taken together
with opposer’s long years of use of the mark, show that the mark enjoys a favorable
reputation at least in the field of commercial coffee machines.
D. Lack of Actual Confusion
Applicant argues in his answer that there has been no injury to opposer
because there has been no actual confusion. It is axiomatic that actual confusion
need not be shown in order for a plaintiff in an opposition proceeding to prevail; a
likelihood of confusion is all that is required. Herbko International Inc. v. Kappa
Books Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Moreover,
applicant has filed for registration on an intent-to-use basis and has not shown that

21 The merger was recorded on March 23, 2006 at Reel/Frame 3275/0246.
22 A “doser” is a device that measures the appropriate dose of coffee beans necessary to
produce a cup of coffee. Nava dep., p. 19, 10 TTABVUE 22.
23 Nava dep., p. 14, 10 TTABVUE 17.
24 Nava dep., p. 21, 10 TTABVUE 24; exhibit 9B, 11 TTABVUE.
25 Nava dep., p. 31, 10 TTABVUE 34; exhibit 17, 10 TTABVUE 127.
26 Nava dep., p. 30, 10 TTABVUE 33; exhibit 16, 10 TTABVUE 124-126.
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he is, in fact, using his mark. Thus, there has been no opportunity for actual
confusion to have arisen. We find this du Pont factor to be neutral.
E. Conclusion
Opposer has shown that applicant’s mark is substantially similar
to opposer’s FAEMA (in standard characters) and marks, and that
FAEMA enjoys a favorable reputation at least in the field of commercial coffee
machines. These factors, together with the legal identity of one of the goods listed
in International Class 11, and the relatedness of the goods in International Class 7,
weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
We conclude that applicant’s registration of the mark is likely to
cause confusion with opposer’s previously used and registered marks FAEMA and
when used on or in connection with the goods listed in International
Classes 7 and 11 of the application. To the extent we harbor any doubt, we resolve
that doubt, as we must, in favor of opposer as the prior registrant. See Hard Rock
Café Int’l (USA) Inc. v. Elsea, 56 USPQ2d 1504, 1514 (TTAB 2000); W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Herbert J. Meyer Indus., Inc., 190 USPQ 308, 311 (TTAB 1976).
Decision: The opposition is sustained under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2(d) with respect to International Classes 7 and 11 only. The
application will be forwarded to the Intent-to-Use Unit for processing of a notice of
allowance in International Class 9.