Grupo Nutec S.A. de C.V.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 13, 2019

87426641 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 13, 2019)

Mailed: September 13, 2019
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Grupo Nutec S.A. de C.V.
————
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
————
Jeffrey M. Goehring of Young & Thompson,
for Grupo Nutec S.A. de C.V.
Laura E. Fionda, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 108,
Steven R. Berk, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Cataldo, Kuczma, and Pologeorgis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Pologeorgis, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Grupo Nutec S.A. de C.V. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the marks NUTEC (in standard characters)1 and ,2 both for
“ceramic fiber insulating materials” in International Class 17.

1 Application Serial No. 87426591, filed on April 26, 2017, based on use in commerce under
Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming December 19, 2013 as both
the date of first use and the date of first use in commerce.
2 Application Serial No. 87426641, filed on April 26, 2017, based on use in commerce under
Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming December 19, 2013 as both
the date of first use and the date of first use in commerce. The description of the mark reads
as follows: “The mark consists of the word ‘NUTEC’ in a stylized blue font.” The color blue is
claimed as a feature of the mark.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
2
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of each of Applicant’s
marks under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground
of likelihood of confusion with the mark NEWTEX (in standard characters) registered
on the Principal Register for “Fiberglass, non-asbestos, fire and smoke curtains for
use in theaters, schools, and other buildings to prevent the spread of fire and smoke;
material for thermal insulation and fire protection, namely, fire-resistant fabric made
of fiberglass” in International Class 17.3
When the refusals were made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. When the requests for reconsideration were denied, the appeals
resumed. The appeals are fully briefed. We affirm the refusals to register.4
I. Appeals Consolidated
These appeals involve common questions of law and fact and the records are
substantially similar. Accordingly, we consolidate and decide both appeals in this
single decision. See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1915 (TTAB 2012); In re
Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (TTAB 2009); TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) § 1214 (2019). We have considered all arguments
and evidence filed in each appeal and have taken into account relevant factual
differences between them.

3 Registration No. 4310720, issued on March 26, 2013; Sections 8 & 15 combined declaration
accepted and acknowledged.
4 Unless otherwise specified, all TTABVUE and Trademark Status and Document Retrieval
(“TSDR”) citations reference the docket and electronic file database for Application Serial No.
87426591. All citations to the TSDR database are to the downloadable .PDF version of the
documents.
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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II. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of
confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, however,
two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d
1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d)
goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods
and differences in the marks.”).
A. Similarity of the Marks
We initially address the first DuPont likelihood of confusion factor focusing on
“the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). “The proper test is not a side-
by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently
similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the
marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc.
v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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Because this factor is based on the marks in their entireties, our analysis cannot
be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various components; that is, the
decision must be based on the entire marks, not just part of the marks. In re Nat’l
Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It
is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it
must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). On the other
hand, there is nothing improper in assigning more or less weight to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the
marks in their entireties. Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 751.
Applicant’s marks are NUTEC in standard characters and . The cited
mark is NEWTEX in standard characters. In support of the refusals, the Examining
Attorney argues that the marks are confusingly similar because they have a similar
structure and look and could be pronounced the same way.5 Specifically, the
Examining Attorney contends that the marks begin with the letter N and the “nü”
sound.6 The Examining Attorney further maintains that the second syllable in each
mark beginning with the letters “TE” and ending with a similar sounding consonant,
could be pronounced the same in each mark.7

5 Examining Attorney’s Brief, p. 5; 9 TTABVUE 6; see also November 6, 2018 Denial of
Request for Reconsideration, TSDR pp. 3 and 12.
6 Examining Attorney’s Brief, p. 5; 9 TTABVUE 6.
7 Id.
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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In traversing the refusals, Applicant argues that the marks at issue cannot be
pronounced the same and, in fact, have distinctly different pronunciations in both the
first portion and the second portion of each mark.8 In particular, Applicant points to
the difference between the last letter in each mark, i.e., X versus C, which Applicant
maintains requires that the marks to be pronounced differently.9 Additionally,
Applicant contends that the first portion of its marks, namely, the letters “NU” is
pronounced with the Spanish pronunciation of the letter U, making the U sound
shorter in length than in English. Applicant submitted evidence demonstrating the
differences in the pronunciation of the letter U in Spanish, as compared to the way it
is pronounced in English.10 Moreover, while Applicant recognizes the principle that
there is no correct pronunciation of a mark, Applicant relies on the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Sonocor Group, Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1327, 111
USPQ2d 1649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), for the proposition that, when there is evidence of
record on how to pronounce a mark, the Board may not disregard such evidence and
must evaluate the similarities in sound based on such evidence in making a
determination of whether the marks are similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.11
With regard to the connotation and commercial impression of the marks at issue,
Applicant maintains that, when considering the goods at issue, the suggestive

8 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, pp. 5-6, 7 TTABVUE 7-8.
9 Id. at p. 6, 7 TTABVUE 8.
10 Applicant’s September 12, 2018 Request for Reconsideration, 4 TTABVUE 23-54.
11 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 7, 7 TTABVUE 9.
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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connotation of the cited NEWTEX mark is “new textile,” while the connotation of
Applicant’s NUTEC marks is “new technology.”12 As such, Applicant argues that
because marks have different connotations and commercial impressions, confusion as
to source is not likely.13
We find Applicant’s arguments unpersuasive and its reliance on the Sonocor
decision misplaced. We first note that it is not necessary for the marks at issue to be
pronounced identically in order to find a likelihood of confusion; instead, the marks
only need to be similar in sound. Here, both marks consist of two syllables. The first
syllable of Applicant’s marks consist of the letters NU and the first syllable of the
cited mark consists of the letters NEW. We find that the first syllable of each mark
would be pronounced in a similar, if not identical, manner. Moreover, the second
portion or syllable of each mark begins with the letters TE. While we acknowledge
that the last letter in each mark, namely, X versus C, are not pronounced identically,
this minor distinction between the marks does not detract from their overall similar
appearance in structure, as well as their similarity in pronunciation or sound.14

12 Id. at pp. 10-11, 7 TTABVUE 12-13.
13 Id.
14 We additionally note that the cited NEWTEX mark is a standard character mark, and
marks appearing in standard character form may be displayed in any stylization, font, color
and size, including the identical stylization, font and blue color of Applicant’s
mark, because the rights reside in the wording and not in any particular display or rendition.
See Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ((“[T]he
argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in
no particular display. By presenting its mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference cannot
legally be asserted by that party.”) Thus, because the cited mark may be displayed in the
identical manner as Applicant’s mark, the stylization and claimed color of
Applicant’s mark is insufficient to distinguish the parties’ respective marks.

Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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With regard to Applicant’s argument that potential consumers would pronounce
the letter U in the first portion of Applicant’s marks as it would be pronounced in
Spanish is unavailing.15 Applicant has not submitted any evidence which
demonstrates that it instructs its potential consumers how to pronounce its NUTEC
applied-for marks in general or that the U in Applicant’s NUTEC marks would have
a Spanish pronunciation. The only evidence regarding the pronunciation of
Applicant’s marks is the voiceover of certain videos on Applicant’s website where the
speaker in the video states Applicant’s mark during the course of the videos.16 These
videos themselves, however, do not specifically educate the potential consumer on
how to correctly pronounce Applicant’s marks. Accordingly, potential consumers of
Applicant’s NUTEC products, particularly non-Spanish speaking customers, who
view Applicant’s website may not necessarily view the videos on the website and
therefore would not be subject to Applicant’s intended pronunciation of its mark.
Thus, potential consumers, upon viewing Applicant’s mark on its website, may
pronounce the first portion of Applicant’s NUTEC mark as “new,” an identical
pronunciation to the first portion of the cited NEWTEX mark.
Moreover, with regard to the Sonocor decision, upon which Applicant relies, the
particular circumstances of that case are distinguishable from the circumstances

15 Applicant’s counsel’s arguments regarding the correct pronunciation of Applicant’s marks
is not evidence. See Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 91 USPQ2d 1409,
1415 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reasoning that a party's “unsworn attorney argument ... is not evi-
dence” and thus cannot rebut record evidence); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424
F.3d 1276, 76 USPQ2d 1616, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Attorney argument is no substitute for
evidence.”).
16 Applicant’s September 12, 2018 Request for Reconsideration, 4 TTABVUE 144-45.
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
8
here. In Sonocor, the plaintiff submitted testimony from one of its corporate officers
on how its pleaded mark is pronounced. Sonocor, 111 USPQ2d at 1332. That same
witness also testified that the plaintiff employed a direct sales force, each of whom
would call potential consumers directly. Id. Although the Federal Circuit noted that
the record in that case did not reflect how these direct sales employees pronounced
plaintiff’s pleaded mark, it nonetheless found that it was a reasonable inference from
the corporate officer’s testimony that the plaintiff’s employees follow the plaintiff’s
pronunciation of its pleaded mark. Id.
Unlike the circumstances in Sonocor, Applicant has not submitted any affidavits
or declarations from any of its corporate officers on how its applied-for mark is to be
pronounced. Moreover, as noted above, the only evidence regarding the pronunciation
of Applicant’s mark is the voiceover of the videos on Applicant’s website. As noted,
however, potential consumers may not necessarily view these videos when visiting
Applicant’s website and, therefore, would not be aware of the intended pronunciation
of Applicant’s NUTEC marks.
As for meaning or significance of the marks, there is no evidence that NUTEC or
NEWTEX, when viewed in their entireties, have any meaning or that they are
anything other than coined terms. Moreover, regardless of Applicant’s unsupported
arguments concerning the differing connotations and commercial impressions of the
parties’ respective marks, because the marks NUTEC and NEWTEX are similar in
structure and sound, and since both are coined terms with no established meaning
on this record, we find that they create a similar overall commercial impression. We
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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further note, as did the Federal Circuit in the Sonocor decision, that there is no
correct pronunciation of a trademark that is not a recognized term, as is the case with
the marks at issue. Sonocor, 111 USPQ2d at 1651 (citing In re Belgrade Shoe Co., 411
F.2d 1352, 162 USPQ 227 (CCPA 1969)); see also In re Allegiance Staffing, 115
USPQ2d 1319, 1325 (TTAB 2015) (no correct pronunciation of mark that is coined
term).
We must consider Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties. Thus, we
have taken into account all of the differences in appearance, sound, meaning and
commercial impression between them. We nonetheless find that despite these
differences, given the similarities in sound, the marks are more similar than
dissimilar for likelihood of confusion purposes. Indeed, similarity in sound alone may
be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re 1st
USA Realty Prof'ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); see also In re White
Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“TMEP”) § 1207.01(b)(iv) (October 2018).
Accordingly, the first DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity of the Goods
We next turn to the comparison of the goods at issue, the second DuPont factor.
In making our determination regarding the relatedness of the goods, we must look to
the goods as identified in Applicant’s applications and the cited registration. See
Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d
1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs. Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of
the identification of goods set forth in the application regardless of what the record
may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels
of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are directed.”)); see also
In re Giovanni Food Co., 97 USPQ2d 1990, 1991 (TTAB 2011).
It is settled that it is not necessary that the respective goods be identical or even
competitive in order to find that they are related. It is sufficient if the respective goods
are “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing
[be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods emanate from
the same source.” Coach Servs. Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v.
Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); see also In re Martin’s Famous Pastry
Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville
Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991). The issue is not whether purchasers
would confuse the goods, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to
the source of these goods. L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (TTAB
2012); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830, 832 (TTAB 1984).
Applicant’s goods in each involved application are identified as “ceramic fiber
insulating materials.” The goods set forth in the cited registration are “Fiberglass,
non-asbestos, fire and smoke curtains for use in theaters, schools, and other buildings
to prevent the spread of fire and smoke; material for thermal insulation and fire
protection, namely, fire-resistant fabric made of fiberglass.” A likelihood of confusion
may be found with respect to a particular class in an application based on any
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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product within the identification of goods for that class. See In re Wacker Neuson
SE, 97 USPQ2d 1408, 1409 (TTAB 2010) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills
Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981)) (emphasis added).
To demonstrate that Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are related, the
Examining Attorney submitted Internet evidence showing that it is common for a
single entity to provide both ceramic and fiberglass insulation materials under the
same mark. The evidence is summarized below:
• www.ceramicfiber.com – company offering for sale both
ceramic fiber materials and fiberglass insulation materials;17

• www.pacorinc.com – company offering both ceramic insulation
products and fiberglass insulation materials;18

• www.thermalproductsco.com – company offering both ceramic
fiber materials and fiberglass textiles;19

• www.ceramicfiberonline.com – offering both ceramic fiber
blankets and insulation materials and fiberglass and silica
insulation textiles. This company’s website also notes that the
goods may be purchased online via the website;20

• www.miniseal.com – offering both ceramic fiber insulation
materials and fiberglass insulting cloth;21 and
• www.unifrax.com– offering both ceramic fiber insulation
materials and thermal insulation material and products for
fire protection.22

17 August 1, 2017 Office Action, TSDR pp. 9-11.
18 Id., TSDR pp. 12-15.
19 Id., TSDR p. 16.
20 March 12, 2018 Final Office Action, TSDR pp. 7-8.
21 Id., TSDR pp. 9-10.
22 Id., TSDR pp. 5-6.
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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In traversing the refusals, Applicant argues that the parties’ respective goods are
unrelated because they do not overlap.23 Specifically, Applicant maintains that its
goods are insulation materials while the Registrant’s goods are limited to just fabric
and curtains.24 In support of its argument, Applicant submitted extrinsic evidence
purportedly from the parties’ respective websites to demonstrate the differences
between the parties’ respective goods.25
We find Applicant’s arguments unpersuasive. First, Applicant’s contention that
Registrant’s goods are limited to mere curtains and fabric that have no insulation
characteristics is incorrect. The identification of goods set forth in the cited
registration clearly identifies the goods, in part, as “material for thermal insulation
and fire protection, namely, fire-resistant fabric made of fiberglass.” (emphasis
added). Moreover, as stated above, to determine the relationship between the goods,
we are bound by the identifications in Applicant’s involved applications and the cited
registration. In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“Likelihood of confusion must be determined based on an analysis of the marks
as applied to the … [goods or] services recited in applicant’s application vis-à-vis the
… [goods or] services recited in [a] …registration, rather than what the evidence
shows the… [goods or] services to be.”) (citing Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Applicant

23 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 8, 7 TTABVUE 10.
24 Id.
25 January 30, 3017 Response to Office Action, TSDR pp. 4-7; September 12, 2018 Request
for Reconsideration, TSDR pp. 55-264.
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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disregards this requirement by impermissibly relying upon extrinsic evidence in an
attempt to distinguish the goods. See Coach Servs. Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1722;
Octocom Sys., 16 USPQ2d at 1787. Accordingly, we reject Applicant’s arguments
based on the extrinsic evidence noted above.
The record establishes that Applicant’s goods and Registrant’s goods are offered
by third parties under the same marks. As such, consumers are likely to believe that
the goods originate from the same source. Accordingly, the second DuPont factor also
favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. Similarities in Trade Channels and Classes of Purchasers
Next we consider established, likely-to-continue channels of trade, the third
DuPont factor. Because there are no limitations as to channels of trade or classes of
purchasers in either the applications or cited registration and the identified goods are
related, we must presume that the goods identified in Applicant’s applications and
the cited registration travel through all normal and usual trade channels for such
goods, and that they are sold to all classes of prospective purchasers for those goods,
i.e., consumers interested in fire retardant or fire insulating material. Stone Lion
Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1161; see also Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1723 (absent
limitation “goods are presumed to travel in all normal channels ... for the relevant
goods”). Moreover, the only probative evidence relating to the trade channels through
which the goods at issue travel is the third-party website evidence submitted by the
Examining Attorney discussed above. This evidence shows that Applicant’s goods and
Registrant’s goods are the type of goods that may be provided in the same online
marketplace to similar or overlapping purchasers. Therefore, the third DuPont factor
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
D. Sophistication and Care of Consumers
Under the fourth DuPont factor, we consider “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.
Applicant argues that consumers of the parties’ respective goods are sophisticated
in light of the nature of the goods at issue.26 As such, Applicant maintains that these
sophisticated consumers would exercise greater care in their purchasing decisions
and would therefore, in turn, notice the differences between the parties’ respective
marks.27
Applicant has presented no evidence that the relevant consumers themselves are
sophisticated. Applicant’s argument is predicated on its attorney’s assertion, which
is not evidence. Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797,
1800 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Even if there were evidence supporting the sophistication of
Applicant’s customers, there is no evidence that Registrant’s customers or potential
customers are sophisticated. Moreover, neither parties’ identifications contain
limitations on the purchasers of the goods or on the conditions of purchase. In view
thereof, the standard of care is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. See
Stone Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1163 (“Board precedent requires the decision to
be based ‘on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.’”). Notwithstanding, it is

26 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 8-9, 7 TTABVUE 10-11.
27 Id. at p. 9, 7 TTABVUE 11.
Serial Nos. 87426591 and 87426641
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well-settled that “even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source
confusion, especially in cases such as the present one involving similar marks and
related goods.” In re i.am.symbollic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1413 (TTAB 2015) (citing
In re Research & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 230 USP 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986)),
aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Carlisle Works, Inc.
v. Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d 1403, 168 USPQ 110, 112 (CCPA 1970) (“Human
memories even of discriminating purchasers ... are not infallible.”). The similarity of
the marks and the relatedness of the goods in this case “outweigh any presumed
sophisticated purchasing decision.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1413
(citing HRL Assocs., Inc. v. Weiss Assocs., Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1819, 1823 (TTAB 1989),
aff'd, 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Thus, the fourth DuPont factor is neutral.
III. Conclusion
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record and all relevant
DuPont factors. Because we have found that the marks at issue are similar and that
Applicant’s identified goods are related to Registrant’s goods and that they would
move in the same or overlapping trade channels and would be offered to the same or
similar classes of purchasers, we conclude that Applicant’s marks, as used in
connection with the goods identified in its involved applications, so resemble the cited
mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive under Section 2(d) of
the Trademark Act.
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Decision: The refusals to register Applicant’s marks NUTEC (in standard
characters) and under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act are affirmed.