Grinnell Fire Systems Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 15, 2000

332 N.L.R.B. 1257 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

GRINNELL FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS CO. 1257
Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company and Road
Sprinkler Fitters, Local Union No. 669, U.A.,
United Association of Journeymen and Appren-
tices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry
of the United States and Canada, AFL–CIO.
Cases 5–CA–28153 and 5–CA–28440
November 15, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
On February 8, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Karl
H. Buschmann issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent and the General Counsel each filed exceptions
and a supporting brief. The Charging Party and the Gen-
eral Counsel each filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as
modified and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied.
As the judge found, the Respondent failed and refused
to provide the Union with, inter alia, the names and ad-
dresses of replacement employees in the bargaining unit
represented by the Union, which has been on strike
against the Respondent since April 1994. We agree with
the judge that the information requested was presump-
tively relevant, that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) by failing and refusing to provide it, and that the
appropriate remedy is to require the Respondent to pro-
vide that information.
Our dissenting colleague would remand the case to the
judge for further findings concerning the purposes for
which the Union sought the information. Noting that the
Board has held that an employer has no duty to bargain
over the terms and conditions of employment of strike
replacements,1 our colleague contends that the Respon-
dent had no duty to furnish the information, with respect
to the strike replacements, to the extent that the Union
requested it in order to bargain for a new contract or to
ensure that employees were paid according to the terms
of the expired agreement. Our colleague also argues that
there is evidence that the Union sought the information
in order to induce the employees to quit their jobs and
work elsewhere, and that the judge failed to make an
explicit factual finding in this regard. To the extent that
the Union sought the information for that purpose, our
colleague would not require the Respondent to provide it.

1 See, e.g., Detroit Newspapers, 327 NLRB 871 (1999) (Members
Fox and Liebman dissenting).
We find that no remand is warranted. To begin with,
our colleague is mistaken when he broadly asserts that
employers have no duty to bargain over the terms and
conditions of employment of strike replacements. To be
sure, while a strike is in progress and individuals have
been hired to replace strikers, the employer is not re-
quired to bargain with the union over the terms and con-
ditions under which those individuals work as strike re-
placements. Once the strike has ended, however, any
replacements who remain employed assume the same
status as other unit employees. They are no longer strike
replacements, and the terms under which they work will
be governed by any newly bargained contract.2 Conse-
quently, the union is entitled to receive information re-
garding strike replacements, not because it can insist on
bargaining over the terms under which they work as
strike replacements, but because in bargaining for a new
agreement, it is bargaining over terms that will be appli-
cable to all unit employees, including those who worked
as replacements during the strike.
The Board thus has repeatedly held that a union is pre-
sumptively entitled to be furnished, on request, with the
names and payroll information concerning bargaining
unit employees, including strike replacements.3 The
employer can rebut the presumption by showing that
divulging the information will be unduly burdensome or
that harassment of employees is likely to result,4 but no
such claim or showing has been made here. Our col-
league contends that the Union had an invalid purpose
behind its information request—to find out who was
working for the Respondent and attempt to persuade
them to quit and work for other employers—but, as the
judge found, that contention is not supported by the re-
cord. Indeed, the judge explicitly found that “the Re-
spondent has failed to demonstrate that the Union’s re-
quest for information is in any way connected with an
improper or unlawful motive.” Thus, our colleague has
failed to demonstrate the existence of a motive that
would even arguably render the Union’s information
request invalid.
Our colleague concedes that certain of the Union’s
“ostensible” purposes were legitimate, but he argues that,
absent a fact-finding, there is no showing that the Union
had any valid purpose for requesting the information. In
effect, our colleague would require the Union to demon-
strate good faith by proving that it had a valid purpose
2 See Detroit Newspapers, 327 NLRB 871, quoting Service Electric
Co., 281 NLRB 633, 639–640 (1986).
3 See, e.g., Page Litho, Inc., 311 NLRB 881, 882 (1993), enf. mem.
denied on other grounds 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995); Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1096 (1st Cir. 1981).
4 Id.
332 NLRB No. 120
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1258
for requesting relevant information, even when its stated
reasons were valid. That is not the Union’s burden,
however. A union’s request for presumptively relevant
information is presumed to be in good faith unless the
contrary is shown.5 As we have already noted, the Re-
spondent failed to show any invalid motive behind the
Union’s information request. Accordingly, there is no
need to remand the case to the judge for additional find-
ings.
In excepting to the judge’s order that it provide the
Union with the information at issue, the Respondent re-
lies on Metropolitan Edison Co., 330 NLRB 107 (1999).
In that case, however, the employer refused an informa-
tion request on grounds of confidentiality, claiming that
the information sought would result in retaliation against,
and coercion and intimidation of, persons who had in-
formed the employer that an employee was stealing food
from the plant cafeteria. For purposes of deciding the
case, the Board assumed that the employer had asserted a
legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest. The
Board nevertheless found that the confidentiality interest
was not so substantial as to justify the employer’s blan-
ket refusal to provide any information in response to the
request for informants’ names. The Board found that the
employer had an obligation to come forward with some
offer to accommodate both its concerns and the union’s
legitimate need for relevant information. The Board or-
dered the employer to bargain in good faith with the un-
ion regarding its request for the names of informants,
which information (the Board found) was relevant to the
union’s administration of the nondiscrimination provi-
sion of the parties’ contract, and thereafter to comply
with any agreement reached through such bargaining.
In the instant case, by contrast, the Respondent has
failed even to assert, let alone establish, a substantial
confidentiality interest. The Respondent does except to
the judge’s finding that it refused to furnish the informa-
tion despite repeated requests and without taking a for-
mal position that the information was confidential.
However, the Respondent has pointed to no evidence that
it in fact took the position that the information was con-
fidential. Nor does the Respondent specifically make
such a claim to the Board, despite its citation in its
exceptions brief to Metropolitan Edison. The
Respondent has therefore shown no need for an
accommodation. In these circumstances, we find that the
judge correctly ordered the Respondent to provide the
requested information.6

5 O&G Industries, 269 NLRB 986, 987 (1984).
6 We find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s finding that the Re-
spondent made no effort to bargain to accommodate the Union’s inter-
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Grinnell
Fire Protection Systems Company, Exeter, New Hamp-
shire, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(a) and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs.
“(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union
by refusing to provide the Union with the information
requested by letter of October 19, 1998, i.e., a current list
of all employees performing work described in Article 18
of the expired agreement, indicating the employee’s
name, address, dates of employment, job title or classifi-
cation, rate of pay, and fringe benefits.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Furnish the Union with the information requested
in its letters of October 19, 1998 and June 7, 1999.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

MEMBER HURTGEN, dissenting.
I would remand the case for further consideration.
The Union sought the information ostensibly for a
number of purposes. They include: (1) continued bar-
gaining for a new contract; (2) making sure that employ-
ees are paid according to the terms of the expired con-
tract; (3) to assure that prior unfair labor practices are
remedied; (4) soliciting employees to be members of the
Union.
In evaluating the Union’s request, it must be borne in
mind that a strike began on April 12, 1994, and Respon-
dent hired a large number of strike replacements. Thus,
the information concerned, inter alia, strike replacements.
Even the judge referred to the employees as strike re-
placements.1
Of course, there is no obligation to bargain with re-
spect to the terms and conditions of employment of strike
replacements.2 Thus, to the extent that items (1) and (2)
involve strike replacements, there is no duty to supply
the information.3 In addition, there is evidence that the

est in seeking relevant information. As noted supra, the Respondent
has failed to show that the “accommodation” model is applicable here.
We grant the General Counsel’s limited exceptions to the judge’s
apparently inadvertent failure to include, in his conclusions of law,
Order, and notice, provisions reflecting his findings as to the Union’s
October 19, 1998 information request to the Respondent. We shall
modify the Order and notice accordingly.
1 Respondent also used some nonstriking employees.
2 Detroit Newspapers, 327 NLRB 871 (1999).
3 The evidence does not establish that the Union wanted the informa-
tion to bargain on behalf of replacements who might remain after the
strike is over.
GRINNELL FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS CO. 1259
Union sought the information for purposes of inducing
the employees to quit their employment and work else-
where. The judge did not make an explicit factual find-
ing in this regard. He said that there was not an “im-
proper or unlawful motive,” and at another point, he as-
sumed that Respondent’s assertion was correct. I believe
that an explicit factual finding is necessary. To the ex-
tent that information was sought for this purpose, I would
not find a duty to supply it.
Concededly, the third and fourth purposes noted above
are legitimate ones. Thus, to the extent that these are the
Union’s true purposes, the Union would be entitled to the
information. However, absent a fact-finding, it cannot
presently be said whether there is any valid purpose for
the information request. Accordingly, the judge must
make findings as to these matters, and must consider
them in determining whether a violation exists and in
fashioning a remedy for any violation that he may find.4
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with
the Union by refusing to provide the Union with the in-
formation requested by letter of October 19, 1998, i.e., a
current list of all employees performing work described
in article 18 of the expired agreement, indicating the em-
ployee’s name, address, dates of employment, job title or
classification, rate of pay, and fringe benefits.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with
the Union by refusing to provide the Union with the in-
formation requested by letter of June 7, 1999, i.e., a list
of all Grinnell employees enrolled in apprenticeship pro-

4 Contrary to my colleagues, I am not requiring that the Union prove
its good faith. I am simply noting that there are a number of possible
bases for the request for information, some of which do not provide a
valid basis for the request. In these circumstances, there is a need for
findings as to whether there was any valid basis for the request.
grams during the period from May 1, 1994 to the present,
setting forth the employee’s identity, current or last
known address, and dates of employment, the program(s)
in which the employee was enrolled, and the dates of
such apprenticeship enrollment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish the Union with the information re-
quested in its letters of October 19, 1998 and June 7,
1999.

GRINNELL FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
COMPANY

Cynthia Blasingame Baker, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Peter Chatilovicz and Charles F. Walters, Esqs. (Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson), of
Washington, D.C., for the Respondent.
William W. Osborne, Jr., Esq., of Washington, D.C., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Washington,
D.C. on November 18, 1999, upon a complaint in Case 5–CA–28153 issued on May 28, 1999
and a complaint in Case 5–CA–28440 issued on September 29, 1999, as consolidated by order
of October 6, 1999. The charges were filed by Road Sprinkler Fitters, Local Union No. 669,
U.A., United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting
Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL–CIO (the Union) on January 25, 1999 and on
June 30, 1999, respectively. The Respondent, Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company, filed
timely answers in which the jurisdictional allegations were admitted and the substantive allega-
tions were denied.
The issue is whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) by refusing to furnish the Union with information relevant and neces-
sary to its representation of bargaining unit employees.
On the entire record in this case, including the briefs filed by the parties and on my observa-
tions of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Bermuda corporation, located in Exeter, New Hampshire, is engaged in
the business of installing and supplying automatic sprinkler and fire protection systems in
various states. With sales and shipments of goods in excess of $50,000 directly across state
lines, the Respondent is admittedly an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. FACTS
The Union has been the collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s employees
in the following unit:

All journeymen sprinkle fitters and their apprentices employed by Grinnell Fire Protection Sys-
tems Company, but excluding all other building tradesmen, clerical, office and supervisory em-
ployees, as defined by the Act.

The last collective-bargaining agreement expired on March 30, 1994. The parties engaged
in negotiations but failed to reach an agreement. Since about April 12, 1994, the Union has
been on strike against the Company. Grinnell has continued its operations with nonstriking
employees and by hiring a large number of replacement workers.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1260
John Bodine, the Union’s vice president, testified that he has solicited Grinnell’s employees
over the last few years to become union members by visiting jobsites and by contacting people
over the telephone. In this connection, he has made sure that employees are receiving the
proper rate of pay and has generally discussed with them the conditions of their employment
with the Respondent. Bodine admitted that he has also informed those employees that job
opportunities existed at other companies, and that he has encouraged employees at Grinnell to
work for other, union companies.
The Union made several requests for information from the Employer. By letter of October
19, 1998, the Union requested that the Respondent provide it with a “current list of all employ-
ees performing work described in article 18 of the expired agreement, indicating the em-
ployee’s name, address, dates of employment, job title or classification, rate of pay and fringe
benefits” (GC Exh. 2). As stated in the Union’s letter, the information was sought in prepara-
tion for future discussions, and as, testified by Bodine, the Union needed to be able to identify
the employees, because it represented them. By letter of December 1, 1998, Daniel Casteel,
Respondent’s vice president for human resources, requested the Union to clarify the purpose of
its demand because the Company questioned the stated purpose for the information (GC Exh.
3). The Union made an additional demand for information by letter of June 7, 1999 seeking
inter alia the following (GC Exh. 4):

A complete list of all Grinnell employees enrolled in programs described in paragraphs 1 and 2,
during the period from May 1, 1994 to the present, setting forth the employee’s identity, current
or last known address, and dates of employment by Grinnell, the program(s) in which the em-
ployee was enrolled, and the dates of such apprenticeship enrollment.

The record shows that the Respondent has failed to provide the requested information. In
its answer to the complaint, the Respondent admitted that it failed to provide the information
described in paragraph 10 of the complaint. Indeed, by letter, dated September 23, 1999, the
Respondent advised the Union that it would not provide the apprentices’ names and addresses
(GC Exh. 6).
III. DISCUSSION
The parties are in agreement that under the Act an employer has an obligation to provide
the Union with information relevant to the Union’s statutory duties and responsibilities as the
employees’ collective-bargaining representative. NLRB v. Acme Industrials Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967). It is also settled that the Union has the right to know the names and addresses of all
bargaining-unit employees and striker replacements without any further showing of relevance.
Page Litho, Inc., 311 NLRB 881 (1993), enfd. 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995). As testified by the
Union’s vice president, Bodine, the Union represented these employees. It should accordingly
know their identities. Nevertheless, the Respondent has refused to furnish the information in
spite of repeated requests and without taking a formal position that the information is confiden-
tial. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). There, the Supreme Court recognized
that even though the requested information may be relevant, an employer may have a legitimate
interest in preserving the confidentiality of certain information, which must be given respect.
Here, the Respondent argues that the Union’s request was made in bad faith because of “the
undisputed evidence that the Union seeks this information for one purpose only: to raid Grin-
nell’s replacements by getting them to work for competitor employers” (R. Br., p. 5). The
Respondent makes this observation without disputing—in effect conceding—“the presumptive
relevancy of the names and addresses of its sprinkler fitters,” but argues that the Union has not
ceased but continues its aggressive effort to interfere with Grinnell’s right to employ replace-
ment workers.
To be sure, John Bodine, the only witness in this case, stated that he had visited the Respondent’s
worksites from time to time or called employees and informed the employees of job opportunities with
other employers and on some occasions even encouraged them to work for union companies. However,
the record does not show that the Union made the information request with the intent of raiding the
Respondent’s work force. Indeed, the Respondent has failed to demonstrate that the Union’s request for
information is in any way connected with an improper or unlawful motive. The mere fact that the
Union has assisted its members in finding employment with union companies or otherwise discussed
with them job opportunities with other employers does not suggest that the information request had that
purpose. The Union obviously accomplished that goal without the requested information. But even if
the Union’s purpose in requesting the information included its intentions to organize the striker replace-
ments by soliciting them to join the Union or to work for union companies, the Respondent has failed to
show that the request lacks a proper and legitimate purpose. The Union’s letter of October 19, 1998
addressed to Daniel W. Casteel, vice president of Grinnell, clearly indicates that the Union demanded
the information in “preparation for our future discussions” and to discuss restoration of the collective-
bargaining relationship. It was also the Union’s position that the Respondent comply with the order in
the prior decision,1 namely to remedy the prior unfair labor practices.
Here, the Respondent made no effort to bargain to accommodate the Union’s interest in seeking
relevant information. Instead, it flatly rejected the request for their names and addresses of the employ-
ees at Grinnell. It thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Metropolitan Edison Co., 330 NLRB 107
(1999).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company, is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following employ-
ees of Respondent, which constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:

All full-time and regular part-time journeymen and apprentice sprinkler fitters engaged in the
installation, alteration, maintenance, repair and service of automatic sprinkler and fire control
systems; excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

4. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union with a complete list of all Grinnell employees en-
rolled in apprenticeship programs during the period from May 1, 1994 to the present, setting forth the
employee’s identity, current or last known address, and dates of employment by Grinnell, the pro-
gram(s) in which the employee was enrolled, and the dates of such apprenticeship enrollment, the
Respondent has failed and refused to bargain collectively and in good faith with the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees within the meaning of Section 8(d) of the Act in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices of Respondent described above affect commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Order will require Respondent to furnish the Union with the information, which it has unlaw-
fully failed and refused to furnish.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following rec-
ommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union by refusing to provide the Union with the in-
formation requested by letter of June 7, 1999, i.e., a list of all Grinnell employees enrolled in apprentice-
ship programs during the period from May 1, 1994 to the present, setting forth the employee’s identity,
current or last known address, and dates of employment, the program(s) in which the employee was
enrolled, and the dates of such apprenticeship enrollment.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.

1 Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co. 328 NLRB 585 (1999).
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
GRINNELL FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS CO. 1261
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish the Union with the information requested in its letter of June 7, 1999.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all of its facilities throughout the United
States copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since March 1, 1994.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification
of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”