Gretchel Acosta, Complainant,v.Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 18, 2010
0120091391 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 18, 2010)

0120091391

06-18-2010

Gretchel Acosta, Complainant, v. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), Agency.


Gretchel Acosta,

Complainant,

v.

Janet Napolitano,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security

(Transportation Security Administration),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091391

Agency No. HS-07-TSA-002285

DECISION

On February 7, 2009, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's January

21, 2009 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether complainant established by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency discriminated against her as alleged.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Transportation Security Officer, SV-1802-D, at the Luis Munoz-Martin

Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The record reveals that complainant

took the Checkpoint Screen Image Interpretation Test on July 18, 2006.

Complainant was informed by the SPOT Transportation Security Manager

(STSM) that she failed the exam. Complainant retook the exam at a later

unknown date and was informed by STSM that she failed the exam again.

However, on June, 29, 2007, when complainant reviewed the Online Training

Records website regarding her training history, she noticed that it showed

that she had passed the Checkpoint Screening Image Interpretation Test.

She spoke with the Training Assistant Instructor (TAI) and who said he

would correct it. TAI changed complainant's score to "fail."

On December 2, 2007, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she

was discriminated against on the basis of her sex (female - pregnancy)

when on June 29, 2007, she became aware that she passed the examination

to become a Dual-Function Officer when she had previously been informed

that she had not passed.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that complainant failed

to prove that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant argues that she established a prima facie case

of discrimination and proved that the agency manipulates test scores in

order to discriminate against employees. Further, complainant argues

that the record supports her allegation that the agency failed to provide

her with a reasonable accommodation. Complainant also argues that the

agency failed to look at all the circumstances around her situation which

showed that the agency subjected her and her husband to harassment based

on their marital status and pregnancy. Complainant appears to argue

that she was constructively discharged as well.

The agency did not submit a reply brief.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

As a preliminary matter, with regard to complainant's allegations

concerning her requests for a reasonable accommodation, harassment, and

constructive discharge, we note that complainant mentions the reasonable

accommodation and harassment issues in her formal complaint. However,

the record reveals that the agency issued a Letter of Acceptance on

March 4, 2008, clearly indicating that the only issue accepted for

an investigation was the claim involving complainant's test results.

Further, in the Letter of Acceptance, the agency stated that complainant

had the opportunity to express any discontent with the claims accepted.

The record does not contain any evidence that complainant expressed that

the agency erred when it frame her claim. Accordingly, we find that the

agency did not err when it did not address complainant's allegations

of failure to reasonably accommodate, harassment, and constructive

discharge.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie case of

pregnancy discrimination, we turn to the agency's articulated reasons for

its actions. The Training Specialist (TS) provide affidavit testimony

stating that the tests at issue were taken on July 17 and 18, 2006.

TS Affidavit at 126. The history indicated "test completed" for the

first test and "test passed" for the second test. Id. In the "View

Details" section, it is possible to view complainant's test scores.

Id. at 127. Complainant failed the first exam with a score of

"84%/68%." Id. Complainant also failed the second exam with a

score of 63%/0%. Id. The TAI incorrectly coded the results of both

of complainant's exams. TAI Affidavit at 110. The TAI performed a

bulk entry, coding all employees as "passed" and did not identify those

employees who failed. Id. The TAI was asked to correct complainant's

scores to "fail." Id. Accordingly, we find that the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

We now turn to complainant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that she was discriminated against. We find complainant failed

to offer any such evidence. Although complainant argues on appeal that

she has proved that the agency alters the scores of employees with the

intent to discriminate, we find the record evidence is devoid of any

such evidence. Further, nothing in the record supports her contentions

that the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus when she was

erroneously informed that she had passed the examinations.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

agency's FAD finding that complainant failed to establish that she was

discriminated against as alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 18, 2010

Date

2

0120091391

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120091391