Greater New Orleans Artificial Kidney Center

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 7, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 973 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

GREATER NEW ORLEANS ARTIFICIAL KIDNEY CENTER
Bio-Medical Applications of New Orleans, Inc.,
d/b/a Greater New Orleans Artificial Kidney
Center and General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers Local No. 270, a/w
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Ind.
Case 15-CA-6176
February 7, 1980
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On September 24, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Leonard M. Wagman issued the attached Supplemen-
tal Decision in this proceeding.' Thereafter, Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed a brief in support of the
Administrative Law Judge's Supplemental Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Supplemental Decision in light of the excep-
tions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Bio-Medical Applications
of New Orleans, Inc., d/b/a Greater New Orleans
Artificial Kidney Center, New Orleans, Louisiana, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order,
except that the attached notice is substituted for that
of the Administrative Law Judge.'
' The Board's original decision in this proceeding is reported at 240 NLRB
432 (1979).
Respondent contends that the Administrative Law Judge erred in failing
to consider Respondent's purported reasons for refusing to reinstate the 10
discharged strikers on and after August 10, 1976, when the strikers
unconditionally offered to return to work. In this regard, Respondent asserts
that, as of that date, it had eliminated the strikers' jobs and thereafter did not
hire striker replacements. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
the circumstances of Respondent's discharge of the strikers on August 6.
1976. rebut Respondent's assertion that the strikers' jobs had been filled by
August 10. Furthermore, in view of his finding that Respondent unlawfully
had discharged the strikers, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
it is unnecessary to consider whether Respondent's refusal to reinstate the
strikers after August 10 might have been justified for economic reasons.
Nevertheless, we find that, in any event, Respondent's purported defense that
247 NLRB No. 136
after August 10 it operated normally without the strikers and without
replacing them does not withstand scrutiny.
In this regard, we note that Respondent's overtime costs increased
significantly after the strike. indicating that Respondents reduction in staff
was achieved only by a substantial change in the working conditions of its
remaining employees. Further, Respondent hired several LPNs after the
strike, largely to perform duties previously performed by the striking
employees. While it may be that LPNs were qualified to perform certain
additional duties as well, it is clear from the record that their primary
function-and the function which caused Respondent to augment its work
force-was the same as the primary function of the strikers. Thus, Respon-
dent's refusal to reinstate the strikers was accompanied by the hiring of
nonunit employees (LPNs) to perform the same work and by an increase in
the hours worked by both unit and nonunit employees. This further rebuts
Respondent's assertion that it was able to operate normally without the
unlawfully discharged strikers and without hiring additional employees.
' For the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinion in .4bilifies and
Goodwill Inc., 241 NLRB 27 (1979), Member Penello would order backpay
for the 10 unlawfully discharged strikers to commence on August 10. 1976,
the date of their unconditional offer to return to work, rather than on August
6, 1976. the date of their discharges.
' This substitution is necessary to conform the cease-and-desist language of
the notice to that of the recommended Order.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties had the opportuni-
ty to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,
the National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amend-
ed, and has ordered us to post this notice. We intend
to abide by the following:
WE WILL NOT discharge, refuse to reinstate, or
otherwise discriminate against employees because
they have engaged in concerted activity or a
protected strike for their mutual aid or protec-
tion.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer to each of the employees listed
below immediate and full reinstatement to the job
they held immediately before August 6, 1976, or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent job, without prejudice to their seniori-
ty or any other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed, discharging, if necessary, any replace-
ments hired after the date of their discharges.
WE WILL make the employees named below
whole for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered by virtue of the discrimination against
them by paying them an amount equal to what
they would have earned from the date of dis-
charge to the date that they are offered reinstate-
ment, with interest.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Theresa J. Buggage
Corlis Allen Dever
Ella Mae Veal
Charles Henry, Jr.
Louis Arthur Huth
Carol S. Smith
Gussie M. Calhoun
Lois Dunston
Linda R. Weppner
Ali Gumuser
the strikers were neither unlawfully discharged nor unlaw-
fully denied reinstatement, but were, in effect, replaced by
those employees who remained at work during the strike.
II1. THE FACTS
BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF NEW
ORLEANS, INC., D/B/A GREATER NEW
ORLEANS ARTIFICIAL KIDNEY CENTER
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LEONARD M. WAGMAN, Administrative Law Judge: On
September 21, 1977, following the prescribed statutory
proceedings of charge, complaint, and hearing, I issued a
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Union, the Charging Party in this case, failed to comply with
Section 8(g) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.' I also found that under Section 8(d), as amended,
such failure deprived the 10 economic strikers of the Act's
protection both during the strike and afterward when they
sought reinstatement.' I recomended that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed
exceptions to my Decision and a supporting brief.
On January 30, 1979, the Board reversed my findings,
conclusions, and recommendations.' The Board issued an
order remanding the case for the purpose of preparing and
issuing a Supplemental Decision setting forth a resolution of
the credibility of witnesses and containing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a recommended Order with respect
to the unfair labor practices alleged on the complaint. Now,
upon remand, I make the following additional and supple-
mental:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. ISSUES
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated
Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by discharging or refusing
to reinstate 10 striking employees. Respondent contends that
' Sec. 8(g) of the Act reads:
(g) A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or
other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not
less than ten days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing
and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of that intention,
except that in the case of bargaining for an initial agreement following
certification or recognition the notice required by this subsection shall
not be given until the expiration of the period specified in clause (B) of
the last sentence of section 8 (d) of this Act. The notice shall state the
date and time that such action will commence. The notice, once given,
may be extended by the written agreement of both parties.
'The pertinent portion of Sec. 8(d) of the Act reads as follows:
Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified
Except as noted below, there are no issues of credibility
presented.
On December 19, 1975, the Union won a Board-held
election among Respondent's 21 hemodialysis technicians.
Thereafter, on December 21, 1975, the Board certified the
Union as the bargaining representative for that unit.' On
March 8,' after the parties had been unsuccessful in reaching
a collective-bargaining agreement, the Union prepared to
strike "to protect the interest of its menirs "
On the morning of August 3 the Union set up a picket line
at Respondent's facility, and the economic strike which
involved 10 of Respondent's hemodialysis technicians began.
The following day Respondent sent letters to the strikers
inviting them to return to work within 48 hours or face the
possibility of being permanently replaced. Some of the
strikers received the letter, others did not. However, Respon-
dent received no responses.
On Friday, August 6, Administrator Maraist prepared
identical separation report forms for each striker's file with a
checkmark under "Voluntary Quit: Other," with the com-
ment, "Left job because of a labor dispute. Employer advised
in writing to return to work and refused to do so within the
time specified in written notice." The same day, Maraist
posted a notice to his charge nurses instructing them to
prevent returning strikers from returning to work and to
remove them from the building with a guard's help if
necessary. That same afternoon, Maraist removed the
strikers' cards from the time rack and canceled their
insurance and retirement benefits.
On August 9 at a meeting with the striking technicians,
Mitchel Ledet, the Union's secretary-treasurer, advised the
assembled employees that Respondent had asserted that the
Union had mishandled the strike notice sent to Respondent.
Upon hearing Ledet's report, the employees decided to seek
reinstatement.
On August 10 the Union sent a telegram to Respondent
stating that the 10 striking employees were unconditionally
offering to return to work and would present themselves at
the appropriate shift on that same day. Corlis Dever, Ella
Veal, and Theresa Buggage reported for the 7 a.m. shift on
August 10. They went to the timeclock and found their
timecards absent. Dever asked Chief Nurse Immel August,
an admitted supervisor within the meaning of the Act, where
in this subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate
period specified in subsection (g) ofr this section, shall lose his status as an
employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the
purposes of section 8. 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of
status of such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by
such employer.
' 240 NLRB 432.
' The certified unit was described as follows:
All hemodialysis technicians; excluding all other employees including
office clerical employees, medical technicians, medical records clerk,
chief technician, asaistant chief technician, housekeeping personnel,
licensed pratical nurses, registered nurses, professional employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
' Unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to 1976.
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GREATER NEW ORLEANS ARTIFICIAL KIDNEY CENTER
an admitted supervisor within the meaning of the Act, where
the timecards were. August replied that as she understood it
as of 3 p.m. the previous Friday, August 6, they had been
"pulled."
While the three returning strikers searched for slips of
paper to use instead of the missing cards as a means to clock
in, Chief Nurse August telephoned Administrator Maraist
for instructions. Maraist told her to ask them to leave the
building and to tell them that their positions had been filled
and that they had been permanently replaced.
After August's conversation with Maraist, Dever asked
her why the strikers' names were not on the patient
schedule. August told Dever that Maraist and Dr. Bailey (a
director of the center) had instructed her that the strikers
were fired as of Friday, August 6, and could not return to
work. She then said, "No, not fired, replaced." She then
asked the three strikers to leave.
However, the strikers waited for Maraist, who arrived 15-
20 minutes later. Dever told Maraist that August had stated
that the strikers were fired. Maraist responded that they had
not been fired, but that Respondent had permanently
replaced them., Dever asked Maraist who had been hired to
take the strikers' jobs. Maraist refused to discuss the matter.
He then asked the strikers to leave. They did so.
Striker Louis Huth reported to work at 2:30 p.m. for the
second shift (3-11:00 p.m.). When he noticed his timecard
missing, he asked Chief Nurse August where it was. She
referred him to Maraist, who told him about the three
strikers who had reported for work on the first shift. Maraist
told Huth that, since he had not responded to the letter
which he had received he too should leave the building
because his job had been permanently filled.
The remaining strikers reported to work on August 10 for
the II p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. They were confronted by an
armed security guard who followed them and prevented
them from entering the patient area. The guard summoned
the charge nurse, Alejendro Pernett, who asked why they
were there. Dunston, the spokesperson for this final group of
returning strikers, announced that they were returning to
work. Pernett responded that the strikers should not be there
because Maraist had told him that afternoon that they were
fired. He then telephoned Maraist. Maraist told Pernett to
tell the strikers that their positions had been filled and to
please leave. Maraist then spoke with Dunston and told her
also that the strikers had been permanently replaced.'
Dunston requested a meeting with Maraist, saying they
would not leave Respondent's facility otherwise. Maraist
agreed to come to the center. He arrived and told the strikers
that their positions had been filled. Respondent hired no new
employees as replacements for the striking technicians
during the strike.
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The General Counsel contends first, and primarily, that
on August 6, 1976, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
' My findings regarding Maraist's remarks to returning strikers Dever,
Buggage, and Veal are based on Maraist's testimony rather than Dever's. As I
have found that Maraist previously instructed August to tell the returning
strikers only that they had been permanently replaced, it seems unlikely that
Maraist would violate his own instruction. Maraist also appeared to be
testifying on this matter in a more candid manner than did Dever.
(1) of the Act by discharging the 10 economic strikers.
Alternatively, the General Counsel urges that Respondent's
refusal to reinstate the strikers was similarly unlawful.
Respondent argues that it neither unlawfully discharged the
strikers nor unlawfully denied them reinstatement. Instead,
Respondent asserts it replaced them with those employees
who remained at work during the strike. For the reasons
stated below, I agree with the General Counsel's first and
primary contention.
"It is now well settled that a respondent's act of
discharging economic strikers prior to their permanent
replacement constitutes an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act." Moffitt Building
Materials Co. and Lumbermans Wholesale Company, 214
NLRB 655, 656 (1974). Here, the evidence shows Respon-
dent discharged 10 economic strikers after they had appar-
ently decided to continue their strike in the face of
Respondent's letter of August 4. In that letter Maraist gave
the strikers 48 hours to report for work after which
Respondent might "find it necessary to hire a permanent
replacement for your position." On Friday, August 6,
Administrator Maraist, seeing that the strikers were not
returing, terminated them. In each case he filled out one of
Respondent's employee separation reports, indicating there-
on that the striker had voluntarily quit and explaining that
the employee had: "Left job because of a labor dispute" and
had refused to return to work "within the time specified in
written notice."
Also on August 6, he promptly removed the strikers'
timecards from the rack and instructed his subordinate
supervisors to bar the strikers from returning to work and to
request assistance from a uniformed guard, if necessary, to
escort them from Respondent's building. That same day
Respondent canceled the strikers' insurance and retirement
benefits.
Contrary to Maraist's written explanation on the separa-
tion form, he was well aware as he wrote it that none of the
10 strikers had evidenced a desire to quit Respondent's
employ. Indeed, their participation in the economic strike,
protected by the Act, signified their desire only to improve
their conditions of employment at Respondent's facility.
They were withholding their services in an effort to obtain a
favorable collective-bargaining agreement.
Maraist's conduct on August 6 strongly suggested an
unlawful design. His willingness to resort to the falsehood
that the strikers had "quit" evidenced a desire to get rid of
them because they persisted in their strike. Thus, he hoped
to camouflage his true intent. The haste with which he filled
out the 10 separation forms, pulled their timecards, and
issued his directive to bar them from their jobs revealed his
hope to accomplish that objective immediately before the
strikers could change their minds and return. In sum,
Maraist's conduct on August 6 added up to nothing less
than the punitive discharge of 10 employees because they
were engaged in an economic strike in support of their
Union's bargaining effort.
· My findings regarding the telephone conversation between Dunston and
Maraist and between Pernett and Maraist are based on Maraist's and
Dunston's testimony. Their accounts of the conversation and confrontation
seemed more reasonable than the apparently embellished account given by
Pernett.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's treatment of the strikers on August 10 when
they attempted to return to work also supports the General
Counsel's theory that they were discharged on August 6. On
August 10 the Union sent a telegram on behalf of the
economic strikers, making an unconditional offer to return
to work and informing Maraist that the strikers would arrive
at the facility that same day to work their respective shifts.
All 10 strikers reported to their respective shifts, thus
showing, contrary to Maraist's claim, that they had not quit
their jobs. However, Respondent did not allow them to
return to work. Instead, Chief Nurse August first told three
strikers they had been fired and then quickly declared: "No,
not fired, replaced." August cited Maraist as the source of
her information. Supervisor Pernett' also made the same
"error" later that day, citing Maraist as his source. August's
and Pernett's statements to the returning strikers suggest
that Maraist, while instructing them to tell the strikers they
had been replaced, also told August and Pernett that in fact
Respondent had discharged the 10 strikers on Friday,
August 6.
In response to the incriminating evidence, Respondent
offered Maraist's testimony that on Thursday or Friday,
August 5 or 6, Respondent had determined that it could
operate smoothly and economically without the 10 strikers
and that their jobs were therefore filled on August 6.
However, this excuse does not withstand analysis.
Initially, Maraist's explanation suffers from the infirmity
of being an afterthought raised as an expedient to fend off
the strikers on August 10 and to respond to such unfair
labor practice allegation as might result after that date. For,
nowhere in the separation forms which Maraist himself filled
out on August 6 was there any assertion that the strikers'
jobs had been filled or that replacements had been hired.
There is a further weakness in Maraist's proffered expla-
nation. On cross examination Maraist testified that by
August 3, the first day of the strike, Respondent discerned
evidence that it could operate smoothly without the strikers.
Yet on the following day Maraist sent his letter to the
strikers, suggesting that their jobs remained available. If, in
fact, Respondent had reservations about its need for the 10
strikers, it appears unlikely that it would have sent the letter.
Moreover, nowhere in his testimony, nor in Respondent's
exhibits, do I find any data focusing on the period from
August 3 to August 6 inclusive to which Maraist pointed as
the basis for Respondent's judgment that the strikers were
not needed. All I have before me is Maraist's uncorroborated
assertions that the operation ran smoothly.
Finally, Maraist, while testifying about this aspect of the
case, seemed uncertain as to whether the important decision
regarding the strikers was made on August 4 or 5, or
Thursday or Friday. Also, he seemed reluctant to testify
with specificity about the crucial period between August 3
and August 6 or to state who actually made the assessment
of the smoothness of Respondent's operation during that
period. For this further reason, I do not credit his testimony
Pernett regularly acted as a charge nurse on alternate weeks. In that
capacity, he prepared work schedules for lead technicians on his shift. He had
authority to direct employees to work overtime. Pernett also had authority to
direct the technicians in the treatment of patients using his own judgment. I
find that on August 10 Pernett was a supervisor within the meaning of Sec.
2(1 ) of the Act.
' In light of my finding that the discharge of the 10 economic strikers
that Respondent did not need the strikers as of Friday,
August 6.
In sum, I find that Respondent discharged the 10
economic strikers on August 6 because they persisted in
striking in support of their bargaining agent. Thus, I further
find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.'
Upon the findings of fact in the earlier Decision and in the
Supplemental Decision, and upon the entire record, I make
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
i. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers Local No. 270, a/w International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Ind., is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by discharging and refusing to reinstate employees Theresa
J. Buggage, Corlis Allen Dever, Ella Mae Veal, Charles
Henry, Jr., Lois Dunston, Linda R. Weppner, Louis Arthur
Huth, Carol S. Smith, Gussie M. Calhoun, and Ali Gumu-
ser.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative
action necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
I have concluded that Respondent unlawfully discrimi-
nated against employees Theresa J. Buggage, Corlis Allen
Dever, Ella Mae Veal, Charles Henry, Jr., Lois Dunston,
Linda R. Weppner, Louis Arthur Huth, Carol S. Smith,
Gussie M. Calhoun, and Ali Gumuser by discharging them
on August 6, 1976, because they were engaged in an
economic strike. Therefore, in accordance with the Board's
policy stated in Abilities and Goodwill, Inc., 241 NLRB 27
(1979), 1 shall require Respondent to offer those 10
employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if such jobs are no longer available, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
any other rights and privileges, discharging, if necessary, any
replacements hired after the date of their unlawful dis-
charges. I shall also require Respondent to make the same 10
discriminatees whole for any loss of earnings which they
may have suffered by virtue of the discrmination against
them by paying them an amount equal to what they would
have earned from the date of discharge to the date that they
are offered reinstatement. Such backpay shall be computed
violated Sec 8(a)3) and (I) of the Act. I find it unnecessary to consider
Respondent's asserted reasons for refusing to reinstate the discriminatees on
and after August 10. Such refusal was a continuation of Respondent's
unlawful conduct. Respondent's subsequent preferential hiring list containing
the names of the discriminatees neither cured their unlawful discharges nor
remedied the effects of those discharges.
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GREATER NEW ORLEANS ARTIFICIAL KIDNEY CENTER
on a quarterly basis, with interest thereon, in the manner
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977). '°
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, Bio-Medical Applications of New Orle-
ans, Inc., d/b/a Greater New Orleans Artificial Kidney
Center, New Orleans, Louisiana, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging, refusing to reinstate, or otherwise dis-
criminating against employees because they have engaged in
concerted activity or a protected strike for their mutual aid
or protection.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to the employees named below immediate and
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if such jobs are no
longer available, to substantially equivalent positions, with-
out prejudice to their seniority or any other rights and
privileges, discharging, if necessary, any replacements hired
after the date of their unlawful discharges.
(b) Make the employees named below whole for any loss
of earnings they may have suffered by virtue of the
discrimination against them by paying them an amount
equal to what they would have earned from the date of
'" See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
"In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
discharge to the date that they are offered reinstatement.
Such backpay is to be computed in the manner set forth in
the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
Theresa J. Buggage
Ella Mae Veal
Lois Dunston
Louis Arthur Huth
Gussie M. Calhoun
Corlis Allen Dever
Charles Henry, Jr.
Linda R. Weppner
Carol S. Smith
Ali Gumuser
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
National Labor Relations Board or its agents, for examina-
tion and copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to effectuate the reinstatement and
backpay provisions of this Order.
(d) Post at its facilities in New Orleans, Louisiana, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."'" Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent's autho-
rized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
'' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
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