Great Lakes Steel

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 19, 1978

236 N.L.R.B. 1033 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

Great Lakes Steel, Division of National Steel Corpo-
ration and Patrick D. Driscoll. Case 7-CA-12731
June 19, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND MURPHY
On March 6, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
Ralph Winkler issued the attached Supplemental De-
cision in this proceeding.' Thereafter, the Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Supplemental Decision in light of the excep-
tions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Great Lakes Steel, Divi-
sion of National Steel Corporation, River Rouge,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recom-
mended Order.
In a Decision issued on July 14. 1976. Administrative Law Judge Wink-
ler found that the alleged 8(a)l I) and (3) violations in the above-entitled
proceeding were amenable to the parties' contractual grevance procedure
and that the matter should be deferred in accordance with Collver Insulated
Wire. 192 NLRB 837 (1971). Thereafter, the Board modified its Collyer
position on deferral to arbitration in General American Transportation Cor-
poration. 228 NLRB 808 (1977). Accordingly. this case was remanded for
further hearing and a decision on the merits.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RALPH WINKLER. Administrative Law Judge: After a
hearing upon charges filed by Patrick D. Driscoll, a com-
plaint issued by the General Counsel on March 31, 1976,
and an answer by Respondent, I issued a Decision on July
14, 1976. In that Decision, I found that the 8(aXl) and (3)
violations alleged in the complaint were amenable to the
contractual grievance procedure established by the parties
and that the matter should therefore be deferred for pro-
GREAT LAKES STEEL
cessing under that procedure in accordance with Collyer
Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB
837 (1971). The Board in General American Transportation
Corporation, 228 NLRB 808 (1977), modified its Collyer
position on deferral to arbitration and it thereupon re-
manded this case for further hearing and a decision on the
merits. Such hearing was held on June 28, 1977.
Upon the entire record in the case,' including my obser-
vation of the demeanor of witnesses and upon consider-
ation of briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the
manufacture of steel and related products in several plants
in Ecorse and River Rouge, Michigan, including the Blast
Furnace plant on Zug Island, River Rouge. I find, as the
parties agree, that Respondent is an employer within Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11 THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (hereinafter
the Union), is a labor organization within Section 2(5) of
the Act.
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This case involves the suspension of Patrick Driscoll in
January 1976 and his discharge on February 2, 1976, for-
among other purported reasons-violating a company rule
that prohibited bringing a certain described literature into
its Ecorse and River Rouge plants. The General Counsel
alleges that both the discharge and the rule itself violated
the Act.
The rule in question reads as follows:
No employee is permitted to bring in or distribute, at any
time on Company property, literature which is libelous,
defamatory, scurrilous, abusive or insulting or any litera-
ture which would tend to disrupt order, discipline or pro-
duction within the plants.
ANY EMPLOYEE WHO BRINGS IN OR DIS-
TRIBUTES LITERATURE IN VIOLATION OF
THIS POLICY IS SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINE UP
TO AND INCLUDING DISCHARGE.
A. Sequence of Events
Driscoll was a divisional vice chairman of the Union 2
and a union safety committeeman, as well. In the latter
capacity, he was concerned with plant safety problems
which he discussed with supervisory personnel, and both
he and his foreman held monthly meetings to inform em-
The Charging Party's uncontested motion of August 12, 1977. to correct
transcript is granted.
· Respondent and the Union have had a longstanding collective-bargain-
ing relationship.
236 NLRB No. 115
1033
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees "of their rights in regard to safety." Driscoll was
also a member of a "functional organization" within the
Union known as the Rank and File Caucus. The Caucus
organizes social activities and is concerned with a variety
of union problems. Driscoll worked with the safety com-
mittee of the Caucus.
On Christmas Eve, 1975, employee Trinidad Hinojosa
was run over at the Zug Island plant by a mobile crane. A
company report on the accident stated that the crane oper-
ator had failed to observe Hinojosa on the occasion of the
accident and the Company later received a citation from
MIOSHA, the state safety and health agency, for failing to
give the operator a test for peripheral vision.
The accident occurred at approximately 9:50 p.m., and a
company-owned ambulance, unaccompanied by any medi-
cal personnel, picked up Hinojosa at the scene of the acci-
dent and reached the Company's first-aid station at or
about 10:10 p.m. Hinojosa sustained grievous injuries-
both legs crushed and almost completely severed, extensive
fractures and bruises on other body parts, and profuse
bleeding. A medical technician, one Mize who is not a
medical doctor, was present at the aid station and, while
waiting for an outside private ambulance which had been
summoned to remove Hinojosa to a hospital, Mize admin-
istered a narcotic to relieve pain; he did not otherwise treat
Hinojosa or apply a tourniquet to stop the bleeding. The
private ambulance arrived at the aid station at 10:20 p.m.:
it departed a few minutes later and delivered Hinojosa at
the hospital at 10:30 p.m. Hinojosa died at 11:45 p.m.. 2
hours after the accident.
Zug Island is in River Rouge, and motor car access to
this island from the mainland is by two bridges, one of
which is normally only a one-way thoroughfare. Respon-
dent maintains a plant ambulance and a first-aid station on
Zug Island. In the case of serious injury, company policy
provided, in effect, that the company ambulance could be
used to transport the injured person directly to a hospital if
in the judgment of "Medical Department personnel" any
delay would be harmful. The record shows the practice to
be that injured personnel are always brought first to the aid
station, and that is what happened in the present case; and,
as indicated above, the medical technician at the first-aid
station did not send Hinojosa to the hospital in the plant
ambulance.
Employee Willie Anderson, the divisional chairman of
the Union's safety committee at the plant, is acknowledged
by both the Union and management as "a responsible man
in the conduct of his [safety] office." In the performance of
these duties, Anderson investigated the circumstances at-
tending Hinojosa's accident and resulting death. A com-
mittee of the Caucus, including Driscoll, also looked into
the matter and they consulted with Anderson in their in-
vestigation. The Caucus committee was meanwhile in-
formed by either Anderson or other union representatives
that the Union had been demanding that the Company
maintain two ambulances on the Island to expedite hospi-
talization of injured individuals and that Respondent re-
fused to incur the expense of a second such vehicle.
On the basis of their Hinojosa investigation, including
their discussion with Anderson, the Caucus committee
drafted a pamphlet 1 which is attached hereto as Appendix
A. The Caucus approved the draft and copies of the pam-
phlet were circulated to plant employees. There was no
showing that the pamphlet was distributed outside of plant
personnel. Driscoll had some copies of the pamphlet in a
laundry bag which he brought into the plant and placed in
his locker. He had intended giving a pamphlet to any ran-
dom employee who had missed the distribution.
On January 22, a plant security officer (John Berlach)
saw Driscoll in the locker room. Berlach observed Driscoll
holding a leaflet which dealt with the bussing of school
children for racial integration purposes, and Berlach in-
quired whether Driscoll was trying to post the leaflet on a
locker room wall. Driscoll said he was not, and Berlach
then escorted Driscoll to Security Sergeant Dixon,
Berlach's plant superior. Driscoll informed Dixon, upon
the latter's inquiry, that he (Driscoll) had found the leaflet
in the locker room and had no intention of posting it. Ber-
lach also told Dixon at the time that Driscoll had no tacks,
tape, or any other such items on his person with which to
post the leaflets. (At the hearing Berlach acknowledged
that when he observed Driscoll in the locker room, Driscoll
may only have been reading the leaflet and, in effect, was
not attempting to post it.) Dixon then asked Driscoll
whether he could inspect Driscoll's locker. Driscoll had no
objection ("I didn't have anything to hide") and he opened
the locker and Driscoll explained to Dixon that the copies
of the Pamphlet in the laundry bag were his "personal ma-
terial" as a Caucus member and divisional vice chairman.
Dixon confiscated the Pamphlet copies and Driscoll re-
turned to work and completed his shift.
Driscoll's next scheduled workday was on January 27,
1976. Upon reporting for work that day, a plant security
guard told Driscoll that he was suspended for 5 days and
not allowed in the plant. On February 2, Respondent con-
verted the suspension to a discharge.
No showing was made that production was disrupted as
a result of the Pamphlet's distribution.
Respondent's stated reasons for discharging Driscoll are
(1) he had left his job during working hours and was in the
locker room without permission at the time of the bussing
leaflet incident; (2) he engaged in an unauthorized posting
of the bussing leaflet; (3) he brought in, and possessed on,
company premises, copies of the Pamphlet which Pamphlet
was "libelous, scurrilous, abusive and insulting"; and (4)
his prior record of misconduct.
At the hearing, the General Counsel moved to amend
the complaint by adding an allegation that Respondent
also violated Section 8(a)(l) by discharging Driscoll for
purportedly posting or attempting to post the bussing leaf-
let, the General Counsel asserting in this connection that
such posting is protected activity under Section 7 of the
Act. The leaflet does not in any respect involve interests of
employees qua employees, and I therefore denied the mo-
tion to amend for the reason that the matter is outside the
coverage of Section 7. N.L.R.B. v. Bretz Fuel Company, 210
F.2d 392, 396 (C.A. 4, 1954) ("Concerted activity is pro-
tected only where such activity is intimately connected
with the employees' immediate employment."); N. L.R.B. v.
' Ths is is m own nomenclature, for convenience purposes only.
1034
GREAT LAKES STEEL
Leslie MetalArts Company, Inc., 509 F.2d 811, 813 (C.A. 6,
1975) ("Protected activity must in some fashion involve
employees' relations with their employer."); Shelly & An-
derson Furniture Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 497
F.2d 1200, 1202-1203 (C.A. 9, 1974).
When Respondent acknowledged that the pamphlet
matter was one of the substantive reasons for discharging
Driscoll, I suggested that it might not be necessary to liti-
gate the other purported reasons. For if Respondent be
sustained on its pamphlet contention, it would consequent-
ly prevail as to the discharge issue; if, on the other hand, it
lost the pamphlet issue, then it also would lose the dis-
charge matter. N.L.R.B. v. Gladding Keystone Corporation,
subsidiary of Gladding Corp., 435 F.2d 129, 131 (C.A. 2,
1970) (" . ..the existence of a lawful cause for discharge
does not insulate an employer from a determination that it
violated Section 8(a)(3) if the Board makes a finding . . .
that the discharge was at least partially because of union
activities."); N.LR.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Incorpo-
rated, 554 F.2d 996, 1002 (C.A. 10, 1977) ("Discrimination
need be but a partial motive for a discharge in order to be
violative."). I shall not further discuss items numbers (I),
(2), and (4), as I am satisfied that the pamphlet matter was
a substantial, if not the principal or even the only, reason
for Driscoll's discharge.
This leaves for consideration the alleged invalidity of
Respondent's rule and the allegedly protected nature of the
pamphlet.
B. Contentions of the Parties
Labeling it a "no-distribution rule," the General Counsel
contends that the rule is unduly vague and also presump-
tively invalid for being overly broad in not being limited to
working time and working areas. "More importantly." the
General Counsel stated, "the rule is invalid on its face as it
specifically prohibits activity which Section 7 of the . . .
Act has been interpreted to protect." The General Counsel
cites Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), at this
point, and then he argues that because the rule is unlawful,
"any discipline imposed pursuant to it is also unlawful. The
Singer Company, 220 NLRB 1179 (1975)." And from this
the General Counsel contends that "It is thus unnecessary
to determine whether the conduct or language for which
Driscoll was discharged was protected activity." The Gen-
eral Counsel contends, however, that the Pamphlet and
Driscoll's conduct respecting it were protected in any
event. The Charging Party further asserts that the Pam-
phlet is necessarily protected if it is not held to be illegal.
Respondent contends that the rule was a reasonable ex-
ercise of its legitimate authority in maintaining order and
discipline in the plant and that the pamphlet was properly
barred by the rule. Respondent asserts that the rule is not
an anti-solicitation/distribution rule. "It does not stifle
communication. It's only purpose and function is to ban
the bringing in and distribution of literature whose com-
municative value, if any, is only incidental to its value as a
means of disrupting the order, discipline, and production
of the plants." Respondent further claims that the pam-
phlet was unprotected under Section 7 and therefore con-
stituted lawful basis for Driscoll's discharge, whether or
not the rule was itself lawful. While acknowledging that the
basic subject matter of the pamphlet was within the scope
of Section 7, Respondent asserts that "the message lost its
protection by virtue of the language in which it was
couched: it was blatantly calculated to inflame more than
inform, to defame more than criticize, to disrupt more than
unite. It was inherently destructive of order and discipline
within the plant, and was therefore unprotected under the
Act." The statements in the pamphlet that Respondent
particularly asserts to be unprotected for these reasons are
"GLS POLICY MEANS-LET THEM DIE WAITING"
(referring to waiting for the outside ambulance in the Hi-
nojosa incident), "THIS IS MURDER TO SAVE
PROFIT" (in reference to Respondent's refusal to main-
tain a second ambulance), "UNITE TO STOP THIS
MURDEROUS POLICY!!!!," and "SAFETY, NOT
PROFITS, FIRST! STOP THE MURDER."
C. Applicable Legal Principles
The Board is charged with "working out an adjustment
between the undisputed right of self-organization assured
to employees under [Section 7 of the Act] . . . and the
equally undisputed rights of employers to maintain disci-
pline in their establishments." Republic Aviation Corpora-
rion v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, 797-798 (1945). See also
Hudgens v. N.L. R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976); 4 N.L.R.B. v.
Magnavox Company of Tennessee, 415 U.S. 322, 324 (1974).
In striking the balance, the Board has upheld an employ-
er's right in an organizational context to bar the continu-
ous wearing during working hours of sweatshirts contain-
ing an obscene and insulting legend directed against the
employer. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 200
NLRB 667, 671 (1972). (The Southwestern Bell and other
such cases considered by me are discussed in American
Hospital Association, 230 NLRB 54 (1977); United Parcel
Service, Inc., 230 NLRB 1197 (1977); United Parcel Service,
Inc., 234 NLRB No. 11 (1978); M Restaurants, Incorporat-
ed., d/b/a The Mandarin, 228 NLRB 930 1977): American
Cast Iron Pipe Company, Case 10-CA-12619, JD-741-77
(Oct. 18, 1977).) However, the mere fact that ordinary
speech and discussion among employees on their own time
on plant property may generate "discord" and "strife" is
not "a justifiable business reason to inhibit the opportunity
for an employee to exercise section 7 rights." Jeannette
Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 532 F.2d 916, 919 (C.A. 3. 1976).
William C. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), and Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers,
AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), were civil libel
actions involving questions of federal preemption. In hold-
ing in its Linn decision that state remedies for libel are
limited "to those instances in which the complainant can
show that the defamatory statements were circulated with
malice and caused him damage" (383 U.S. at 65), the Court
made the following observations:
4The Court emphasized in Hudgens that this accomodation must be de-
termined under statutor? and nor under constitutional principles. 424 L S.
507 521 ( 1976L
1035
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Labor disputes are ordinarily heated affairs; the lan-
guage that is commonplace there might well be
deemed actionable per se in some state jurisdictions.
[383 U.S. at 58.]
*
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. (1964)-the disputed matter
is published "'with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not'" (418
U.S. 281).
* *
In sum. although the Board tolerates intemperate,
abusive and inaccurate statements made by the union
during attempts to organize employees, it does not in-
terpret the Act as giving either party license to injure
the other intentionally by circulating defamatory or
insulting material known to be false. [383 U.S. at 61.]
* *
We acknowledge that the enactment of §8(c) mani-
fests a congressional intent to encourage free debate
on issues dividing labor and management. And, as we
stated in another context, cases involving speech are
to be considered "against the background of a pro-
found . . . commitment to the principle that debate
. . . should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks." New } ork
Times Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.C. 254, 270 (1964).
Such considerations likewise weigh heavily here: the
most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it
falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth. [383 U.S.
at 62-63.]
Letter C'arriers v. A.4ustin, supra, involved state libel judg-
ments imposing liability on a labor union for publishing a
newsletter calling nonunion carriers "scabs" and setting
out Jack London's "definition of a scab" as including
"traitor." The Supreme Court stated that the question pre-
sented for its consideration was "whether these libel judg-
ments can be squared with the freedom of speech in labor
disputes guaranteed under federal law" (418 U.S. at 266).
Noting that the relevant Federal law in Linn was Executive
Order 11,491 rather than the NLRA, the Court deemed
that "the same federal policies favoring uninhibited, robust
and wide-open debate in labor disputes are applicable
here" (418 U.S. at 273) and that the "primary source of
protection for union freedom of speech under the NLRA
. . is the guarantee in §7 of the Act ... ."(418 U.S. at
277). The court referred to its recognition in Linn "that
federal law gives a union license to intemperate, abusive, or
insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it
believes such rhetoric to be an effective means to make its
point" (418 U.S. at 283). And referring to words that are
"obviously used ... in a loose, figurative sense"--"rhetor-
ical hyperbole" -to demonstrate a union's "strong dis-
agreement," the Court observed that "Expression of such
an opinion, even in the most perjorative terms is protected
under federal labor law" (418 U.S. at 284). With regard to
the publication of Jack I.ondon's "definition of scab," the
Court found it "impossible to believe" that any reader of
the "scab" newsletter would have understood the newslet-
ter to be charging the nonunion employees "with commit-
ting the criminal offense of treason" (418 U.S. at 285 286).
The Court accordingly determined that the "scab" publica-
tion was protected under Federal labor law, the test being
whether-under the principles of Linn and New York
Conclusions
The pamphlet, headed "GLS POLICY MEANS-LET
THEM DIE WAITING," was a direct reaction of employ-
ees to the circumstances of the Hinojosa incident and re-
flected their concern that other critical situations might oc-
cur (involving waiting for an outside ambulance) unless
Respondent improved its practices in serious accidents.
The plain objective of the pamphlet was to bring about
improvement in medical and ambulance practices to avoid,
as Charging Party's brief states, the possibility of "needless
deaths in the future." So far as the record shows, the pam-
phlet contained no malicious falsehoods,5 it contained no
obscenities,6 and it did not attack Respondent's product. 7
It did use the word "murder," but, as in Austin, not in the
sense of imputing to Respondent the criminal offense of
murder. And, as in the Austin case, I find that the use of
such "rhetorical hyperbole" is well within the protected
right of employees "under federal labor law" in demon-
strating their "strong disagreement" on the matter of their
legitimate concern in the present case.
Driscoll's conduct respecting the Pamphlet-bringing
copies into the plant and placing them in his locker-was
protected under Section 7 of the Act and, by suspending
and then firing him for such activity, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 8
Turning now to the rule, the Linn and Austin decisions
fairly indicate that its proscriptions undercut the rights of
organizational expression guaranteed employees under
Section 7 of the Act.
The Court in Austin stated, as mentioned above, that
"Linn recognized that Federal law gives a union license to
use intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without
fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be
an effective means to make its point" (418 U.S. at 283) and
that "Vigorous exercise of [Section 7 rights] ... must not
be stifled by the threat of liability for the overenthusiastic
use of rhetoric or the innocent mistake of fact" (418 U.S. at
277-278). The Court continued:
Thus, the Board has concluded that statements of fact
or opinion relevant to a union organizing campaign
are protected by §7, even if they are defamatory and
prove to be erroneous, unless made with knowledge of
their falsity. See, e.g., Atlantic Towing Co., 75 NLRB
'See the ('ourt's definition of "malice" in Letter Carriers v. Austin. 418
UI.S. at 281.
tSouiirhetern Bell Telephone (ompanv. 200 N t RB 667 (1972).
V L. R.B v. Local U'nion Vo. 1229. Internarional Brotherhood of Electrical
Wiorker [Jcefferyson Standard Broadcasting Compani'. 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
8 While I do not share Respondent's siew that the Linn and Austin opin-
ilns "shed ver, little light on the issue under dispute here," I do agree with
Respondent insofar as it would reject the Charging Parts's contention that
the pamphlet was necessarily protected under Sec. 7 if it is not illegal. See.
for ex:nmple, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 'upra. Cf. Harmisehfeger
(I rporatioiin 9 NILRB 676. 686 (1938); FAk L umber (ornpan., 91 NLRB 333.
337 (1950)
1036
GREAT LAKES STEEL
1169, 1171-1173 (1948). The Court in Linn recognized
the importance of this §7 protection. in words quite
pertinent to this case:
Likewise, in a number of cases. the Board has
concluded that epithets such as "scab," "unfair."
and "liar" are commonplace in these struggles and
not so indefensible as to remove them from the pro-
tection of §7, even though the statements are erro-
neous and defame one of the parties to the dispute.
[383 U.S., at 60-61.1
The Court stated that it was "necessary" in Linn "to im-
pose substantive restrictions on the state libel laws to be
applied to defamatory statements in labor disputes in order
to prevent 'unwarranted intrusion upon free discussion en-
visioned by the [National Labor Relations] Act.'" (418
U.S. at 272).
Practically any item of literature of an organizational
nature could arugably "tend to disrupt order, discipline or
production within the plants." To be on the safe side under
the rule and thus avoid discipline "up to and including
discharge," an employee could feel inhibited from bringing
organizational literature of any kind into the plants. And
this is merely the catchall portion of the rule. The Act re-
quires the Board, as stated earlier, to work out an adjust-
ment between the Section 7 rights of employees and the
management rights of employers. The rule under consider-
ation hardly approaches the statutory desideratum of bal-
ance. Nothing further need be said about individual items
("libelous," "abusive," "defamatory") proscribed by the
rule, for the aforementioned authorities say it all. I con-
clude that the rule constitutes an "unwarranted intrusion
upon free discussion envisioned by the Act" and that by
maintaining such rule, Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights
under Section 7 of the Act.9
CONCLUSIONS OF LAVW
I. Respondent is an employer within Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. By suspending and discharging Patrick D. Driscoll,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. By maintaining and enforcing its aforementioned
rule, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce
within Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, including reinstating
Driscoll and making him whole, in order to effectuate the
91 consider it irrelevant in resolving this matter to set forth arbitral dispo-
sitions respecting the rule and Respondent's purported re:sons for promul-
gating it
policies of the Act. All backpay computations shall be in
accordance with F. W: KWoolworth Compan', 90 N LRB 289
(1950). and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977). (See, generally, Isi.s Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716 (1962).)
Upon the foregoing findings, conclusions, and the entire
record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER 10
The Respondent. Great Lakes Steel, Division of Na-
tional Steel Corporation, Ecorse and River Rouge, Michi-
gan, its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against em-
ployees for engaging in protected activities under Section 7
of the Act.
(b) Maintaining and enforcing or giving any other effect
to the following rule:
No employee is permitted to bring in or distribute, at anv
time on Companr, property, literature which is libelous.
defamatory, scurrilous, abusive or insulting or any litera-
ture which would tend to disrupt order, discipline or pro-
duction within the plants.
ANY EMPLOYEE WHO BRINGS IN OR DIS-
TRIBUlTES LITERATURE IN VIOLATION OF
THIS POLICY IS SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINE UP
TO AND INCLUDING DISCHARGE.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Patrick D. Driscoll reinstatement to his former
job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him
whole, as set forth in The Remedy section, above, for any
loss of earnings suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of
reinstatement under the terms of this Order.
(c) Rescind the rule set forth in I(b), above.
(d) Post at its Ecorse and River Rouge plants, including
the Blast Furnace plant on Zug Island, the attached notice
marked "Appendix B." " Copies of said notice, or; forms
"i In the esent no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions. : nd the recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted b) the Board and become
its findings. conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be
deemed valied for all purposes
l In the event that this Order is enforced bh a Judgment of a L'nited
States (Court of Appeals, the ssords in the notice reading "Posted hb Order
of the National l.abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
(Continued
1037
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7 of the
Board, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX A
GLS POLICY MEANS-LET THEM DIE WAIT-
ING!
Christmas Eve, Trinidad Hinojosa lay critically injured
waited at First Aid (at Hanna) for an outside ambulance to
pick him up. Meanwhile the Company ambulance sat unused
outside. He died later. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN ANY
ONE OF US WAITING !!!
COMPANY ACCIDENT REPORT LEAVES QUES-
TIONS
Hinojosa, a Keeper's helper on D4 furnace, was run over
and crushed by a mobil crane. The company says he died
at the hospital several hours later. The accident occurred
when Hinojosa was walking down D4 road toward his job.
The crane operator was looking for a parking space near
the Mobil Equipment Shop on D4 roadway. The Comp.
safety report makes no attempt to explain how he got run
over, only that the crane operator found him under the
crane when he got off. Many other questions arise, such as
(1) How was the lighting on the crane and in the area? (2)
Was the area cluttered with machinery and other things?
(3) Was there a working back up beeper on the crane? (4)
Could Hinojosa have had a diabetic attack?
HINOJOSA WAITS FOR AN OUTSIDE AMBU-
LANCE AS DYING
According to Divisional Safety Co-chairman, Willie An-
derson, Honojosa was taken to First Aid, where he waited,
though critically' hurt, for an outside ambulance to come
and take him to the hospital. The length of time is not
known, but the Company Safety Chairman had time
enough to arrive on the scene (this was around 10 at night).
BEFORE THE OUTSIDE AMBULANCE HAD TAK-
EN HINOJOSA AWAY !!! The Company has long had
the policy of taking an injured person to First Aid in the
Co.'s ambulance, then having an outside ambulance come
and pick them up. The claim the cost of another ambu-
lance (for stand by). licensing and insurance is too great.
Greater than the lives of Hinojosa or R. Jackson (who died
of heart attack as he waited in '72) or anyone of our lives is
worth. So they leave us critically or badly hurt with medics
and bandaids; not real doctors and a hospital; to wait in
pain or die. THIS IS MURDER TO SAVE PROFIT.
WITH OUR LIFES AT STAKE-SOMEONE IS
LYING !!!
Our present union leaders, both local and international,
were long ago confronted with this and other major safety
problems. A petition signed by 1200 people from Hanna
demanding (1) Co. ambulance go direct to hospital (2) doc-
tors (3) another first aid (4) a two way bridge and several
hundred angry people raised these at the General Meeting.
Chambers was forced to negotiate the issues with the com-
pany. Chambers came back crying, that he could do no
more, the company had said no. With the no strike clause (he
supported) our only other choice is illegal. Later it was
raised in contract negotiations in Pittsburgh and Washing-
ton, thanks to grievanceman Covington. But still no results.
Finally a bone was thrown to us, and 1299 Pres. Chambers
and Safety Chair. Sturgis stated-the Co. had agreed to let
it be the option of company personnel to decide if an in-
jured person should go directy off the island in the co.'s
ambulance or not. This amounted to giving a company
man a life and death decision, but still we must ask our
"leaders." WHAT REALLY IS COMPANY POLICY?
WAS NOT HINOJOSA, CRITICALLY INJURED AND
DYING. SERIOUS ENOUGH? SOMEBODY IS
LYING, EITHER CHAMBERS, THE COMPANY OR
BOTH.
UNITE TO STOP THIS MURDEROUS POLICY!!!
What happened to Hinojosa could happen to any one of
us! The only time our local's leaders showed "concern"
about our major safety problems was when the rank and
file worker got out and raised some hell. And as soon as we
stopped Chambers and his buddies forgot to care. So we
have got to get out and start raising hell again and for as
long as it takes to win or Chambers is replaced in our soon
coming election.
The Rank and File Caucus calls upon all progressive
people in the union to join with us to stop this murderous
policy and fight for a safety program that meets head on
the major safety problems we face such: 5 battery pollu-
tion, slag pit explosions and the condition of the operating
floor at the BOP's. We can start by all of us at least making
that one general union meeting a month. LETS UNITE
AND ORGANIZE OURSELVES TO BUILD A FIGHT-
ING AND DEMOCRATIC UNION!!!
SAFETY, NOT PROFITS, FIRST!
STOP THE MURDER!
ATTEND THE NEXT GENERAL UNION MEET-
ING
WEDS. JAN. 28 at 7:30
AT THE USWA LOCAL 1299 HALL
Rank and File Caucus
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
1038
GREAT LAKES STEEL
against employees for bringing or having literature in
the plant, which literature is protected under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them under the Act.
WE WILL rescind and no longer enforce or give any
other effect to the following rule:
No employee is permitted to bring in or distribute, at
any time on Company property, literature which is
libelous, defamatory, scurrilous, abusive or insulting or
any literature which would tend to disrupt order, disci-
pline or production within the plants.
ANY EMPLOYEE WHO BRINGS IN OR DIS-
TRIBUTES LITERATURE IN VIOLATION OF
THIS POLICY IS SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINE UP
TO AND INCLUDING DISCHARGE.
WE WILL reinstate and make whole Patrick Driscoll
for loss of earnings since his discharge.
GREAT LAKES STEEL, DIVISION OF NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION
1039