Gray-Syracuse, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 19, 1968

170 N.L.R.B. 1684 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

1684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
Gray-Syracuse , Inc. and Elizabeth I. Griffin. Case
3-CA-3219
April 19, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND ZAGORIA
On January 26, 1968, Trial Examiner Owsley
Vose issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion . Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support
thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was ` committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the 'exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Gray-Syracuse, Inc.,
Manlius, New York, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
' The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the
record, including the Respondent's brief and exceptions, adequately
presents the issues and the positions of the parties
We find no merit in the Respondent's contention that the Recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner is too broad and would prevent the Respon-
dent from imposing lawful restrictions on the wearing of union insignia in
the plant
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
OWSLEY VOSE, Trial Examiner : This case, heard
at Syracuse , New York, on October I1 and 12,
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1967, pursuant to a charge filed on the preceding
May 5 and a complaint issued on August 4,
presents two questions: (1) Whether the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it suspended the Charging Party for 5 days on
April 25, 1967; and (2) whether the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it
required the Charging Party to cease wearing an
"Organizing Committee" button on May 6, 1967.
Upon the entire record in the case, my considera-
tion of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and
the Respondent, and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a New York corporation, is en-
gaged at Manlius, New York, in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of small investment castings
for the computer, aircraft, air-conditioning, instru-
ment, and similar industries. The Respondent
operates a job shop and is engaged almost exclu-
sively in filling specific orders for component parts
required by its customers. During the past year the
Respondent produced over $100,000 worth of
parts, of which more than $50,000 worth were
shipped to customers located outside of New York.
Upon these facts, I find, as the Respondent ad-
mits, that it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to as-
sert jurisdiction herein.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union , United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, AFL-CIO ( herein called the UAW), is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Respondent's 5-day Layoff of Elizabeth
Griffin in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act
1. The facts
Elizabeth Griffin became interested in the UAW
about the middle of March 1967. She attended
union meetings and passed out membership cards
among her fellow employees. Charles Friedman,
the president of the local of the UAW at the nearby
Precision Casting Company plant, assisted the or-
ganizational efforts of the Respondent's employees.
Griffin credibly testified that she "was more or less
the main contact" with Friedman.
170 NLRB No. 193
GRAY-SYRACUSE, INC. 1685
Prior to April 24, Griffin had made tentative ar-
rangements with Friedman to have a union meeting
at the union hall of the Precision Casting Company
Local on April 24 if the UAW could have an or-
ganizer present. Griffin was to call Friedman later
to find out if the meeting definitely could be held as
planned.
Griffin was laid off by the Respondent for 5 days
because of having offered to give Lucille Harper a
ride to the meeting scheduled for the night of April
24. There are very serious conflicts in the testimony
concerning exactly when this incident occurred, the
General Counsel's witnesses generally placing the
incident during the noon lunch hour and the
Respondent's witnesses placing it at or about 11:30
a.m., before the lunch hour. In resolving these con-
flicts I have taken into consideration some of the
work procedures,followed by the employees in the
finishing department, where Griffin worked,
discussed below.
The employees in the department perform vari-
ous finishing operations on the parts manufactured
by the Respondent, including deburring parts, i.e.,
hand filing or machine sanding burrs off of parts,
finishing parts with a punch press or a drill press,
and straightening, adjusting, and gauging parts. The
employees are given various parts to finish in lots of
as many as a thousand and they may work on a
given lot for only a few hours or as long as days at a
time. The time spent on each lot of parts is
recorded on an IBM punchcard which is punched
in when work on the lot is begun and punched out
when the lot is completed.
After considering all of the conflicting evidence
concerning the timing of the incident which led to
Griffin's 5-day layoff, and having in mind the
demeanor of the respective witnesses, I conclude
that the incident occurred about 11:30 a.m., as
testified to by the Respondent's witnesses.'
The facts concerning this incident are as follows:
Lucille Harper, one of Griffin's fellow workers, was
Griffin's next door neighbor. Griffin had been told
that Harper had signed a union card. When Harper
completed the lot of parts she was working on that
morning she punched out at the timeclock and at
the same time punched the starting time on another
card, which would be used to time her next job. As
she was leaving the timeclock on her way to obtain
her next assignment from Foreman Carman, Griffin
called,' to Harper. Harper turned and stopped by
Griffin's workbench, where Griffin asked Harper
"if she would care to attend a meeting that night
along ',with a few other people" and told her "if you
would you may ride with us." z Harper replied,
"No." and walked up to Foreman Carman and told
him she had finished her job and was ready for
another assignment. Carman told Harper that he
would be with her in a minute and Harper returned
to her workbench. Harper's workbench is alongside
that of Marie Southard whose testimony reveals
that she was strongly opposed to a union at the
Respondent's plant. Upon Harper's return to her
place of work she told Southard about Griffin's
offer to give her a ride to the meeting. (Although
all witnesses agree that Griffin made no mention of
the UAW in connection with the meeting, the
record establishes that all concerned understood
that Griffin was referring to a union meeting.)- As
Southard testified, she told Harper that she "should
tell Carman about it right away."
Within the next few minutes, as Harper testified,
she "just went to pieces," became "nervous and up-
set" and "felt like punching out and going home."
When Foreman Carman arrived at Harper's work
station, she told him of Griffin's offer to give her a
ride to the meeting. It is not clear as to exactly
when Harper became upset. It is clear, however,
that Harper was not upset when she spoke to
Foreman Carman about another assignment, right
after talking to Griffin, and that she became upset
only after returning to her workbench. And it was
immediately after her return to her workbench that
Harper told Southard about the brief conversation
with Griffin. It may be, as Harper testified at one
point, that she did not become upset until after she
reported the incident to Carman.' Or possibly
Harper became upset from realizing that she had
disclosed to an antiunion employee the prounion
sympathies of her friend and neighbor. I need not
decide specifically what caused Harper to have this
unusual reaction to a brief conversation in the
plant. In any event, Harper was so emotionally
disturbed that it was necessary for Carman to spend
time calming her down.
Upon leaving Harper, Foreman Carman called
Plant Superintendent Brockway and asked if he
could see him. Carman saw Brockway shortly be-
fore noon that day and reported the incident to him
and said that Harper was "very upset over it."
Brockway, who was on his way to a meeting, said
that he would look into the matter the first thing
the next morning.
Early on April 25, Brockway had Carman bring
Harper to the office. Carman said that Harper was
"very excited" and recommended that Southard be
brought in also. After the two women arrived in the
' Among the factors which lead me to this conclusion are the following
The IBM punchcards covering the jobs worked on by both Griffin and
Harper about the time of the incident failed to substantiate Griffin's
testimony and did substantiate the version of the Respondent's witnesses
Also Griffin failed to protest Plant Superintendent Brockway's inclusion in
the warning notice given her as a result of this incident the statement that it
occurred at 11 30 a.m., although she did protest the inclusion on the notice
of the word "union" in referring to the meeting , which was inaccurate.
2 The quoted testimony is what Daniel Brockway , the plant superinten-
dent, testified that Milton Carman , the foreman of the finishing depart-
ment, reported to him about the incident shortly after it happened
3It is possible that Harper unthinkingly followed the antiunion
Southard 's advice to report the matter to Foreman Carman and only after
having done so realized that she may have unwittingly revealed to the
Respondent her own involvement with the Union. This is one explanation
for Harper 's very emotional response to Griffin's casual offer of transporta-
tion to a meeting for unstated purposes
1686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
office Harper related what had happened in sub-
stantially the terms stated above. Upon inquiry of
Southard, she confirmed that Harper's account of
the incident was true. Brockway dismissed Harper
and Southard and had Carman bring Griffin into
the office. There Brockway, after telling Griffin
that he "felt that a serious incident had occurred,"
asked for her side of the story. Griffin admitted
having the conversation with Harper but stated that
it had happened during the lunch hour. Griffin
sought to buttress her version by saying that she
had moved over to the optical comparator before
lunch and that the incident could not have hap-
pened at her workbench at that time. After Griffin
asserted that "it's a lie," that it happened before
lunch, and insisted on confronting Harper,
Brockway had Harper brought in the office. When
Griffin insisted to Harper that the incident had oc-
curred during the lunch hour, Harper reiterated
that it had happened at 11:30 a.m. Griffin persisted
in her version and Brockway terminated the discus-
sion by- saying that he would have to investigate
further.
Brockway testified that later , that day he
questioned Marian Craw, who was present during
the incident, and also checked Griffin's punchcards
to ascertain when she had commenced the job at
the optical comparator. He found that Griffin had
not started on that job until after 1 p.m. and con-
cluded that she must have been at her work station
at 11:30 a.m., as Harper had testified. Brockway
also checked Harper's punchcards and found that
she had changed jobs between 11:18 and 11:24
a.m. Brockway concluded, as he further testified,
that Griffin had stopped work herself, had inter-
fered with Harper's work and had caused an "ex-
citable incident," and decided in view of the fact
that Griffin had received two prior warning notices
that a 5-day layoff was an appropriate punishment.
Near the end of Griffin's workday Brockway
summoned Griffin to the office and informed her
that he had investigated further and that he was
sorry, but he was going to have to give her a 5-day
suspension and handed her a warning notice stat-
ing, in part,
The reason is for interfering with the work of
another employee and stopping work yourself
to solicit attendance for a meeting to be held
the night of 4/24/67.
This was done the morning of 4-24-67 at 11:30
a.m.4
2. The Respondent's contentions; conclusions
The Respondent asserts in its brief that Griffin
was laid off, as stated in the warning notice given
her, because of her "interfering with the work of
another employee and stopping work [herself] to
solicit attendance at a meeting." Griffin was not ac-
tually interfering with the work of another em-
ployee because Harper had just completed her cur-
rent assignment and had no work' to do until
Foreman Carman was free to give her her next as-
signment. Carman was aware of this fact when 'he
reported the incident to Brockway. As for stopping
work herself, there is no showing that Griffin had to
stop what she was doing in order to tell Harper
about the meeting and to ask her if she wanted a
ride. The whole conversation, at most, 'took no
more than 10 seconds. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that such brief interruptions, as-
suming that Griffin stopped work for the entire 10
seconds, were impermissible. Nor is there any
showing that all talking in the plant was forbidden.
Indeed, the fact that Harper and Southard felt free
to discuss the incident together upon Harper's
return to her workbench strongly suggests that the
Respondent normally does not forbid brief conver-
sations between employees.
As far as causing an "excitable incident" is con-
cerned, as Brockway testified, it is just as reasona-
ble to attribute Harper's "going to pieces" to
Southard's advice to Harper to inform Carman
"right away," as it is to attribute it to Griffin's in-
vitation. As Harper admitted, the significance of
this episode "didn't dawn on [-her] until [she] got
back to [her] seat."
While the Respondent contends that Griffin's
conduct was in violation of a company rule against
solicitation, I find no such rule among the Respon-
dent's published list of 33 "Company Rules."
Furthermore, it is an inaccurate characterization of
Griffin's conduct to say that she was engaged in
"solicitation." As found above, Griffin did no more
than to mention the meeting and to offer to give
Harper a ride if she cared to attend. In my opinion,
had Griffin invited Harper during working hours to
ride with her to a PTA meeting, for example, I feel
sure that the Respondent would not have charged
her with engaging in "solicitation." The Respon-
dent's action in thus characterizing Griffin's con-
duct, in my opinion, suggests that the Respondent
was concerned that the conversation had to do with
a union meeting for this is language which is com-
monly associated with union campaigns. ' The
Respondent was aware, of course, that a drive for
membership was being made by the UAW among
its employees and understood that the meeting
referred to was a union meeting.
To sum up, the Respondent, acting upon what it
must have assumed was the complaint of an-anti-
union employee, sought to blow up a trivial interrup-
tion in production, at most, by a prounion em-
ployee into a major incident. At the same, time the
Respondent made no serious effort to ascertain
precisely what touched off Harper's nervous upset,
'This was the second notice handed Griffin The first notice had the
word "union" in parenthesis preceding the word meeting After Griffin
protested that she had not mentioned the word "union" during this conver-
sation with Harper, Brockway wrote out another notice eliminating the
word "union "
GRAY-SYRACUSE, INC. 1687
which consumed much more working time than did
Griffin 's brief remarks . It just seemed to assume
that because Griffin in her brief conversation had
reference to a union meeting that this is what had
upset Harper . But, as suggested above , this does not
necessarily follow. Had the Respondent sought to
get to the bottom of what ailed Harper it might
have ascertained that it was the antiunion Southard
who touched off Harper 's nervous upset.
Under all the circumstances I conclude that the
Respondent laid off Griffin because of the fact that
she had invited Harper to a union meeting and
would not have meted out this punishment to Grif-
fin had she been speaking to Harper about any
other kind of a gathering . Such disciplining of Grif-
fin violated Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act.
B. The Respondent Prohibits Griffin from Wearing
an Organizing Committee Button in Violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
1. The facts
Griffin's 5-day suspension ended on May 2, and
she returned to work on May 3. Upon her return to
work she commenced wearing the button which is
reproduced below, full size,
the telephone concerning whether the Respondent
"had to stand" the wearing and displaying of such
insignia, and, the limits, if any of permissible em-
ployee conduct in this regard. After a few hours
Williams called Brockway back and advised him, as
Brockway testified, that the wearing of the usual
union membership buttons was permissible as long
as they were not being used for solicitation during
working hours. Williams also told Brockway during
this telephone call that it had been established in
the Fabri-Tek case (Fabri-Tek, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 352
F.2d 575 (C.A. 8), reversing 148 NLRB 1623) that
the wearing of insignia of an unusual size or color,
or denoting that the wearer's status had employer
approval, could be prohibited.
With this advice in mind, Brockway prepared a
notice, and after checking with Attorney Williams
concerning its wording and receiving Williams' ap-
proval, Brockway on May 5 posted the notice on
the Respondent's bulletin boards. The text of the
notice is as follows:
EMPLOYEES HAVE ALL BEEN
PROPERLY INFORMED IN THE PAST
THAT SOLICITATION OR CAMPAIGNING
DURING THEIR WORK HOURS IS
PROHIBITED.
THIS PROVISION IS NOT INTENDED TO
RESTRICT EMPLOYEES IN THE WEARING
OF CUSTOMARY AND USUAL SIZED
JEWELRY, BUTTONS OR OTHER PER-
SONAL LABELS THAT WOULD INDICATE
THEIR MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION
WITH FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS,
RELIGIOUS GROUPS, LABOR ORGANIZA-
TIONS, OR CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS,
ETC.
EMPLOYEES WHOVIOLATE THIS REGU-
LATION ARE SUBJECT TO COMPANY
DISCIPLINE.
D. P. Brockway
Plant Superintendent
The background of the button is white, the words
"JOIN" and "VOTE" are in red, and the words
"ORGANIZING COMMITTEE" and the circular
design are in dark blue. After Griffin's return to
work she also commenced wearing on a string tied
around her neck a brooch with the letters UAW in-
corporated in raised letters in the center of the
design. The letters were almost three-eighths of an
inch high, The brooch was made of silver colored
metal and contained no contrasting colors.
A few days before Griffin returned to work other
employees commenced wearing or displaying UAW
insignia in the plant. These appeared not only on
buttons, but also on pocket protectors, cigarette
cases, and the like.
On May 3 or 4, after Griffin's return to work,
Plant Superintendent Brockway consulted the
Respondent's attorney, Daniel C. Williams, over
Early the next morning, Brockway, while on his
regular Saturday tour of the plant, went into the
finishing department. According to Brockway,
"there were obviously a number of people kind of
stretching their heads around .... Looking towards
the east side of the department where [he] was
walking about that time." Foreman Carman com-
mented to Brockway that Griffin was wearing "an
interesting button." Brockway walked down to
where Griffin was working and observed that she
was wearing high on her shoulder the "Organizing
Committee" button which has been reproduced
above. Brockway then informed Griffin, as he
testified, that "because of the size and the color
and the wording and the fact the wording could
lend semi-official status to Mrs. Griffin, [he] would
like her to remove" the button. Griffin said that she
1688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had been advised that she could wear the button.
Brockway replied that he had been advised by his
labor attorney that such a button should not be
worn . Griffin complied with Brockway 's request.
Later Brockway went back to Griffin and told
her that it was all right for her to wear the button
on her own time, such as during break or lunch
periods. Griffin asked Brockway at this point
whether she could continue to wear the UAW
brooch . Brockway said yes. Being confused as to
Brockway 's meaning , during her break period that
morning Griffin asked Brockway if it was permissi-
ble to wear the brooch during working hours.
Brockway said yes.5 Griffin was not disciplined in
any way because of her wearing the "Organizing
Committee" button.
2. The Respondent 's contentions ; conclusions
The Respondent contends that because of the
size, color, and wording of the "Organizing Com-
mittee" button, it was inherently disruptive of
production , and that special circumstances existed
at its plant which justified it in promulgating its rule
and enforcing it with respect to Griffin.
With regard to the latter, the Respondent con-
tends that because of the nature of the precision
parts made by it it is necessary to eliminate all dis-
tractions which might impair the accuracy and effi-
ciency of the employees ' operations and disrupt
their production . In support of this contention, the
Respondent cites the fact that its products are
mostly of a very small size , that they are made to
very close tolerances , and that frequent testing is
the rule. The Respondent points out that certain
changes in contour , required after observation in an
optical comparator, must be made by hand with
pliers and that a variety of gauges is used by the
finishing department employees during their finish-
ing operations . The Respondent calls attention to
the fact that the parts manufactured by it are used
in the computer industry, that it makes small impel-
lors used to air-condition DC-8 jet airliners, and
that these impellors revolve at speeds in excess of
125,000 RPM 's. The Respondent also notes that it
does precision work for IBM, Carrier , Sigma Instru-
ments , and subcontractors of Boeing and Pratt &
Whitney . Inaccurate work on the parts made by it,
the Respondent asserts , automatically results in the
loss of business.
Brockway testified that the Respondent main-
tains a quality incentive program to keep scrap at a
low level under which all hourly employees receive
a 5-cent-per-hour bonus for the entire month if the
Respondent succeeds in keeping its losses due to
scrapped parts down to 11.5 percent. The Respon-
dent posts a daily analysis of the results of this pro-
gram in terms of scrap produced. To achieve the
quality of performance essential to remain in busi-
The findings in the above paragraph are based primarily on Brockway's
testimony Griffin's testimony differs in some respects , but not in any
ness, Brockway testified , requires continuous con-
centration by' the employees on the details of the
job at hand . Griffin herself testified regarding the
work, "It's sort of a little tricky and complicated.
Yes, you have to concentrate , very,much so."
The foregoing facts, the Respondent urges,
justified it in promulgating the rule set forth in the
notice which was posted on May 5 and in enforcing
the rule so as to require Griffin to remove the "Or-
ganizing Committee" button. Such conduct, the
Respondent asserts, was part of a consistent pro-
gram to promote concentration and eliminate dis-
traction.
I cannot agree with the Respondent 's- first con-
tention that because of the size, color , and wording
on the button it was "inherently disruptive" of
production . The button was smaller and no more
colorful than those involved in other cases in which
the Board has held that the wearing of such buttons
was a protected activity. Standard Fittings Co., 133
NLRB 928; Fabri-Tek, Inc., 148 NLRB 1623, 1628,
fn. 10, reversed, 352 F.2d 577 (C.A. 8); Serv-Air,
Inc., 161 NLRB 382. The message on the button
was clearly no more provocative than that which
the Board has held to be permissible in numerous
cases. See cases cited in fn . 10 in the Fabri-Tek
Board decision , supra , and Serv -Air, Inc., supra.
Nor do the words "Organizing Committee," in my
opinion , suggest that the wearer of the button had
some "semi-official status " with the Respondent.
On the contrary, these words do more than convey
that the wearer is interested in organizing em-
ployees in the UAW.
The only evidence bearing upon the question of
whether Griffin 's wearing of the button had any
disruptive effect on production or was distracting in
nature is the testimony of Brockway that Griffin
was wearing the button high on her shoulder and
that when he entered the finishing department that
morning he observed employees "stretch their
heads around" in his direction. From Brockway's
own testimony it appears that the employees were
more interested in observing his reaction to Grif-
fin's wearing of the button than in the actual button
itself. These circumstances, in my opinion , are not
enough to warrant limiting employees ' statutorily
protected right , absent special considerations, to
wear union campaign buttons while at work.
The Respondent recognizes that employees
generally have the right to wear union buttons and
to display other union propaganda items while at
work . It contends , however, that the facts discussed
above constitute " special considerations relating to
employee efficiency and plant discipline" which
justify its promulgation and enforcement of the rule
in this case. The above quoted phrase is taken from
the Trial Examiner 's decision in the Fabri- Tek case,
which the Board affirmed, and which the Court of
respect which is significant in view of my ultimate conclusion regardingthis
aspect of the case
GRAY-SYRACUSE, INC. 1689
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in reversing the
Board, also quoted.
The Respondent's reliance on the court of ap-
peals decision in Fabri-Tek presents the threshold
question of which precedent I am to follow for in
my opinion the facts of the case bring it clearly
within the Board's view of the Fabri-Tek case. Of
course I am bound to follow the Board precedent
unless it appears that the Board has been persuaded
by the court of appeals' opinion to abandon its
former views as to what constitute special con-
siderations relating to employee efficiency and
plant discipline warranting limitations on the wear-
ing of union insignia.
I have been unable to find any Board decisions
subsequent to the Fabri-Tek court decision in which
it has expressed its position with respect to the
court decision in Fabri-Tek. However, the Board's
subsequent decision adopting the Trial Examiner's
decision in Serv-Air, Inc., 161 NLRB 382, indicates
that the Board is still adhering to the views which it
approved in its Fabri-Tek decision.
The Serv-Air case involved the wearing of large
badges and other conspicuous union propaganda
items by civilian mechanics, among others, em-
ployed by Serv-Air, a private contractor at Vance
Air Force Base , to work on advanced supersonic jet
engines which were used to power T-38 U.S. Air
Force fighter planes. The Board affirmed the Trial
Examiner's finding in Serv-Air that the employer
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promulgat-
ing and enforcing a rule limiting employees to the
wearing of one propaganda button, notwithstanding
the employer's contention that the wearing of but-
tons by 'employees working on or around jet en-
gines constituted a serious safety hazard. Upon the
basis of the Serv-Air decision and upon my review
of other Board decisions in this area since the
Fabri-Tek court decision,6 I conclude that I am
bound by the Board's decision in the Fabri-Tek
case.
The Respondent, in addition to relying on the
Fabri-Tek court decision (which I agree supports its
position), urges also that the instant case is distin-
guishable on the facts from the Fabri-Tek Board
decision. The Respondent cites the portion of the
Fabri-Tek Board decision stating that Fabri-Tek's
production process has been "broken down into a
great number of simple steps punctuated by
frequent inspections" and argues that this is not the
situation in the instant case.
My analysis of the facts of both cases compels me
to disagree with this conclusion. In my opinion, the
individual operations performed by finishing de-
partment employees are no more complex and
require no more concentration on the job than the
operations involved in Fabri-Tek. In Fabri-Tek em-
ployees were engaged in soldering and testing
memory frames which are component parts used in
computers' and in building and wiring electrical
testing apparatus. The testing of memory frames in
Fabri-Tek involved reading on an electronic oscil-
loscope the effect of applying in various ways low
electrical currents called "drives."
The most complicated operation performed by
the Respondent's finishing department employees,
as I understand it, involved observing on an optical
comparator deviations in contour of the small
castings manufactured by the Respondent and cor-
recting these deviations by hand with pliers. The
gauging and straightening operations, the drilling
and deburring operations done on small castings in
the finishing department, as I understand them, in
my opinion, require less concentration and less skill
than the testing, wiring and soldering operations on
complicated electrical equipment involved in Fabri-
Tek. And in the instant case, the work of the finish-
ing department employees was all inspected after
being completed by them. While it is true that the
production process in Fabri-Tek had been broken
down into a great number of simple steps, I believe
this is true, in the sense that it is true in the Fabri-
Tek case, also of the operations of the Respondent's
finishing department employees. They work on
relatively large batches of one type casting at a time
and have only a limited number of operations to do
on each casting, many of which are very simple
such as the deburring operations and the drilling
out of imperfections in holes.
The facts of this case, in my opinion, are on all
fours with those of the Fabri-Tek Board decision. In
view of the Board's holding in that case I must re-
ject the Respondent's contention that it has
established those "special considerations relating to
employee efficiency and plant discipline" which
warranted it in prohibiting Griffin from wearing the
"Organizing Committee" button on and after May
6, 1967. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent by
such conduct has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act."
'J. P Stevens and Co , Inc , 163 NLRB 217, enfd. 388 F.2d 896 (C.A 2),
Portage Plastics Co., 1,63 NLRB 753; Consolidated Casinos Corp, Sahara
Division , 164 NLRB 950
' The Trial Examiner in the Fabri-Tek case discussed these fames as fol-
lows (148 NLRB at 1625, fn 5).
These frames consist of sheets of plastic ranging in size from 2 inches
square to 2 feet The center portion of the sheet is cut out so that only
a frame is left Across this open space are strung, horizontally , verti-
cally and diagonally, many fine insulated wires , each fastened to the
frame by being soldered to a terminal which looks like a metal eyelet
Suspended at many points on the wire mesh thus are tiny doughnut-
shaped bits of ferrite called "memory cores " In very general terms, it
seemed that these , when magnetized by applied electrical impulses,
vary or affect current passing through them to register or effect pre-
dictable results There is no doubt - that these memory frames are in-
tricate and complex in construction and operation , that their fabrica-
tion requires care and concentration, that they must be frequently
tested and repaired as they go through the process of manufacture and
that, unless perfect, they cannot be used.
'The Respondent's promulgation of its rule regarding the wearing of
union buttons was not alleged in the complaint as an unfair labor practice
and the matter was not fully litigated at the hearing . Hence, I make no find-
ing regarding this aspect of the case
1690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By laying off Elizabeth Griffin for 5 days
because of her prounion conversation with another
employee during working hours, the Respondent
has discriminated against Griffin in regard to her
tenure of employment and has discouraged mem-
bership in the UAW in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
2. By prohibiting Elizabeth Griffin from wearing
a union campaign button during working hours in
the plant on and after May 6, 1967, the Respondent
has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)'and
(7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, my Recommended
Order will direct the Respondent to cease and de-
sist from such unfair labor practices and from like
and related conduct, and that the Respondent make
Griffin whole for her losses as a result of her dis-
criminatory layoff by paying her the wages she
would normally have earned during her layoff, plus
interest at 6 percent per annum, as provided in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and
the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, there is hereby issued the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The Respondent, Gray-Syracuse, Inc., Manlius,
New York, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Iplement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, by laying off or in any
other manner discriminating against employees in
regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
(b) Prohibiting Elizabeth Griffin or any other
employee from' wearing permissible union cam-
paign buttons or other permissible union propagan-
da items during working hours.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following' affirmative action which it
is found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole Elizabeth Griffin for any loss of
pay' she may have suffered by reason -of her 5-day
layoff in the manner set forth in the-section of the
Trial Examiner's, Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request,- make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Recommended Order.
(c) Post at its plant at Manlius, New York, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 3 after being duly signed 'by
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by- the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it'for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered' by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of
this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken
to comply herewith.10
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
1° In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 3 , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a-Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board
and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby
notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT layoff any of our employees or
otherwise discriminate in regard to their hire,
tenure of employment, or any` term or condi-
tion of employment, because they have en-
gaged in union or concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection.
GRAY-SYRACUSE, INC.
WE WILL NOT prohibit Elizabeth Griffin or
any other employees from wearing an organiz-
ing committee button or from wearing any
other permissible union campaign items during
working hours.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of their right to engage in, or to
refrain from engaging in, any or all of the ac-
tivities specified in Section 7 of the Act, except
to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
amended.
WE WILL reimburse Elizabeth Griffin for the
1691
wages she lost as a result of her 5-day layoff.
GRAY-SYRACUSE, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 4th Floor, The 120 Building, 120 Delaware
Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone
842-3112.