Grand Industries

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 360 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATINAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 360
Grand Industries, Inc. and Great Lakes Regional In-
dustrial Council, United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of America, AFL–CIO.
Cases 7–CA–42513 and 7–CA–42680
August 27, 2001
DECISION, ORDER, AND ORDER REMANDING
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
TRUESDALE AND WALSH
On July 6, 2000, Administrative Law Judge George
Carson II issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision, Order, and
Order Remanding, to adopt the recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below, and to remand this
proceeding for further consideration as discussed herein.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) by suspending employee Brian Phipps
from October 28, 19991 through November 15. In the
absence of exceptions, we adopt this finding.
The amended consolidated complaint (complaint), at
paragraph seven, also alleged multiple violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1). In its amended answer, the Respondent ad-
mitted these allegations, and, at the hearing, counsel for
Respondent acknowledged that the Respondent was ad-
mitting those allegations. Accordingly, the judge found
that the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) as al-
leged in paragraph seven of the complaint. In light of the
Respondent’s admission, and in the absence of excep-
tions to these allegations, we adopt this finding.
We further find that it would effectuate the policies of
the Act to sever these uncontested violations from the
issue being remanded herein and to issue an appropriate
remedial Order as modified and set forth in full below.2

1 All dates refer to 1999, unless otherwise specified.
2 The judge found, inter alia, that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by promulgating and maintaining a rule prohibiting unauthor-
ized solicitation or distribution of literature whether written or printed
on company premises during working hours. (The rule was twice
stated to employees on October 22.) The judge inadvertently failed to
require the Respondent to rescind this provision.
The judge also inadvertently failed to include a preservation of re-
cords remedy in his Order, and failed to specify that, within 3 days after
removing from its files any unlawful reference to Phipps’s unlawful
suspension, the Respondent must notify Phipps in writing that this has
been done and that the suspension will not be used against him in any
way. We shall modify the judge’s Order accordingly and issue a new
notice to employees. Finally, we shall modify the judge’s recom-
mended Order in accordance with our recent decision in Ferguson
Electric Co., 335 NLRB 142 (2001).
The complaint also alleged that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) by disciplining employees “known
to the Respondent” pursuant to the more stringent en-
forcement of its disciplinary rules.3 The judge dismissed
this complaint allegation. The General Counsel has ex-
cepted to this dismissal. We find that it is necessary to
remand this allegation for further consideration by the
judge.
The relevant facts regarding this allegation are set
forth briefly below. The Respondent, at its Grand Haven
facility, is engaged in several operations, the most labor
intensive of which is the construction of wooden boxes,
pallets, and skids. The Respondent employs approxi-
mately 30 hourly employees. Twenty of these employ-
ees work on the day shift and 10 work on the night shift.
The Union began an organizational campaign among
Respondent’s employees in August; a representation
petition was filed on October 28.
The Respondent’s employee handbook lists various in-
fractions for which discipline may be imposed. Exces-
sive absenteeism, excessive tardiness, and failure to re-
port properly absences are specifically listed as “causes
for disciplinary action and/or dismissal.” The handbook
includes an attendance rule which provides for progres-
sive discipline resulting from excessive tardiness and
unexcused absences. An incident of tardiness is one half
of a point, and an unexcused absence is one point. When
employees accumulate a certain number of points, they
may be disciplined accordingly, i.e., they may receive
warnings and, upon accumulating more points, suspen-
sions.4

3 The complaint allegation states, at par. 11, that “[b]eginning about
October 25, 1999, Respondent, through its agent Bradley J. Billinghurst
at its Grand Haven plant, discriminated against employees whose
names currently are unknown to the General Counsel but are well
known to the Respondent[,] by suspending said employees pursuant to
its actions described above in par. 10.” Par. 10 of the complaint, in
turn, states that, “[b]eginning about October 25, 1999, Respondent,
through its agent Bradley J. Billinghurst at its Grand Haven plant, en-
forced discipline rules in a more stringent manner because employees
had joined or supported the Charging Party Union.”
4 With respect to the suspension of employee Phipps, the judge
found that the Respondent had unlawfully retroactively revoked its
waivers of Phipps’s suspensions and suspended him because of his
union activities. Importantly, the judge found that, on October 26,
Billinghurst told Phipps that, “in the past we would have let this
[Phipps’s attendance violations] slide, but since we brought up the
attendance issue. . . . we are going to enforce it”; he further found that
Billinghurst admitted that he was “going back retroactively and enforc-
ing the three and 10-day suspensions that [he] had previously waived.”
See sec. II,C,1 of the judge’s decision.
335 NLRB No. 31
GRAND INDUSTRIES 361
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that, on October 25,5
the Respondent had threatened employees with more
rigorous adherence to disciplinary rules set forth in the
employee handbook because employees had joined or
supported the Union. This allegation was uncontested.
The General Counsel further alleged that the Respondent
followed through on this threat by imposing a “massive
increase” in discipline, i.e., suspensions, given to em-
ployees after October 25.6 The Respondent contends that
it consistently applied its disciplinary policy and that the
discipline for attendance infractions imposed following
the advent of the organizing effort would have taken
place even in the absence of the protected conduct.
In Wright Line,7 the Board set forth a test of causation
for all cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3), or
violations of Section 8(a)(1) turning on employer moti-
vation: The General Counsel must show, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that protected conduct was a
motivating factor in the employer’s decision; once the
General Counsel has made this required showing, the
burden shifts to the Respondent to demonstrate that it
would have taken the same action even in the absence of
the protected activity.
The judge found that the General Counsel had estab-
lished a prima facie case that the Respondent had unlaw-
fully imposed its disciplinary rules more stringently.
However, he also found that the Respondent had rebutted
the General Counsel’s prima facie case because it dem-
onstrated that its disciplinary policy was not unlawfully
applied, and would have been utilized in the same man-
ner even in the absence of employees’ protected conduct.
In this regard, the judge found that the documents in the
record imposing suspensions upon all disciplined em-
ployees reflect those employees’ attendance violations,
and no attendance records were introduced showing that,
prior to any union activity, violations that should have
resulted in discipline were ignored.
The judge examined the number of suspensions im-
posed during the 6-month period before August, when
the Respondent became aware of the organizing cam-
paign, and the 6-month period following that month.
Using this timeframe for analyzing whether the amount

5 Although the complaint refers to the date of Billinghurst’s unlawful
threat to enforce more rigorously the Respondent’s disciplinary rules as
occurring “about” October 25, it appears that Billinghurst may have
actually made this remark on October 22. This minor discrepancy does
not affect our analysis of this issue, and because the complaint refers to
“about” October 25, we shall refer to that date as the date on which
Billinghurst made the statement.
6 See fn. 3.
7 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399–403 (1983).
of discipline increased after Respondent’s knowledge of
the campaign, the judge found that there was a relatively
consistent pattern of suspensions for attendance infrac-
tions 6 months before August and 6 months after August,
and that the suspensions were justified. Specifically, he
found that from February through July, the Respondent
issued three suspensions for a total of 16 days of suspen-
sions, and that from September through February 2000,
the Respondent issued four suspensions for a total of 19
days of suspensions.8 The judge also found that the three
attendance-related suspensions issued by the Respondent
in March 2000, and the three attendance-related suspen-
sions it issued in April 2000, were, in light of the docu-
ments imposing those suspensions, justified.
In its exceptions, the General Counsel contends, inter
alia, that the judge erred in using August as the bench-
mark month for analyzing this allegation. The General
Counsel asserts that, instead of using August, the judge
should have used October, the month when the Respon-
dent unlawfully threatened employees with more rigor-
ous adherence to its disciplinary rules because employees
had joined or supported the Union, as the benchmark
month for analysis, as alleged in the complaint. Thus,
the General Counsel contends that the appropriate time-
frame for analyzing whether the Respondent more strin-
gently enforced its disciplinary rules would be 6 months
before, and 6 months after, October 25. The General
Counsel further contends that the judge erred in exclud-
ing Phipps’s suspensions (which were imposed on Octo-
ber 26) from his analysis of this allegation, and did not,
in analyzing this allegation, take into account the fact
that the Respondent stopped waiving discipline for atten-
dance violations on or about October 26.
We find that these contentions warrant further exami-
nation by the judge of the complaint allegation that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by disciplin-
ing employees “known to the Respondent” pursuant to
the more stringent enforcement of its disciplinary rules.9
Accordingly, we remand this proceeding to the judge to
resolve the following issues.
First, because the Respondent unlawfully threatened
employees with more rigorous adherence to its discipli-
nary rules on or about October 25, the judge is instructed,
on remand, to analyze whether the Respondent consis-
tently applied its disciplinary rules regarding attendance
infractions 6 months before and 6 months after that date,
i.e., April 25, 1999, through April 25, 2000.
8 The judge did not include Phipps, who, as discussed above, unlaw-
fully received a 3-day suspension and a 10-day suspension on October
26, in this analysis. And, it is unclear whether the judge included sus-
pensions (if any) imposed in the month of August in his analysis.
9 See fn. 3.
DECISIONS OF THE NATINAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 362
Second, because Phipps received a 3-day suspension
and a 10-day suspension on October 26 (after the Re-
spondent had unlawfully revoked its previous waivers of
those suspensions), the judge is instructed to include
these suspensions in his analysis of this allegation.
Finally, the judge is instructed to determine whether
any of the employees who were suspended for attendance
violations in the 6 months after October 25 would have
had their suspensions postponed or waived but for the
Respondent’s unlawfully threatening employees with
more rigorous adherence to its disciplinary rules.10 The
judge may, if necessary, make credibility resolutions, and
reopen the record to obtain evidence required to resolve
these issues.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge, as
modified and set forth in full below, and orders that the
Respondent, Grand Industries, Inc., Grand Haven,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Suspending or otherwise discriminating against any
employee for supporting Great Lakes Regional Industrial
Council, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America, AFL–CIO, or any other union.
(b) Prohibiting distribution of union literature on com-
pany property on nonworking time in nonworking areas
or requiring employees to obtain permission before en-
gaging in such distribution.
(c) Prohibiting employees from discussing the Union
during nonwork time.
(d) Threatening employees with plant closure, loss of
benefits, and unspecified reprisals if they select the Un-
ion as their collective-bargaining representative.
(e) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union activities and the union activities of other
employees.

10 The judge found that the Respondent waived discipline for em-
ployees’ attendance violations in September and October 1999. Thus,
consistent with this remand, the judge should determine whether the
Respondent postponed or waived discipline for attendance violations
from April 25, 1999, through August 1999 (as well as Sept. and Oct.
1999) or at any time from October 25, 1999, through April 25, 2000.
The judge also found that “the waivers of discipline for Locke,
Mengel, and Phipps in September and October of 1999 occurred after
Respondent became aware of union activity [and] [t]he waivers of
discipline given to Locke and Mengel were not revoked.” See sec.
II,D,2 of the judge’s decision. Insofar as the judge relied on this find-
ing to conclude that the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(3), we
instruct him to reconsider this finding consistent with this remand, i.e.,
to use October 25, 1999, as the benchmark date for analyzing this alle-
gation, not August 1999, when the Respondent became aware of the
organizing campaign.
(f) Soliciting employee grievances and implicitly
promising to remedy them in order to discourage em-
ployees from supporting the Union.
(g) Promising employees that Respondent would con-
sider implementing a 401(k) plan as a means of discour-
aging employees from supporting the Union.
(h) Threatening employees with more rigorous adher-
ence to disciplinary rules because of their membership in
or support of the Union.
(i) Threatening employees with reduction of their
profit-sharing payment due to corporate legal fees paid in
connection with the Union.
(j) Advising employees that organizational efforts are
futile and that they will be discharged if they select the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
(k) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the unauthorized solicitation/distribution
rule promulgated on or about May 1, 1999, and notify all
its employees at its Grand Haven, Michigan plant that
this has been done.
(b) Make Brian Phipps whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of his unlawful
suspension, in the manner set forth in the remedy section
of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful suspension of
Brian Phipps, and within 3 days thereafter notify him in
writing that this has been done, and that the suspension
will not be used against him in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Grand Haven, Michigan, copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 7, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “posted by order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “posted pursuant to a
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
GRAND INDUSTRIES 363
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since
September 14, 1999. (f) Within 2 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the portion of Cases
7–CA–42513 and 7–CA–42680 alleging that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by disciplining
employees “known to the Respondent” pursuant to the
more stringent enforcement of its rules, is hereby severed
and remanded to Administrative Law Judge George Car-
son II for further consideration as described above, and
reopening of the record if necessary.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judge shall pre-
pare and serve on the parties a supplemental decision
setting forth credibility resolutions, findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and a recommended Order, as appropri-
ate, on remand. Copies of the supplemental decision
shall be served on all parties, after which the provisions
of Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations
shall be applicable.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT suspend or otherwise discriminate
against any of you for supporting Great Lakes Regional
Industrial Council, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL–CIO, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT prohibit distribution of union litera-
ture on company property on nonworking time in non-
working areas or require you to obtain permission before
engaging in such distribution.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from discussing the Un-
ion during nonwork time.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with plant closure, loss
of benefits, and unspecified reprisals if you select the
Union as your collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you concerning
your union activities or the union activities of others.
WE WILL NOT solicit your grievances and implicitly
promise to remedy them in order to discourage you from
supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT promise to consider implementing a
401(k) plan as a means of discouraging you from sup-
porting the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with more rigorous ad-
herence to disciplinary rules because of your member-
ship in or support of the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten reduction of your profit-
sharing payment due to corporate legal fees paid in con-
nection with the Union.
WE WILL NOT advise you that your organizational
efforts are futile or threaten discharge if you select the
Union as your collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the unauthorized solicitation/distri-
bution rule promulgated on or about May 1, 1999, and
notify all of our employees at our Grand Haven, Michi-
gan plant that this has been done.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the
Board’s Order, make whole Brian Phipps for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of his
unlawful suspension, plus interest, and WE WILL re-
move from our files any reference to his unlawful sus-
pension and within 3 days thereafter notify him in writ-
ing that this has been done and that it will not be used
against him in any way.
GRAND INDUSTRIES, INC.

DECISIONS OF THE NATINAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 364
Steven E. Carlson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Gary T. Britton, Esq., for the Respondent.
Bill Rose, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on May 11, 2000.
The charge in Case 7–CA–42513 was filed on October 28,
1999.1 The charge in Case 7–CA–42680 was filed on January
4, 2000, and amended on February 25, 2000. The amended
consolidated complaint issued on April 24, 2000. The com-
plaint alleges multiple violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. The complaint further alleges that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by sus-
pending employee Brian Phipps because he engaged in union
activities, by more stringently enforcing its disciplinary rules
because employees engaged in union activity, and by disciplin-
ing employees “known to the Respondent” pursuant to the more
stringent enforcement of its rules. Respondent’s amended an-
swer admits the statements alleged to violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. It denies that the suspension of Phipps violated the Act
or that it more stringently enforced rules. I find that the suspen-
sion of Phipps did violate the Act, but that the record does not
establish a more stringent enforcement of rules.
On the entire record,2 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, Grand Industries, Inc., a corporation, is en-
gaged in the manufacture of wooden boxes, pallets, and skids
and in the assembly and packaging of other materials at its
facility in Grand Haven, Michigan, at which it annually pur-
chases and receives goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points located outside the State of
Michigan. The Respondent admits, and I find and conclude,
that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that Great
Lakes Regional Industrial Council, United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of America, AFL–CIO, the Union, is a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent, at its Grand Haven facility, is engaged in
several operations, the most labor intensive of which is the

1 All dates are 1999, unless otherwise indicated.
2 The parties have stipulated to the following corrections of the tran-
script:
P. 8, L. 13: Change “maintain the Rules of Evidence” to “maintained
a rule prohibiting;”
P. 25, L. 6: Change “Fair Rep” to “paragraph;”
P. 86, L. 10: Change “1989” to 1999;”
P. 92, L. 21: Change “MR. CARLSON” to “MR. BRITTON.”
construction of wooden boxes, pallets, and skids. Respondent
employs approximately 30 hourly employees, 20 who work of
the first or day shift and 10 who work on the smaller second or
night shift. In August, the Union began an organizational cam-
paign among Respondent’s employees. A representation peti-
tion was filed on October 28. Respondent’s vice president of
operations, Bradley Billinghurst had no prior experience with
union organizational efforts.
B. The 8(a)(1) Allegations
The complaint, in paragraph 7, alleges multiple incidents of
interference, restraint, and coercion, several of which are attrib-
uted to Billinghurst. Respondent’s amended answer states that
Respondent “does not contest” these allegations, and, at the
hearing, counsel for Respondent acknowledged that Respon-
dent was admitting these allegations. Respondent admits that it:
(a) Since on or about May 1, promulgated and maintained a
rule prohibiting unauthorized solicitation or distribution of
literature whether written or printed on company premises dur-
ing working hours. On October 22, the foregoing rule was
twice stated to employees.
(b) On September 14 and October 20, threatened employees
with loss of benefits if they formed a union.
(c) On October 22, twice, and October 25, threatened em-
ployees with closure of its Grand Haven plant if employees
selected a labor organization to represent them.
(d) On October 22, orally promulgated a rule requiring that
employees obtain permission before distributing union litera-
ture at the Grand Haven plant.
(e) On September 22, October 22, twice, and October
27,coercively interrogated employees concerning their union
activities and the union activities of other employees.
(f) On October 22, twice solicited employee grievances and
implicitly promised to remedy them.
(g) On September 22 and October 22, threatened employees
with unspecified reprisals for engaging in union activity.
(h) On October 22, promised employees that Respondent
would consider implementing a 401(k) plan as a means of dis-
couraging employees from supporting the Union.
(i) On October 25, threatened employees with more rigorous
adherence to disciplinary rules because employees had joined
or supported the Union.
(j) On October 25, prohibited employees from discussing the
Union during nonwork time.
(k) On October 27, prohibited employees from talking about
the Union in the plant.
(l) On October 27, advised employees that money spent on
legal fees related to the Union would reduce employees’ profit-
sharing payment.
(m) On September 14, advised employees that organization
efforts would be futile and that they would be discharged if
they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining represen-
tative.3
3 I have alphabetized the separate violations alleged in the complaint
for clarity in this decision. This listing does not correspond to the sub-
paragraphs in the complaint.
GRAND INDUSTRIES 365
C. The Suspension of Brian Phipps
1. Facts
Respondent’s employee handbook sets out a list of various
infractions for which discipline may be imposed, and it in-
cludes an attendance rule that provides for progressive disci-
pline as a result of excessive tardiness and unexcused absences.
Discipline is imposed after an employee exceeds two points in
a 1-month period. An incident of tardiness is one half a point
and an unexcused absence is one point. There is no probative
evidence that Respondent deviated from its disciplinary policy
at any time in 1998 nor through the first 8 months of 1999.
Vice President of Operations Billinghurst asserted without con-
tradiction that discipline had sometimes been postponed be-
cause of production needs. Assuming this to be true, there is no
probative evidence that discipline was ever actually waived
except in September and October 1999. The record establishes
that in September and October, Respondent waived discipline
that should have been imposed upon three employees.
Tom Mengel had unexcused absences on August 16, 30, and
31 and should have received a 3-day suspension that would
have begun after his return to work on September 1. A notation
in his file states that the suspension was waived. Mengel also
had unexcused absences on September 7, 9, and 10, and should
have received a 10-day suspension. A notation reflects that this
suspension also waived on September 14. Mengel had unex-
cused absences on October 11, 18, and 25. He was suspended
for 30 days on October 25.
David Locke was late on October 4, 5, 11, 18, and 19. He
signed a document stating that the 3-day suspension he should
have received on October 19 was waived but that he would be
suspended for 10 days if he again violated the attendance pol-
icy. Locke was late on November 3, 4, and 5 and had unex-
cused absences on November 8, 9, and 15. On November 16 he
was suspended for 10 days.
Brian Phipps was late on September 5 and had unexcused
absences on September 12 and 13, which should have resulted
in a 3-day suspension. Following this, Phipps was late on Sep-
tember 16 and 20 and absent on September 22, 27, and 28,
which should have resulted in a 10-day suspension. None of the
foregoing discipline was imposed upon Phipps. On occasions
after this when Phipps was late for work, his supervisor would
comment, “You know you are up for ten days off;” however,
discipline was not imposed, and Phipps’ supervisor never ad-
vised him that the discipline might be imposed at a later time.
Although there is no notation in Phipps’ file reflecting that the
discipline was waived, Billinghurst admitted that the discipline
had been waived. When asked, “Isn’t it a fact that when you
suspended Phipps you told him that you were going back retro-
actively and enforcing the three and 10-day suspensions that
you had previously waived?” Billinghurst answered, “Correct.”
Billinghurst learned of the Union’s organizational activity in
August. Thereafter, union literature was observed at the facility.
On October 22, Respondent purchased pizza for its employees
and served it at mealtime on the day and night shifts. Bill-
inghurst used this opportunity to address employees regarding
their organizational activity. His comments included several of
the statements alleged in the complaint as violating Section
8(a)(1) of the Act including threats of closure, reiteration of
Respondent’s overly broad no-solicitation and distribution rule,
interrogation, and solicitation of grievances. At the day-shift
meeting, Phipps was wearing a button on his hat that stated,
“Thanks for the pizza, but I still want a Union.” In the course of
the meetings, employees made comments. One comment at the
day shift meeting related to favoritism regarding treatment of
employees with attendance violations. Billinghurst acknowl-
edged that discipline had been waived for some employees due
to the workload. He specifically mentioned employee David
Locke, who was not identified as supporting the Union. He
stated that, because there was so much work that needed to be
done, Locke’s 3-day suspension had been waived. Phipps com-
plained that he could not make enough money to support his
family, and Billinghurst commented upon his poor attendance.
On October 26, Billinghurst called Phipps to his office. He
noted that the matter of attendance had been mentioned at the
meeting on October 22, and that, following the meeting, he had
looked at Phipps’ attendance. Billinghurst stated that “in the
past we would let this slide, but since we brought up the atten-
dance issue . . . we are going to enforce it.” Billinghurst admit-
ted that he was “going back retroactively and enforcing the
three and 10-day suspensions that [he] had previously waived.”
The foregoing admission establishes that Phipps’ suspensions
had been waived. In view of this admission, there is no basis
for Respondent’s argument in its brief that the suspensions of
Phipps had merely been delayed. In further testimony, Bill-
inghurst admitted stating that he told Phipps that he was taking
this action “because there was potential for a Union to be at
Grand Industries, we were going to follow our handbook much
closer . . . [and] that he [Phipps] recently had three-day and 10-
day suspensions waived because we could not find enough
people, but now he was being suspended.”
Billinghurst explained that when Locke was suspended on
November 16 the manpower “situation was easing up.” Al-
though Respondent retroactively revoked its waiver of disci-
pline as to union adherent Phipps on October 26, the waiver of
the 3-day suspension of Locke in October and the waivers of
the 3-day and 10-day suspensions of Mengel were not revoked.
Although the original charge herein names both Phipps and
Mengel as alleged discriminatees, there is no evidence that
either Locke or Mengel had identified themselves as supporting
the Union at the time Respondent retroactively revoked its
waiver of Phipps’ suspension.4 Indeed, the record reveals no
union activity at the facility by either Locke or Mengel. Bill-
inghurst did not address the disparity in the treatment of Phipps
vis-a-vis Locke and Mengel.
2. Analysis and concluding findings
In applying the analytical framework of Wright Line, 251
NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), to the
foregoing facts, I find that Respondent was aware that Phipps
was engaged in organizational activity on behalf of the Union

4 The portion of the charge relating to Mengel was dismissed. The
General Counsel stated that there was “not sufficient evidence that that
[October] suspension had anything to do with the employer’s alleged
unfair labor practices.” The transcript incorrectly identifies Mengel as
“Magden” at pp. 51 and 52.
DECISIONS OF THE NATINAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 366
and bore animus towards such activity. Billinghurst admitted
that he revoked the previously waived suspensions of Phipps
“because there was potential for a Union to be at Grand Indus-
tries,” and that he “didn’t want to be penalized down the road”
for not enforcing Respondent’s rules. The foregoing admission
establishes that union activity was a substantial and motivating
factor for Respondent’s action. Manno Electric, 321 NLRB 278
(1996).
Contrary to Respondent’s argument in its brief, it is immate-
rial that Phipps acknowledged the infractions for which the
discipline was imposed. In further argument, Respondent as-
serts that Respondent had previously postponed discipline and
that the General Counsel did not elicit any evidence that the
imposition of discipline upon Phipps was meted out “differ-
ently that it had been in the last five years.” Contrary to this
argument, the record establishes that Phipps was treated differ-
ently from other employees. Respondent had waived the sus-
pensions of Locke and Mengel, just as it had waived the sus-
pensions of Phipps. Neither Locke nor Mengel were identified
as union supporters by Respondent in October. Phipps, wearing
a prounion button, had questioned Billinghurst at the October
22 meeting. On October 26, Respondent revoked its previous
waiver of Phipps’ suspensions and suspended him for 13 days.
There was no revocation of the waivers of the suspensions of
Locke and Mengel.
Respondent has not established that it would have taken the
same action against Phipps in the absence of his union activi-
ties. Respondent’s counsel did not examine Billinghurst regard-
ing the disparity in his treatment of known union activist
Phipps and two employees not identified as union supporters. I
find that Respondent retroactively revoked the waver of
Phipps’ suspensions, and suspended him for 13 days because of
his union activities. In so doing, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and dis-
criminated against Phipps with regard to his hire and tenure of
employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
D. Discipline of Employees “Known to Respondent”
1. Facts
The General Counsel introduced documents reflecting sus-
pensions for attendance violations issued to a total of eight
employees from December through April 2000, one in Decem-
ber, one in February 2000, three in March 2000, and three in
April 2000. The General Counsel argues that the foregoing
documents establish that Respondent, consistent with the ad-
mitted complaint allegation of a threat to more stringently en-
force its rules, did exactly what it had threatened to do.
Respondent acknowledges the admitted threat but argues that
Respondent “consistently applied its disciplinary policy” and
that the action taken following the advent of the Union’s organ-
izational effort “would have taken place even in the absence of
the protected conduct.” Respondent introduced documents re-
flecting suspensions for attendance violations prior to any un-
ion activity at its plant including two suspensions in late 1997,
five in 1998, as well as a suspension relating to misuse of
equipment in 1998. There were a total of four suspensions af-
fecting three employees for attendance violations in the first 4
months of 1999: R. Cushman on January 25, J. Gates on March
12 and April 1, and T. Raglin on May 13. Billinghurst testified
that the discipline imposed upon the employees identified by
the General Counsel was consistent with Respondent’s policy
and not related to the organizing campaign.
The General Counsel argues that there was a “massive in-
crease” in the number of suspensions issued by Respondent,
and cites numbers that include the unlawful suspension of
Phipps and the November suspension of Locke. The General
Counsel refers to Respondent’s argument that there was no
change in the enforcement of its policies and cites the testi-
mony of Billinghurst that Respondent administered as much
discipline in the 6 months before he became aware of any union
activity as in the 6 months after. The record establishes that this
testimony was substantially correct. From February through
July, the 6 months before Billinghurst became aware of union
activity in August, Respondent issued three suspensions: a 3-
day suspension to Gates in March, a 10-day suspension to
Gates in April, and a 3-day suspension to Raglin in May, a total
of 16 days of suspensions. In the 6 months following August,
from September through February 2000, not counting Phipps,
the record establishes a total of four suspensions: Locke for 10
days in November, employee T. Spoelhof for 3 days in Decem-
ber, employee T. Sanders for 3 days in January 2000, and em-
ployee B. Davis for 3 days in February 2000, a total of 19 days
of suspensions.
No attendance records reflecting violations of Respondent’s
attendance policy that did not result in discipline prior to Au-
gust were placed into evidence. So far as the record shows, the
only employees deserving of discipline for infraction of Re-
spondent’s rules prior to union activity were the employees that
Respondent’s evidence reveals were disciplined.
2. Analysis and concluding findings
The complaint alleges that Respondent more stringently en-
forced its rules because employees engaged in union activity
and disciplined employees “known to the Respondent” pursuant
to the more stringent enforcement. In view of Respondent’s
knowledge of employee union activity and its admitted threat to
more stringently enforce its rules, I find that the General Coun-
sel has established a prima facie case pursuant to Wright Line. I
am mindful that there is no evidence of the union sympathies of
the employees who were suspended after October. As the Gen-
eral Counsel correctly argues, in cases involving more stringent
rule enforcement, discipline pursuant to the unlawful applica-
tion of a warning system is, ipso facto, unlawful. See Hyatt
Regency Memphis, 296 NLRB 259 (1989); Joe’s Plastics, 287
NLRB 210 (1987).
Notwithstanding the foregoing finding, I further find that Re-
spondent has rebutted the General Counsel’s prima facie case
and has established that its disciplinary policy was not unlaw-
fully applied because the same action would have taken place
even in the absence of the employees’ protected conduct.
Unlike the record in Hyatt Regency Memphis, supra, the re-
cord does not establish that Respondent’s prior enforcement of
its rules was “lax and sporadic, and at times . . . nonexistent.”
Id. at 261. The documents imposing the suspensions upon all
disciplined employees reflect their attendance violations. No
GRAND INDUSTRIES 367
attendance records were introduced showing that, prior to any
union activity, violations that should have resulted in discipline
were ignored. The record reveals that employees were disci-
plined both before and after the advent of union activity. Al-
though the General Counsel argues that there was an increase in
suspensions after October, the record reveals a relatively con-
sistent number of suspensions from January 1999 through Feb-
ruary 2000. The General Counsel presented evidence that re-
flects three suspensions in March 2000 and three in April 2000.
The justification for that discipline is reflected on the docu-
ments imposing the suspensions, and I find that those docu-
ments establish more frequent violations of Respondent’s at-
tendance policy rather than more stringent enforcement of its
rules. Respondent’s evidence showing a pattern of consistently
disciplining employees for attendance violations was not rebut-
ted. In order for the General Counsel to prevail upon his theory
of the case, evidence needed to be adduced that, prior to em-
ployee union activity, Respondent’s rules were not consistently
enforced. The waivers of discipline for Locke, Mengel, and
Phipps in September and October occurred after Respondent
became aware of employee union activity. The waivers given to
Locke and Mengel were not revoked. So far as the record
shows, the only employees deserving of discipline for infrac-
tion of Respondent’s rules prior to union activity were those
employees that Respondent’s evidence reveals were disci-
plined. There is no evidence upon which I can base a finding
that, prior to the Union’s organizational effort, employees who
should have been disciplined were not disciplined. Thus, there
is no probative evidence upon which I can find that Respon-
dent’s postorganizational enforcement of its rules was more
rigorous. I shall, therefore, recommend that the allegations that
Respondent more stringently enforced its disciplinary rules
because employees engaged in union activity, and disciplined
employees “known to the Respondent” pursuant to the more
stringent enforcement of its rules be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By engaging in the conduct set out above which was ad-
mitted in its amended answer, Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By suspending Brian Phipps because of his union activi-
ties, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily suspended Brian
Phipps, must make him whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits, from October 28, through November 15, 1999,
plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987).5 The Respondent must also remove
any reference to the foregoing suspension from his file.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]

5 Phipps had previously applied for and been granted a leave day on
October 27.