Grace Fashions, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 1987

283 N.L.R.B. 842 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

842 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gracinda Fashions, Inc. a/k/a Grace Fashions, Inc.
and Local 144, International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, AFL-CIO
Gracinda Fashions , Inc. ,a/k/a Grace Fashions, Inc.
a/k/a Starlite Fashions, Inc. and Local 144,
International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
AFL-CIO. Cases 22-CA-14035 and 22-CA-
14525
30 April 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT
On 29 December 1986 Administrative Law
Judge Winifred D. Morio issued the attached deci-
sion. Respondent Starlite Fashions, Inc. filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge' s rulings, findings,1 and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondents, Gracinda
Fashions, Inc., and its alter egos Grace Fashions,
Inc. and Starlite Fashions, Inc., Newark, New
Jersey, their officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
I Respondent Starlite Fashions , Inc. has excepted to some of the
judge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to over-
rule an administrative law judge 's credibility resolutions unless the clear
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are in-
correct Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d
362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully exammed the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
William F. Grant, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Kenneth P. Samson, Esq. (Samson & Samson), of Maple-
wood, New Jersey, for Respondents Gracinda Fash-
ions and Grace.
Steven R. Weinstein, Esq. (Schwartz, Tobia & Stanziale), of
Montclair, New Jersey, for Respondent Starlite.
Jesse H. Strauss, Esq. (Wrightman, Parson, Mazel &
Dugan), of Newark, New Jersey, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WINIFRED D. MoRIo, Administrative Law Judge. This
case, heard on 9 October 1986 at Newark, New Jersey,
was based on an order consolidating cases, first amended
complaint, and notice of hearing that was issued by -the
Regional Director for Region. 22: on 4 August 1986.
The complaints allege,- in substance,,, that about 15
August 1985 Gracinda Fashions, Inc. (Gracinda Fash-
ions) established Grace Fashions, Inc. (Grace) as a subor-
dinate instrument to and a disguised continuance of Gra-
-cinda Fashions and that about 1 June 1986 Gracinda
Fashions established Starlite Fashions, Inc. (Starlite) as a
subordinate instrument to and a disguised continuance of
Gracinda Fashions and that all three corporations are
alter egos and constitute a single employer within the
meaning of the Act. The complaints also allege that
these corporations were employer-members of the Asso-
ciation of Rain Apparel Contractors, Inc. (the Associa-
tion) and as such were parties to collective-bargaining
agreements with Local 144, International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers Union, AFL-CIO (Local 144) covering
their production, maintenance, packing, and shipping em-
ployees. The complaints further allege that representa-
tives of the corporations withdrew their recognition of
Local 144 as the exclusive representative of their em-
ployees about 15 August 1985 and since that date these
representatives have failed and refused to abide by the
terms of the most recent agreement between the Associa-
tion and Local 144, which was effective from 1 June
1985 to 31 May 1988. The answers filed by counsel for
the corporations deny the commission of the unfair labor
practices as alleged.'
All parties were afforded the opportunity to present
witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses and to Me briefs.
Briefs were filed by counsel for the General Counsel and
counsel for Starlite.
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witness and on consideration of the
briefs filed by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all times material, Gracinda Fashions, Grace, and
Starlite, New Jersey corporations with facilities in
Newark, New Jersey, were engaged in the business of as-
sembling coats , jackets, and related items of clothing.
During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the com-
plaint, Gracinda Fashions and Grace in the course and
conduct of their business operations provided services
valued in excess of $50,000 for various enterprises, in-
cluding Cortland Fashions, Inc. (Cortland), which enter-
prises are located in New Jersey, and during that same
period Cortland and the other enterprises purchased
goods and materials in excess of $50,000 directly from
points outside the State of New Jersey and derived gross
revenues in excess of $50,000 from the direct sale and
shipment of products to customers located outside the
State of New Jersey. Based on a projection of its oper-
ations for a 12-month period since about 1 June 1986,
Starlite in the course of its business operations will pro-
vide services valued in excess of $50,000 for various en-
1 Gracmda Fashions and Grace were represented by the same attor-
ney Starlite was represented by another attorney.
283 NLRB No. 134
GRACE FASHIONS
terprises, including Majestic/FTP, which enterprises are
located within the State of New Jersey . During the past
12 months these other enterprises , including Majestic/-
FTP, purchased goods and materials valued in excess , of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of New
Jersey and derived gross revenues in excess of $50,000
from the direct sale and shipment of products to custom-
ers located outside the State of New Jersey . The parties
admit, and I find, , that Gracinda Fashions, Grace, and
Starlite are employers within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The parties admit, and I
fmd, that Local 144 is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
IL THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On 20 September 1985, Local 144 filed a charge, in
Case 2--CA-14035 against Gracinda Fashions and Grace
alleging, in substance, that representatives of Gracinda
Fashions had established Grace in order to avoid their
bargaining obligation with Local 144. On 6 January
1986, the parties entered into a settlement agreement
with respect to that charge , which was approved on 7
January 1986 by the Regional Director. The agreement
was executed by Gracinda Soares on behalf of Gracinda
Fashions and by Rosa DaSilva on. behalf of Grace. The
agreement, on its face, stated that the parties agreed to
execute and be bound by a collective -bargaining agree-
ment that- was attached to the settlement agreement. The
attached document stated that Gracinda Fashions and
Grace agreed that, for labor relations purposes, they
were alter egos; that Grace had been the employer since
September 1985;2 and that Grace would become a
member of the ' Association - and would honor the Asso-
ciation's collective-bargaining agreement, with Local
144, as modified by terms of the settlement agreement.
According to this attached document , the Company
agreed that its machinery would be collateral for moneys
owed and the Company further agreed to pay all ac-
crued benefits . The Union agreed to a schedule of re-
duced benefits.
On 1 August 1986, the Regional Director issued an
order in which he withdrew his approval of this settle-
ment agreement - and- set aside the settlement agreement
on the ground that Gracinda Fashions and Grace had es-
tablished Starlite as a disguised- continuance of Grace and
had refused to recognize Local 144 and to honor the col-
lective-bargaining agreement entered into as part of the
settlement agreement. Notwithstanding this order, which
set aside the settlement agreement , it is the position of
the General Counsel that the Companies were bound to
honor the document, attached to the settlement agree-
ment, because it was tantamount to a collective -bargain-
ing agreement and Local 144 had- entered into ` this agree-
ment and made concessions in order to permit the Com-
panies to remain in business . Thus, it appears that the
General Counsel considers the settlement agreement and
the document attached to it as sepatrate agreements and,
therefore, the order that set aside the settlement agree-
ment did not have any effect on the obligation of the
2 Gracinda Fashions, allegedly, went out of = existence in September
1985.
843
Companies to honor the document that -was attached to
the settlement agreement . The General Counsel further
contends that Starlite, as the disguised continuance of
both corporations , also was obligated to honor the col-
lective-bargaining agreement that arose because of the
settlement.
This case presents an unusual situation. The only wit-
ness called by the General Counsel in support of the alle-
gations of the complaints was Alfred Soares , who was
admittedly an officer of Gracinda Fashions , one of the
corporations charged with violating the Act . Counsel for
Starlite contended that Scares" testimony was motivated
either because of animosity to his wife and daughter or
as a means of securing certain production machinery,
part of which he claimed he owned , and that was used
by the employees of the three corporations.
Soares testified that Gracinda Fashions began its man-
ufacturing operations about 1979 under the direction of
his wife, Gracinda Soarer. Soares claimed that he had
given his wife "permission" to start the business but he
did not become involved with the Company on a full-
time basis until 1982 . The operations of Gracinda , Fash-
ions were conducted at St . Francis 'Street, Newark, New
Jersey, and the machinery used in the operations had
been purchased at some point from Cortland , the compa-
ny for which Gracinda Fashions manufactured coats and
jackets. This machinery , which appeared to be the only
asset of Gracinda Fashions , was owned jointly by Alfred
and Gracinda Soares.
Gracinda Soares, Company president , directed the
work of the production employees and handled the cus-
tomer, Cortland . She was assisted in these duties by her
daughter, Rosa DaSilva, who acted as an interpreter for
her parents, Alfred and Gracinda Scares, because they
did not speak English. Alfred Scares was primarily re-
sponsible for the maintenance of the machinery and it
does not appear that he directed or supervised the em-
ployees or had contacts with the customers. Gracinda
Fashions had a collective-bargaining agreement with
Local 144 for its production employees by virtue of its
membership in the Association , which Gracinda Snares
had joined in April '1978.
During the period between 1979 and September 1985,
Cortland , as a union jobber, made contributions for pen-
sion and welfare benefits for the Gracinda Fashions em-
ployees as required by the collective -bargaining agree-
ment between the Association and Local 144. However,
in September , 1985, Cortland went out of business and
ceased its contributions to Local 144 for benefits for the
Gracinda employees. Gracinda Fashions was unable to
pay the employee benefits and was also unable to secure
a union jobber . Soares testified that because' their effort
to secure union work was unsuccessful , "we had to open
a new firm, Grace Fashions . So it was not to have a
union." After consultation with an attorney , Kenneth
Samson, Snares and his wife and daughter decided that
Soares and his wife would not appear as officers of
Grace but their daughter , DaSilva, would be listed as an
officer.
The new corporation , was located at' the same address
as Gracinda Fashions and utilized the same ' machinery,
844 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which had been owned by that Company. In addition,
Gracinda Spares continued to direct the day-to-day oper-
ations and to supervise the same employees who had
been employed by Gracinda Fashions and these employ-
ees performed the same type of work, although it was
now being performed for nonunion companies. DaSilva
continued to act as an interpreter for her mother. Snares
testified that his daughter, DaSilva, had an accountant
prepare a document to show' that Gracinda Fashions had
sold its machinery to Grace, but Soares denied,that there
had been such a sale or that he had signed any document
transferring the machinery to Grace. No document was
produced to establish such a sale and there was no evi-
dence that Scares received money for his share of this
machinery.
According to Scares, about September 1985, his wife
told the employees that they were now working for a
new firm, the firm was nonunion, there was no need for
a union.
The Regional Director issued a complaint wherein he
alleged `that the new firm, Grace, was a disguised con-
tinuance of Gracinda Fashions and that, therefore, it had
an obligation to recognize- and bargain with Local 144.
As noted, Gracinda Soarer and Rosa DaSilva executed a
settlement agreement in January 1986 to settle the allega-
tions of that complaint.
Snares testified that after the settlement agreement was
executed, he had a conversation with his wife, Gracinda,
during which she told him that they would have to form
another company to avoid the union. Thereafter, at the
request of her parents, Rosa DaSilva met with their at-
torney, Kenneth Samson.3 According to Snares, DaSilva
told her parents that the attorney had advised her that
they would have to put the new corporation in the name
of a person who was not a member of the family and
they would have to move to a new location, In the
second week of February 1986, Snares, with the help of
his wife, daughter, and some truckmen, who were paid
by Snares, moved the machinery that had been owned
by Gracinda Fashions and then used by Grace to a new
location, 397 Market Street, Newark, New Jersey. Soares
testified that he installed the machinery at the new loca-
tion and made-the electrical' connections and, during the
months of February, March, and April, he continued to
install the machines. _ He further testified that he ap-
proached a cousin and he requested this cousin to allow
his name to be used for incorporation purposes for the
new Company but, after some consideration, his cousin
rejected his request.
At this point his wife approached a neighbor, Franci-
lina Palmer, and asked her to allow her name to be used
for incorporation purposes and this neighbor agreed to
the arrangement. The new Company was called Starlite.
Scares maintained that he accompanied his wife to court
where they received the corporate records from Samson
and paid him for them.4 Snares testified that production
8 Samson represented both Gracinda Fashions and Grace during the
hearing in the instant case and he was present during the hearing.
4 Soares stated that they paid Samson $500. $400 for the incorporation
of Starlite and $100 to defend ` Soares on an assault charge
began at Starlite in early June with 12 employees, about
4 of -whom had been employed by Gracinda Fashions
and `Grace. Spares claimed that Gracinda Scares hired
these employees and, during the time that he was there
she directed ` the work of these emloyees . Palmer per-
formed only production work and she did not direct or
supervise other employees . It appears that within a` few
days after production started at Starlite, Snares and his
daughter and wife ' had an argument and Scares 'was
locked out of the plant and his home.'It was Soares' 'tes-
timony that he owned stock in Starlite because he owned
half of the machinery.
Discussion
The Board has held that a settlement agreement will
be set aside if its provisions are breached or if postsettle-
ment unfair labor practices are committed. Cambridge
Contracting, 259_ NLRB 1374, 1381 (1982); Ann's-Sehnei-
der Bakery, 259 NLRB 1151, 1152 (1982). The Board
also has held that presettlement conduct may be consid-
ered as background evidence in determining the motive
or object underlying, a respondent's postsettlement con-
duct. Yore Cinema Corp., 254 NLRB 1288, 1291 (1981);
Laborers Local 185 (Joseph's Landscaping), 154 NLRB
1384 (1965). In the instant case, it is the General Coun-
sel's contention that the provisions of the settlement
agreement were breached and that unfair labor practices
were committed and, therefore, the agreement should be
set aside . The settlement agreement was executed by
Gracinda Scares, on behalf of Gracinda Fashions,,and by
Rosa DaSilva, on behalf of Grace. Both of those corpo-
rations, allegedly, have ceased to exist and the only oper-
ating corporation, Starlite, was not in existence, at the
time the settlement agreement was executed. Therefore,
in order to determine, whether the contention of the
General Counsel has any validity and whether the princi-
ples enunciated above have any application to this case it
is necessary to decide what relationship, if any, existed
among the corporations.
It is the position of the General _ Counsel that the -real
principles in all three corporations were Gracinda and
Alfred Snares and that these two individuals first formed
Grace' to avoid their bargaining obligation to Local, 144
and when that effort was unsuccessful they, improved
their "methodology" and created Starlite. Counsel for
Gracinda Fashions ' and Grace did not file a brief. The
brief filed on behalf of Starlite claims that the facts show
that neither Gracinda or Alfred Scares or their corpora-
tion, Gracinda Fashions, owned stock in either Grace or
Starlite-and neither Gracinda or Alfred Snares were offi-
cers in either Grace or Starlite. Counsel further argues
that the General Counsel has "an affirmative burden -of
proof and`-must show by a preponderance of the affirma-
tive evidence on the record as a whole, that the allega-
tions of the complaint are. in truth supported," mere sus-
picion alone will not suffice to prove an unfair labor
practice. Counsel contends that there is no evidence to
support the following allegations of the complaint; Gra-
cinda Fashions created Grace or Starlite, Alfred and
Gracinda Scares are coowners of Grace and Starlite. Da-
Silva was an agent of Grace and Starlite, a majority of
GRACE FASHIONS
employees of the Companies designated Local 144 as
their bargaining representative, and, there have been a
succession of collective-bargaining agreements with
Local 144.
As noted, the only witness who testified in this pro-
ceeding ,was Alfred Soares and the only documents ad-
mitted into evidence were the settlement agreement, the
membership form in the Association executed by Gra-
cinda Soares, and the certificate of incorporation for
Starlite. Thus, the first issue to decide is whether Soares
testified truthfully, or whether he fabricated a story in
retaliation against his wife and daughter for their actions
against, him. The next issue is whether his testimony,
even if credited, is sufficient to support the affirmative
burden placed on the General Counsel 'with respect to
the allegations of the complaint. -
There are several factors that convince me that Soares
testified truthfully. In the first place, I observed Soares
throughout his testimony and my observation of his de-
meanor convinces me that he-,told the truth about the
events surrounding the formation of the two corpora-
tions. Second, it should be noted that outside events sup-
port Soares' testimony. Thus, long before Soares was,
locked out of the plant by his wife and daughter, or had
any reason to retaliate against them, Graci,nda Soares and
Rosa DaSilva entered into a settlement , agreement to re-
solve the charge that Grace had been formed in an effort
to avoid the bargaining obligation of Gracinda Fashions.
Third, Gracinda Soares, Rosa DaSilva, Kenneth Samson,,
and Francilina Palmer, implicated by ' Soares in the
scheme to deceive Local 144, failed to' testify and no ex-
planation was offered for their failure to testify. Kenneth
Samson was in the hearing room during the proceeding,
but he did not testify and refute Soares' testimony.
Palmer, the alleged owner of Starlite, the only corpora-
tion presently in existence that could bear the burden of
remedying the unfair labor practices, 'did not testify to
protect her alleged independent corporation. 'It is highly
unlikely that a disinterested owner would have acted in
such a fashion. It is well established that when a witness
is not produced to deny or explain the testimony given
by witnesses for the General Counsel an adverse infer-
ence is warranted that they could neither refute- nor deny
that, testimony. NLRB v. Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
613 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1980); Siligrnan 4 Associates, 273
NLRB 1216, 1218 (1984), Earle Industries, 260 NLRB
1128 (1982).
Therefore, based on the testimony of Alfred Soares, I
find that Gracinda+ and Alfred -Soares,' officers of Gra-
cinda Fashions, with the assistance of their daughter,
Rosa DaSilva, and their attorney, Kenneth Samson,
formed Grace as a disguised continuance of Gracinda
Fashions in order to avoid their bargaining obligation
with Local 144. I also find that Gracinda Soares contin-
ued to direct and control the day-to-day operations of
Grace and to supervise the same employees at the same
location. Further, I find that when these initial efforts to
avoid their collective-bargaining relationship with Local
144 were unsuccessful the Soares, with the, assistance of
Francilina Palmer and their attorney, Kenneth Samson,
formed Starlite as a disguised continuance of Grace and
Gracinda Fashions and, thereafter, Gracinda Soares, as
845
she had at the two former corporations, directed the
day-to-day operations of-Starlite, supervised the employ-
ees, and handled the customers. The fact that only 4 of
the 12 Starlite employees had been employees of the
former corporations is insufficient to establish that Star-
lite was a totally separate and independent Company. In
this connection, it should be noted that the only tangible
asset of all three Companies was the machinery, which
was owned in part by Alfred Soares. Contrary to asser-
tion by Starlite's counsel, the,record does disclose the
basis on which Starlite used that equipment. Soares testi-
fied that he personally paid for the delivery of that
equipment to Starlite premises and he installed it. Soares
made it clear on the record,that he was not paid by_Star-
lite for his share of that machinery and he credibly
denied that he had authorized the transfer of that ma-
chinery to Grace or Rosa DaSilva.5
In the circumstances of this case, I do not consider
that the certificate of incorporation for Starlite, which
lists Palmer as owner, is sufficient to outweigh the testi-
mony by Soares concerning the reason why she was so
listed. This is particularly true in view of Palmer's failure
to testify. Nor do I - consider the fact that Gracinda
Soares and Alfred Soares were not listed as officers or
stockholders of either Grace or Starlite to be dis,positive
of the issue in view of the credible testimony by Soares
that they were not listed as part of the scheme to de-
ceive Local ,144. Further, in view of my finding that the
true principles in the corporations were Gracinda and
Alfred Soares, I do not consider that Soares' testimony
concerning conversations he had with his daughter about
her discussions with Samson are hearsay. DaSilva acted
as an' agent for her parents when she discussed the for-
mation of both Grace and Starlite and when she relayed
the attorney's instructions to her parents she did so in
her capacity as their representative. Soares had the right
to disclose those instructions during his testimony. More-
over,,'4assuming arguendo that the testimony was hearsay
the Board has stated, -"Administrative agencies ordinarily
do not invoke a technical rule of exclusion but admit
hearsay evidence and give it such weight as its inherent
quality justifies." Alvin J Bart & Co., 236 NLRB 242
(1978).
In Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 NLRB 1301 (1982),
the Board stated that in deciding whether one company
is aq alter ego of another, it would consider whether
there was common ownership and management, common
business purposes, common premises and equipment,
common customers, and ' the nature of the- operations and
supervision. The Board also stated that it would consider
"whether the purpose behind the creation of the alleged
alter ego was legitimate or whether, instead, its purpose
was to evade its responsibilities under the Act." If the
factors outlined above' are considered in relation to
Grace, and Starlite, it is evident that both corporations
are alter egos of Gracinda Fashions. Thus, Gracinda and
Alfred Soares were the owners of Gracinda Fashions
B In fact, counsel, in effect , admitted that Soaves had not been paid for
the machinery. Counsel claimed that Soares testified against his wife and
daughter because be thought that was the way that he could secure his
share of the machinery.
846 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Grace, they are the owners of Starlite, and they are
equal owners of the equipment. The business purpose of
Gracinda Fashions and Grace was to manufacture coats,
and that is also the purpose of Starlite. And the direction
of the day-to-day operations of the three corporations
was and is within the control of `Gracinda Soares. Fur-
ther, as- Soares testified, both Grace and Starlite were
formed for the purpose of evading the Soares' responsi-
bilities under the Act.
In these circumstances, I find that the settlement
agreement was ' breached and was properly set aside.
However, contrary to the General Counsel, I do not find
a basis to set aside the agreement although at the same
time directing the parties to abide by one of the terms of
that agreement (i.e., the collective -bargaining agreement
attached to the settlement agreement). However, I do
note that Starlite, as an alter ego of Gracinda Fashions,
is a member of the Association and as such is obligated
to recognize and bargain with Local 144 for its produc-
tion employees and to abide by the terms of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in existence between the Asso-
ciation and Local 144.6 The, contention by counsel for
Starlite that the record does not disclose the employees
represented by Local 144 or that there were a series. of
collective-bargaining agreements is without merit. Soarer
testified that all production employees were represented
by the Union and that they had been from the beginning
of Gracinda Fashions "until last year when Gracinda
Fashions was closed and Grace Fashions was opened."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Gracinda Fashions, Inc. (Gracinda Fashions), Grace
Fashions, Inc. (Grace), and Starlite Fashions, Inc. (Star-
lite) are employers engaged in commerce and in oper-
ations affecting commerce, within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 144, International Ladies Garment Workers
Union, AFL-CIO (Local 144) is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Grace Fashions, Inc. and Starlite Fashions, Inc. for
the purpose of this proceeding are the alter egos of Gra-
cinda Fashions, Inc.
4. All nonsupervisory production, maintenance, pack-
ing, and shipping employees employed by employer-
members of the ' Association of Rain Apparel Contrac-
tors, Inc. (the Association), 'including Gracinda Fashions,
Grace, and Starlite,` constitute a unit appropriate for the
purpose of collective-bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. Since about 24 April 1978, Local 144 has been and
is the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit within
the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
6. By failing and refusing to bargain in good faith,
since about 15 August 1985, with Local 144 as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of their employees in
6 The evidence in the record establishes that Gracmda Fashions
became a member of the Association in 1978. There is no evidence that
Gracinda Fashions resigned from the Association. Thus, Starlite as an
alter ego of Gracinda Fashions is bound to honor the collective -bargain-
ing agreement in existence between the Association and Local 144.
the aforesaid appropriate -unit, and by failing and refusing
to abide by ' the Association contract , effective from 1
June 1985 to 31 May 1988, Gracinda -Fashions , - Grace,
and Starlite have engaged in and are engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. -
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
` THE. REMEDY
Having found that Gracinda Fashions, Grace, and
Starlite have engaged in certain unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall
recommend that they be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the,policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that Gracinda Fashions, Grace, and
Starlite be, required to bargain with Local 144 as the ex-
clusive representative of the employees in the unit found
appropriate herein. I shall further recommend that Gra-
cinda Fashions, Grace, and Starlite be required to abide
by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement in
effect between the- Association and Local 144 covering
the aforesaid employees and reimburse Local 144 for all
health, welfare, pensions, and other .moneys -due to- the
employees in the aforesaid unit, since about 15 August
1985, with interest thereon, in the manner established in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950); Florida Steel
Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on 'the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed7
ORDER
The Respondents, Gracinda Fashions, Inc., Grace
Fashions, Inc., and Starlite Fashions, Inc., their officers,
agents, successors , and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively with
Local 144, International Ladies Garment - Workers
Union, AFL-CIO as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the following unit: -
All nonsupervisory production, maintenance, -pack-
ing and shipping employees employed by employer-
members of the Association of Rain Apparel Con--
tractors, Inc. (Association), including Gracinda
Fashions, Grace, and Starlite, but excluding office
clerical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
(b) Failing and refusing to abide by the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement in existence between
Local 144 and the Association of Rain Apparel, Contrac-
tors, Inc.,
' If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for ' all pur-
poses.
GRACE FASHIONS
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain in, good faith with Local 144,
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit set forth above.
(b) Honor the terms of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment in effect between the Association and Local 144
and reimburse Local 144 for all health, welfare, pensions,
and other moneys due to employees in the above-de-
scribed unit, from about 15 August 1985, under the terms
of that agreement with interest on those moneys in ac-
cordance with the formula described above under the
remedy section.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its Newark, New Jersey Facilities, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."s Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 22, after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thon;ized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places' including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations -Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
847
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Local 144, International Ladies Garment' Workers
Union, AFL-CIO as the exclusive collective -bargaining
representative for employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed below.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to abide by the .terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement in existence between
Local 144 and the Association of Rain Apparel Contrac-
tors, Inc.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with Local
144, as the exclusive representative of our employees in
the appropriate unit described below:
All nonsupervisory production, maintenance, pack-
ing and shipping employees employed by employer-
-members of the Assocation of Rain Apparel Con-
tractors, Inc., including Gracinda Fashions, Grace
and Starlite, but excluding all office clerical em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act. '
WE WILL abide by the terms of the collective- bargain-
ing agreement in existence between Local' 144 and the
Association and will reimburse Local 144 for all health,
welfare, pension, and other moneys due from about 15
August 1985 to employees in the above-described unit
under the terms of that agreement, with interest.
GRACINDA FASHIONS, INC., A/K/A GRACE
FASHIONS, INC., A/K/A STARLITE FASH-
IONS, INC.