G.Q. Security Parachutes, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 24, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 508 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
G. Q. Security Parachutes, Inc. and Warehouse, Mail
Order, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, Af-
filiated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America and The Shop Committee, Party In Inter-
est. Case 32-CA- 1084
May 24, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND MURPHY
On February 23, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Jerrold H. Shapiro issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed a re-
quest for review in the nature of exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the request for review and
has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and con-
clusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, G. Q. Security Parachutes,
Inc., San Leandro, California, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order, except that the at-
tached notice is substituted for that of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge.
I Respondent requests the Board to review the backpay order as to em-
ployee Deborah Ochoa on the ground that she "willfully did not seek em-
ployment during the time since her termination." We find that this matter
should be left for determination in the compliance stage of this proceeding.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT dominate, assist, or contribute
financial or other support to, or interfere with,
the administration of the Works Committee or
any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT establish a committee of em-
ployees for the purpose of soliciting and remedy-
ing employees' grievances to discourage the em-
ployees from supporting an independent union
or by otherwise soliciting and remedying em-
ployees' grievances to discourage them from sup-
porting an independent union.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with the loss
of their jobs if they support Warehouse, Mail Or-
der, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, af-
filiated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT discharge, discipline, or other-
wise discriminate against employees for support-
ing or engaging in activities on behalf of Ware-
house, Mail Order, and Retail Employees Union,
Local 853, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, or any other labor or-
ganization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL offer Deborah Ochoa full and imme-
diate reinstatement to her former job or, if that
job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to her seniority or any
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed,
and WE WILL make her whole for loss of earnings
suffered because of our discrimination against
her, plus interest.
WE WILL expunge and physically remove from
our records and files the written disciplinary
warning we issued to Deborah Ochoa on May
22, 1978, and any reference thereto.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recogni-
tion from, and completely disestablish, the
Works Committee, or any successor thereto, as
the representative of any of our employees for
the purpose of dealing with us concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work.
G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERROLD H. SHAPIRO, Administrative Law Judge: The
hearing in this case, held November 9, 1978, is based upon
an unfair labor practice charge filed by Warehouse, Mail
Order, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, affiliated
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein
508
G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC.
called the Teamsters Union,' on July 18, 1978, as amended
October 24, 1978, and a complaint issued August 31, 1978,
as amended October 11, 1978, and October 25, 1978, on
behalf of the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 32, alleging that G. Q. Security Para-
chutes, Inc.,2 herein called Respondent, has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l),
(2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.' Respon-
dent filed an answer which, as amended, denied the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
Upon the entire record, from my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and having considered the post-
hearing briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The essential questions presented for decision are five:
I. Whether Respondent's president threatened employ-
ees he would close Respondent's plant if the Teamsters
Union succeeded in organizing them, thus violating Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Whether Respondent's president promised employees
an unspecific employment benefit in order to dissuade them
from supporting the Teamsters Union, thus violating Sec-
tion 8(a)( ) of the Act.
3. Whether Respondent granted its employees the use of
a picnic table to eat their lunch in order to dissuade them
from supporting the Teamsters Union, thus violating Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Whether Respondent disciplined and discharged em-
ployee Deborah Ochoa because of her Teamsters Union
activities, thus violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
5. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by creating an employees' Works Committee and
granted benefits to the employees through the committee in
order to dissuade the employees from supporting the Team-
sters Union, and violated Section 8(aX2) and (1) of the Act
by dominating or interfering with the formation and admin-
istration of the Works Committee and by contributing fi-
nancial aid or other support to its existence.
B. Background
Respondent at its San Leandro, California, plant manu-
factures parachutes and employs between 55 to 60 employ-
ees. A substantial number of the employees are of foreign
extraction, i.e., Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Mexican, and
Italian, and have a difficult time understanding and ex-
pressing themselves in English.
Respondent admits the Teamsters Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.
2 As amended at the hearing.
It will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdic-
tion over this case. The record establishes, and Respondent admits, it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and (7) of
the National Labor Relations Act and meets the Board's applicable discre-
tionary jurisdictional standard.
On approximately April 1, 1978,' Respondent changed
management. The new owners, G. Q. Parachutes, Ltd., of
England, purchased all of Respondent's stock and took
over the management of the Company. During the time
material herein Respondent's management hierarchy was
as follows: Alan Levinson, Respondent's president, was in
charge of the entire business operation. James Bates, the
production manager and manufacturing director, was in
charge of all personnel matters involving the production
workers. Marie Bechnel, the assistant manufacturing direc-
tor, was Bates' assistant. The production workers' immedi-
ate supervisors were Dorothy Parrish and Louise Small.
Ruth Craddick occupied the position of personnel manager
and comptroller.
On April 1, when the new owners took over the manage-
ment of the Company, the employees were represented by
Upholsterers Union Local No. 3, herein called the Uphol-
sterers Union, which had a collective-bargaining contract
with Respondent covering Respondent's production work-
ers. On April 4 an employee filed a petition with the Board
in Case 32-RD-86 seeking a representation election to
decertify the Upholsterers Union as the employees' collec-
tive-bargaining representative. On May 10 Respondent, the
Upholsterers Union. and the Petitioner entered into an
agreement, approved by the Board, to hold a representation
election in Case 32-RD-86 on May 31. Since the Teamsters
Union, on May 10, intervened in the representation pro-
ceeding, the employees had three choices. They could vote
for no union, for the Teamsters Union or for the Upholster-
ers Union. On May 31 the election was conducted, and the
Teamsters Union received a majority of the votes. Respon-
dent filed objections to the results of the election and the
Teamsters Union withdrew from the proceeding which re-
sulted in the election being set aside.
C. The Threat To Close the Plant
It is undisputed that prior to the May 31 representation
election Respondent's President Levinson on two separate
occasions spoke to the employees in a group to persuade
them to vote against union representation. Levinson told
them he was opposed to union representation and thought
it would be in the employees' best interest to leave them-
selves in the hands of management. He stated that Respon-
dent's parent company was an English employer and that
most companies in England did not have unions and Re-
spondent's parent was known for the benevolent way in
which it looked after its workers. Levinson also stated that
because of the strict State and Federal laws governing em-
ployees' working conditions, Respondent's employees did
not need union representation. If, however, the employees
believed they needed a union, Levinson urged them to vote
for the Upholsterers Union instead of the Teamsters Union.
He stated that the Teamsters Union had a reputation for
violence, its officials were hoodlums, and it had no experi-
ence in representing employees in Respondent's industry.
The factual matter which is in dispute herein is whether
in expressing his opposition to the Teamsters Union Levin-
son threatened to close the plant if the employees voted for
that union. Deborah Ochoa, the alleged discriminatee, testi-
4 All dates herein refer to 1978 unless otherwise specified.
509
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fled that at both meetings Levinson stated that before he
would allow the Teamsters Union into the plant he would
close it. Similarly, Arlene Mack, who is currently employed
by Respondent as a supervisor, testified that when Levinson
voiced his opposition to the employees voting for the Team-
sters Union, he stated:5 "The Teamsters-or nobody else
was going to come in [here] and run [the] company because
before [they'd] do that, he'd close it down." Bates and Lev-
inson, on the other hand, testified that Levinson did not
threaten the employees he would close the plant if they
supported the Teamsters Union. On this particular matter
Ochoa and Mack impressed me as more sincere and trust-
worthy witnesses than either Levinson or Bates. Therefore,
based upon the testimony of Ochoa and Mack, I find that
Respondent, through Levinson, threatened the employees
that if a majority of them voted for the Teamsters Union
Respondent would close the plant. This constitutes a bla-
tant threat that the employees would be terminated if they
supported the Teamsters Union and, as such, violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. The Promise of Unspecified Benefits
As described infra, Respondent on approximately May
17 established an employees' Works Committee. Levinson
spoke to the Committee once. General Counsel alleges that
on this occasion he promised the Committee that things
would be good without a union but that he could not be
more specific. In support of this contention General Coun-
sel relies upon the testimony of Mack, who was one of two
witnesses called by the General Counsel to testify about
Levinson's conversation with the Works Committee. The
other witness, Ochoa, significantly failed to corroborate
Mack's testimony in this respect. In addition, Mack did not
impress me as a reliable witness when she attributed the
disputed statement to Levinson.6 Initially Mack's descrip-
tion of Levinson's remarks omitted any mention of an ex-
press or implied promise of benefits. It was only after hav-
ing her memory refreshed with an affidavit, submitted to
the Board approximately 3 months after the disputed prom-
ise was voiced, that she testified Levinson told the Works
Committee "he thought we could do better if we did not
even have a union." But, after reading her affidavit a sec-
ond time, she testified that Levinson said "we could do bet-
ter if we did not have a union but he could not make any
promises to us of what the betterment could be." Then,
after reading the affidavit a third time, Mack testified that
Levinson said "if we did not have the union, things would
be good for us, but he could not tell what would be good."
When asked whether reading the affidavit refreshed her rec-
ollection, Mack seemed uncertain. She testified it refreshed
her memory only "in a way."
I Mack was questioned only about one of the meetings at which Levinson
spoke to the employees.
6 Levinson's description of his meeting with the Works Committee in effect
denies that he made the alleged promise. However, Levinson in general did
not impress me as a reliable or trustworthy witness. In concluding that he did
not make the disputed promise of unspecified benefits I have relied upon my
observation that Mack was not a reliable witness when she testified about
this portion of Levinson's remarks and upon Ochoa's failure to corroborate
Mack's testimony.
Based upon the foregoing, I shall recommend that this
allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
E. The Unfair Labor Practices Attributed to Respondent by
Virtue of its Creation of the Works Committee7
1. The evidence
On approximately May 14 or 15 Respondent, on its own
initiative, decided to create a Works Committee comprised
of six employee representatives selected by management.
On May 17 Respondent posted notices throughout the
plant notifying the employees about the formation of the
Works Committee and named the six employees who had
been appointed to the committee. The notices stated that
the Works Committee "has been formed in order to have
better communications between employees and manage-
ment" and that the committee "will meet once a week to
discuss any problems, complaints or suggestions [employ-
ees] may have." During May the Committee met on at least
two separate occasions with production manager Bates in
Bates' office during working time. s Bates appointed em-
ployee representative Ochoa to be the head of the commit-
tee and informed the members of the committee that their
function would be to speak with the employees in order to
determine their problems and complaints and to inform
Bates about the employees' problems and complaints. He
authorized the committee to go out onto the floor of the
plant during working time and speak with the employees in
order to ascertain their grievances. Also, he asked the com-
mittee to determine whether the employees would rather
start work at 7:30 a.m., instead of the current 7:45 a.m.
starting time, and to ask if the employees would like to take
a 4-day weekend, instead of a scheduled 3-day one, and
make up the fourth day by working one Saturday. The
members of the Works Committee, pursuant to Bates' in-
struction, went out into the plant and questioned the em-
ployees and solicited their grievances. They reported back
to management that the employees complained about a
lack of material that was necessary to perform their work,
needed more room in which to work, wanted a lunch table
as there was no place for them to eat their lunches, re-
quested fans because the plant was poorly ventilated and
too hot, and wanted a pay raise. Bates admittedly remedied
each of these grievances except for the one dealing with
wages.9 Finally, Ochoa, who had been appointed by Bates
to head the committee, met with Bates on two occasions, at
Bates' request, to discuss matters of concern to the employ-
ees.
I The Works Committee is referred to in the complaint as the "Shop Com-
mittee."
I have rejected Bates' testimony that the committee never met with him.
His testimony was vague, evasive, and contradictory. He testified that he
never met with the committee, then admitted there might have been one such
meeting, then testified that the only meeting he could recall was one where
employee Ochoa gave him a list of "things" which the employees wanted
improved. Ochoa and Mack, members of the committee, testified that the
Committee met more than once with Bates. They impressed me as more
credible witnesses than Bates. Likewise, I reject Bates' testimony that he did
not appoint Ochoa to be the head of the committee.
9 Bates instructed the committee that the employees' demand for a pay
raise was out of his hands and would have to be dealt with by higher man-
agement.
510
G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES. INC.
Respondent's President Levinson testified that the sole
purpose for the Works Committee was to learn from the
Company's approximately 47 production workers whether
there was anything mechanically wrong with the equipment
they were operating and that the idea for the committee
came from the chairman of the board of Respondent's par-
ent company. In response to Levinson's complaint that the
plant was operating way below its efficiency because the
equipment was in bad condition and management could
not get the workers to tell them what was wrong with their
machines since the workers spoke nine different languages,
Levinson testified that the chairman of Respondent's parent
company suggested that Levinson form a Works Commit-
tee comprised of employees who spoke the different lan-
guages. The facts belie Levinson's testimony. Levinson
failed to explain why, if the committee's purpose was only
to speak to the employees about their equipment, the notice
announcing the creation of the committee was worded in
language which plainly indicated that the committee would
communicate to management "any problems, complaints or
suggestions [the employees] may have" [emphasis added].
Moreover, production manager Bates testified that the pur-
pose of the committee was "to handle employee complaints
because the suggestion box was not being used" and further
testified that he told the Committee to talk to the employees
"about their problems and get suggestions from them" and
"to bring the employees' complaints to [Bates]." ° In addi-
tion, Bates' testimony reveals that representatives of the
Committee brought employees' grievances to Bates' atten-
tion, not one of which concerned equipment which was out
of tune or otherwise not operating satisfactorily, which
Bates remedied." Clearly, contrary to Levinson's testimony,
Bates had absolutely no idea that the committee's purpose
was to serve as a conduit between management and the
employees only on matters involving the maintenance of
equipment. I cannot believe that if this was the real purpose
for the committee's existence, Levinson would not have told
this to Bates, who was his production manager and manu-
facturing director." Finally, Levinson's testimony that it
101 note there is no evidence that Bates ever specifically indicated to the
committee that their function, even in part, would be to determine whether
the employees had complaints about their equipment. I recognize Levinson
testified that once when Levinson spoke to the committee he asked its mem-
bers to plead with the employees who were having difficulty with their ma-
chinery to let the Company know so it could repair the machines. Levinson
did not impress me as a trustworthy witness and the facts, as described in the
text, belie his testimony. Moreover, Ochoa and Mack credibly testified in
substance that at this meeting Levinson told the committee that Respondent
was opposed to union representation but if the employees wanted a union
they should vote for the Upholsterers Union rather than the Teamsters
Union.
" The only evidence that the alleged sole purpose for the committee, the
repair of employees' equipment so as to increase the plant's productivity, was
ever effected is Levinson's testimony that Ochoa's punch machine which did
not work was repaired. The record reveals that Ochoa was proficient in
English, so obviously there was never any communication problem between
Ochoa and management which necessitated reating a committee composed
of bilingual employees so Respondent could discover that something was
wrong with her machine.
XI Bates testified that Levinson and himself"just decided that we'd have a
shop committee" composed of employees from the several nationalities em-
ployed by the Company so that all of the employees "would know what was
going on at the same time." Bates failed to corroborate Levinson's testimony
that the idea for the committee originated in the mind of the chairman of
Respondent's parent company or that the committee was established for the
purpose of remedying the problem of employees failing to inform manage-
ment that their equipment was not operating satisfactorily.
was necessary to speak to the employees to determine
whether their machines were not correctly tuned is suspect
in view of his admission that by just walking out onto the
production floor he could determine whether an employee's
machine was properly tuned without even speaking to the
employee." It is for all of the foregoing reasons, including
Levinson's insincere demeanor as a witness, that I find the
reason Levinson advanced at the hearing for the establish-
ment of the Works Committee was a fabrication and not
the true reason.
2. Conclusions
a. Respondent established the Works Committee to
accomplish an illegal purpose
The conclusion is warranted, as urged by the General
Counsel, that in establishing the Works Committee Respon-
dent was motivated by a desire to frustrate its employees'
organizational efforts by showing them that union represen-
tation was not necessary. This conclusion is based upon the
following considerations:
(i) As described supra, Respondent, through the Works
Committee, solicited its employees' grievances and reme-
died them, which plainly had the intended effect of demon-
strating to the employees that they did not need the Uphol-
sterers Union or the Teamsters Union to obtain redress of
their grievances. While the actual changes in the employees'
terms and conditions of employment effected as the result
of the Works Committee intervention on behalf of the em-
ployees may seem modest, these matters were important to
the employees and the changes showed the employees that
they would not need the Upholsterers Union or the Team-
sters Union to remedy their grievances.
(ii) Respondent was openly opposed to the employees
being represented by the Upholsterers Union or the Team-
sters Union. Respondent's President Levinson, as described
supra, simultaneously with the establishment of the Works
Committee, told the employees he was opposed to union
representation and stated that it would be in the employees'
best interests not to vote for either the Upholsterers Union
or the Teamsters Union but instead to leave themselves in
the hands of management.
(iii) Respondent established the Works Committee on
approximately May 17, immediately after it learned that
later that month an election would be conducted in which
the employees would have the opportunity to vote for union
representation.
(iv) As I have discussed supra, the reason Respondent
offered for establishing the Works Committee was patently
false.
These circumstances taken in their entirety persuade me
that Respondent's sole motive in establishing the Works
Committee and soliciting the employees' grievances
through this committee and remedying the grievances was
to frustrate and undermine its employees' efforts to secure
representation by an independent union. I further find that
by engaging in this conduct Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
" Presumably Production Manager Bates also had the same expertise.
511
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I recognize that the complaint does not specifically al-
lege, other than in the case of the employees' lunch table
grievance, 4 that Respondent's solicitation of the employees'
grievances through the Works Committee and the remedy-
ing of the grievances constitute an independent violation of
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. The law however is settled that
"when an issue relating to the subject matter of a complaint
is fully litigated ... the Board [is] expected to pass upon it
even though it is not specifically alleged to be an unfair
labor practice in the complaint." Monroe Feed Store, 112
NLRB 1336, 1337 (1955). Here the solicitation of the em-
ployees' grievances through the Works Committee and Re-
spondent's conduct in remedying the grievances is directly
related to the portion of the complaint which alleges that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by establish-
ing the Works Committee for the purpose of receiving and
remedying employees' grievances. Thus, it is not surprising
that Respondent did not object to the testimony regarding
the solicitation of grievances through the Works Committee
and Respondent's treatment of the grievances and that it
fully litigated these issues.
b. Respondent dominated and interfered with the formation
of the Works Committee which is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the for-
mation or administration of any labor organization or con-
tribute financial or other support to it...." General
Counsel contends that the Works Committee is a domi-
nated labor organization. I shall evaluate the evidence per-
tinent to the committee's status as a statutory labor organi-
zation and then evaluate the evidence pertinent to its status
as a dominated organization.
(1) The Works Committee's status as a labor organization
The statutory definition of a labor organization as set out
in Section 2(5) of the Act is very broad and reaches "any
organization of any kind ... in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
The statute has been broadly construed with respect to the
type of interchange between the parties which may be
deemed "dealing with." N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company
and Cabot Shops, Inc., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959).
In the instant case it is undisputed that the Works Com-
mittee is an organization "in which employees partici-
14 In concluding Respondent remedied its employees' grievances in order
to discourage them from supporting an independent union, I have consid-
ered Levinson's testimony that the lack of a table in the plant on which the
employees could eat lunch was an obvious unhealthy and inconvenient situ-
ation and that it was because of this that Respondent purchased a picnic
table for the employees. Levinson explained: "Any humane benevolent per-
son would find it within their heart to spend a few dollars on a picnic table
so [the employeesl could have a place to sit down and enjoy their lunch."
However, he significantly failed to explain why Respondent waited to rem-
edy this obvious inconvenience until it established a Works Committee for
the purpose of solciting the employees' grievance to discourage them from
supporting an independent union and until the employees had raised this
grievance through that committee.
pate,"' and I am of the view the Committee "exists for the
purpose ... in part, of dealing with [Respondent] concern-
ing grievances, labor disputes, hours of employment or con-
ditions of work."'6 In reaching this conclusion I considered
the declared purpose of the Works Committee as set forth
in the notice to the employees announcing the creation of
the committee; Production Manager Bates' admissions con-
cerning the committee's purpose made to the committee
and at the hearing; and the manner in which the committee
actually functioned.
The purpose of the Works Committee was declared in the
notice to the employees announcing its formation. The no-
tice states that the committee "has been formed in order to
have better communications between employees and man-
agement" and that the committee "will meet once a week to
discuss any problems, complaints or suggestions [employ-
ees] may have." The plain import of this declaration is that
the committee will deal with the representatives of manage-
ment on behalf of those employees with employment griev-
ances which they desire to have remedied.
Bates informed the members of the Works Committee
that their function was to speak to the employees for the
purpose of learning their grievances and to communicate
these grievances to Bates. Consistent with this instruction,
Bates testified that the purpose for which the Works Com-
mittee was formed was "to handle employees' complaints
because the suggestion box was not being used."
As described in detail supra, the employees transmitted
their individual grievances concerning wages, hours of em-
ployment, and conditions of work to the Works Commit-
tee's members who brought them to management, which
took them under consideration and, in several instances,
acted favorably upon them, resulting in a change of em-
ployees' conditions of employment. In addition, Bates met
with the employee who was the head of the committee to
discuss matters of concern to the employees.
Based upon the foregoing circumstances in their entirety
I find that the Works Committee is an organization in
which employees participate and which exists for the pur-
pose, in part, of dealing with Respondent concerning griev-
ances, wages, hours of employment, and conditions of
work; thus, it is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. I recognize that the committee is
limited to advising management about the existence of em-
ployees' grievances and has apparently no authority to ne-
gotiate with management what action, if any, should be
taken. However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a committee of employees may be "dealing with" an
employer, and hence be a labor organization as defined in
Section 2(5) of the Act, even though its activities may not
be equated with the usual concept of collective bargaining.
N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company, supra at 210-211, 214,
and fn. 15. I am persuaded that the record herein estab-
lishes that the Works Committee was created and exists for
' Of course, the fact that the committee was a loosely formed one with no
formal organization, bylaws, officers, or dues is immaterial in determining
whether it is a laboi organization. See Pacemaker Corporation an Indiana
Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 260 F.2d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 1968) and ases cited.
J6 I note that it is well settled that since the phrasing of the statutory
definition is in the disjunctive, "dealing with" an employer concerning one
(or more) of the matters enumerated in Section 2(5) suffices.
512
G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES. INC.
the purpose, at least in part, of "dealing with" Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
(2) The Works Committee's status as a dominated labor
organization
I find that Respondent dominated, interfered with, and
illegally supported the Works Committee because Respon-
dent, on its own initiative, conceived the idea for, estab-
lished, and announced the creation of the Works Commit-
tee; determined the function of the committee and its
method of operation; unilaterally determined the number
of employee representatives who comprised the committee
and appointed said representatives to the committee; and
because the Works Committee conducted its business dur-
ing working time and its employee representatives were
paid their normal wages for conducting this business. These
are the considerations, plus the fact that Respondent estab-
lished the Works Committee for the illegal purpose of un-
dermining the employees' efforts to secure representation
by an independent union, that have persuaded me that Re-
spondent dominated and interfered with the formation and
administration of the Works Committee and rendered un-
lawful assistance and support to it in violation of Section
8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
F. Respondent disciplines and discharges Ochoa'7
1. The evidence
Ochoa began work for Respondent on January 19 and,
except for a 2-week period in late February and early
March, was continuously employed by Respondent until
July 14 when, as described infra, she was discharged. Man-
agement regarded her as an excellent employee.
Ochoa played a leading role in the Teamsters Union's
effort to organize the employees. She distributed union au-
thorization cards and literature for the Teamsters Union,
wore a Teamsters Union button and, on the day of the
representation election, was the official observer in the poll-
ing area for the Teamsters Union. Respondent's manage-
ment knew that Ochoa was pro-Teamsters and was actively
campaigning on behalf of the Teamsters. Likewise it is a
fair inference that when on the day of the May 31 election
Respondent discovered that Ochoa was the Teamsters
Union's official observer, it surmised that she was the lead-
ing Teamsters Union adherent among the employees.
As I have described supra, Respondent opposed its em-
ployees' efforts to secure union representation and was par-
ticularly opposed to the employees' selecting the Teamsters
Union as their bargaining representative. During May Pres-
"1 The complaint lacks a specific allegation relating to Ochoa's May 22
disciplinary warning. Nevertheless, "lilt is well established that when an is-
sue relating to the subject matter of a complaint is fully litigated at a hearing
. . the Board lis expected to pass upon it even though it is not specifically
alleged to be an unfair labor practice in the complaint." Monroe Feed Store,
112 NLRB 1336, 1337 (1955). Therefore-inasmuch as the disciplinary
warning is related to Ochoa's discharge, which is the central issue alleged in
the complaint and the underlying charge; Respondent did not object to tes-
timony regarding the disciplinary warning: and the facts pertaining to the
warning, including Respondent's motivation in issuing it were fully liti-
gated-I have considered its legality.
ident Levinson gathered together all of the employees and
specifically told them that the Company was opposed to
union representation and it was especially opposed to the
Teamsters Union representing the employees. In addition,
as I have found supra, on approximately May 17, Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it created an
employees' Works Committee through which it solicited
employees' grievances and remedied a substantial number
of them for the purpose of discouraging the employees from
voting for union representation. Also, to be absolutely sure
that the employees would not vote for the Teamsters
Union, Levinson, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), on ap-
proximately May 30 threatened the employees he would
close the plant if they voted for that union.
On May 22, Ochoa received a written disciplinary warn-
ing from Production Manager Bates which in pertinent part
stated that the Company's "pay record indicates a recurring
pattern of unexcused absences," informed Ochoa that "this
type of attendance record cannot and will not be tolerated"
and concluded by warning, "[T]his is your first formal writ-
ten warning. After three such warnings you will be termi-
nated for cause." This warning was issued after Respondent
learned Ochoa was actively campaigning for the Teamsters
Union. As indicated in the warning, it was Ochoa's first
written warning. Ochoa credibly testified that prior to this
warning no one from management, including Bates, had
personally spoken to her about her attendance.'" The record
reveals that during the 7-week period commencing April 1
and ending May 21, the time period during which Respon-
dent's new management operated the Company, employee
Lucy Garbin had a substantially poorer attendance record
than Ochoa yet did not receive a written disciplinary warn-
ing.'9
Between May 22 and July 14, the date Ochoa was dis-
charged, she did not receive another written disciplinary
warning and, other than on one occasion, Bates did not
speak to her about her attendance °Ochoa credibly testi-
fied that the only time Bates spoke to her about her attend-
ance was shortly prior to July 7, when he called her into his
office and spoke to her about the fact that she had informed
the Company she would be absent from work July 7 be-
cause of a doctor's appointment. Bates indicated he was
unhappy about Ochoa's absenteeism and stated that if she
1 I reject Bates' testimony that prior to the May 22 warning he had spo-
ken to Ochoa two or three times about her attendance. Ochoa impressed me
as the more credible witness. In addition, Bates' testimon' lacked specificity,
inasmuch as he failed to describe what was stated during these conversa-
tions.
19 During this 7-week period Garbin worked 40 hours a eek for weeks
and was absent 16 hours I week, II hours another week, and 8 hours n 3
separate weeks: a total of 50 hours of absences. During this period Ochoa
worked 40 hours a week 2 weeks and was absent 14-3/4 hours in I week. 8
hours in 2 separate weeks: 4-1/2 hours in another week; and 3-3 4 hours in
another week: a total of 39 hours of absences.
1o I reject Bates' testimony that between the May 22 written warning and
Ochoa's discharge he spoke to her two or three times about her attendance.
Ochoa impressed me as the more credible witness. In addition. Bates' testi-
mony lacked specificity as he failed to descnbe what was allegedly stated
during these conversations. I also note that since the May 22 written warning
indicated that if Ochoa's attendance continued to be unsatisfactory. she
would receive further written warnings, it is difficult to believe that if Bates
was concerned about Ochoa's absences and tardiness he would not have
issued another written warning rather than merely speaking to Ochoa Bates'
testimony explaining his reasons for not issuing a second written warning to
Ochoa was not convincing.
513
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wanted to visit the doctor she should schedule the appoint-
ment for a Saturday rather than a workday. Ochoa stated
that since the May 22 written warning she had only been
absent from work when it was absolutely necessary and
that it was impossible for her to schedule a doctor's ap-
pointment for Saturday because the doctor was not avail-
able that day. Bates concluded the conversation by indicat-
ing that if Ochoa went to the doctor as scheduled she would
be terminated. Ochoa cancelled the appointment.2
On July 13, after work, Ochoa made an appointment
with the City of Oakland Housing Authority for the next
morning. On July 14, prior to the start of the workday, she
phoned the plant and notified Assistant Manufacturing Di-
rector Bechnel she would not get to work until the after-
noon and asked her to notify Bates. Bechnel informed
Bates, who removed Ochoa's timecard from the rack and
notified Ochoa's immediate supervisor, Dorothy Parrish,
that he intended to discharge Ochoa because he could no
longer tolerate her absences. Later that morning,22 accom-
panied by several employees, Supervisor Parrish visited
Bates and unsuccessfully urged him not to discharge
Ochoa. Parrish told Bates that Ochoa was a good employee
who was really needed in the department and asked Bates
to give her another chance. Bates emphatically rejected
Parrish's plea. He stated that he could no longer tolerate
Ochoa's absences, that he was not employing part-time
workers, and that he intended to fire her.23
Approximately I hour after Bates had emphatically re-
jected the plea of Parrish and the employees that Ochoa not
be discharged, Ochoa showed up at the plant for work.
When she discovered her timecard was missing she went to
Bates' office and asked for her timecard. Bechnel, who was
in the office with Bates, stated Ochoa would have to get her
timecard from Ruth Craddick, the Company's personnel
manager and comptroller. Ochoa went to the front office
and asked Craddick for her timecard. Craddick stated she
had been discharged. Ochoa returned to Bates' office and
asked why she had been discharged. Bates replied she was
discharged because of her absenteeism and tardiness.
Ochoa stated that since May 22, when she was given the
written warning, she was absent only when it was abso-
lutely necessary. Ochoa warned Bates that she intended to
take her discharge as far as she could and hoped that the
Company and Bates would be investigated. Ochoa left
Bate's office to get her personal belongings and then went to
Craddick's office for her paycheck.
The foregoing description of what took place on July 14
when Ochoa came to work is based upon the testimony of
Ochoa, whose testimony was that of a sincere and reliable
witness. Bates' testimony was in sharp conflict with
Ochoa's. He testified that after Supervisor Parrish left his
office he reconsidered his decision to fire Ochoa and de-
cided to give her another chance nd issue her a written
warning rather than discharge her. He also testified that
21 The description of what was stated between Bates and Ochoa is based
upon Ochoa's testimony. I have rejected Bates' testimony that he did not
indicate Ochoa should not go to the doctor but only asked her why she had
so many different doctors. Ochoa impressed me as the more credible witness.
22 Bates places the time as about 11:30 a.m.
13 The description of Parrish's conversation with Bates is based upon a
synthesis of Mack's and Bates' testimony which was not inconsistent.
when Ochoa came into his office that he told her he could
not tolerate her absences and, in reply, Ochoa stated Bates
could not fire her because she would "have his ass" and
would take him to court and to the Teamsters Union and
would cause the Company a bunch of trouble. Bates further
testified that he viewed Ochoa's outburst as an act of insub-
ordination and that upon hearing her reply, he instanta-
neously decided to discharge her for insubordination and,
because of this, stated to Ochoa: "I can fire you and you are
fired." I reject Bates' testimony for these reasons:
(a) Bates' demeanor was not that of a sincere or reliable
witness.
(b) Bates, only I hour before speaking to Ochoa, had
rejected a plea by Ochoa's supervisor that Ochoa not be
discharged. Rather Bates had emphatically stated he in-
tended to fire Ochoa for absenteeism. I recognize Bates tes-
tified that immediately after Supervisor Parrish left his of-
fice he changed his mind and decided to give Ochoa a
written warning instead of discharging her. This self-serving
testimony is completely without corroboration. There is no
evidence Bates indicated to Supervisor Parrish that he had
changed his mind nor is there evidence that Bates had pre-
pared a written warning in anticipation of Ochoa's return to
work.
(c) Bechnel, Respondent's assistant manufacturing direc-
tor, called as a witness by the General Counsel, in signifi-
cant respects corroborates Ochoa's description of the dis-
charge interview. Bechnel, who impressed me as a sincere
witness, testified that Ochoa came into the office for her
timecard, at which point Bates complained that she was
absent from work too frequently and had not brought a slip
from the Housing Authority verifying her absence and told
Ochoa she was fired. Bechnel further testified that Ochoa
did not swear at Bates nor tell Bates she would "have his
ass."
In evaluating Bechnel's testimony I have considered that
she placed the time of Ochoa's discharge interview as tak-
ing place at the start of the work day and testified Ochoa on
July 14 entered Bates' office only once. Nevertheless, I do
not feel that her failure to accurately testify about these
matters impugns her testimony on the critical matters in
dispute, which testimony she presented in a convincing
manner. Likewise, I have given careful consideration to the
fact that Bechnel signed a statement for Bates stating that
during the discharge interview Ochoa directed profane lan-
guage against Bates and the Company. Bechnel credibly
testified that this statement is not true that Bates prepared
it for her signature and the only reason she signed it was
that Bates threatened her with discharge if she refused.2 '
(d) Bates' description of Ochoa's termination has the ap-
pearance of a fabrication inasmuch as it is inconsistent with
the description contained in his written report submitted to
President Levinson shortly after the discharge. In a memo
to Levinson dated July 17 Bates reported about Ochoa's
termination. The report did not, as Bates testified, state that
Ochoa was discharged because she was insubordinate
toward Bates by stating, in reply to his criticism about her
absenteeism, that he could not fire her as she would "have
24 I have rejected Bates' testimony that Bechnel was not coerced by him
into signing the statement. Bechnel impressed me as the more credible wit-
ness
514
G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC.
his ass" and take him to court and to the Teamsters Union
and cause the Company trouble. Rather, the import of
Bates' report was that Ochoa had been discharged because
she was insubordinate in failing to improve her attendance
record despite the fact that she had been warned about the
matter. And concerning what took place on July 14, Bates'
report to Levinson conflicts with Bates' description pre-
sented at the hearing. His report admits that it was only
after Bates notified Ochoa that she was discharged that
Ochoa replied that Bates could not fire her and intended to
speak to the Teamsters Union and cause trouble for the
Company. Thus, the report states:
I informed her that her services could not and would
not be tolerated any more. [Emphasis supplied.] She
informed me that I could not fire her. I informed her
that she was fired and to please leave the premises. She
said she would not leave without a letter of termina-
tion. I requested her to do so now and that a letter
would be mailed at a later date. Ochoa then stated ...
'I am going to the Union and get you into trouble.' I
told her to go ahead. She then stated that she 'would
take me to court and cause the company a lot of trou-
ble.'
In short, the plain import of Bates' report to Levinson is
that Ochoa was discharged for too many absences. His tes-
timony sharply conflicts with his report. In addition, Bates'
testimony that Ochoa threatened to "have his ass" is not
included in the report.2
Based upon the foregoing I find that on July 14 Bates
informed Ochoa she was discharged because of absenteeism
and tardiness. I further find that the reason advanced by
Respondent at the hearing for Ochoa's termination-insub-
ordination-is patently false.
2. Conclusionary findings
a. The disciplinary warning
On May 22 Respondent issued Ochoa a written warning
for poor attendance. Respondent knew she was actively
campaigning for the Teamsters Union and was one of its
leading advocates. Respondent was extremely hostile
toward this Union, and in a series of speeches Respondent's
president made this hostility known to the employees. In
addition, Respondent's president formed a committee of
employees through which Respondent granted employment
benefits to the employees for the illegal purpose of under-
mining the Teamsters Union's organizational campaign.
Also, to make sure the employees understood his message,
Respondent's president warned them that their activity on
behalf of the Teamsters Union would lead to the loss of
their jobs. This was the context in which Respondent issued
Ochoa a written warning.
The record establishes that when it issued Ochoa's warn-
ing, Respondent departed from its normal practice of issu-
21 Bates' explanation for his failure to include Ochoa's threat to "have his
ass" in his report to Levinson was not persuasive. He testified his reason for
this omission was he is not accustomed to including such language in reports
but then, apparently realizing this explanation was not convincing. testified
the reason for the omission was. "I didn't think anything like that would he
legal. I'm not a lawyer."
ing a written warning only after the disciplined employee
had been personally counseled.2 6 And, as described in detail
supra, employee Garbin, at the time of Ochoa's warning,
had a worse attendance record under the management of
Levinson and Bates than Ochoa, yet was not issued a writ-
ten disciplinary warning.
In summation, the relevant facts surrounding Ochoa's
written disciplinary warning-the Company's hostility
toward the Teamsters Union's organizational campaign ex-
pressed by way of an unlawful threat of job loss if the em-
ploees supported that Union and the formation of an em-
ployee's committee to remedy the employees' grievances so
as to undermine the Teamsters Union's organizational cam-
paign, Respondent's knowledge of the leadership role of
Ochoa in the Teamsters Union's campaign, the discrimina-
tion against Ochoa in the issuance of the warning as evi-
denced by Respondent's departure from its normal practice
in issuing such warnings and its failure to issue a written
warning to another employee with a worse attendance rec-
ord combine to establish that but for Ochoa's activities on
behalf of the Teamsters Union Respondent would not have
issued the May 22 written warning. It is for this reason that
I find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the
Act by issuing the May 22 written warning to Ochoa.
b. The discharge
Ochoa's disciplinary warning for engaging in activities on
behalf of the Teamsters Union and Respondent's threat
that the employees would suffer the loss of their jobs if they
supported the Teamsters Union were ignored by Ochoa
who, on the day of the representation election, served as the
Teamsters Union's official election observer, thus making it
plain to Respondent that she was the leading Teamsters
Union advocate among the employees. Six weeks later
Ochoa was discharged, ostensibly for absenteeism and tar-
diness.
The coalescent factors-- Respondent's extreme anti-
Teamsters Union bias as evidenced by its unfair labor prac-
tices previously found, its knowledge that Ochoa was the
leading adherent for the Teamsters Union and its prior dis-
crimination against Ochoa on account of her activities on
behalf of the Teamsters Union-establish prima afcie that
Ochoa's discharge was attributable to her activities on be-
half of the Teamsters Union. Maphis Chapman Corporation
v. N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 1966) "Hence it
became incumbent upon the Company, if it would avoid
that result, to come forward with a valid explanation for the
discharge. The real reason lay exclusively within its knowl-
edge." N. L.R.B. v. Miller Redwood Company, 407 F.2d
1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1969). 1 have considered the evidence
presented by Respondent to explain Ochoa's discharge and
am of the view that it fails to rebut the General Counsel's
prima facie case but instead bolsters the General Counsel's
case.2 In reaching this conclusion I was influenced by these
considerations:
26 Bates testified he disliked issuing wntten warnings and did so only with
great reluctance and only after personally counseling the disciplined em-
ployee. As I have found supra, Bates did not counsel Ochoa about her at-
tendance prior to the May 22 wntten warning.
" The law is settled that "the failure of an employer to establish a justifi-
able reason for the layoff gives rise to an adverse inference against him."
Malphis (Chapman Corporation v. N R B. 368 F.2d 298. 304 (4th Cir. 1966).
515
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(i) As I have previously found, the evidence does not
support the rationale of insubordination advanced by Re-
spondent to justify Ochoa's discharge. Rather, the record
reveals that this reason was a false one. It is settled that if
the stated motive for a discharge is found to be false, it can
be inferred that the real motive is an unlawful one which
the respondent desires to conceal, at least where, as in the
instant case, the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that
inference. See, Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation [Iron
King Branch] v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir.
1966).
(ii) Respondent was unable to settle on a reason for the
discharge. Respondent informed Ochoa that she was dis-
charged for poor attendance, but at the hearing contended
that she was discharged for insubordination. "[A]n unfavor-
able inference may be drawn against the company for its
inability to settle upon an explanation for the discharge.
This failure 'in itself lends support to the theory that
[Ochoa's] union support was the real explanation.'"
N.L.R.B. v. Teknor-Apex Company, 468 F.2d 692, 694 (Ist
Cir. 1972).
(iii) Although it would seem that a discharge when
predicated on bona fide grounds would produce harmoni-
ous explanations and a consistent story describing the dis-
charge, Respondent's evidence is characterized by contra-
dictions and inconsistencies. Thus,
(I) As I have found supra, Bates' testimony describing
the incident which allegedly resulted in Ochoa's discharge
sharply conflicts with his description of this incident which
he included in a report about the discharge submitted to his
superior.
(2) Bates and Levinson, Respondent's president, gave
conflicting testimony about significant matters such as the
identity of the person who decided to discharge Ochoa and
about the description of Ochoa's insubordinate conduct
which supposedly resulted in her discharge. Bates testified
he made the July 14 discharge decision "on [his] own . . .
just on the spot during the termination interview when
[Ochoa] was insubordinate." He also testified that his con-
versation with Levinson on July 14 consisted of simply re-
porting that he had terminated Ochoa for insubordination.
On the other hand, Levinson testified, "I made the decision
to discharge Ochoa" and, also contrary to Bates, testified
there was a detailed conversation between himself and
Bates on July 14 about the discharge during which Levin-
son told Bates, "[Y]ou tell me right now why you fired
Ochoa because I'm not sure you have because I haven't
told you whether you can or not."" Bates and Levinson
also contradicted one another when they described the al-
leged insubordinate conduct which they testified resulted in
Ochoa's termination. Ochoa was insubordinate because, ac-
cording to Bates, she stated to him: "I can't fire her. I'll
have your ass. I'll take you to court. I'll go to the Team-
sters. I'll cause the company a bunch of trouble." Levinson
considerably embellished upon Bates' description, testifying
that Ochoa was terminated because she told Bates:
"[D]on't give me any of that shit, you son of a bitch, I'll tell
21 I note that this does not seem plausible inasmuch as the record reveals
that Bates normally dealt with all personnel problems, including discharges
involving the production employees, without consulting Levinson.
you what you can and cannot do to me and tell me. You can't
fire me because I'll have your ass." [Emphasis supplied.]
I am of the opinion that the aforesaid significant contra-
dictions between Bates' and Levinson's testimony and be-
tween Bates' testimony and his report submitted to Levin-
son indicate that the testimony of Bates and Levinson was a
fabrication.
Based upon the foregoing, I conclude that the moving
cause for Ochoa's discharge was her activity on behalf of
the Teamsters Union and that she would not have been
discharged but for that activity. It is for this reason that I
conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)3) and ()
of the Act by discharging her.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Teamsters Union, the Upholsterers Union, and
the Works Committee each is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By dominating and interfering with the formation and
administration of the Works Committee and by contribut-
ing financial and other support to it, the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)2) and (1) of the Act.
4. By establishing a committee of employees, the Works
Committee, for the purpose of soliciting and remedying em-
ployees' grievances to discourage the employees from sup-
porting an independent union, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By threatening employees with the loss of their jobs if
they supported the Teamsters Union, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
6. By issuing a written warning to Deborah Ochoa and
discharging her because of her activities on behalf of the
Teamsters Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent has illegally dominated
and interfered with the formation and administration of the
Works Committee and has contributed financial and other
support to it, I shall recommend that Respondent perma-
nently withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and
completely disestablish, the Works Committee, or any suc-
cessor thereto, as a bargaining representative of any of its
employees.
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily discharging Ochoa, I
shall recommend that Respondent offer to fully and imme-
diately reinstate her to her former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job. I shall also
recommend that Respondent make her whole for any loss
516
G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC.
of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimi-
nation against her. by payment of a sum of money equal to
that which she would have earned from the date of her
unlawful discharge, less her net earnings, if any, during
such period, to be computed in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Interest
on the backpay shall be computed as set forth in our deci-
sion in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of facts, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER29
The Respondent, G. Q. Parachutes, Inc., San Leandro,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Assisting, dominating, contributing financial or other
support to, or interfering with the administration of the
Works Committee or any other labor organization of its
employees.
(b) Establishing a committee of employees for the pur-
pose of soliciting and remedying employees' grievances to
discourage the employees from supporting an independent
union or otherwise soliciting and remedying employees'
grievances to discourage them from supporting an indepen-
dent union.
(c) Threatening the employees with the loss of their jobs
if they support Warehouse, Mail Order, and Retail Em-
ployees Union, Local 853, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, or any other labor organization.
(d) Discharging, disciplining, or otherwise discriminating
against employees for supporting or engaging in activities
on behalf of Warehouse, Mail Order, and Retail Employees
Union, Local 853, affiliated with the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, or any other labor organization.
(e) In any other manner intefering with or attempting to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
2. Take the following action necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Deborah Ochoa full and immediate reinstate-
ment to her former position or, if that position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with full se-
niority, privileges, and benefits, and make her whole for any
losses she may have suffered because of the discrimination
practiced against her, in accordance with the provisions set
forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Expunge and physically remove from its records and
files the written disciplinary warning issued to Deborah
Ochoa on May 22, 1978, and any reference thereto.
(c) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and
completely disestablish, the Works Committee, or any suc-
cessor thereto, as the representative of any of its employees
for the purpose of dealing with Respondent concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or conditions of work.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records. timecards.
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of
reinstatement under the terms of this Order.
(e) Post at its San Leandro, California, facility, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."0 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 32, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted."
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered bN any
other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 32, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
as to those allegations not specifically found herein.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a Un..
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted b5 Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."
1' The record reveals that a substantial number of Respondent's employees
are of foreign extraction who have a limited understanding of the English
language, accordingly, the notices herein shall be printed in the several lan-
guages used for the election notices posted in Case 32-RD-86.
517