Goulds Pumps, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 1, 1972

196 N.L.R.B. 820 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Goulds Pumps, Inc., Vertical Pump Division and Inter-
national Union, United Automobile , Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW). Case 16-CA-4385
May 1, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On January 13, 1972, Trial Examiner John M.
Dyer issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order as modified below.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner as modified below and
hereby orders that Goulds Pumps, Inc., Vertical
Pump Division, Lubbock, Texas, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order, with the
following modifications:
1. Delete from paragraph 1(a) the second sentence.
2. Substitute the attached notice for the notice of
the Trial Examiner.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE HEREBY withdraw all recognition from and com-
pletely disestablish the Shop Committee as the repre-
sentative of any of our employees for the purpose of
dealing concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment and will not recognize it.
WE WILL NOT ask our employee about their union
sympathies, activities, or desires.
WE WILL NOT warn our employees that benefits pre-
sently enjoyed by them would be lost if the Union
came into the plant.
WE WILL NOT tell any employee that he does not
have to obey Board subpoenas nor will we seek to
persuade them not to participate in Board hearings or
investigations.
WE WILL NOT dominate or interfere with the admin-
istration of the Shop Committee or any other labor
organization or contribute unlawful financial or other
aid or support to it.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist the International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid and protection.
All our employees are free to become members of
the UAW or any other labor organization.
GOULDS PUMPS, INC., VERTICAL
PUMP DIVISION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Federal Office Building, Room 8A24,
819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Tele-
phone 817-334-2921.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN M. DYER, Trial Examiner : On June 11 , 1971,' The
International Union , United Automobile , Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), here-
in called the Union or UAW, filed a charge against Goulds
Pumps, Inc., Vertical Pump Division , herein called Respon-
dent or the Company, alleging that Respondent had viola-
ted Section 8(a)(2) of the Act by dominating , interfering
with , and giving unlawful aid and assistance to the Shop
Committee and had violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening
reprisals if employees participated in an NLRB hearing.
The Regional Director issued a complaint against Re-
spondent on July 30, alleging that Respondent violated Sec-
1 Unless stated otherwise, all events herein occurred in 1971.
196 NLRB No. 118
GOULDS PUMPS, INC.
tion 8(a)(2) by urging and directing employees to conduct
and attend meetings which it allowed the Shop Committee
to conduct on plant remises during' working hours, after
stopping production, for the purposes of electing shop com-
mitteemen and by interrogating employees as to whether
they should serve as shop committeemen. The independent
8(a)(1) allegations consist of interrogation and a threat, and
efforts to persuade employees not to participate in Board
proceedings by derogating the necessity of complying with
Board subpoenas.
Respondent admitted the requisite service and commerce
allegations of the complaint and that George Robert Giov-
annetti was its plant manager and Bob Fredrickson its tool-
room supervisor, but denied that they were agents of
Respondent.2 The parties agreed that both the Union and
the Shop Committee are labor organizations within the
meaning of the Act. Respondent denied that it had violated
the Act in any manner.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally
at the hearing held October 6, in Lubbock, Texas. General
Counsel and Respondent have filed briefs which have been
carefully considered.
From the evidence before me, I have concluded that Re-
spondent did dominate and interfere with the administra-
tion of the Shop Committee and violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(2) as alleged in the complaint.
The parties are in agreement regarding a number of
events on which the 8(a)(2) violation is based. Essentially it
is Respondent's position that the activities complained of
individually do not violate Section 8(a)(2) of the Act and
therefore no violation exists. The General Counsel insists
that viewed in concert, the activities engaged in by Respon-
dent and the Shop Committee indicate that Section 8(a)(2)
has been violated. I have concluded that this latter view is
correct.
Upon the entire record in this case, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED
Respondent is a New York corporation with its principal
offices in California and a plant in Lubbock, Texas, which
is the only facility involved in this case . Respondent is en-
gaged in the manufacture and sale of vertical pumps and
related machinery and in the course and conduct of such
business annually receives at its Lubbock, Texas, plant
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were
shipped there directly from points outside the State of Tex-
as.
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
The parties agree, and I find, that the Union herein and
the Shop Committee are each labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ii. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Undisputed Facts
George Robert Giovannetti, who has been with the par-
2 In their supervisory positions I find that they are agents of Respondent.
821
ent company some 21 years, has been the manager of the
Lubbock plant for 13 months . He succeeded Thomas Peter
Bevins, who is the manager of manufacturing and located
at the parent operation in California. The Lubbock plant
employs approximately 50 people including several supervi-
sors, among whom is Toolroom Supervisor Bob Fredrick-
son.
On March 26 , the Union filed an election petition (Case
.16-RC-5684) for the production and maintenance unit at
the Lubbock plant . A hearing was held on April 28 and the
Regional Director issued his Decision on May 24 , dismiss-
ing the etition since he found that the Shop Committee was
not defunct , but was a functioning labor organization and
that its contract with Respondent constituted a bar to the
petition. The parties agreed to the receipt in evidence of the
transcript of the representation case with Respondent's pro-
vision that it was not waiving any 10(b) de ense.
Respondent 's brief states that as a successor to U.S.
Pumps, Inc., which had owned the Lubbock plant until
1967, Respondent , when it took over the plant , became
party to a collective-bargaining agreement between U.S.
Pumps and the Shop Committee , and urges Bevins' testimo-
ny in the representation hearing as support for this state-
ment. However , Bevins was answering a leading question
suggesting there was such an agreement when he affirma-
tively responded that to the best of his knowledge there was
such an agreement . But Bevins ' personal knowledge extends
only from the time he took over the plant on December 9,
1968. During the representation hearing he testified that the
first agreement between the parties (received in evidence as
G.C. Exh . 7 with handwritten dates 1 / 1/68 through
12/31/68) was in existence at the time he took over the
plant. This testimony conflicts with his testimony in the
instant hearing wherein Bevins stated that he had negotiat-
ed all three of the contracts which would include this first
one.
It is clear that his testimony in the representation hearing
is corroborated by independent facts and I find that his
contrary , testimony in the instant hearing is erroneous. This
is further demonstrated by the fact that Bevins did not sign
the undated first contract and from the testimony was not
in a position where he would have negotiated it. He did sign
the later contracts he "negotiated." I therefore discount and
do not credit that part of his testimony which asserts he
negotiated the original contract or that the Company inher-
ited the Shop Committee and a contract from its predeces-
sor U . S. Pumps. This finding is also based on the
uncontradicted testimony of Melchor O. Esquivel concern-
ing the first contract.
Esqquivel, who was elected chairman of the Shop Commit-
tee in January 1971, testified during the representation hear-
ing that he first started with Respondent in December 1967
and at that time there was no Shop Committee at the plant.
He stated that about 20 employees got together and, know-
ing that Respondent had a contract for its plants in Los
Angeles, wrote to the Company requesting a cop y of the Los
Angeles contract . Shorty thereafter , a copy of the contract
was made available for the employees in the shop foreman's
office . Sometime in 1968 a notice was placed on the bulletin
board concerning a meeting to elect a Shop Committee and
a meeting was held and a Shop Committee was elected.
Each of the contracts contains virtually the same lan-
guage in an article entitled "Shop Committee " which is as
follows:
822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ARTICLE IX-SHOP COMMITTEE
Section 1. A shop committee of not more than three (3)
shall be elected annually during the first week of Janu-
ary by the employees, and the Company shall recognize
said Shop Committee for the purposes of adjusting
complaints, disputes, grievances, etc.
Section 2. The employee receiving the most votes for
Committeeman shall become the Committee Chair-
man, unless there is a tie between any two of the three
committee men, in which event the committee shall
elect its chairman.
Section 3.It is further understood and agreed by the
parties hereto that each will cooperate with the other in
reducing to a minimum the actual time spent by the
Shop Committeemen in investingating, [sic] presenting
and adjusting grievances and disputes.
An additional provision in each of the contracts under the
heading of "Termination" provides that, "The Shop Com-
mittee and Management shall meet at least once every six
(6) months, unless more frequent meetings are called by
either the Management or the Shop Committee."
The contracts are lengthy documents setting forth the
Purpose and scope of the contract containing sections deal-
ing with overtime, holidays, grievance procedures, dis-
charges, seniority, and the normal subjects found in a
collective-bargaining agreement with the obvious excep-
tion, as noted above, that each of these contracts establishes
the Shop Committee as an organization . Under "Grievance
Procedure," a four-step plan provides a first meeting at the
supervisory level where the individual with or without a
shop committeeman may contact the supervisor; at the sec-
ond step the grievance is reduced to writing and the shop
committeeman takes it up at a grievance meeting with a
person designated by the Company; the third step provides
for a grievance meeting within a specified period of days
with top management, and the fourth step provides for arbi-
tration with the parties to equally share the cost of the
arbitrator 's fees.
The second contract was to run from January 1, 1969,
until September 1, 1970. This document was signed by Gar-
land Schoor (a signer of the first contract), Juan Garza, and
James Scoggins. The third contract runs from September 1,
1970, through August 31, 1972, and this document was
signed for the Shop Committee by Luther Bannister, Juan
Garza, and Larry Blake and is dated November 12, 1970.
It was agreed by the parties that the Shop Committee has
no constitution or bylaws, collects no dues or fees, and that
its existence is only provided for in the succession of these
three contracts. It was further agreed that all grievances that
have been filed have been settled at the first or second step
and nothing has ever been taken to arbitration.
The testimony concerning some of the grievances would
seem to indicate that they are more in the nature of an
inquiry, with a response by the Company ending the matter.
Respondent's testimony would indicate that on these suc-
cessive contracts there have been up to five or six negotia-
tion sessions . However , the testimony of one of the signers
of the second contract, Mr. Scoggins, who was subsequently
reelected as a shop committeeman in January 1971, is that
he did not recall attending such meetings but that he did
sign the second contract after Mr. Bevins called the Com-
mittee to his office and told them to look over the document
and if they agreed with it to sign it.
As for the third contract, the witnesses for General Coun-
sel agree (and there was no contradictory evidence ) that one
employee meeting was held at which the chairman of the
Shop Committee , Luther Bannister , told the employees
there was a choice between getting a raise or getting a pen-
sion plan and he recommended getting a raise since it would
take employees 15 years to qualify for the pension plan.
There was immediate agreement and that was the only con-
tract term mentioned or discussed . The contract with the
raise was then signed by the three shop committeemen.
There have been two employee meetings held in 1971,
and they were held on January 6 and June 2 for election of
shop committeemen . Bannister , 1970 chairman , requested
permission of Giovannetti to hold the January 6 meeting for
the election of 1971 shop committeemen . Giovannetti gave
his permission and the employees were allowed to hold the
meeting on company premises and production was stopped.
The first shift was working overtime until 5:30 p .m. and the
meeting was held between 5 and 5:30 p .m. so that members
of the first and second shifts could attend . Employees were
kept on the "clock" and were paid for their attendance at
this meeting. Notices concerning the meeting were either
prepared or typed by company personnel and placed on a
company bulletin board . Similarly , for the second meeting
in June, permission was granted by the Respondent and the
meeting was similarly held on company premises and on
company time, so the employees were paid for their atten-
dance at the meeting . Notices in regard to the meeting were
either prepared or typed by company personnel and placed
on the company bulletin board.
B. Representation Case Subpoenas and the June Shop
Committee Election
Melchor Esquivel , the 1971 chairman of the Shop Com-
mittee , resigned from that position 1 or 2 weeks prior to the
representation case hearing. He received a subpoena to tes-
tify at that hearing but did not discuss this fact with compa-
ny representatives . The day before the hearing he was told
to report to Giovannetti 's office where he found Giovannet-
ti with a Mr. Hastings ( resumably a member of Respon-
dent counsel 's law firm. Giovannetti said he had been
notified that Esquivel had been subpoenaed to appear at the
representation hearing and Esquivel admitted it. Giovan-
netti asked if he was going, and Esquivel replied he was
going, that the people wanted him to represent them at the
heanng. Giovannetti said "Well, you don 't have to go to this
hearing. You don't have to go. They can't force you to go.
Who gave you the subpoena ?" Hastings said that didn't
matter and Giovannetti continued that there was no way
Esquivel had to go and if he did he was on his own and if
he wanted to go that was fine. Giovannetti continued that
if Esquivel didn't go that was up to him , and the NLRB
couldn't force him to go.
Giovannetti testified that he had a conversation with Es-
quivel 1 or 2 days before the representation case hearing. He
said he had been notified by his plant superintendent that
a number of people had been subpoenaed to appear at the
hearing and 'were wondering ... at it was all about,
whether they had to, in fact , appear or just what was hap-
pening." His superintendent had a problem in setting up a
work schedule as to who was going to court and who wasn't.
According to Giovannetti this was the Company's busiest
season and information was needed to schedule the work.
Therefore , "under advice of counsel , Mr. Robertson, and
also my immediate supervisor, Mr. Thomas Bevins, who is
the manager of the manufacturing , we talked to Roy Es-
GOULDS PUMPS, INC.
quivel , in particular as to what his rights might have been
in this kind of a hearing ." Esquivel was called to the office
and after a bit of chitchat , according to Giovannetti , he told
Esquivel he had his legal counsel prepare a statement so that
he `could relay to Mr . Esquivel ]ust what his rights were as
we saw it ; whether he , in fact , had to attend . It was up to
him." Although he had the prepared statement in front of
him, he did not recite it verbatim and could not recall pre-
cisely what he said to Esquivel but believed it was something
to the effect that it was a matter of Esquivel's own j udgment
whether he attended the hearing or not . Esquivel told him
that he planned on attending and would attend . He told
Esquivel that was okay with him but it was his decision
whether he wanted to attend or not . Esquivel told him he
had been subpoenaed and he believed he told Esquivel that
the subpoena was not self-enforcing.
Giovannetti , after reading and identifying the prepared
statement (G.C. Exh . 8),3 gave the following version of his
"subpoena conversation" with Esquivel: "Roy I understand
that you have been served with a subpoena and that you
have asked out in the plant whether or not you had to
attend , and because I was interested in what your rights and
obligations might be I asked our counsel and he, in fact, told
me that the subpoena was not a self-enforcing subpoena'
that whether he attended or not was a matter of his own
decision and as far as Goulds was concerned the decision
was up to him and that this little session that we had wasn't
intended to influence him in any way but that we wanted
him to know that he was free to act as he so desired."
Giovannetti admitted he did not say that the subpoena
could be enforced by the NLRB going to a Federal court.
It is clear that Esquivel had not sought advice so it would
appear that the second version and the prepared text are
wrong and that this language was purposefully used in an
attempt to camouflage Respondent 's interference with its
employees ' rights.
Billy DeVore , a toolroom employee at the plant for some
9 years, was told by Shop Committeeman James Scoggins
during a break that DeVore would be subpenaed for the
representation case hearing. DeVore 's supervisor, Bob
Frederickson , told him "you can go if you want to or if you
don't want to you don't have to." DeVore said he was going
to the hearing.
Fredrickson testified that DeVore told him he had been
subpoenaed and was a little reluctant to go but said that he
would go through with it. He told DeVore it was his decision
to make whether he wanted to go or didn ' t want to go and
it was up to him.
At the representation hearing James Scoggins, then a
member of the Shop Committee and who had previously
been a committeeman in 1969 , testified that he did not
know , and no one had ever explained , what his duties were
as a committeeman , or that he had authority to negotiate
3 The text of the prepared statement is as follows:
I have been advised that you have been served with a National Labor
Relations Board subpoena directing you to testify at the hearing tomor-
row morning, and that you have asked whether or not you have to attend
that hearing. Because you have asked what your rights and obligations
are, I want you to know that such subpoenas are not self-enforcing. In
other words, if you do not attend you will not be arrested or fined.
However, the National Labor Relations Board can go to Federal Court
and obtain an order directing you to attend and testify at such a hearing,
in which event you could be prosecuted for failure to attend. As far as
we are concerned, the decision whether or not you attend the hearing
tomorrow is entirely up to you, and the Company wants you to know
that it is in no way attempting to influence your decision one way or the
other. You are on your own to make that decision, and as far as we are
concerned, you are free to do as you wish.
823
contracts. He said he had presented some written grievances
and talked to Bevins about them and had been told they
would be taken care of. During 1969 the Committee held no
meetings with the employees to discuss wages, hours, or
working conditions and as far as he knows his only duties
in 1971 were to run his machine. Scoggins also said he had
filed no grievances during 1971, and did not wish to repre-
sent the employees on wages, hours, or working conditions
or to administer the present contract.
Shortly after the representation case hearing, Giovannet-
ti, as he testified, approached Scog ins and said "Scoggins,
in view of your testimony at the NLRB hearing, where, in
fact, you testified that you did not want to represent the
membership, nor in fact-you testified that you didn't feel
that you were qualified to represent the membership'-I felt
that in my opinion it would be best that he did resign from
the committee and open that spot up to someone who felt
and wanted to actively support the activities of the shop
committee." On the following day Scoggins wrote out a
resignation and gave it to a secretary in the office who typed
it on company stationery. The typed resignation was placed
on the company bulletin board with Giovannetti's approval.
Toward the latter part of May or early June, Giovannetti
told Juan Garza, the remaining committeeman, that in line
with the ruling from the NLRB Regional Director, the Shop
Committee was a bona fide labor union and Garza was the
chairman since Esquivel had resigned. As such Garza was
responsible for the Union's applying the contract and mak-
ing the contract go. Giovannetti reminded Garza that the
contract called for three committeemen and to have a good
working viable committee and a good contract the vacan-
cies should be filled. A notice was prepared, typed in the
company office, and placed on the bulletin board notifying
the employees that there would be an election . Giovannetti
stopped production and allowed the employees to hold the
election on company time and company premises on the
afternoon of June 2. Two employees were elected to fill the
positions vacated by Esquivel and Scoggins.
Hyllan Pearson, an employee since April 1970, testified
that on April 28, Giovannetti asked him if he would vote for
a union, and Pearson said he would.
Giovannetti testified that he did not recall any such con-
versation with Pearson and could not imagine making such
a statement. He remembered that he was tied up with coun-
sel preparing for the representation case most of the day
before the hearing and denied making the statement.
Jasper Lee Corley testified that a few days before the
representation hearing he was on a coffeebreak in the tool-
room with his boss, Bob Fredrickson, who asked what he
thought about joining the Union. He replied he was in favor
of it and couldn't see where it would be anything but better.
A short time after that, they again were on a coffeebreak
and while talking about coffeebreaks in general, Fredrick-
son said if they got a union, they wouldn t be able to drink
coffee as they were doing but just at definite breaks.
Fredrickson, who is presently working for another com-
pany, testified that to the best of his memory he did not ask
Corley what his feelings were about the Union, but stated,
though not remembering it, it was possible he could have
done so. He similarly did not recall making a statement
about a coffeebreak.
C. Analysis and Summary
I have concluded that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(2) of the Act based on the totality and course of its
actions. It is noted that the ancestry of this organization is
824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not clear , but appears from Esquivel 's testimony to have
been generated by employees ' request for a contract and a
management response . However , whatever actions oc-
curred did so several years prior to the 10 (b) date here.
What we have is an organization whose only apparent
genesis is in a series of contracts between Respondent and
it. The contracts provide for a Shop Committee of three
members elected annually, with the person receiving the
most votes to act as chairman . The principal obligation
placed on the shop committee by the contract is to co-
operate with Respondent in reducing to a minimum the
time spent by shop committeemen in investigating, pre-
senting, and adjusting grievances and disputes.
It may be implicit , but nowhere in this document is the
Committee given any power to negotiate new contracts with
Respondent . The Shop Committee has no independent
means of existence other than the contract . It is not granted
nor does it claim for itself to have the right to establish dues
or other means to independently finance and organize itself.
It has no constitution or bylaws by which its officers or
committeemen may be guided . Indeed , as was testified by
one of the committeemen , they were never informed what
their duties or obligations were . In fact , it is clear from the
testimony of Giovannetti that he took it upon himself to
persuade a committeeman to resign and to instruct another
committeeman that it was his duty to act as chairman and
call an election to fill two vacancies.
The provision in the contract for arbitration seems to be
an empty gesture considering that it provides for sharing of
such expenses and the Committee is without funds or any
manner to secure funds to pay an arbitrator . Added to this
was the testimony that a number of employees represent
themselves without the benefit of any shop committee. The
testimony concerning presentation of grievances and
Respondent 's responses would not seem to inspire any con-
fidence in the efficacy of the Committee.
Respondent provided the Shop Committee with secre-
tarial assistance in prearing or typing notices and placing
them with Respondents permission on Respondent's bulle-
tin board . The only two employee meetings during 1971
were for the purpose of electing and replacing officers, and
these two meetings were held on Respondent 's premises,
during overtime worktime , and employees were paid for
their attendance at these two meetings . The results of the
meetings were immediately reported to management, for
the purpose , management states, of informing their main
headquarters in California of the results.
Respondent attempted to minimize the financial assis-
tance given to the Shop Committee by stating that in an-
other of their plants, where a Steelworkers local is the
representative , the local is permitted to hold union meetings
on company time and premises . The present instance can-
not be controlled by what Respondent does at another
plant . I am not in the position of deciding whether at this
other plant Respondent may or may not be violating the Act
by granting permission to a union to so act , or whether that
union through bargaining has won such a concession from
Respondent . Therefore , fcan only consider what has taken
place at the Lubbock plant.
Adding to the above the fact that Respondent has taken
it upon itself to in effect tell a committeeman that he should
resign from that position (something which should be the
prerogative of the members of an independent or gganiza-
tion), and in telling the remaining committeeman that an
election should be called so that the Shop Committee can
live up to its contract (seemingly another prerogative of
members of an independent organization), serves only to
indicate that Respondent is the dominant force of this Shop
Committee and that it is being maintained mainly for
Respondent's benefit.
There is nothing in this record laudatory of the perfor-
mance of the Shop Committee but only indications that the
employees have been dissatisfied with their representation
by the Committee. Since some of these indications appear
to predate the 10(b) date, I will recommend that the employ-
ees be given freedom of choice to join the Union or any
other labor organization including a representative commit-
tee if a proper one should be independently established.
General Counsel's argument that Respondent can change
the makeu of the Shop Committee by firing one of its
members dpoes not strike me as a particularly strong argu-
ment in the instant case since there are no provisions for
representation by department or shift . It is likely that the
makeup of a group of union stewards could be changed by
a respondent firing one or more of them for just cause.
The situation here is different from that in the case of
Federal-Mogul Corp., 163 NLRB 927 . There the respondent
was seeking a voice with which to bargain . Here Respon-
dent is attempting to keep alive an organization and give
substance to its contract and possibly ward off an organiza-
tional attempt by an outside union.
In sum , the incidents which have occurred within the
10(b) period convince me that the Shop Committee is dom-
inated, and its administration has been interfered with, by
Respondent, which has contributed financial and other sup-
port to it . These incidents include the continuing fact that
the Shop Committee owes its existence to the contract be-
tween Respondent and its existence is therefore subject to
negotiation . Further the Shop Committee has no consti-
tution or bylaws, no fees or dues, or independent means of
support , and is entirely dependent on Respondent even for
permission to hold its meetings , which are held on company
time and company premises , so that employees are paid
(some at overtime rates ) for attendance at the few meetings
which are called . Further , any communications to the mem-
bership are prepared or typed by Respondent and placed
with Respondent 's permission on its bulletin board for the
information of Respondent's employees . Respondent has
also questioned one of the shop committeemen and urged
him not to continue as a shop committeeman and has urged
another shop committeeman to call meetings so that a con-
tract may be lived up to. It may be true that if each of these
incidents were only a single event it might not be enough to
establish any violation of the Act, but when looked at as a
whole, these parts fit together into a picture which demon-
strates that the Shop Committee is only a facade which has
some small semblance to a grievance committee , but not to
an independent collective -bargaining agent 4
I conclude and find that Giovannetti violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by his statements to Esquivel concerning
the subpoena . The prepared statement , as well as
Giovannetti's versions of his statement , attempt to set up a
condition that the employee sought information about the
subpoena . However , it is clear that no such information was
ever sought by Esquivel, either from a lower supervisor or
from Giovannetti. Respondent then attempts to say that it
needed information from Esquivel and others as to whether
they were going to be at work so it could prepare its produc-
tion schedule. If this were true , all that would have been
necessary was for Giovannetti to have said this to Esquivel.
However , there is nothing in Giovannetti 's nor Esquivel's
testimony , nor in the statement prepared by Respondent's
counsel to illustrate that this reason was ever considered by
Respondent in making the statements to Esquivel.
See Modern Plastics Corporation, 155 NLRB 1126.
GOULDS PUMPS, INC.
The only thing that is left is intrusion by Respondent into
a matter not truly of its concern, and by its language giving
an impression that it wished the individual not to appear at
the hearing, by derogating the necessity of complying with
the subpoena and telling the employee he was on his own
if he did.
Respondent also claims that it was merely advising the
individual of his rights. However, this individual sought no
advice from Respondent and it is not, and was not, incum-
bent upon Respondent to offer advice on subpoena rights.
The only reasonable inference that can be drawn by Re-
spondent bringing a man into an office, and with counsel
present advising him that he did not have to obey a subpoe-
na, and that if he did, it was up to him, is that Respondent
sought to interfere with that individual giving testimony
before the Board. The rationale set forth by the Board in
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 128 NLRB 574 at 578-579, is appli-
cable to the present situation. Respondent's actions have an
inherent tendency to deprive employees of vindication of
their statutory rights, and, by so doing, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent's actions through its supervisor, Bob
Fredrickson, telling employee DeVore that he did not have
to go, after being advised that DeVore was going to be
subpoenaed, is again an implicit intrusion into this
employee's rights and the rights of other employees by at-
tempting to dissuade an employee from obeying a Board
subpoena. Fredrickson states that DeVore said he was re-
luctant . DeVore expressed no such reluctance concerning
testifying. I do not completely trust Frederickson's memory,
since he had stated that he did not remember other incidents
and might have made statements attributed to him. The act
of advising employees that they do not have to obey a Board
subpoina, which in and of itself calls for obedience until a
motion to revoke it is made and granted, is sufficent in and.
of itself to show that Respondent was attempting to invade
the statutory rights of employees. Respondent, by
Fredrickson's act, therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
Corley made a favorable impression on me as a witness,
in that he appeared to try to definitely establish what took
place at the time. He stated his memory was based on the
fact that this was the only occasion on which anybody had
ever said anything to him about the Union, which made the
fact stick in his mind. When contrasted with Fredrickson's
poor memory and an admission that what Corley said might
possibly have happened, I have to credit Corley s version of
the statements by Fredrickson. I find that Respondent, by
Fredrickson's interrogation of Corley as to how he felt
about the Union, and by advising Corley that the privilege
of drinking coffee at any time would be revoked if the
Union came in , violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The testimony of Pearson concerning Giovannetti's ques-
tioning him as to whether he would vote for the Union could
be an offhand interrogation, possibly meant in jest, but no
one has suggested that it was. Giovannetti denied that he
made such a statement with a long explanation that he had
been advised by counsel not to engage in such. Pearson, I
believe, spoke truthfully. This might have been an isolated
bit of offhand interrogation by Giovannetti, but taken with
the course of conduct engaged in by Respondent here is a
violation of the Act, which also needs to be remedied.
In summary of the 8(a)(1) issues, I find that Respondent
has violated the Act by Giovannetti's and Fredrickson's
interrogations and Fredrickson's statement that a privilege
of drinking coffee at any time would be dropped if the
Union won the election. I also have found, that, by the
remarks made and the interrogations of Esquivel and De-
Vore in regard to their subpoenas, Respondent violated and
825
interfered with the statutory rights of employees and there-
fore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COM-
MERCE
The violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by
Respondent, as set forth above, in section II, occurring in
connection with Respondent's business operations as de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Goulds Pumps, Inc., Vertical Pump
Division, has unlawfully dominated the Shop Committee
and rendered unlawful aid and support to it and otherwise
interfered with its administration, which thereby interfered
with and coerced Respondent's employees in the exercise of
their statutory rights, I shall recommend that the Shop
Committee be disestablished.
Having also found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by unlawfully interrogating its employees
and warning that present benefits might not be enjoyed
under a union and further by interfering with the substan-
tive rights of employees by derogating the necessity of com-
pliance with the Board subpoenas, I shall recommend that
Respondent cease and desist therefrom and so notify its
employees.
On the basis of the foregoing facts and the entire record
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Goulds Pumps, Inc., Vertical Pump Division, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW) and the Shop Committee are each labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent Company, by dominating and interfering
with the administration of the Shop Committee and contrib-
uting unlawful financial and other aid and support to it, as
detailed above, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(2) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act by inter-
rogating employees concerning their union sympathies, ac-
tivities, and desires, warning employees that present
benefits will be curtailed if the Union is successful in com-
ing into the plant; and by interfering with employees' sub-
stantive rights by derogating the necessity of compliance
with Board subpoenas.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:5
5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Respondent , Goulds Pumps, Inc., Vertical Pump Divi-
sion , its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Recognizing , dominating, or interfering with , or con-
tributing unlawful financial or other support to , the Shop
Committee . This order does not mean that Respondent may
change or vary any of the conditions established in its pre-
sent contract with the Shop Committee to the prejudice or
detriment of its employees.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning their union sym-
pathies, activities , and desires or warning them that present
benefits may be discontinued if the Union is successful in
coming into the plant.
(c) Interfering with employees ' substantive rights by dero-
gating the necessity of compliance with Board subpoenas.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining , or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sa to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and
completely disestablish , the Shop Committee as representa-
tive of any of its employees for the purpose of dealing with
respect to grievances , labor disputes , wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment , or other conditions of work.
(b) Post at its Lubbock , Texas, plant copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appppendix ." Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16,
after being duly signed by Respondent's representative,
shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board"
In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after
exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify
the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."