Gordon Gaumnitz et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 21, 2019

14326352 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/326,352 07/08/2014 Gordon Gaumnitz 54874-040F01US 2352
64280 7590 08/21/2019
Mintz Levin/SAP
Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
One Financial Center
Boston, MA 02111
EXAMINER
HOANG, HAU HAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2167
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/21/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDocketingBOS@mintz.com
IPFileroombos@mintz.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GORDON GAUMNITZ, ROBERT SCHULZE,
LARS DANNECKER, IVAN BOWMAN,
and DAN FARRAR
____________

Appeal 2018-007921
Application 14/326,352
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.

BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–12, 15, 16, 18, and 19, which are all the pending claims.
See Final Act. 1; App. Br. 10–25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 Appellants identify SAP SE as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3.
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Introduction
Appellants’ disclosure and claims “relate[] to data platforms, and
more particularly to a system and method for compressing series data of a
database.” Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification states that
[w]hen dealing with series data in a storage layer of a data
platform, improving memory consumption and general
performance in a manner that is virtually transparent to the user,
and involves an ease of use when handling this kind of data
using an extensive number of time series analysis functionality,
is very challenging.

Spec. ¶ 3. Appellants summarize the disclosure as “describ[ing] various
storage extensions, which are specifically adapted to the characteristics and
requirements of time series data. The extensions comprise special
compression formats for time stamps.”2 Spec. ¶ 5. In particular, Appellants
describe “compression of time stamp columns to improve memory
consumption and general performance of a database.” Spec. ¶ 16; see also
id. at 17–19.
Claim 1 is representative of the claims on appeal:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving a plurality of time stamps of a time series for
operations executed on a database of a data platform;
determining that the plurality of time stamps includes at
least one gap separating a first subseries and a second subseries,
the first subseries having a first start time and a first plurality of
successive time stamps separated by an equal time interval, the
second sub series having a second start time and a second
plurality successive time stamps separated by the equal time

2 The Specification and Claims both variously refer to “time stamp(s)” and
“timestamp(s),” without any apparent distinction between their meanings.
We treat these terms as interchangeable.
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interval, and the gap separating the first subseries and the
second subseries being different than the equal time interval;
storing, by one or more processors of the data platform,
the equal time interval in a dictionary of a column store of the
database;
generating, by the one or more processors, an index
vector comprising indices corresponding to the first plurality of
successive timestamps and the second subseries of successive
time stamps;
generating, by the one or more processors, a starts vector
and a starting values vector in the dictionary of the column
store of the database, the starts vector storing references, based
on the index vector, to the first start time and the second start
time, and the starting values vector storing a respective starting
time stamp for each of the first subseries and the second
subseries; and
constructing one or more timestamps of the plurality of
time stamps in the first subseries and/or the second subseries
based at least on the equal time interval, the starts vector, and
the starting values vector, the constructing comprising
accessing the dictionary.
App. Br. 20–21 (Claims App’x).
The Rejection and the Representative Claim
All pending claims stand rejected 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without reciting significantly more.
See Final Act. 2–6. Appellants argue all claims together based on claim 1,
which therefore is representative of all claims for the purpose of this appeal.3
App. Br. 7, 12–18; 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

3 There are two other independent claims (6 and 11), both of which include
limitations analogous to the limitations of claim 1 and stand rejected on the
same basis as claim 1. See App. Br. 20–24 (Claims App’x) and Final Act.
2–6.
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General § 101 Law and the USPTO 2019 Guidance
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71–73 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical concepts (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). In
Diamond v. Diehr, the claim at issue recited a judicial exception in the
category of mathematical concepts, but the Supreme Court held that “[a]
claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
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nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” 450 U.S. 175,
176 (1981).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. at 212.
The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).4
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim:

4 All references to the MPEP are to Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner’s Determination and Appellants’ Contentions
With respect to the first step in the Alice/Mayo framework, the
Examiner determined claim 1 is directed to (recites) the abstract idea “of
coding and decoding data.” Final Act. 2–3 (citing RecogniCorp, LLC v.
Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Appellants contend the
Examiner erred because, rather than reciting the abstract idea of coding and
decoding data, claim 1 “details a particular application of time series
compression and memory storage” and “also improves the function of the
computer itself.” App. Br. 12 (emphasis omitted). Appellants argue that
in determining whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea
for purposes of the first step, it is not sufficient to simply ask
whether the claim involves a patent-ineligible concept. The
claims must be “considered in light of the specification, based
on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded
subject matter.’”
App. Br. 13 (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). In particular, Appellants argue “[c]laim 1 is directed to
the particular solution to a particular technical problem: improved memory
consumption and database performance,” and, thus, the Examiner erred by
“generaliz[ing claim 1] down to ‘coding and decoding data.” App. Br. 15;
see also Reply Br. 4 (arguing claim 1 recites a “technology-based solution
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. . . for addressing technical problems that are endemic to conventional time
series dictionary data compression”).
Our Analysis
Alice/Mayo Step One, 2019 Guidance Step 2A Prongs One and Two
Under the Guidance, we first determine if claim 1 recites a judicial
exception, i.e., here, an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54–
55. In doing so, we must express the basic idea in a way that is “[]tethered
[to] the language of the claim[].” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Keeping in mind that caveat, we summarize claim 1 as: receiving time
stamps for a series of operations; determining there are two subseries of time
stamps within the series that have the same periodicity; saving the time
interval for the periodicity “in a dictionary of a column store”; and
generating data retrieval vector information to use along with the stored
equal time interval for “constructing” a time stamp from the series. In view
of the foregoing, we determine claim 1 describes (recites) the idea of using a
vector-based algorithm for post hoc reconstruction of any time stamp in a
series of received time stamps from time interval data and vector values
stored in a column store of a database, without requiring stored copies of the
received time stamps.
As discussed above in the Introduction, the idea underlying claim 1
provides technical advantages in the field of database technology. See Spec.
¶¶ 16–20. Notwithstanding that claim 1 involves a mathematical algorithm,
because the claim focuses on particular data storage (database) technology in
conjunction with the algorithm, claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea in
the category of a mathematical concept. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–
92. Nor is claim 1’s basic concept a method of organizing human activity or
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a mental process. Accordingly, the Examiner has not sufficiently shown that
claim 1 recites a judicial exception.
Further, under prong 2, we determine that claim 1 is akin to the
patent-eligible claims at issue in Enfish, which were directed to specific
improvements in the use of database technology. See 822 F.3d at 1337; see
also id.at 1339 (explaining that “[m]uch of the advancement made in
computer technology consists of improvements to software that, by their
very nature, may not be defined by particular physical features but rather by
logical structures and processes”).
Accordingly, at least under prong one of step 2A of the Guidance,
claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea, which concludes our analysis. See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54.
DECISION
We reverse the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–12,
15, 16, 18, and 19.
REVERSED