Gopinathan, Krisha et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 10, 2020

13278072 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/278,072 10/20/2011 Krisha Gopinathan 372566-000015 1062
26379 7590 02/10/2020
DLA PIPER LLP (US )
2000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE
EAST PALO ALTO, CA 94303-2248
EXAMINER
OYEBISI, OJO O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/10/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PatentDocketingUS-PaloAlto@dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte
KRISHA GOPINATHAN and SRIRAM RANGARAJAN
____________________

Appeal 2019-000560
Application 13/278,072
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ERIC S. FRAHM, and JUSTIN BUSCH,
Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the
inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as
provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Gain Credit, Inc. (Appeal Br. 1).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Disclosed Invention and Exemplary Claim
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention relates to a method of
collecting and processing data to predict an outcome (see Title; Abstract;
Spec. ¶¶ 2; claim 1). More specifically, the method helps make credit
decisions by more accurately evaluating creditworthiness of a consumer,
organization, family, or business applying for a loan or financial service
account when credit history information about the applicant is limited or
entirely absent (Spec. ¶¶ 2, 4–9, 212; Abstract). Exemplary and sole
independent claim 1 under appeal, with emphases and bracketed lettering
added to key portions of the claim at issue, reads as follows:
1. A method of generating a prediction of an outcome
comprising:
collecting data related to a prospect requesting an action
and storing the data in a database;
using a computer based processing system to identify
references related to the prospect, the references including at
least one forward reference and at least one backward reference;
[A] using a network graph engine that is part of the
computer-based processing system to generate a network
graph where the nodes of the graph represent the prospect and
the edges of the graph represent the strength of the references for
the prospect;
[B] using a prediction engine that is part of the computer-
based processing system to apply a predictive model to the
network graph to determine a predicted outcome related to the
requested action, the predictive model having a plurality of
matrices, including at least one predictor linked data matrix and
at least one singular vector matrix. 
Appeal Br. 8, Claims Appendix (emphases and bracketed lettering added).

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The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 1–10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea). Final Act. 2–5.
(2) The Examiner rejected claims 1–10 as being anticipated under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) by Bayliss (US 7,912,842 B1; issued March 22, 2011).
Final Act. 5–7. Because the Examiner has withdrawn the § 102(b) rejection
(Ans. 3), we will not address this rejection or Appellant’s arguments (see
Appeal Br. 5–7) directed thereto.
Appellant’s Contentions
(1) Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 1–3) that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Specifically, Appellant contends the claims are not directed to an abstract
idea because the claimed invention amounts to significantly more than an
abstract idea (Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 1–3). In other words, Appellant
does not contest that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, only that
additional elements of the claims (see, e.g., claim 1, limitations A and B)
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Appellant primarily
presents arguments as to independent claim 1 (Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 1–
3), and asserts that the dependent claims include similar limitations as claim
1, and are therefore patent eligible for the same reasons. Therefore, with
regard to the patent-eligibility rejection, we select claim 1 as representative
of the group of claims 1–10 pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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Principal Issue on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 4–7)
and Reply Brief (Reply Br. 1–3), the following principal issue is presented
on appeal:
Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–10
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter,
because representative claim 1 recites significantly more than the abstract
idea, that is, additional elements that are not well-understood, routine, or
conventional activity in the field, or does claim 1 simply append well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea?

ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
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we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
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attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed.,
Rev. 08.2017, 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (Step 2B).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to” inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the
specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
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technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, claim 1, and claims 2–10 depending
therefrom, recite “[a] method of generating a prediction of an outcome”
including the steps of “collecting data” and “storing data,” “identify[ing]
references” related to the data, “generat[ing] a network graph,” and
“apply[ing] a predictive model to the network graph” (claim 1). Therefore,
claim 1, as well as claims 2–10 depending therefrom, as method claims,
recite at least one of the enumerated categories (e.g., process) of eligible
subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is
directed to a process including a series of steps (see Final Act. 3), and thus
the claims pass muster under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry.
Appellant does not dispute this determination.
As a result, as to claims 1–10, we continue our analysis under Step
2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance to determine whether the claims (1) recite a
judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter
within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above); and (2) are patent-
eligible.
Step 2A, Prong 1
At a high level, representative claim 1 recites a method of generating
a prediction of an outcome by operating on data (see claim 1), and
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specifically, credit worthiness based on references (i.e., data) for a prospect
(i.e., credit applicant) (see Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 2, 4–9).
The Examiner determines, and we agree, that “claim 1 is directed to a
process” that is a “series of steps instructing how to predict an outcome
which is considered to be an abstract idea inasmuch as such activity is a
method of organizing human activities” (Final Act. 3). Appellant does not
dispute this determination.
According to Appellant, “the industry relevant to the current claims is
the lending industry” (Appeal Br. 4). This is in agreement with Appellant’s
disclosure that the invention relates to a method for predicting outcomes
useful for making decisions on credit applications of consumers (Spec. ¶¶ 2,
4, 9).
We determine that the limitations of claim 1 are focused on, and
generally relate to commercial activities, i.e., the prediction of
creditworthiness and/or business relations between people (e.g., determining
credit worthiness for credit applicants) (see generally Spec. ¶¶ 2, 4–9;
Abstract). As such, the claimed invention recites certain methods of
organizing human activity, which is an abstract idea. See, e.g., Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“analyzing information by steps people [can] go through in their minds, or
by mathematical algorithms, without more [are] mental processes within
the abstract-idea category.”); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (process of organizing
information through mathematical correlations found ineligible); Digitech
Information Systems, Inc. v. BMW Auto Leasing, LLC, 504 F. App’x 920
(mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rendering a decision based on data and
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mathematical formulas and finding process of operating on information
using mathematical formulas/correlations patent ineligible); Clarilogic v.
Formfree Holdings, 681 Fed. App’x. 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial data/assessment is an abstract
idea that is patent ineligible).
Because we conclude, and Appellant does not contest, claim 1 recites
an abstract idea, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to
determine whether claim 1 is “directed to” the judicial exception, by
determining whether additional elements of the claim integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application. Such additional elements may reflect an
improvement to a technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception.
The claimed invention receives, processes, and generates data – this is
merely conventional data gathering and analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g);
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
As such, based on the record before us, we determine that the claimed
invention is not integrated into a practical application. And, we note our
agreement with the Examiner that:
the recited “processor” and “network graph engine” are recited
at a high level of generality to simply perform the computer
functions of receiving, processing, calculating, storing,
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transmitting information and displaying data (i.e., That is, the
computer processor is provided to process certain instructions or
data; input from the user is received to provide an indication of a
first consideration to be applied in the process and to indicate an
expression of interest by the user in certain types of the
descriptive material; a particular display of information is
presented based upon the first consideration and the indication
of expressed interest received; and a provision is made to allow
the user to complete an instance or session of the process). Thus,
taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to
significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception
(the abstract idea). And looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination of elements add nothing that is not already present
when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no
indication that the combination of the elements improves the
functioning of a computer or improves any other technology.
Their collective functions merely provide conventional computer
implementation.

(Ans. 3–4).
Merely adding a programmed computer to perform generic computer
functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general purpose computer to
apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular
machine. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716–17; In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation
of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp.
IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
decisions).
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For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
(and claims 2–10 grouped therewith) invokes generic computer components
merely as a tool in which the computer instructions apply the judicial
exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application. Because Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea under Step 2A, and claim
1 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea of a method of
organizing human activity) that is not integrated into a practical application,
in accordance with the Guidance, we conclude claim 1 and claims 2–10
grouped therewith are directed to an abstract idea under Step 2A, and the
eligibility analysis with regard to claims 1–10 proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 1 and claims 2–10 grouped therewith are
directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application,
we now evaluate whether the additional elements add a specific limitation
that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, or
simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract
idea. See generally Guidance.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “a computer based
processing system,” “a network graph engine,” and “a prediction engine”
(claim 1; see also Final Act. 4; Ans. 3 (similar findings of Examiner)).
Considering claim 1 as a whole, none of the additional elements applies or
uses the abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
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Appellant has not shown claim 1 recites additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, either by way of
evidence or argument. In particular, Appellant has not shown the additional
elements (e.g., a computer-based processing system, the network graph
engine recited in limitation A, and/or the prediction engine recited in
limitation B), alone or in some combination, integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application.
In the instant case on appeal, the additional elements recited in claim
1 (“a computer based processing system,” “a network graph engine,” and “a
prediction engine”) do not “contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor do the
additional elements “include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim]
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’”
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Instead, claim 1
merely requires a generic computer implementation and fails to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id.
Here, the Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements
beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components used to perform
generic computer functions (Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 4–5) — a determination
that is supported by Appellant’s Figures 18 and 19 and the accompanying
descriptions found in the Specification (see, e.g., Figs. 18, 19; Spec. ¶¶ 198–
210). As stated by Appellant in the Specification, “the system may be
implemented on any suitable computing environment including personal
computing devices, smart-phones, pad computers, and the like” (Spec.
¶ 210). Appellant’s Specification only shows (see Figs. 18, 19) and
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describes (see Spec. ¶¶ 198–210) well-understood, routine, conventional
computer components (e.g., a computer, memory database, and processor or
engine) that are “in a general purpose computing environment” (Spec. ¶ 200)
in a manner that indicates the components and the functions they perform
were well-known in the art. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need
not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see also
USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to
Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision
(Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that describes additional
elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are
sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the
particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation
details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware,
or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to
retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
As a result, we are not persuaded that the operations recited in claim 1
are anything beyond generic computer functions as opposed to an
improvement to a fundamental economic practice and/or method of
organizing human activity. Considering the elements of claim 1 individually
and as an ordered combination, claim 1 does no more than simply instruct
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the practitioner to implement the abstract idea on a generic computer,
processor, and/or mobile device. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315,
1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a
claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render
[a] claim patent eligible.”)
The Examiner concludes, and we agree, that (i) “[t]here are no
improvements to the technical field or the technology, nor are there
improvements to the computer system itself. Consequently the claim [claim
1] is not patent eligible” (Final Act. 4 (emphasis omitted)); and (ii) “[t]here
is no indication that the combination of the elements improves the
functioning of a computer or improves any other technology” (Final Act. 5).
See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355 (finding that use of “conventional
computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and
presenting the desired information” does not add significantly more to the
claimed abstract idea); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells
Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing
that data collection, recognition, and storage is well-known); CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
incidental use of a computer to perform the [claimed process] does not
impose a sufficiently meaningful [limitation] on the claim’s scope.”).
Claim 1 explicitly recites neither (i) improving the efficiency or speed
of the computing system or engines components nor (ii) reducing needed
memory storage space. Instead, claim 1 merely recites computer elements
performing generic computer functions to perform the abstract idea (i.e., a
fundamental economic practice such as business relations and/or commercial
practices like predicting an outcome for a credit applicant), and does not
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“include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 221 (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Thus, the
method of generating an outcome prediction recited in Appellant’s claim 1
does not exhibit the type of activity that distinguishes inventions having
significantly more than the abstract idea from those claims that do no more
than generically link the use of the method to a particular technological
environment, that is, by computers, memories, processors, or engines. Alice,
573 U.S. at 226. Instead, claim 1 merely requires generic computer
implementation and fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. Id.
Appellant does not persuasively argue any specific limitation or
combination thereof is not well-understood, routine, or conventional in the
field. Nor does Appellant persuasively argue the Examiner erred in that
aspect. In particular, Appellant’s attorney arguments that “the examiner has
not provided the requisite findings under Step 2B of the analysis for patent
eligibility” (Appeal Br. 4, 5; Reply Br. 1, 2), are unpersuasive, because they
are not supported by competent evidence. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir.
1977). Indeed, we agree with the Examiner that court decisions exist that
demonstrate the additional elements are in fact well-understood, routine, or
conventional (see Ans. 4, citing Versata Development Group v. SAP
America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Appellant does not
specifically rebut this finding.
Additionally, as noted in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II), the courts have
previously recognized that using computer processors and memories to
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collect data and keep records, perform repetitive calculations, and/or
receive/send data are well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions
when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of
generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II)(i)–(iv)). See also Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (acts of parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data
are abstract ideas); SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1021
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“merely presenting the results of abstract processes of
collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of
such collection and analysis”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One
Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data” is an abstract idea); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(concluding “claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of
data are directed to an abstract idea.”).
Not only has the Examiner cited at least one court decision as noted
above (see supra citing Ans. 4), but the Examiner cited and described a prior
art reference, Bayliss (see Final Act. 5–6, citing Bayliss, Figs. 8,2 10, 14;
Abstract; cols. 1,3 4, 13, 59–60), that demonstrates the additional elements

2 Notably, Figure 8 represents a network graph (see Fig. 8; col. 6, ll. 7–9).
3 Bayliss describes using a computer processing system and method “for
accessing data from one or more sources, processing such data” (col. 1, ll.
19–20), and then using that data to process applications for “consumer
related applications, credit reporting, scoring and/or evaluating; debt
collection; entity identification verification; account establishment, scoring
and monitoring; fraud detection” by predicting an outcome for an
application (col. 1, ll. 50–53). Bayliss shows the use of computer processing
components, like those shown in Figures 18 and 24–26, demonstrating that
Appeal 2019-000560
Application 13/278,072

18

(“computer based processing system,” “network graph engine,” and/or
“prediction engine”), whether taken alone or in some combination thereof,
are in fact well-understood, routine, and conventional. In addition, as noted
previously above, Appellant’s own Specification supports this finding (see
supra citing Figs. 18, 19; Spec. ¶¶ 198–210).
As a result, Appellant’s contentions (Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 1–3)
that the Examiner has failed to make appropriate findings under Step 2B of
the analysis for patent eligibility are unpersuasive, and Appellant has not
persuaded us the Examiner erred with respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B
analysis. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at Step 2B.
CONCLUSION
As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 1–10 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter without significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1–
10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
For all of the reasons above, we hold as follows:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–10 101 Ineligibility 1–10

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

computer engines, modules, processors, and/or servers are well-understood,
routine, and conventional.