Google LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 2, 20222021000250 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2022) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/049,921 02/22/2016 Yoky Matsuoka 094021-0944961 2710 125802 7590 03/02/2022 Google LLC - Nest Labs / Kilpatrick Townsend Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER CHOI, ALICIA M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2117 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com googlepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YOKY MATSUOKA, FRANK E. ASTIER, RANGOLI SHARAN, DAVID SLOO, and ANTHONY M. FADELL ____________ Appeal 2021-000250 Application 15/049,921 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before KARL D. EASTHOM, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Google LLC. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-000250 Application 15/049,921 2 THE INVENTION The disclosed and claimed “invention relates generally to the monitoring and control of HVAC systems and/or for other systems for controlling household utilities, and/or resources,” and more “particularly . . . to systems, methods and related computer program products for facilitating user-friendly installation and/or operation of a monitoring and control device such as a thermostat.” Spec. ¶ 2.2 Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for HVAC control schedule learning, comprising: receiving, over a learning period of time, a population of immediate-control inputs, wherein: each immediate-control input of the population indicates user desire to make an immediate change to a current setpoint temperature being used by a thermostat to control an HVAC system; each immediate-control input of the population is selected from the group consisting of: a user manually interfacing with a user input component of the thermostat; and interaction with a user interface provided via a remote computerized device; upon receipt of each of said immediate-control input: operating, by the thermostat, the HVAC system according to a temperature defined by that immediate-control input until that immediate-control input expires after a first predetermined 2 We refer to the Specification filed Feb. 22, 2016 (“Spec.”); Final Office Action mailed Oct. 17, 2019 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief filed Apr. 9, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed Aug. 7, 2020 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed Oct. 7, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2021-000250 Application 15/049,921 3 time interval during which an additional immediate-control input is not received; and upon the immediate-control input expiring after the first predetermined time interval, performing a setback event in which the thermostat operates the HVAC system at a predetermined lower energy setpoint temperature until such time as a next immediate-control input is received, thereby producing a population of setback events over the learning period; and after the learning period of time, generating a learned HVAC schedule based on the population of immediate-control inputs and the population of the setback events. Appeal Br. 12 (Claims App.). REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Chapman, Jr. et al. (“Chapman”) US 2006/0208099 A1 Sept. 21, 2006 Szabados US 2008/0183337 A1 July 31, 2008 Harter US 2008/0191045 A1 Aug. 14, 2008 Amundson et al. (“Amundson”) US 2010/0131112 A1 May 27, 2010 Steinberg et al. (“Steinberg”) US 2010/0318227 A1 Dec. 16, 2010 Alexander et al. (“Alexander”) US 2011/0181412 A1 July 28, 2011 Craig et al. (“Craig”) US 2011/0202193 A1 Aug. 18, 2011 REJECTIONS Claims 1-3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Harter, Chapman, Alexander, and Craig. Final Act. 4-16. Claims 4, 5, 14, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Harter, Chapman, Alexander, Craig, and Szabados. Final Act. 17-19. Appeal 2021-000250 Application 15/049,921 4 Claims 8, 9, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Harter, Chapman, Alexander, Craig, and Amundson. Final Act. 19-22. Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Harter, Chapman, Alexander, Craig, and Steinberg. Final Act. 22-23. ANALYSIS Claim 1 recites (emphasis added) “after the learning period of time, generating a learned HVAC schedule based on the population of immediate- control inputs and the population of the setback events.” The Examiner finds that Chapman’s intelligent thermostat setting the HVAC system to a vacation setting to reduce energy consumption teaches performing a setback event for the HVAC system as claimed. Final Act. 7 (citing Chapman ¶¶ 46, 50, Fig. 5). The Examiner relies on Craig’s establishing and managing a schedule to teach generating a learned HVAC scheduled based on inputs after a period of time. Final Act. 10 (citing Craig ¶¶ 5, 23); see also Ans. 10. Appellant argues that Craig does not teach “creating a temperature- based HVAC schedule, let alone a schedule that incorporates setback events that occurred during a learning process.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues that Craig teaches “a schedule of when particular electrical loads are active or not” rather than “an HVAC setpoint schedule.” Id.; see also Reply Br. 3- 4. We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument as the Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence or provided sufficient explanation as to how Appeal 2021-000250 Application 15/049,921 5 Craig teaches generating a learned HVAC schedule based on the inputs and setback events after the learning period of time as claimed. Craig explains that the “scheduling sub-module may be configured to manage a schedule associated with at least one of the loads,” and the “schedule may be indicative of time periods of energization and deactivation of the one or more circuits and/or the one or more of the loads.” Craig ¶ 23. Craig also explains that a “schedule may be statically or dynamically established, and may be based at least in part on one or more of preset time periods, occupancy sensors, daylight sensors, computed dusk/dawn time, holiday schedules, and/or any other timing indicator.” Id. In other words, the sections of Craig cited by the Examiner and on the record before us do not teach generating a learned HVAC schedule. Instead, Craig teaches managing a dynamically established schedule that indicates periods of load energization. For example, Craig teaches that, based on occupancy sensors, a schedule indicating periods of load energization is established. Although Craig teaches maintaining a schedule that is established to identify when loads are deactivated, Craig does not teach any learning, and Craig does not teach learning a schedule or generating a learned schedule. Therefore, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s finding that Craig teaches the disputed limitations is in error because it is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (The Examiner’s burden of proving non-patentability is by a preponderance of the evidence.); see also In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) (“The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not, because it may doubt that the Appeal 2021-000250 Application 15/049,921 6 invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis.”). Because we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by Appellant regarding claim 1, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments. Accordingly, we are constrained on the record before us to reverse the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of independent claim 1, as well as independent claims 10 and 20, reciting limitations commensurate with the disputed limitation in claim 1, and dependent claims 2-9 and 11-19. CONCLUSION We reverse the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of claims 1-20. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20 103 Harter, Chapman, Alexander, Craig 1-3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20 4, 5, 14, 15 103 Harter, Chapman, Alexander, Craig, Szabados 4, 5, 14, 15 8, 9, 18, 19 103 Harter, Chapman, Alexander, Craig, Amundson 8, 9, 18, 19 12 103 Harter, Chapman, Alexander, Craig, Steinberg 12 Overall Outcome 1-20 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation