2020005810 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2021)

Google LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 20, 2021

2020005810 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/941,726 03/30/2018 Shijing Xian GOOGLE 3.0F-3174 CON 8078 78792 7590 12/20/2021 GOOGLE Lerner, David, Littenberg, Krumholz & Mentlik, LLP 20 Commerce Drive Cranford, NJ 07016 EXAMINER HTUN, SAN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2643 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/20/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): eOfficeAction@lernerdavid.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SHIJING XIAN, HUISHENG WANG, and YANG LU Appeal 2020-005810 Application 15/941,726 Technology Center 2600 Before JASON J. CHUNG, BETH Z. SHAW, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 7–10, and 12–20. Claims 6 and 11 are pending but objected to as being allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Final Act. 2, 30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Google LLC. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-005810 Application 15/941,726 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to cross-device security scheme for tethered devices. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter, with disputed limitations italicized: 1. An audio device comprising: a communication interface configured for communication with a master computing device; at least one audio output component; at least one processor disposed in the audio device; and program instructions stored on a non-transitory computer-readable medium and executable by the at least one processor to: determine that the master computing device is in an unlocked state, and responsively disabling an audio device lock process so as to keep the audio device in an unlocked state so long as the master computing device is unlocked; while the master computing device is in a locked state and the audio device is also in a locked state, receive first input via the audio device, wherein the first input corresponds to an audio device unlock process; and responsive to receipt of the first input via the audio device, implementing the audio device unlock process, wherein the audio device unlock process unlocks the audio device independently from the master computing device. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Delalat US 2006/0128305 Al June 15, 2006 Reuss US 2009/0281809 Al Nov. 12, 2009 Hicks et al. US 2014/0253461 Al Sept. 11, 2014 Hong US 2015/0022438 Al Jan. 22, 2015 Choi et al. US 2017/0012994 Al Jan. 12, 2017 Appeal 2020-005810 Application 15/941,726 3 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 3, 7, and 12–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hicks, Hong, Choi, and Delalat. Final Act. 4. Claims 2, 4, 5, 8–10, and 15–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hicks, Hong, Choi, and Delalat, and Reuss. Final Act. 18. OPINION Claim 1 requires “determin[ing] that the master computing device is in an unlocked state, and responsively disabling an audio device lock process so as to keep the audio device in an unlocked state so long as the master computing device is unlocked.” The Examiner relies on Hicks, and in particular, Figure 1e and Figure 5 of Hicks to teach this element. Final Act. 5; Ans. 6–7. However, we agree with Appellant that in Hicks, the stylus locks the electronic touch sensitive device in response to determining the electronic touch sensitive device is unlocked. See Hicks, Fig. 5. Although Figure 1e of Hicks illustrates the ability to lock or unlock the stylus device, we do not see, on this record, where this is done “so as to keep the [] device in an unlocked state so long as the master computing device is unlocked,” as required by claim 1. We also agree with Appellant that on this record, the cited portion of Hong fails to teach that in response to determining the watch type mobile terminal 100 is unlocked, an audio device disables a lock process to keep the audio device in an unlocked state so long as the watch type mobile terminal 100 is unlocked. See Hong Figures 5a–5b; ¶¶ 89–90. On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the cited portion of Choi teaches that its wearable device 405 disables a lock process to keep the Appeal 2020-005810 Application 15/941,726 4 wearable device 405 in an unlocked state so long as the electronic device is unlocked. See Choi, Fig. 10. Similarly, on this record, the Examiner has not explained sufficiently how the cited portions of Delalat teach the disputed limitations. See Delalat ¶¶ 70, 82, 84; Ans. 6–8. We fail to see—nor has the Examiner shown—how the cited portions of Delalat teach responsively disabling an audio device lock process so as to keep the audio device in an unlocked state so long as the master computing device is unlocked. Therefore, on this record, we agree with Appellant that the cited portions of Hicks, Hong, Choi, and Delalat do not teach the disputed limitations of claim 1, i.e., “determin[ing] that the master computing device is in an unlocked state, and responsively disabling an audio device lock process so as to keep the audio device in an unlocked state so long as the master computing device is unlocked.” Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and for the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 3, 7, 12–14. We also do not sustain the rejections of claims 2, 4, 5, 8– 10, and 15–20, because the Examiner does not find that Reuss cures the above-noted deficiencies. CONCLUSION The rejections are reversed. Appeal 2020-005810 Application 15/941,726 5 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3, 7, 12– 14 103 Hicks, Hong, Choi, Delalat 1, 3, 7, 12– 14 2, 4, 5, 8– 10, 15–20 103 Hicks, Hong, Choi, Delalat, Reuss 2, 4, 5, 8– 10, 15–20 Overall Outcome 1–5, 7–10, 12–20 REVERSED