GOOGLE LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 8, 2021

2021005042 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/990,741 05/28/2018 Hui Xu 0058-771002 7192
79318 7590 10/08/2021
BRAKE HUGHES BELLERMANN LLP
P.O. Box 1077
Middletown, MD 21769
EXAMINER
HUYNH, THU V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2177
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/08/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brakehughes.com
uspto@brakehughes.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_____________

Ex parte HUI XU, RUPESH KAPOOR, HAO FANG,
CRISTIAN TAPUS, and ERIK ARJAN HENDRIKS
_____________

Appeal 2021-005042
Application 15/990,741
Technology Center 2100
______________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOYCE CRAIG, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–17.2 See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies Google LLC as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 1.
2 Claims 18–20 were cancelled. In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew the
§ 112 rejection of claims 1–8, the § 103 rejection of claims 18–20, and
double patenting rejections of claims 1–20. Ans. 12.
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Application 15/990,741

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a batch-optimized render and fetch
architecture for rendering web pages. Spec. ¶¶ 2–3. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer system comprising:
at least one processor; and
a batch rendering engine configured to, without user input:
receive a request to render a web page from a requesting
process,
initialize a virtual clock for rendering the web page,
generate a task list with at least two tasks for rendering the web
page, wherein each task in the task list has an associated start time,
add a stop task to the task list, the stop task having a start time
set to a predetermined time,
perform the tasks in the task list according to the virtual clock
for the web page, wherein the virtual clock for the web page advances
independently of real time by being set to a time represented by a
next-occurring task in a task list for the web page, the virtual clock
remaining unchanged while a pending task in the task list has a run
time matching the virtual clock,
generate a rendering result for the web page when the virtual
clock matches a start time for the stop task in the task list, and
provide the rendering result to the requesting process.
Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App.).
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Application 15/990,741

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Logan et al. (“Logan”) US 5,761,683 June 2, 1998
Kuehr-McLaren US 6,978,298 B1 Dec. 20, 2005
Banguero et al. (“Banguero”) US 2011/0202924 A1 Aug. 18, 2011
Canton US 2012/0036450 A1 Feb. 9, 2012
Kapoor et al. (“Kapoor”) US 8,346,755 B1 Jan. 1, 2013
Xu et al. (“Xu”) US 9,984,130 B2 May 29, 2018
Lepeska US 10,375,192 B1 Aug. 6, 2019
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–11, 13, and 15–17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Lepeska and Banguero. Final Act. 4–10.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lepeska, Banguero, and Kuehr-McLaren. Final Act. 10.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lepeska, Banguero, and Canton. Final Act. 10–11.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections (Final Act. 4–11) in light
of Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 6–20) that the Examiner has erred, as
well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal
Brief (Ans. 11–19) and Appellant’s reply in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–6).
With regard to the Examiner’s obviousness rejection based on
Lepeska and Banguero, we agree with Appellant’s contentions (Appeal Br.
10–15; Reply Br. 2–4) that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–11, 13,
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Application 15/990,741

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and 15–17 because the Examiner has not shown sufficiently that Lepeska
and Banguero teach or suggest all of the recited elements.
Based on our review of the record, we agree with Appellant that the
Examiner erred in finding that Lepeska and Banguero teach “a virtual
clock,” as recited in independent claim 1 and similarly recited in
independent claim 9. See Appeal Br. 10–15; Reply Br. 2–4. The Examiner
has not sufficiently identified where Lepeska teaches “a virtual clock,” let
alone a virtual clock that “advances independently of real time by being set
to a time represented by a next-occurring task in a task list” and remains
“unchanged while a pending task in the task list has a run time matching the
virtual clock,” as further recited in claim 1.
The Examiner relies on Figure 4A of Lepeska as teaching “initializing
a virtual clock.” Final Act. 4. Figure 4A, however, is at best a record of the
timing of events (i.e., a timeline as labeled). See Appeal Br. 11; Lepeska,
Fig. 4A, col. 13:42–59. The Examiner has not identified where Lepeska
describes the timeline of Figure 4A as related to initializing a virtual clock or
to the use of a virtual clock. Nor has the Examiner explained how the cited
portions of Lepeska would suggest a virtual clock to an artisan of ordinary
skill.
The Examiner further relies on Lepeska’s teaching of fetching each of
the objects accordance to a scheduling timeline as teaching the limitation
perform the tasks in the task list according to the virtual clock for
the web page, wherein the virtual dock for the web page advances
independently of real time by being set to a time represented by
a next-occurring task in a task list for the web page, the virtual
clock remaining unchanged while a pending task in the task list
has a run lime matching the virtual clock.
Final Act. 4 (citing Lepeska Fig 4A and cols. 4:5–24, 27:50–56).
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Application 15/990,741

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We agree with Appellant that the timeline of Lepeska’s Figure 4A
teaches a timeline that may be analyzed and accelerated in accordance with
embodiments of Lepeska’s claimed invention, but does not teach a task list
that is performed according to a virtual clock for the web page. See Reply
Br. 2–3; Lepeska col. 13:42–45. Moreover, the Examiner has not explained
sufficiently how the cited portions of Lepeska columns 4 and 27, which are
directed to scheduling the downloading of resources on a particular network
connection, teach or suggest the initialization or use of a virtual clock, much
less a virtual clock that advances independently of real time by being set to a
time represented by a next-occurring task in a task list for the web page and
remains unchanged while a pending task in the task list has a run time
matching the virtual clock, as claim 1 requires.
For these reasons, on the record before us, we are persuaded that the
Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Lepeska and Banguero
teaches or suggests the disputed “virtual clock” limitations of claims 1 and 9.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claims 1 and 9, as well as dependent claims 2–8, 10, 11, 13, and
15–17.
With regard to the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of dependent
claims 12 and 14, the Examiner has not shown that either Kuehr–McLaren
(claim 12) or Canton (claim 14) teaches the “virtual clock” limitations
missing from Lepeska and Banguero. Accordingly, on the record before us,
we reverse the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of claims 12 and 14.
Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments
advanced by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other
contentions. See Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir.
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Application 15/990,741

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1984) (finding an administrative agency is at liberty to reach a decision
based on “a single dispositive issue”).
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–17.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11, 13,
15–17
103 Lepeska, Banguero 1–11, 13,
15–17
12 103 Lepeska, Banguero,
Kuehr-McLaren
12
14 103 Lepeska, Banguero,
Canton
14
Overall
Outcome
1–17

REVERSED