Google Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 11, 2021

2019006300 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/585,272 12/30/2014 Jeffery Theodore Lee 030120-201010US 7205
16621 7590 02/11/2021
Butzel Long / 030120
1909 K St.
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20006
EXAMINER
GILES, EBONI N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/11/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@butzel.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JEFFERY THEODORE LEE,
SOPHIE LE GUEN, and JEFFREY ALAN BOYD
____________________

Appeal 2019-006300
Application 14/585,272
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 seeks review of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–31. Although Appellant appeals from a
non-final rejection, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 6 and 134

1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original
Specification, filed December 30, 2014; “Non-Final Act.” for the Office
Action from which this appeal is taken, which was mailed February 8, 2019;
“Appeal Br.” for Appellant’s Appeal Brief, filed April 18, 2019; “Ans.” for
Examiner’s Answer, mailed August 1, 2019; and “Reply Br.” for
Appellant’s Reply Brief, filed August 28, 2019.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
Google LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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because the claims have been twice presented and rejected. See Ex parte
Lemoine, 46 USPQ2d 1420, 1423 (BPAI 1994) (precedential).
We AFFIRM IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to a
home security system. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative
of the claimed subject matter:
1. A security system comprising:
a sensor to detect a location of at least one user, and
generate detection data according to the detected location of the
at least one user;
a processor communicatively coupled to the sensor to
receive the detection data, to determine whether the at least one
user is occupying a building according to the detection data, to
store allowance data that sets one or more preferences for the at
least one user, to determine whether the user is entering or
exiting the building as expected based on user history data, the
allowance data, and the detection data, and to adjust a time
period included in the allowance data so as to provide
additional time for the at least one user to enter or exit the
building based on the determination of whether the user is
entering or exiting the building as expected and based on the
detection data from the sensor; and
an alarm device, communicatively coupled to at least the
processor, that is armed or disarmed by the processor according
to the allowance data and the determination as to whether the at
least one user is occupying the building.
Appeal Br. 12 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 1, 4, 7, 11–18, 23, and 26–31 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Knasel (US 2012/0019353 A1, published
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January 26, 2012) and Caler (US 2010/0045461 A1, published February 25,
2010). Non-Final Act. 3–10.
R2. Claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8–10, 19–22, 24, and 25 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Knasel, Caler, and Poder
(US 2014/0266699 A1, published September 18, 2014). Non-Final Act. 10–
15.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Obviousness Rejection R1 of Claims 1, 4, 7, 11–18, 23, and 26–31
The Examiner rejected independent claims 1 and 18 and dependent
claims 4, 7, 11–17, 23, and 26–31 as obvious over Knasel and Caler. Non-
Final Act. 3–10. Appellant argues these claims as a group (see Appeal Br.
4–7) and presents additional arguments directed to dependent claims 11 and
26 (as a group) (see id. at 7, 9–10). Accordingly, we limit our discussion to
independent claim 1 and dependent claim 11, consistent with the provisions
of 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Independent claim 18 and dependent claims
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4, 7, 12–17, 23, and 27–31 stand or fall with claim 1; dependent claim 26
stands or falls with claim 11.
Claim 1
Claim 1 recites: “determin[ing] whether the user is entering or exiting
the building as expected based on user history data, the allowance data, and
the detection data.” Appeal Br. 12 (Claims App.) (referred to herein as “the
determination limitation”). The claim further recites: “adjust[ing] a time
period included in the allowance data so as to provide additional time for
the at least one user to enter or exit the building based on the determination
of whether the user is entering or exiting the building as expected and based
on the detection data from the sensor.” Id. (emphasis added) (referred to
herein as the “disputed limitation”).
The Examiner found that Knasel teaches most limitations of claim 1,
including the claimed “allowance data” and the determination limitation.
Non-Final Act. 4–5. In particular, the Examiner found that Knasel describes
a security system with a learning algorithm that dynamically adjusts
parameters and/or a user profile (the claimed “allowance data”) based on an
analysis of historical monitoring data, expected activity, and sensed data. Id.
(citing Knasel, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 17, 37, 59–60); see Ans. 3–4 (reiterating findings;
further citing Knasel ¶ 29). But the Examiner found that Knasel’s
“algorithm does not adjust a time period in the allowance data to provide
additional time for a user to enter or exit a building.” Non-Final Act. 6. The
Examiner relied upon Caler for these claimed aspects, explaining that:
Knasel’s learning algorithm collects data dynamically to
modify a user profile, e.g. allowance data, based on historical
data, expected activity and sensed data[;] however, the
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algorithm does not adjust a time period in the allowance data to
provide additional time for a user to enter or exit a building.
Caler teaches programming time periods for entry and exit
delays into the security system and when activity patterns
change, these time periods may be reprogrammed based on the
learned movements of users, time of day, day of week and
security zones. The system may automatically reprogram times
when the security system is in an armed state, a disarmed state
or times in which entry and exit delays are used based upon the
determined activity patterns.
Non-Final Act. 6 (citing Caler ¶¶ 6–8, 45).
Appellant argues that this rejection is in error. Appeal Br. 4–7. First,
Appellant contends that Knasel does not teach or suggest the disputed
limitation because the Examiner acknowledges that Knasel fails to disclose
all aspects of it. Id. at 5. Next, Appellant argues that Caler fails to teach or
suggest the disputed limitation. Id. at 5–7. Appellant quotes from Caler’s
disclosure and asserts:
Caler merely discloses adjusting when entry or exit delay
times are used, and does not disclose or suggest adjusting a
time period in the allowance data for a user to enter or exit a
building based on whether the entry or exit is as expected, and
based on data being obtained from the sensor during the entry
or exit.
Id. at 6 (discussing Caler ¶ 7). Appellant further states:
Caler determines activity patterns and reprograms when entry
and exit delays are used based on the determined activity
patterns, but Caler does not disclose or suggest determining
when a user is not leaving as expected (i.e., based on a
determination of whether the user is entering or exiting the
building as expected and based on detection data from a
sensor), and adjusting the exit allowance rather than have a user
rush or unintentionally set off an alarm.
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Id. (discussing Caler ¶ 45). Appellant also includes quotes from Caler’s
disclosure (see id. at 5–7), but Appellant does not further explain its
argument.
We are not persuaded of error. First, several of Appellant’s
arguments fail to respond to the rejection as articulated. In particular,
Appellant argues the references individually—asserting that neither
reference teaches or suggest all aspects of the determining limitation (see,
e.g., Appeal Br. 5–6)—but this does not address the rejection as articulated,
which relied on certain combined teachings of the references (see Non-Final
Act. 3–7). Also, Appellant contends that Caler fails to teach or suggest the
determining limitation (see Appeal Br. 6), but the Examiner relied on Knasel
(not Caler) to teach this limitation (Non-Final Act. 4–5). Because these
arguments fail to address the rejection as articulated, they do not persuade us
of error on the part of the Examiner. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091,
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking
references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references.”) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981) (“[T]he test [for obviousness] is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”)); see
also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (If an examiner
presents a prima facie case, “the burden of coming forward with evidence or
argument shifts to the applicant.”).
Second, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in relying on
Caler to teach or suggest “adjust[ing] a time period included in the
allowance data so as to provide additional time for the at least one user to
enter or exit the building.” See Appeal Br. 6; Non-Final Act. 6. Caler
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specifically contemplates adjusting “entry and exit delay times” based on
users’ activity patterns. Caler explains:
In conventional security systems, time periods in which
the security system is turned on (armed) or turned off
(disarmed) may be programmed by a user, system administrator
or manufacturer. Time periods for the entry and exit delays or
dialer delays may also be programmed into the system. As
activity patterns of users changes [sic], these preprogrammed
times may cause an increase in false alarms.
The present invention reduces false alarms in a security
system by monitoring activity within a premises over time and
learning the typical movements of users and the associated time
of day, day of week, and security zones of such movements.
Such activity monitoring allows for natural adjustments to, for
example, arming and disarming times, entry and exit delay
times, dialer delay times or other processing times that are fixed
(programmable) in many conventional security systems.
Caler ¶¶ 6–7 (emphases added). Appellant asserts that this “merely
discloses adjusting when entry or exit delay times are used,” but Appellant
does not explain the basis for this conclusion. Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis
omitted and added). In the passage quoted above, Caler describes
adjustment of “entry and exit delay times” based on monitored activity
patterns (Caler ¶ 7), which at least suggests adjusting the time period of
these delays (see id. ¶ 4 (describing “entry or exit delay” as “some time
period . . . to allow the user to enter a passcode or other identification to
thereby abort an alarm signal”)).
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
adjusting when entry or exit delay times are used fails to teach or suggest
“adjust[ing] a time period included in the allowance data.” See Appeal
Br. 6–7 (citing Caler ¶ 46). Appellant’s Specification provides examples of
time periods that may be included in the allowance data:
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The allowance data may include, for example, . . . times
(e.g., times allotted to exit before arming the alarm device 76,
times of day to allow entry and/or exit, etc.), . . . to allow exit
from the home, building, and/or predetermined area (e.g.,
without activation of the alarm device 76).
Spec. ¶ 100 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the broadest reasonable
interpretation3 of “a time period included in the allowance data” includes
both a duration of time (e.g., five minutes) as well as a time range (e.g., 6:30
a.m. to 7:00 a.m.). As a result, we are not also persuaded by Appellant’s
argument that Caler’s adjustment of “when entry and exit delays are used
based on the determined activity patterns” fails to teach or suggest
“adjust[ing] a time period included in the allowance data,” as required by
claim 1. Appeal Br. 6; see Caler ¶ 45 (expressly teaching that the system
may adjust “times in which entry and exit delays . . . are used based upon the
determined activity patterns”).
Finally, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Caler is
deficient because it fails to “adjust[] the exit allowance rather than have a
user rush or unintentionally set off an alarm” (Appeal Br. 6)—this argument
is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. In particular, claim 1 does
not require an “exit allowance,” but more generally recites “a time period
included in the allowance data.” Also, the claim does not require the time

3 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using
“the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as
they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into
account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may
be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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period to be extended until the user leaves the building, as Appellant
suggests.4
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we
find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1, and grouped claims 4, 7, 12–18, 23, and 27–31, which
fall therewith.
Claim 11
Claim 11 depends from claim 1 and further recites: “the processor
configures the allowance data to allow the at least one user to exit though
one or more preset doors without activating the alarm device.” Appeal
Br. 14 (Claims App.). The Examiner found that Knasel teaches this
limitation because Knasel states that “a particular sequence of detected
activity [can] result[] in automatic deactivation of the monitoring system.”
Non-Final Act. 7–8 (citing Knasel ¶ 48).
On this record, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
cited portion of Knasel fails to teach or suggest the limitations of dependent
claim 11. See Appeal Br. 9–10. Knasel contemplates taking action based on

4 Although the Specification describes an embodiment where a time period
is extended until the user leaves (e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 19, 79), Appellant identifies
(and we perceive) no limitation in claim 1 that is properly construed to
include this particular requirement. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification often
describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly
warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).
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“a particular sequence of detected activity.” Knasel ¶ 48. However, the
Examiner has not adequately explained how this teaches or suggests
allowing a “user to exit through one or more preset doors without activating
the alarm device,” as the claim specifically requires. See Non-Final Act. 7–
8; Ans. 11–12.5
Therefore, on this record, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
reliance on Knasel to teach or suggest the additionally recited limitation of
claim 11, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claim 11. Dependent claim 26 (which was argued therewith)
recites a commensurate limitation. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 26.
Obviousness Rejection R2 of Claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8–10, 19–22, 24, and 25
The Examiner rejected dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8–10, 19–22, 24,
and 25 as obvious over Knasel, Caler, and Poder. Non-Final Act. 3–10.
For these claims, Appellant relies on the arguments made with respect
to independent claims 1 and 18 (Appeal Br. 7–8); however, as explained
above, we are not persuaded by those arguments.
In addition, Appellant presents arguments directed to claims 5 and 21
(as a group) and claims 6 and 22 (as a group). Appeal Br. 8–9. We begin
our discussion of these claims with dependent claim 5.

5 In the Answer, the Examiner responds to Appellant’s argument by
pointing to Poder (Ans. 11–12 (citing Poder ¶¶ 39, 57, 70)); however, claim
11 was rejected as obvious over Knasel and Caler, not over the combination
of these references with Poder (see Non-Final Act. 3, 7–8). Accordingly, the
findings in the Answer do not support the rejection. But, in the event of
further prosecution, the Examiner may consider entering a new rejection of
claim 11 as obvious over Knasel, Caler, and Poder.
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Claim 5 depends from claim 1 and recites: “the processor determines
whether a respective door or window is opened from inside the building.”
Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.). The Examiner found Poder teaches this claim
limitation because Poder describes sensors that detect whether a door (or a
window) is open or closed. Non-Final Act. 12 (citing Poder ¶ 30). In
response to Appellant’s argument that this fails to disclose “determin[ing]
whether a respective door or window is opened from inside the building”
(Appeal Br. 8 (alteration in original)), the Examiner instead relied on
paragraph 70 of Poder (Ans. 10).
On this record, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
cited portions of Poder do not teach or suggest the identified claim
limitation. See Appeal Br. 8; Reply Br. 8. In particular, Poder teaches that
its system determines that “[a] user has left the house” based on sensor data
received from the front door and the entry hallway. Poder ¶ 70. Although
Poder determines that the front door was opened and a user left, the
Examiner does not explain (and we do not perceive) why this teaches or
suggests a determination that the front door was opened from inside.6 The
record provides no reason for Poder to make such a determination: Poder
determines whether a user has left so that first responders responding to a
fire alarm can be better informed (Poder ¶ 70), and the Examiner does not
explain why it would be obvious to also determine how the front door was
opened.

6 It would certainly be more common for a user to leave by opening the
front door from inside, but this fails to show that the processor determines
that the door was opened from inside.
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Therefore, on this record, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
reliance on Poder to teach or suggest the additionally recited limitation of
claim 5, and so we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claim 5. Dependent claim 21 (which was argued therewith)
recites a commensurate limitation. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 21.
Finally, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 6 and 22,
as these claims depend from dependent claims 5 and 21, respectively.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 7, 11–
18, 23, 26–31
103 Knasel, Caler 1, 4, 7, 12–
18, 23, 27–31
11, 26
2, 3, 5, 6, 8–
10, 19–22,
24, 25
103 Knasel, Caler,
Poder
2, 3, 8–10,
19–20, 24, 25
5, 6, 21,
22
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 7–10,
12–20, 23–
25, 27–31
5, 6, 11,
21, 22, 26
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART