Goodman Lumber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 29, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 304 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Goodman Lumber Company and Local 12 , Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case
20-CA-3889
June 29, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
MEMBERS FANNING , JENKINS , AND ZAGORIA
On October 4, 1966, Trial Examiner Stanley Gil-
bert issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion . The Trial Examiner further found that the
Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended that the complaint be dismissed with
respect to those allegations. Thereafter, both the
Respondent and the General Counsel filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and support-
ing-briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in this case, and adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner, as modified herein.
1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent
did not constructively discharge Freeman Parker,
Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
We do not agree with this finding.
Freeman Parker, Jr.,' was one of the six em-
ployees whose cards were shown to Gelleri,
Respondent's general manager, on December 1,
1965, and on the same date he was unlawfully inter-
rogated by Gelleri as to his union membership.
Sometime later in December, Edward Goodman,
Respondent's president, asked him if he signed a
union card. Goodman, when told that he had, asked
whether he planned to get out of the Union. After
Parker, Junior, answered that he did not know,
Goodman responded, "Well, I think you will."
Freeman Parker, Sr. ,2 also worked for Respond-
ent, and the record shows that officials of Respond-
ent were aware that Parker, Senior, was opposed
to his son's joining the Union. Parker, Senior,
1 Hereinafter referred to as Parker, Junior
testified that Goodman called him in the office and
told him the boy had joined the Union. "He asked
me to get the card back. I told him that he gave the
Union $50.00." Mr. Goodman said, "Well, I'll give
him the $50.00 back if he gets the card back." The
Trial Examiner found the above interrogation of
Parker, Senior, to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1),
and he further found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising an
economic benefit to Parker, Junior, through his
father if he would revoke his union authorization
card.
The foregoing clearly shows that Respondent
was intent on coercing Parker, Junior, into revoking
his union authorization card and that responsible of-
ficials of Respondent ordered Parker, Senior, to
pressure his son into such action. The record also
shows that the Parkers had numerous quarrels over
this issue , making their home life miserable- and
virtually unbearable to Parker, junior's
mother- and that the dissension in the Parker
household measureably increased as the direct
result of Parker, Senior's attempts to carry out his
superior's instructions to obtain his son' s resigna-
tion from the Union. In addition, the record shows
that, prior to the failure of Parker, Junior, to return
to work, during a discussion between Paul Sant, a
supervisor, and Parker, Senior, concerning the
problem arising from the refusal of Parker, Junior,
to quit the Union, Sant admittedly suggested that
Parker, Senior, get his son to resign. Though Sant
testified that he intended to suggest only that
Parker, Senior, obtain his son's resignation from the
Union, the testimony of both Sant and Parker,
Senior, concerning the discussion permits the con-
struction that the resignation referred to was a
resignation from employment with Respondent. It
is clear that Parker, Senior, -so construed the
reference, and that he told his son not to go back to
work because "they don't want you there any-
more." Thereafter, Parker, Junior, did not return to
work, and when Sant asked Parker, Senior, why his
son was not at work, Parker, Senior, told him what
had transpired at home. Sant then told Parker,
Senior, that he had not meant that Parker, Junior,
should resign from work; he did not, however, in-
struct Parker, Senior, to correct the allegedly er-
roneous impression given to the son, nor did he, or
any other official, call Parker, Junior, back to work.
Instead, they continued to exert pressure on both
Parkers in an effort to obtain Parker, Junior's revo-
cation of the authorization card he had given the
Union.
The foregoing establishes beyond any doubt that
Respondent's supervisory oficials instructed
Parker, Senior, to obtain his son 's resignation from
the Union, gave him instructions in this regard
which were construed by Parker, Senior, to the
2 Hereinafter referred to as Parker, Senior
166 NLRB No. 48
GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY
knowledge of Respondent's supervisors, as instruc-
tions to have his son resign his employment, and
ratified Parker, Senior's actions by failing to in-
struct him or his son that they did not intend that
Parker, Junior, should quit his employment.3
We are satisfied that, by the foregoing conduct,
Respondent constituted Parker, Senior, its agent,
and is legally responsible for his statements to his
son relative to the union matter and for the con-
sequences of such statements. As Parker, Junior,
quit his employment as the direct result of intolera-
ble conditions resulting from the unlawful pressures
thus exerted upon him by Respondent in its effort
to coerce and restrain him in the exercise of Section
7 rights, we find that Parker, Junior, was construc-
tively discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.4
2. The Trial Examiner also found that Respond-
ent by its counsel did not unlawfully interrogate
Parker, Senior, a few days before the hearing in this
matter when counsel in the course of their conver-
sation asked him if he had signed a card for the
Union. We do not agree with this finding.
The interrogation of Parker, Senior, about his
union membership was admittedly not relevant to
the Respondent's defense herein. The obvious ef-
fect of this conduct, even if not specifically so in-
tended, was to intimidate the employee before his
testimony was given at the hearing.5 We find such
conduct on Respondent's behalf in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and the entire record in this case, we hereby adopt
the present Conclusions of Law, with the exception
of Conclusions 5 and 9, and substitute the following
as Conclusions of Law 5 and 9:
"5. Respondent did discriminate against its em-
ployee, Parker, Junior, in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by constructively
discharging him because he had joined the Union."
"9. Respondent, by its counsel, interfered with,
restrained, and coerced an employee, Parker,
Senior, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, by interrogating him as to his union member-
ship.
5We note particularly that General Manager Gelleri did not give
Parker, Junior, his last paycheck until Gellen had ascertained that Parker,
Junior , had not resigned from the Union.
4 The fact that the intolerable conditions were created in Parker, Ju-
nior's home life rather than merely in his working conditions , does not, in
all the circumstances of this case , preclude this finding . Parker, Senior,
had no control or supervision over Parker, Junior's work performance;
manifestly, therefore, Respondent , in using Parker , Senior, as an instru-
ment of its coercion in regard to his son's union activities, was seeking to
utilize the lever of parental control and displeasure to gain its ends Hav-
ing interjected itself into the Parkers ' domestic affairs for its unlawful
ends, Respondent cannot hide behind the claim that its unlawful conduct
did not cause Parker , Junior, to quit his employment , simply because
Parker, Junior , appears to have quit , at least in part , because of an un-
THE REMEDY
305
As we have found that the Respondent has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, we shall order it to
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
As we have found that Respondent discrimina-
torily discharged Parker, Junior, we shall order him
reinstated to his former position, if it still exists, or,
if not, to a substantially equivalent position, and
make him whole for any loss of pay he may have
suffered by reason of his discharge to the date on
which he is offered reinstatement, less his net
earnings during such period. His backpay shall be
computed on a quarterly basis in the manner
prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 289, and shall include interest at 6
percent per annum, as provided in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices
committed, we shall order Respondent to cease and
desist from in any manner infringing upon rights
guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Goodman Lumber
Company, San Francisco, California, their officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order, as herein modified:
1. Delete paragraph 2(a) thereof and substitute
therefore the following:
"(a) Offer to Roger Ruiz and Freeman Parker,
Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to the jobs
they held prior to their discriminatory discharges or
to substantially equivalent positions, without preju-
dice to their seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make them whole for any loss of earnings they
may have suffered as a result of Respondent's dis-
crimination against them, as provided in the section
of this Decision entitled `The Remedy."'
derstandable and natural desire to forestall the breakup of his parent's
household because of the unnatural stratus and pressures exerted on it by
Respondent's conduct.
5 Joy Silk Mills v. N L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732, at 743 (C A.D.C.), cert de-
nied 341 U.S. 914, the court stated : The Board has held that "an Em-
ployer is privileged to interview employees for the purpose of discovering
facts within the limits of the issues raised by a complaint , where the em-
ployer , or its counsel, does so for the purpose of preparing its case for trial
and does not go beyond the necessities of such preparation to pry into
matters of union membership , to discuss the nature or extent of union ac-
tivity , to dissuade employees from joining or remaining members of a
union, or otherwise to interfere with the statutory right to self-organiza-
tion "
306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
2. Delete paragraph 2(b) thereof and substitute
therefor the following:
"(b) Notify Roger Ruiz and Freeman Parker,
Jr., if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of their right to full reinstatement,
upon application, in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces."
3. Delete from paragraph 2(e) of the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order the words "to be
furnished" and substitute therefor the words "on
forms provided."
4. The notice shall be amended by deleting the
sixth paragraph thereof and substituting therefor
the following:
WE WILL offer to Roger Ruiz and Freeman
Parker, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to
the jobs they held prior to their discriminatory
discharges, or to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make them
whole for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered as a result of our discrimination
against them.
[The notice shall be amended by deleting the
note and substituting therefor the following:
[WE WILL notify Roger Ruiz and Freeman
Parker, Jr., if presently serving in the Armed
Forces of the United States, of their right to
full reinstatement, upon application, in ac-
cordance with the Selective Service Act and
the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, as amended after discharge from the
Armed Forces.]
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STANLEY GILBERT, Trial Examiner: Based upon a
charge filed on December 15, 1965, and amended on
March 10, 1966, by the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Local 12, hereinafter referred to as the Union,
the complaint herein was issued March 29, 1966. The
complaint, which was amended during the course of the
hearing,' alleges that Goodman Lumber Company,
hereinafter referred to as the Company or Respondent,
1 Paragraph 5 of the complaint was amended to add the names of
Robert Levy, Charles Goodman, and Paul Sant as agents and supervisors
of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Paragraph
9 of-the complaint was amended to add subparagraph (g) alleging unlawful
interrogation of an employee by counsel for the Respondent
2 Respondent amended its answer to admit the allegation in paragraph
5 with respect to Robert Levy and Charles Goodman but it denied the al-
legation with , respect to Paul Sant . However, subsequently, Respondent
stipulated that Paul Sant was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
Respondent further amended its answer to deny the above -mentioned ad-
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Respond-
ent, by its answer as amended during the course of the
hearing,2 denies that it committed the unfair labor prac-
tices alleged in said complaint.
Pursuant to notice, a heanng was held in San Fran-
cisco, California, on June 7 and 9, 1966, before me, the
duly designated Trial Examiner. Briefs were received
from the General Counsel and Respondent within the
time designated therefor.
Upon the entire record ' in this case and upon observa-
tion of the witnesses as they testified, I make the follow-
ing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a California corporation, is engaged in the
business of selling lumber, hardware, and plumbing sup-
plies in San Francisco, California. During the year
preceding the issuance of the compalint, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations,
received gross revenues in excess of $500,000. During
the same period, it purchased and received at its aforesaid
place of business goods and supplies valued in excess of
$50,000, which were shipped directly to it from suppliers
outside the State of California.
As is admitted by Respondent, it is, and at all times
material herein has been, an employer engaged in com-
merce and in operations affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
As is admitted by Respondent , the Union is, and at all
times material herein has been , a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In the early part of the hearing the parties entered into
a settlement agreement with respect to the allegation in
the complaint of a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.4
In view of said settlement agreement, evidence relating to
said allegation was received and considered only as
background information with respect to the remaining is-
sues herein. The settlement agreement provided, inter
alia, that the Respondent bargain collectively with the
Union, upon request, as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit described in para-
graph 6 of the complaint.
Background Information
The record discloses that by December 1, 1965, the
Union had received authorization cards from six em-
ployees in the aforementioned unit of Respondent's em-
dition to paragraph 9 of the complaint
3 General Counsel filed a motion with the Trial Examiner, which was
unopposed , to correct the transcript of the hearing in this proceeding Said
motion is hereby granted and corrections made
4 In view of the settlement agreement , General Counsel requested and
was granted leave to withdraw the allegation in paragraph 16 of the com-
plaint The Trial Examiner granted Respondent's motion to strike para-
graphs 6, 7, 8, and 13 of the complaint, over the opposition of General
Counsel, since said allegations were related to the allegation in said para-
graph 16 which was withdrawn as above noted
GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY
ployees (which apparently constituted a majority of the
employees in said unit). On said date, December 1, 1965,
the Union sent a letter to Respondent advising that it
represented a majority of Respondent's "warehousemen"
and requesting that Respondent recognize and bargain
with it as the collective-bargaining agent for the
warehousemen. On the morning of the same date, George
Pedrin, secretary-treasurer of the Union, called upon
Murray Gelleri, general manager of Respondent, at the
office of Respondent, and gave him a copy of the
aforesaid letter. Gelleri asked for proof of the claim of
majority representation. The six authorization cards were
presented to him. Gelleri looked at the cards and copied
the names of the employees who had signed said cards.5
Gelleri and Pedrin agreed to meet on December 10. At
the meeting on December 10 Pedrin gave Gelleri copies
of the proposed union contract and protested the
discharge of Roger Ruiz as an "unfair discharge,"
requesting that Ruiz be put back on the job and paid for
lost time. A further meeting was scheduled for December
14, 1965. On said date representatives of the Union, Gel-
leri, and Edward Goodman, president of Respondent,
among others, attended. Goodman stated, in effect, that
he would not recognize the Union as the collective-bar-
gaining agent of the employees in the unit in which it
claimed to have a majority and that he had no intention of
engaging in collective bargaining with the Union.
The Issues
The following are the issues in this proceeding:
1. Whether on various dates in December 1965
Respondent unlawfully interrogated employees.
2. Whether Respondent discharged Roger Ruiz in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. Whether Respondent unlawfully promised an em-
ployee monetary benefits if he convinced a fellow em-
ployee to revoke his union authorization card.
4. Whether Respondent threatened an employee with
discharge if he did not revoke his union authorization
card.
5. Whether Respondent constructively discharged
Freeman Parker, Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
6. Whether Respondent threatened an employee with
discharge if he did not convince a fellow employee to
revoke his union authorization card.
7. Whether Respondent discriminatorily laid off
Freeman Parker, Sr., on two occasions.
8. Whether Respondent discriminatorily laid off Carb-
by Burwell on one occasion.
9. Whether Counsel for Respondent unlawfully inter-
rogated Freeman Parker, Sr.
A. The Interrogation (in December)
The record discloses that Respondent did engage in
various acts of interrogation of its employees during the
month of December. Respondent does not contend that
it did not engage in interrogation, but rather its defense
with regard thereto, according to its brief, is that, while it
does not deny any of the testimony of the General Coun-
sel's witnesses as to the interrogation:
307
It is adequately made clear by the record that em-
ployer was under the good faith belief he could inter-
rogate employees concerning their union member-
ship, for the purposes of determining the collective
bargaining position of the Union, a question no
longer an issue in this case.
Julia Myers testified that "a few days after December
1st" Gelleri called her into his office. Her testimony as to
the conversation which ensued is as follows:
Well, he asked me if I had signed a card. First of all,
he asked me if the Goodman benefits had been stated
to me, and I said, "Yes." It was then that he asked
me if I had signed the card, and I said, "What card?"
He said, "The Union card," and I said, "Yes."
Thomas H. Irving testified that he was called into "the
office" by Gelleri on or about December 6 where he held
a conversation with Gelleri and Edward Goodman. His
testimony with respect to their conversation is as follows:
A. Murray [Gelleri] asked me if I knew any of
the benefits of Goodman and I told him I didn't and
Mr. Goodman asked me, or he told me that I should
have known about them, and they explained them to
me, and then Mr. Goodman asked me who hired me,
and I said, "Charles Goodman, your son," and I told
him that he didn't tell me any of the benefits, and
then Mr. Goodman asked me if I was hired part time,
and I told him, "Yes." And then Murray asked me if
I was hired part time, and I told him, "yes." And
then Murray asked me if I had signed a card, and I
said, "Yes."
Then, after explaining Goodman's benefits, he
asked me if it changed my mind any, and I said,
"No."
Q. What card are you referring to?
A. The Union card.
Freeman Parker, Jr., testified to a conversation he had
on December 1 with Gelleri. His testimony with respect
thereto is as follows:
THE WITNESS: I was in the back of the hardware
department working, and Mr. Gelleri asked me to
come down, and he wanted to talk to me. I came
down and he asked me had I joined the Union, had I
signed a card for the Union, and I told him, "Yes,"
and he asked me what they offered me, and I told him
they offered benefits and other things, and he said,
"O.K.," and he left me.
Parker, Junior, also testified to a subsequent conversation
he had with Edward Goodman in December. His
testimony with respect thereto is as follows:
A. I was working and he asked me, he made a
joke and said, "Are you working hard?" I told him,
"Yes," and he told me to come down for a moment,
he wanted to speak with me, and we went down there
in back of the hardware, where his car was parked,
where the parking lot is, and then he asked me had I
joined the Union, and I told him I had.
5 The six employees were Julia Myers, Thomas H. Irving, Carbby Lee
Burwell, Freeman Parker, Jr , Roger F. Ruiz, and Joseph Pohl.
308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
He asked me do I plan on-
TRIAL EXAMINER: If you what?
THE WITNESS: Did I plan on getting out of the
Union, and I told him I didn't know.
Then he said, "Well, I think you will."
I said, "O.K.," and I left.
Roger Ruiz testified to a conversation he had with Gel-
leri on December 1. His testimony with respect thereto
is as follows:
A. On December 1st, as I was leaving warehouse
no. 4, Mr. Gelleri approached me and asked me if I
had signed a union authorization card , and I told hitr
that I had.
Q. Can you recall anything further being said?
A. Yes. At that particular time, he asked me what
sort of deal did the Union offer me, and I told him
there was no such deal.
Then he also asked me as to what kind of pay did
they promise to grant me, and I told him at the time
that he would have to discuss this in negotiations
with the Union.
Gelleri testified, in response to questions by the
General Counsel, that he questioned employee Joseph
Pohl as to whether he had signed a union card. Gelleri's
testimony is as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Orenstein) And you asked him [Pohl]
if he had signed a card?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you ask him if he knew the union benefits,
or the company benefits, excuse me?
A. I did.
All of the above-quoted testimony is uncontradicted
and is credited.
The record does not indicate that the Respondent had
had any doubts as to the authenticity of the authorization
cards which the Union showed Gelleri on December 1,
nor does the Respondent contend that it questioned em-
ployees, whose names were noted by Gelleri when he
saw their cards, in order to determine whether they had,
in fact, signed cards. In the circumstances of this case and
in the context of the unfair labor practices of Respondent
found hereinbelow, it is concluded that the systematic in-
terrogation of all but one of the employees who had
signed cards was reasonably calculated to, land did tend
to, interfere with, coerce, and restrain said employees
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. There is
no merit to the defense that Respondent had a good-faith
belief that it was not unlawful to so interrogate its em-
ployees.
B. The Discharge ofRuiz
Ruiz entered the employ of Respondent as a
warehouseman on July 1, 1965, and was discharged on
December 9, 1965. His starting salary was $105 a week.
In the first week of November 1965, he was transferred
from the hardware warehouse and "put in charge of
warehouse No. 4 and warehouse No. 2" and was given
a raise of $5 a week.6
Although it was stipulated that Ruiz was instrumental
in arranging meetings between union representatives and
fellow employees in the Union's attempt to obtain their
authorization cards, there is no showing, nor is there any
basis for inferring, that Respondent was aware of these
activities on his part. However, he was one of the six em-
ployees whose authorization cards were shown to Gelleri
and he was interrogated with respect thereto by Gelleri
on December 1, as above indicated.
On December 8, Ruiz was told by Charlie Goodman
to turn over the keys to warehouse No. 4 and No. 2 and
to report to the "hardware warehouse." Ruiz testified
that he questioned Gelleri about his transfer to the hard-
ware warehouse. His testimony, which is uncontradicted
and is credited, is as follows:
I asked Mr. Gelleri if this were to be a permanent
change, and he told me not to worry about it, that if
he wanted me to know, he would let me know.
On the following day, at 4:30, Gelleri informed him of
his discharge. Ruiz testified to his conversation with Gel-
leri (at that point) as follows:
A. Yes. Mr. Gelleri said that they were letting me
go. I then asked Mr. Gelleri why and he said because
they were overstaffed in the hardware warehouse
and I questioned this and Mr. Gelleri said the reason
they were letting me go was that I was the last person
to be hired in the hardware warehouse.
I then told Mr. Gelleri that I had not been the last
person hired in the hardware warehouse, and he
stated that that was all right, because I had at one
time given them notice that I was leaving the firm,
and this was the end of the conversation.
Q. Now, who among the-warehouse people was
hired after you?
A. Mr. Tom Irving, for one. There was Mr. Carb-
by Burwell, who was hired after myself. Also, there
was, I think, two parttime people-one that I know
of, for sure, and I don't know the other person.
Q. Do you know his name, Mr. Ruiz?
A. Just by the first name. His name was Terry.
Q. Now, you mentioned something in your
testimony about a two-week notice to quit. Can you
elaborate on that a little bit?
A. Yes. At approximately the end of November
or the early part-latter part of October to the first
part of November, I had been offered a job with the
Forestry Department, with the government Forestry
Department, and I chose to take this position
because I felt at that particular time that it would be
better advancement for myself.
So, I notified Mr. Charlie Goodman that I had in-
tentions to quit to take this other job.
Two days following, I received notice from the
government that the person who offered me this job
did not have the authorization to offer me this par-
ticular job and that supposedly my qualifications did
not qualify for the position, so therefore I returned to
Mr. Charlie Goodman and told him the situation and
asked him if I could remain with the firm, to which he
said it would be quite all right.
6 It was stipulated that he was not a supervisor within the meaning of
the Act.
GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY 309
Gelleri testified with respect to the discharge of Ruiz
and the events leading up to it. His testimony is sum-
marized as follows: that toward the end of October
Charles Goodman told him that Ruiz "had quit"; that he
replaced Ruiz in the hardware warehouse with Freeman
Parker, Jr., who had previously been working part time;
that a day or two later he was informed that Ruiz' govern-
ment job had fallen through; that since he had replaced
Ruiz by Parker, Junior, he put Ruiz in warehouse No. 4
and No. 2 and gave him an "automatic raise" because the
job was more difficult. Gelleri further testified that he
notified Ruiz that he was discharged on December 9; that
he did not give him a reason therefor; that Ruiz asked him
why he was discharged; and that he told Ruiz "that his
work was not of a satisfactory nature and we were not
going to put him back in the hardware department as we
had replaced him ... "
Counsel for Respondent elicited considerable
testimony from Gelleri and- Paul Sant in support of
Respondent's contention that Ruiz was discharged
because his work was unsatisfactory. One of the bases for
this contention was that Ruiz was excessively tardy. His
timecards which were introduced in evidence disclosed
that he did report late a number of times but on most of
the occasions his tardiness amounted to only a few
minutes. His timecards also revealed that on quite a few
occasions he also reported some minutes early. A review
of the cards did not disclose, in the Trial Examiner's
judgment, what reasonably might be considered a record
of excessive tardiness. Gelleri testified that he had
warned Ruiz about his tardiness which Ruiz denied.
However, Gelleri's testimony with regard to the warning
was vague and unconvincing and the Trial Examiner
credits Ruiz' testimony that he was never warned about
tardiness.
The other complaint about his work was that he did not
fill orders properly. According to the testimony of Sant,
on one or more occasions merchandise was returned
because Ruiz had not filled an order properly. Sant's
testimony with regard to these instances was not impres-
sive. Furthermore, Ruiz testified without contradiction,
which testimony is credited, that there were two others
who filled orders, that the drivers checked the merchan-
dise against the orders before making delivery, and that,
if there were any mistakes, it could very well have been
that the salesman had made out the order improperly.
Furthermore, Ruiz testified without contradiction, which
testimony is credited, that about 10 days prior to his
discharge and just before Respondent learned that he had
signed a union card, Charles Goodman complimented
him on his work and promised him raises. The testimony
with respect thereto, which was uncontradicted and is
credited, is as follows:
A. Yes. Mr. Charlie Goodman told me that my
work was quite satisfactory ; that following the month
of November that I was to receive a $5.00 a week
raise- at the end of November , one at the end of
December-
Q. How large a raise at the end of December?
A. A $5.00 raise per week after the end of
December and also a $5 . 00 raise at the end of Janua
ry, per week . This was a $5.00 a week raise at which
time I would be up to $125 .00 per week.
He also stated that every six months following this
particular raise or the establishment of $125.00 per
week, that I would be reevaluated and if they saw fit
I would be given another raise, and this was the end
of the conversation.
It does not appear that Goodman would have made the
above-quoted statements to Ruiz if his work had been un-
satisfactory. In view of all the circumstances, it is the
conclusion of the Trial Examiner that Ruiz' testimony as
to what was said to him by Gelleri at the time of his
discharge should be credited. It is further concluded that
the reason advanced by Respondent for the discharge
was merely pretextual. Among the factors upon which
this conclusion is based are the unconvincing nature of
the testimony with respect to dissatisfaction with Ruiz'
work performance, the promise of raises just 10 days
prior to the discharge, the timing of the discharge, the
animus of Respondent toward the Union, the assignment
of Ruiz to a new job just a day prior to his discharge, and
the efforts of Respondent to dissipate the Union's majori-
ty. Therefore, it is found that Ruiz was discharged by
Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
C. Events Relating to the Alleged Constructive
Discharge of Freeman Parker, Jr.
The issues with respect to the allegations in the com-
plaint of an unlawful promise of monetary benefits, of a
threat of discharge, and of the constructive discharge of
Parker, Junior, are so interrelated that the evidence rele-
vant thereto will be considered in one context.
As above indicated, Freeman Parker, Jr., was one of
the six employees whose cards were shown to Gelleri on
December 1, 1965. Also as above indicated, Parker, Ju-
nior, was interrogated by Gelleri on December 1 and by
Edward Goodman sometime in December as to his sig-
ning a union card. Goodman not only asked him if he had
joined the Union but also asked him, when told that he
had, whether he planned to get out of the Union. After
Parker, Junior, answered that he did not know, Goodman
responded, "Well, I think you will." This statement by
Goodman appears to be the only evidence in the record
relating to the allegation in the complaint that Respondent
threatened an employee with discharge if he did not
revoke his union authorization card. Not only is the state-
ment too ambiguous to be construed as a threat of
discharge, but also it appears reasonable to construe it as
a statement of Goodman's opinion that Freeman Parker,
Sr., would succeed in his efforts to persuade his son,
Parker, Junior, to resign from the Union, of which efforts
Goodman was aware.
It appears that Parker, Senior, was opposed to his son
joining the Union. Freeman Parker, Jr., testified as fol-
lows:
A. Well, all that time during when the Union was
going on, I would go home and argue about trying to
get into the Union. I was argtng with my family.
They wanted me to get out of tleUnion ...
That Edward Goodman was aware'that Parker, Senior,
was opposed to his son's adherence to the Union is
evidenced by the testimony of Edward Goodman, which
is credited, that Parker, Senior, told him that he was
"very disturbed about" his son's adherence to the Union.
Parker, Senior, also testified that he was opposed to his
son's joining the Union. Parker, Senior, testified, "I did
not know he joined it, he won't tell me because he knows
I would say `no, don't you do that.' That is why he
308-926 0-70-21
310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sneaked and done it ...... Therefore, it is concluded that
the General Counsel has not proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that Edward Goodman threatened
Parker, Junior, with discharge if he did not revoke his
union authorization card.
It is alleged in the complaint that Respondent unlaw-
fully promised an employee monetary benefits if he con-
vinced a fellow employee to revoke his union authoriza-
tion card. This allegation apparently relates to the
testimony of Parker, Senior, with respect to a conversa-
tion he had with Edward Goodman, which is as follows:
A. Well, he called me in the office and told me the
boy had joined the Union. He asked me could I get
him to get the card back, which I thought I could, and
I give him hell every day but it's to no avail, and I
would have bet money I could do it, but with this guy
talking to him, I couldn't do a doggoned thing with
him, so-well, I promised him that I would give him
hell, but I didn't have any luck. That was about all
that conversation.
Q. Was anything said about an initiation fee?
A. Well, he said-I told him that he'd give the
Union $50.00. That's what the boy told me. Mr.
Goodman said, well, I'll give him the $50.00 back if
he gets the card back.
Goodman denied that he promised to reimburse Parker,
Junior, and testified, in effect, that Parker, Senior, in-
dicated that he was trying to get his son to resign. The
testimony of Parker, Senior, of the offer of reimburse-
ment is consistent with the evident desire of Respondent
to dissipate the Union's majority representation and is
credited. Therefore, it is concluded that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising an
economic benefit to Freeman Parker, Jr., if he would
revoke his union authorization card.? However, Good-
man's testimony that Parker, Senior, indicated to him his
intention to get his son to resign is credited, since it is
consistent with the above-quoted testimony of his opposi-
tion to his son's joining the Union.
Parker, Senior, testified to conversations he had with
Paul Sant, an admitted supervisor, "around the middle of
December." These conversations relate to the failure of
Parker, Junior, to report to work, which the General
Counsel contends was caused by the constructive
discharge of Parker, Junior. The testimony of Parker,
Senior, with respect to his conversations with Paul Sant
and the action he, Parker, Senior, took with regard
thereto, is as follows:
A. Well, he [Sant] came up there and told me, he
said, "Parker, you get your boy to resign." Well, I
said, "All right," because in fact I was fairly glad
because I was getting tired of the headache, you
know.
Q. What kind of headache?
A. You know, harassed every day. I wasn't feel-
ing good. I was sick anyway.
Q. Who was harassing you?
A. Well, Mr. Goodman got at me several times.
Q. Now, on this occasion when Mr. Sant said to
you to tell your boy to resign ,-
° Although it would appear from the wording of the allegation that the
promise of a benefit was to one employee if he would induce a "fellow em-
ployee" to revoke his authorization card, it is the judgment of the Trial
Examiner that the testimony of the promise of reimbursement and the al-
A. Yes.
Q. - what, if anything, did you say?
A. Well, I told him, "All right," and I did. I got
him right away. I said, "Little brother,"-I call him
"Little brother"-"don't go back down there any
more. Don't go no more," I said, "they don't want
you there any more," but it didn't do no good.
Q. Did you speak to Mr. Sant again?
A. Well, the next day.
Q. Where did you speak to him the next day?
A. About the same spot.
Q. In the shed?
A. Paul said, "Where's your boy?" I said, "At
home."
He says, "Did you tell him to resign?"
I says, "Yes."
He says, "I didn't mean for him to quit." I says,
"What else does it mean?" He said, "Well, I thought
he was still working."
I said "He is at home. That's what I told him.
That's what I told him. The boy ain't been back
since. "
Q. Now, did he say anything further, Mr. Sant, as
to why he told-
A. Well, he said, "That's what the bosses told me,
Parker," because I didn't question him about it. He
said, "Well, the bosses told me." He didn't said what
bosses. He just said, "The bosses."
Sant testified to a conversation he had with Parker,
Senior, which testimony is as follows:
A. The conversation was that Parker told me,
that's Senior, told me that his son-he can't control
his son. He said, If I hit him, he might turn and hit me
back. I can't control him. He is a big man."
I said, "Yes," I said, "well, why don't you-" and
furthermore, Parker, Sr., told me that he never
wanted his son to work in there.
He says, "I don't want him to work where I'm
working," so I said, "Why don't you have him get a
letter and resign?" and he says to me, "He already
quit. He isn't coming back here no more," and that
was the end of the question.
Parker, Junior, testified to the reason he stopped re-
porting to work for Respondent. His testimony with
respect thereto is as follows: -
A. Well, all that time during when the Union was
going on, I would go home and argue about trying to
get into the Union. I was arguing with my family.
They wanted me to get out of the Union and then one
day I came in and my mother told me that someone
at the lumber company told my father to tell me not
to come back to work. I was going to come back to
work, but my mother said she was going to leave if I
went back to work, and I said, "O.K., I won't go
back to work. I will stay home."
Q. It is your testimony that your mother told you
that your father had told her that you were not to go
back to work?
A. Yes.
legation were sufficiently related as to inform Respondent that the
testimony was being elicited in support of said allegation. In any event, the
matter was fully litigated
GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY 311
Q. And that if you did go back to work your
mother was going to leave home , is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do when your mother told you
this?
A. I just didn't go back to work.
Q. Did you ask your father about it?
A. No.
A comparison of the testimony of Parker , Senior, and
Sant with respect to their conversation about Parker, Ju-
nior , and of the testimony of Parker , Senior, and Parker,
Junior, discloses a number of conflicts . It is the Trial Ex-
aminer 's belief that it is reasonable to infer from their
testimony that the following are the probable facts:8 That
Parker, Senior, did have two conversations with Sant, the
first on the day before Parker , Junior, stopped reporting
to work and the second on the following day; that in the
first conversation Parker, Senior, complained to Sant
about the trouble he was having with his son in trying to
persuade him to resign from the Union and that he voiced
a wish that his son were not working for the Respondent;
that Sant suggested that he get his son to resign from his
job; that Parker , Senior, seized upon this suggestion and
informed his wife that " someone at the lumber company"
told him to tell his son to quit ; that his wife was upset by
the quarrels that had been going on at home between
father and son with respect to the Union and threatened
to leave home if her son did not quit his job ; that, when
the son did not report to work , Sant questioned Parker,
Senior , as to where his son was ; that Parker , Senior, said
that he [Sant] had told him to have his son resign; and
that Sant replied, "I did not mean for him to quit" which
the Trial Examiner construes as an expression on the part
of Sant that his suggestion that the son resign was not in-
tended as an attempt on his part to have the son "quit." s
General Counsel contends that Parker, Junior, was
constructively discharged because he was "interrogated"
by Goodman and Gelleri , he was "harassed at home by
his father who was carrying out Goodman 's orders to get
him to resign from the Union ," and his mother threatened
to leave home if he returned to work, and that , therefore,
Parker , Junior, did not "voluntarily quit."
While it appears reasonable to infer that Parker , Junior,
ceased working for Respondent because of the dissension
at home between him and his father over his joining the
Union and that Respondent did encourage the father to
persuade the son to resign from the Union , it does not ap-
pear reasonable to conclude that the father and mother
were agents of Respondent or that Respondent should be
held responsible for the dissension in the Parker menage
(which had apparently been in progress prior to the time
Respondent encouraged Parker , Senior , to use his in-
fluence on his son to resign from the Union). Further-
more , Sant's suggestion to Parker , Senior, that he get his
son to resign appears to have been no more than a sug-
gestion of a solution to the problem Parker , Senior, com-
plained about, rather than an "order." It does not appear
that Respondent imposed such intolerable working condi-
8 Those portions of their testimony which are in accord therewith are
credited.
9 Sant's statement to which Parker, Senior, testified appears to be in-
consistent with the facts found herein unless construed as indicated.
10 Although there were threats found hereinbelow to have been made
by Goodman to Parker, Senior, they were made subsequent to the deci-
sion by Parker, Junior, to quit and, therefore, cannot be considered as a
factor in his arriving at that decision.
tions either upon father or son that it can be found to have
constructively discharged Parker, Junior.10
Therefore, it is concluded that the General Counsel has
not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent constructively discharged Freeman Parker,
Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
D. Re the layoffs of Freeman Parker, Sr.
The evidence with respect to threats made to Parker,
Senior, is considered hereinbelow in context with that
relating to his layoffs.
Parker, Senior, testified that shortly after his son quit
working for Respondent, he had two conversations with
Edward Goodman with regard to his son. His testimony
relevant to the first conversation is as follows:
THE WITNESS: Well, he [Goodman] asked me had
I talked to the boy, and I told his yes.
He said, "Well, is he coming down to sign"-
TRIAL EXAMINER: Is he coming down to what?
THE WITNESS: To sign, to sign a card. What kind
of card, I don't know, but to sign a card.
He said, "Well, you either get him down here to
sign or else."
His testimony as to the second conversation, which oc-
curred shortly thereafter, is as follows:
A. Well, he asked me where the boy was, was he
coming down to sign, and I told him, "Well," I says,
"I don't know where he is. The boy left home."
He said, "He left home?"
I said, "Well," I said, "I don't know where he is
at," and he said, "if I lay you off a week you will find
that boy."
"Well," I said, "if I find him, I don't know what
the hell I'm going to do with him." I didn't know
what I was going to do with him.
He said, "All right."
Goodman denied having such conversations and that
he asked Parker, Senior, to persuade his son to resign
from the Union. It is the opinion of the Trial Examiner
that the testimony of Parker, Senior, should be credited.
He did not impress the Trial Examiner as a witness who
was fabricating his testimony out of whole cloth and his
testimony is consistent with the efforts of the Respondent
to dissipate the Union's majority representation (which
efforts the Trial Examiner finds are evident from the
record). Based upon the above credited testimony, the
Trial Examiner finds it is reasonable to infer therefrom
that Respondent threatened Parker, Senior, with
economic reprisal 11 in order to have Parker, Senior, exert
pressure upon his son to resign from the Union. It is,
therefore, concluded that by such threats Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Parker, Senior, testified to being laid off on two occa-
sions, for 2 days on January 19 and 20, 1966,12 and for 2
11 By the phrase "or else" and by the threat of a layoff of a week.
Although the allegation in the complaint was a threat of discharge, it ap-
pears that the above-quoted testimony of threats is substantially related to
said allegation. In any event the incidents were fully litigated.
12 It appears that these dates were January 6 and 7, based upon the
credited testimony of Gelleri Parker, Senior, gave the impression that he
was not certain of these dates.
312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
days on February 1 and 2, 1966. According to his
testimony Sant advised him that he was laying him off on
instruction from top management, which does not appear
of any significance since the record indicates that Sant
was a minor supervisor. General Counsel contends that
the layoffs were discriminatorily motivated "because of
his inability to get his son to withdraw from the Union
and as part and parcel of Respondent's campaign to de-
feat the Union activity."
Parker, Senior, was not a member of the unit which the
Union sought to represent and Respondent was aware
that he was opposed to his son's belonging to the Union
and that he had put considerable pressure upon his son to
resign from the Union (to the extent that the son quit his
job). It appears that Parker, Senior, had the least amount
of seniority among the forklift drivers. Gellert testified
that there were a number of layoffs for economic reasons
and that the employees were laid off according to their
seniority in their "job units." He further testified that
Parker, Senior, was laid off a total of 5 days during the
period material herein, that he was one of three people
laid off on December 29, that he was one of three people
laid off on January 6 and 7, and that he was the only one
laid off on February 1 and 2. 13 The above testimony of
Gelleri was uncontradicted and is credited. It is the con-
clusion of the Trial Examiner that in the circumstances
outlined above, it does not appear reasonable to infer that
Parker, Senior, was laid off by Respondent in reprisal for
his failure to persuade his son to resign from the Union or
in order to discourage union activity.14
Therefore, it is concluded that the General Counsel has
not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
its layoffs of Parker, Senior.
E. The Layoff of Carbby Burwell
Burwell entered the employ of Respondent in July
1965 as a warehouseman at the rate of $1.50 an hour.
Around September 1965, he was given the duties of a
janitor and a raise of 25-cents per hour. Six weeks later he
was given a raise to the rate of $1.90 an hour. Burwell
was one of the six employees whose union authorization
cards were shown to Gelleri on December 1, 1965.
According to Burwell's testimony, which was uncon-
tradicted and is credited, he was complimented on his
work prior to December 1, 1965, but after that date
(when the Respondent was made aware of the advent of
the Union and Burwell's adherence to it) it appears that
Respondent's supervisors, Robert Levy and Charles
Goodman, complained about the quality of his work and
gave him additional duties. He was laid off for 3 work-
days between December 30, 1965, and January 4, 1966.
According to his further uncontradicted and credited
testimony, when he returned to work on January 4, Levy
asked him if the floor was "dirty" enough for him and
stated that it could "get a little dirtier." Burwell further
testified to an incident which occurred in the middle of
January which testimony is uncontradicted and is
credited. His testimony with respect thereto is as follows:
A. I was sweeping the store and he [Levy] came
back and told me to clean the restroom.
Q. What floor were you sweeping?
A. The main floor out in the store.
Q. And he came up to you on that occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say to you?
A. He asked me to go in and clean the restroom
and I did; shortly after I went in and he came in.
Q. Into the restroom?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you speak to him then?
A. So, he started to cussing me about leaving the
trash out on the floor, so in the meantime he told me
to leave everything as it was and start cleaning the
restroom.
Q. Would you be a little more explicit on that?
How did this trash come to be left on the floor?
A. He told me to leave everything as it was and
start and go in and clean the restroom.
Q. I see. Then, when you went in the restroom, he
came in and spoke to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you please tell us again what was said?
A. He cursed me and I asked him not to because
I told him that I didn't talk to him that way and he
shouldn't talk to me that way.
Q. Did he say anything about the trash on the
floor?
A. He told me not to ever leave it like that any
more.
Q. What did you say?
A. I told him I just did what he asked me to do.
Q. Was there anything else that he said that you
recall?
A. I don't recall anything, no.
Q. Did he say he knew you left it there?
A. Yes, he did. I told him I didn't.
Q. What did he say?
A. He asked me why don't I quit, and I told him
that he had to lay me off, he had the authority to lay
me off and he should fire me.
Q. What, if anything, did he say?
A. He said he wouldn't.
The record discloses that on May 1, 1966, Burwell
received a raise to the rate of $2.50 per hour. Respondent
contends that he was laid off for economic reasons. Ac-
cording to the testimony of Gelleri, the period over which
he was laid off was a "slack" period. It is reasonable to
conclude that the period was a slack period insofar as
customer traffic is concerned. However, in view of the
harassment of Burwell by Respondent after learning of
his adherence to the Union, the complaints about his
work in contrast to the raises he received, and the state-
ment to him by Levy with respect to the dirty floor on his
return form layoff, it is the conclusion of the Trial Ex-
aminer that the layoff was intended as a reprisal for his
adherence to the Union. Therefore, it is concluded that
Burwell was laid off by Respondent for 3 workdays in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
13 There is no showing or contention that any of the other people named
as having been laid off on the dates Parker, Senior, was laid off, were
members of the unit or that their layoffs were discriminatorily motivated.
14 The Trial Examiner has not failed to consider the threats which were
found to have been made against Parker, Senior, but is of the opinion that
they are not of sufficient significance to outweight the credited testimony
of Gellert.
GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY 313
F. Interrogation by Counsel for Respondent
A few days before the hearing in this matter, Parker,
Senior, was called into Gelleri's office and introduced by
him to both counsel who entered their appearance on be-
half of Respondent. One of counsel, in the course of their
conversation with Parker, Senior, asked him if he had
signed a card for the Union. He replied that he had signed
a card in 1952 and counsel asked him for what Union, to
which Parker, Senior, replied "2559." At this point the
other counsel stated "he means the other Union." It ap-
pears that Parker, Senior, was a member of a union which
has represented a unit of Respondent's employees over
a considerable number of years. Clearly the question
asked of Parker, Senior, as to whether he had signed a
card for the Union was neither relevant nor material to
the preparation of a defense to any of the allegations in
the complaint. There is no showing that counsel asked
similar questions of any other employees whom they may
have interviewed. In the circumstances, including the fact
that Parker, Senior, was a member, of a union which had
long represented a unit of employees to which Parker,
Senior, belonged and the remoteness of this incident from
the unfair labor practices found herein, it is concluded
that this isolated interrogation of Parker, Senior, did not
interfere with, restrain, or coerce him within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 15
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices of the Respondent set forth
in section III, above, occurring in connection with the
operations of Respondent described in section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that
Respondent be ordered to cease and desist froth such un-
fair labor practices and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that Respondent discriminated
against Roger Ruiz by unlawfully discharging him on
December 9, 1965, it will be recommended that Respond-
ent be ordered to offer him reinstatement to the job he
held before the discriminatory discharge, or to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniori-
ty or other rights and privileges. It will be further recom-
mended that Respondent make said employee whole for
any loss of earnings he may have suffered because of said
discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum
equal to the amount he normally would have earned as
wages from December 10, 1965, to the date an offer of
reinstatement is made to him together with interest
thereon as provided below. The loss of pay should be
computed in accordance with the formula and method
prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289, and the interest, payable in accordance
with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716,
should be computed at the rate of 6 percent per annum on
the amount due for each calendar quarter (under the
Woolworth formula) beginning with the end of the first
calendar quarter and continuing with each succeeding
calendar quarter until payment of such amount is
properly made.
It having been found that Respondent discriminated
against Carbby Burwell by unlawfully laying him off for
3 workdays during the period from December 30, 1965,
to January 4,1966, it will be recommended that Respond-
ent make him whole for any loss of earnings he may
have suffered because of said discrimination against him
by payment to him of a sum equal to the amount he nor-
mally would have earned as wages during the period he
was laid off.
Inasmuch as the unfair labor practices committed by
Respondent are of a character striking at the root of em-
ployees' rights safeguarded by the Act, it will be further
recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and
desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights
guaranteed its employees in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by unlawfully interrogating them as to their ad-
herence to the Union.
2. Respondent discriminated against its employee,
Roger Ruiz, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by discharging him on December 9, 1965, because he
had joined the Union.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
unlawfully promising Freeman Parker, Jr., reimburse-
ment for the amount of the initiation fee he paid to the
Union if he would resign from the Union.
4. General Counsel did not prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
threatening an employee with discharge if he did not
revoke his union authorization card.
5. General Counsel failed to prove by a preponde-
rance of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that
Respondent constructively discharged Freeman Parker,
Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
threatening Freeman Parker, Sr., with economic reprisals
if he did not convince Parker, Junior, to revoke his union
authorization card.
7. General Counsel failed to prove by a preponde-
rance of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that
Respondent discriminatorily laid off Freeman Parker, Sr.,
on two occasions.
8. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by discriminatorily laying off Carbby Burwell for 3
workdays during the period between December 30, 1965,
and January 4,1966.
9. General Counsel failed to prove by a preponde-
rance of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that
counsel for the Respondent interfered with, restrained,
15 This finding should not be construed as condonation, however, of
counsel's interrogation of Parker, Senior, as to whether he had signed a
card for the Union.
314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and coerced an employee within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating him as to whether he
had signed a union card.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pur-
suant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, it is recommended that Respondent, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Local 12, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or in any other
labor organization of its employees, by discriminating in
regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment.
(b) Unlawfully interrogating employees with respect
to their adherence to the Union.
(c) Unlawfully promising employees economic
benefits conditioned upon their withdrawal of adherence
to the Union.
(d) Threatening employees with economic reprisals if
they fail to convince a fellow employee to resign from the
Union.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to
self-organization, to join, form, or assist labor organiza-
tions, including the above-named labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
deemed will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Roger Ruiz immediate and full reinstate-
ment to the job he held prior to his discriminatory
discharge on December 9, 1965, or to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges and make him whole for any
loss of earnings he may have suffered as the result of
Respondent's discrimination against him, as provided in
the section of this Decision dentitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify Roger Ruiz, if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full
reinstatement upon application, in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Make Carbby Burwell whole for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered as a result of Respondent's
discrimination against him, as provided in the section of
this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(d) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, upon request, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records, and all other records neces-
sary to determine the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Recommended Order.
(e) Post at its place of business in San Francisco,
California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."1fi Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Re-
gional Director for Region 20, after being signed by an
authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be
posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be main-
tained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(1) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.17
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it relates to the unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint which have been found were not
sustained.
16 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommen-
dations of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. If the Board's Order is en-
forced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the notice will be
further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision
and Order."
17 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuan t to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Local 12,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or in
any other labor organization of our employees, by
discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employees
with respect to their adherence to the aforesaid labor
organization.
WE WILL NOT promise employees economic
benefits conditioned upon the withdrawal of their ad-
herence to the aforesaid labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with economic
reprisals if they fail to convince a fellow employee to
resign from the aforesaid labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the right to self-organization, to join, form, or assist
labor organizations, including the above-named labor
organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment, as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Roger Ruiz immediate and full
reinstatement to the job he held prior to his dis-
GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY
criminatory discharge on December 9, 1965, or to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have
suffered as a result of our discrimination against him.
WE WILL make Carbby Burwell whole for any loss
of earnings he may have suffered as a result of our
discrimination against him.
All our employees are free to become or remain mem-
bers of Local 12, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, or any other labor organization, or to refrain
therefrom, except to the extent that such right may be af-
fected by an agreement authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
GOODMAN LUMBER COM-
PANY
(Employer)
Dated By
315
(Representative) (Title)
Note: We will notify Roger Ruiz if he is presently serv-
ing in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right
to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted tor 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 450 Golden
Gate Avenue, 13050 Federal Building, San Francisco,
California 94102, Telephone 556-03 3 5.