103 N.L.R.B. 1543 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

Golden Belt Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 3, 1953

103 N.L.R.B. 1543 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

GOLDEN BELT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 1543 GOLDEN BELT MANUFACTURING COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL PRINT- ING PRESSMEN & ASSISTANTS' UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL, PETITIONER . Case No. 11-RC-495. April 3,1953 Decision and Order Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Harry Goldman, Jr., hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Houston, Styles, and Peterson]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Employer and Textile Workers of America, CIO, herein called the CIO, are presently parties to a collective-bargaining agreement which is urged as a bar to the petition filed herein. By the terms of the agreement it was "entered into the 22nd day of March, 1949" and "shall be in effect for a period of one (1) year from the effective date hereof and shall automatically renew itself from year to year there- after, except that either party may terminate it at the end of any such year by giving to the other party written notice at least sixty (60) days before the end of such year." No notice to terminate was ever given by either party. The instant petition was filed January 21, 19531 The issue in this matter relates to the timeliness of the filing of the petition. It is clear that if the contract year starts on March 22 and runs through March 21 as the CIO contends, the petition was un- timely and the contract bars an election at this time.2 However, if as the Petitioner claims, the contract term starts on March 23 and runs through March 22, the petition was timely filed. 1 After the close of the hearing, the Petitioner moved to reopen the hearing to introduce evidence purporting to show that its representation claim was received by the Employer on January 21 , 1953. As the receipt of the claim would , even assuming the correctness of Petitioner 's position , coincide with the date of the filing of the petition , we deem it unneces- sary to rule upon the motion. 2 Miles Laboratories , Inc, 92 NLRB 23. 103 NLRB No. 137. 1544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Petitioner argues that the collective-bargaining agreement was not, and that the parties did not intend that it should be, in effect on the day it was executed. To support this assertion it argues that the use of the word "from" in the phrase "from the effective date hereof" was meant to exclude the day the contract was entered into, and that the words "effective date" were used to signify the date of execution, not the day the contract went into active operation. This argument is clearly lacking in merit. It calls for the unreason- able conclusion that the "effective date" of the contract is a day upon which the contract is not in effect. Moreover, contrary to the Peti- tioner's position, the sense of the word "from" is not always exclusive, but it depends on the context and subject matter.3 The word "from" is here used together with the words "effective date." In that context it would be unreasonable to construe the language of the agreement before us to create a situation whereby the yearly period established by the contract begins not on the day that the contract goes into effect, but 1 day thereafter. Accordingly, we find that the contract became effective on March 22, and that its yearly term begins March 22 and runs through March 21. Consequently, as the Mill B date was January 21, 1953, the petition filed on that date was untimely and the contract bars an election. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition filed herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 8 In fact, in the very case cited by Petitioner , Taylor v . Brown, 147 U. S. 640, the Court held that the day "from" which the period was to be counted should be included in the period and cites authorities which include and others which exclude the terminal day. Cf. Miles Laboratories, Inc., supra, where the Board found that the parties intended "from" to mean "from and including." See also, Little Rock Furniture Manufacturing Company , 80 NLRB 65, where the Board found that the parties intended "to" to mean "to and including." NATIONAL CONTAINER CORPORATION and INDEPENDENT CORRUGATED WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL No. 1, PETITIONER I. and U. S. CORRUGATED WORKERS UNION, LOCAL No. 444, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF PULP, SULPHITE AND PAPER MILL WORKERS, AFL' NATIONAL CONTAINER CORPORATION and INDEPENDENT CORRUGATED WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL No. 1. Cases Nos. 2-RC-1839 and 2-CA-1436. April 3, 1953 Decision and Order On July 11, 1952, Trial Examiner Charles W. Schneider issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled consolidated proceedings, a 1 Herein called Local 1. Herein called Local 444. 103 NLRB No. 138.