Godfrey O. Herzog, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 10, 2004
01A40276_r (E.E.O.C. Feb. 10, 2004)

01A40276_r

02-10-2004

Godfrey O. Herzog, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Godfrey O. Herzog v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A40276

February 10, 2004

.

Godfrey O. Herzog,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A40276

Agency No. 2000-0570-2003101259

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Management Analyst at the agency's Director's Office, VA Central

California Health Care System (VACCHCS), in Fresno, California.<1>

Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on February 26, 2003, alleging that he was discriminated against

in reprisal for prior EEO activity when the agency did not approve a

Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment (VSIP) for him to receive under

its Voluntarily Early Retirement Authority (VERA).

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. When

complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in 29

C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

On August 29, 2003, the agency issued a final decision finding no

discrimination. The agency concluded that complainant established a prima

facie case of reprisal because management was aware of complainant's prior

EEO activity. The agency, however, concluded that management articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not approving a VSIP for him

to receive under its VERA. Further, the agency found that complainant

failed to present any evidence which demonstrated that the agency's

articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Upon review, the Commission finds that the evidence supports a

determination that the agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for its employment actions. The record in this case contains

a sworn telephonic statement dated June 16, 2003, from complainant's

Supervisor. Therein, the Supervisor stated that on November 1, 2002,

the agency made an announcement that it had received Voluntary Separation

Incentive Payment (VSIP) under the Voluntary Early Retirement Authority

(VERA). The Supervisor further stated that eighteen employees, including

complainant, applied for the early retirement and incentive payment; and

that he was the deciding official of who would receive approval for the

incentive payment under the early retirement authority. The Supervisor

stated that on December 15, 2002, he approved six employees to each

receive a $25,000 VSIP. The Supervisor stated that his decision was

based on the following criteria: (1) that the approval of the VSIP

would allow for elimination or restructure of the employee's position;

(2) that management official under which the position was assigned had

agreed to eliminate the position or have it restructured; and (3) that

the VSIP would create an opportunity for the employee to leave government

service where otherwise he or she might not leave.

Furthermore, the Supervisor stated that he did not approve complainant

to receive VSIP because he learned on or before December 15, 2002,

that complainant had been selected for a position with the Disabled

American Veterans, a non-profit organization; and that the buy-out

was not necessary to encourage complainant to leave federal service

because his new position was an indication that he no longer wished to

be a federal employee. The Supervisor stated that complainant's prior

EEO activity did not factor in his decision not to approve complainant

to receive VSIP. The Supervisor further stated that out of the six

employees that were approved for the VSIP, one had prior EEO activity;

and that he was approved for the VSIP because he met the three criteria.

The record also contains a sworn telephonic statement dated June 5, 2003,

from the Employee Relations Specialist. Therein, the Employee Relations

Specialist stated that complainant had the option to cancel or rescind his

retirement prior to the end of December 2002, once he learned that he was

not approved for the VSIP. The Employee Relations Specialist stated that

out of the 18 employees who applied for the early retirement and incentive

payment, "seven retired, one resigned, four remained in the positions

that they were in, and of course six received the separation incentive."

Complainant has not demonstrated that the agency's articulated reasons for

not approving a VSIP for him to receive under its VERA were a pretext

for discrimination. Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no

discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 10, 2004

__________________

Date

1The record reveals that complainant retired

from agency employment on December 31, 2002. The record further reveals

that during the investigation, complainant's position was also called a

"Management Analyst," a "Program Analyst," or a "Staff Assistant."