Global Door, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 26, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 266 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Global Door, Inc. and Allied Industrial Workers of
America, AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-10191
April 26, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
WALTHER
On February 16, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,1 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modified below and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Global Door, Inc., Upper Sandusky, Ohio, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
I. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a):
"(a) Informing its employees that it will revise its
layoff selection procedure under conditions implying
that said revision is a result of their union activity."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
In agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)3) of the Act by discharging Douglas Schmuck, Member
Walther places no reliance on the Administrative Law Judge's comments at
fn. 13 of his Decision.
2 The language of par. I(a) of the recommended Order is modified to
parallel that used in the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law 3.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties had the
opportunity to present evidence, the National Labor
Relations Board has found that we have violated the
law and has ordered us to post this notice.
The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as
employees, certain rights, including the right:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help a union
To bargain collectively through a repre-
sentative of your own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
Accordingly, we give you these assurances:
WE WILL NOT inform employees that we have
changed our policy in selecting employees for an
economic layoff under conditions implying that
this change resulted from their union activity.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Allied
Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, by discriminatorily
discharging, or otherwise discriminating against,
employees in any manner with regard to their hire
and tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL offer Douglas Schmuck immediate
reinstatement to his former position or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges, and reimburse him for
any loss of earnings he incurred as a result of our
discriminatory discharge of him.
GLOBAL DOOR, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding was heard in Findlay, Ohio, on October 5 and
6, 1976, upon a charge filed on June 8, 1976, and a
complaint issued on June 30, 1976, alleging that Respon-
dent independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
229 NLRB No. 36
266
GLOBAL DOOR, INC.
creating the impression that the union activity of employ-
ees was subject to surveillance, by telling employees that
layoff procedures would be altered because of union
activity, by telling employees that the Union had given
false information relative to the Employer, and by advising
an employee that a terminated worker had been a union
protagonist. The complaint further alleged that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
discharging, and refusing to reinstate, Douglas E. Schmuck
because of his union activity. In its duly filed answer,
Respondent denied that any unfair labor practices were
committed. After close of the hearing, a brief was filed on
behalf of Respondent.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including my
observation of the witnesses while testifying and their
demeanor, and consideration of the posthearing brief, I
find as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Respondent is an Ohio corporation, with a principal
place of business in Upper Sandusky, Ohio, from which it
is engaged in the manufacture of truck doors. Annually, in
the course and conduct of its business, Respondent ships
goods valued in excess of $50,000, from the aforesaid
location, directly to points located outside the State of
Ohio, and receives at said location goods valued in excess
of $50,000 shipped directly from points located outside the
State of Ohio.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent is now, and has been at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is now
and has been at all times material herein, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
This case is concerned essentially with Respondent's
discharge of Douglas Schmuck, which according to the
General Counsel was motivated by the latter's union
activity, but which, according to Respondent, was prompt-
ed by insubordinate and temperamental behavior directed
I Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1976.
2 Although there is no direct evidence that this was the case, Greg Case
testified that he received a report from an unidentified source that Sharon
Schmuck solicited signatures to union cards. From the record it appears that
only Bob Burton and Douglas Schmuck were involved in such activity.
I There is neither allegation nor claim that this layoff was predicated
upon unlawful considerations. Although there was some probing of
witnesses as to the motivating factors the issue, from my perspective, could
not be described as the subject of conclusive litigation.
4 Binns testified that he altered the layoff selection method on this
occasion because he was "running scared" as a result of the union activity,
and while convinced that a layoff was necessary, he felt that he would not
get into trouble by laying off the more junior employees.
at John Binns, Respondent's owner and president, on the
day before the termination. As indicated, also involved are
allegations to the effect that Respondent in various respects
independently violated Section 8(aX 1) of the Act.
B, Concluding Findings
Respondent is a manufacturer of truck doors. Its
employees, prior to the events here in issue, were not
represented by a labor organization.
On April 28,1 an organizational meeting was held at a
local restaurant and was attended by seven to eight
employees. All in attendance signed union authorization
cards. At the meeting, two employees, Bob Burton and
Douglas Schmuck, were given blank authorization cards to
distribute to other employees. The next day, Burton and
Schmuck began soliciting signatures to the authorization
cards at the plant.
During the last week in April, John Binns was away from
the plant on a trip. On Friday, April 30, in a telephone
conversation with Greg Case, who was the son-in-law of
John Binns and the plant superintendent, Binns was
admittedly informed that employees at the plant were
signing union cards. Binns' own description of his personal
reaction to this report, was as follows: "if someone had
said my wife was murdered, I would not have been more
shocked." Binns testified that he could not recall whether
Case identified employees who instigated the card signing,
explaining that his recollection was blurred because he was
"shocked and stunned."
As of Monday, May 3, Respondent's work force
consisted of about 20 to 25 employees. That morning, a
number of employees, including Sharon Schmuck, the
sister-in-law of the alleged discriminatee, 2 and Bob Burton,
the other employee primarily responsible for inplant
organization activity, were laid off. In announcing the
layoff, Binns informed the employees that the layoff was
due to a lack of orders, that they would be recalled when
sufficient work became available, and that he would try to
find other employment for those affected, if they so
desired.3
On past occasions when a layoff was necessary, employ-
ees were selected on a discretionary basis by Binns,
depending upon his assessment of their productivity and
value. In announcing the layoff of May 3, Binns indicated
that this former procedure would not be followed, advising
employees "you know what you did," and therefore
indicating that this time layoff selection would be governed
by seniority. 4
With the layoff of Bob Burton, Doug Schmuck as of May
4, remained the only inplant organizer on active payroll
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sec. 8(aXI) by Binns'
action in informing employees of this alteration in Respondent's layoff
procedure. This allegation is substantiated by the record. Binns, in
announcing the change, implicitly suggested that union activity prompted
the adjustment. Although the new selection procedure involved greater
objectivity and might be viewed as more equitable than that employed in the
past, its implementation could conceivably shift the burden of the layoff to
employees, who under the old procedure would have been retained. By
linking the change with union activity, Respondent's action not only would
tend to foster a division amongst employees with respect to the organization
drive then in progress, but, indeed, might well have been taken as
foreboding other union related changes in conditions of work. Accordingly,
I find that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)( I) by the action of Binns, in telling
(Continued)
267
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
status. Schmuck had been hired on October 26, 1975.
According to Binns, Schmuck was one of the "promising
young men" to be introduced to management through an
award of limited supervisory authority and leadman
status. 5 At the time of his discharge, on May 5, Schmuck
was the head of Respondent's packing department.
Schmuck was discharged on the second working day
after Binns' return from his trip, and within a week after
Schmuck began to solicit authorization cards on behalf of
the Union. According to Binns, a confrontation on May 4,
between himself and Schmuck, considered against a
background of past difficulties with Schmuck's perfor-
mance, prompted the discharge decision.
Thus, on May 4, Schmuck was working alone in the
packing area when Binns instructed him to cut rubber seals
for assemblers engaged in production of "bottom panels."
Schmuck went to the assembly area and, according to his
testimony, cut 30 pieces for Reuben Caceres and 10 pieces
for assembler Charlene Ekleberry. 6 According to Schmuck,
it took him about 30 to 40 minutes to cut the 40 pieces,
after completion of which he returned to the packing
department. After doing some work in the packing
department, Schmuck lit up a cigarette. At that time, Binns
approached, yelling at Schmuck. Binns inquired as to why
Schmuck was in the packing department and not cutting
rubber. Schmuck indicated that he had cut enough rubber
to take care of the assemblers for the balance of the day,
and that he returned to pack doors. Binns started to curse,
indicating that he told Schmuck to cut rubber, and was not
paying him for standing around. Binns then grabbed
Schmuck's arm and started shaking it. At this point,
Schmuck stated to Binns, "Back off or I'll zap ya." 7
Binns claims that he did not discharge Schmuck that day
out of "fear of doing something wrong." After assertedly
spending a sleepless night, Binn's decided to effect the
discharge.
employees that he would follow a different selection procedure in
designating those to be laid off because of what the employees "went and
did."
I It was stipulated that Schmuck did not possess indicia of supervisory
authority while a leadman.
6 John Binns testified that he initially instructed Schmuck to cut 100
pieces. Reuben Caceres, an assembler, was offered by Respondent in an
effort to corroborate Binns in this respect. Caceres was an obviously biased
witness, willing to give whatever testimony was necessary to favor the
Respondent. It should be apparent from the face of this testimony that he
was not in a position to overhear interchanges between Schmuck and Binns
which occurred in the shipping department, and that much of his testimony
was not based on direct knowledge. Binns also was an unpersuasive witness.
Considering the incredulous testimony offered by Respondent on this point,
and the probabilities as well, it is deemed unlikely that Binns specifically
instructed Schmuck to cut 100 pieces at the time of their first encounter.
I Binns testified that after checking with Caceres as to how much rubber
had been cut by Schmuck, they counted it and it was only 10 pieces. Caceres
testified that Schmuck cut 20 pieces before leaving the assembly area.
The version of the May 4 confrontation set forth in the above text
conforms, in essential respects, with a composite of the testimony of Binns
and Schmuck. Conflicts in their accounts are resolved in favor of Schmuck,
a more reliable witness. For example, Schmuck denied that, in the course of
the argument, he told Binns that cutting rubber was not his job, and that he
would not do it. Binns testified that in their second encounter, Schmuck said
that cutting rubber was not his job and that if he had to do it he would quit.
Although Caceres gave testimony tending to support Binns, for reasons
already indicated this testimony is not worthy of credence. Although
On Tuesday May 5, after Schmuck reported for work, he
was called to Binns' office. Present in the office, were Greg
Case, Ron Krischan, a brother-in-law of Binns who was
recently hired and reported for work the day before, and
Jim Schroeder, a newly hired engineer. At this time, Binns
informed Schmuck that he was sorry that things did not
work out, but that Schmuck possessed an uncontrollable
temper, which Binns no longer could tolerate. Binns
informed Schmuck that he was fired in consequence of the
incident of the day before, and referred to Schmuck's past
involvement in fights, stating that he didn't want anything
like that to happen in his plant. Binns went on to warn
Schmuck that his fighting might result in his going to jail
someday.8 Although there was no specific reference to
union activity in the course of the discharge interview,
Schmuck credibly, and without contradiction, testified that
in the course of the discussion, Binns referred to the fact
that he and Schmuck had been the best of friends before
Binns took his vacation, but when the latter returned
someone had given Schmuck "a bum steer about him,"
Binns acknowledges that after he came back from a trip,
he noticed that Schmuck held a different attitude and that
there was something wrong. On one occasion, Binns claims
to have asked Schmuck what he had done to deserve
Schmuck's treatment, with Schmuck responding, "Plenty
. . . $2.65 an hour for instance." 9
The issue with respect to the lawfulness of the discharge,
turns critically upon the credibility of John Binns. It was
his decision alone to effect the termination, and he acted
without consulting anyone. The General Counsel has met
his initial burden. Binns himself avowed his emotionally
charged and negative response towards reports of union
organization. His interest in maintaining a union free
operation is also established by other credible evidence. I
am also satisfied that Binns, at the time of the discharge,
Schmuck may have indicated to Binns that cutting rubber was not his job. in
the light of ensuing events, it is considered unlikely that he indicated that he
would not perform that task. In this respect, again I prefer Schmuck's
testimony to that of Binns.
8 The foregoing is based upon a composite of the credited testimony of
Binns, Ron Krischan, and Greg Case. In adopting this mutually corrobora-
tive testimony, in this instance, I am unwilling to accept Schmuck's denials
that he was informed as to the reason for his discharge, and his further
denial that there was any discussion about fighting. Although I regarded
Schmuck as a basically honest witness, this phase of his testimony struck me
as attributable to faulty recollection.
9 This testimony appeared on the record at a time when the only trip
known to have been taken by Binns was that during the last week in April.
After further examination by me, Binns attempted to associate this
conversation with some other trip, taken during an earlier time frame. In my
opinion this was an unbelievable attempt on the part of Binns to diminish
the natural import from a slip in his testimony, otherwise disclosing that the
change in Schmuck's attitude actually became manifest between April 30
and May 5. This conclusion is enforced by Sharon Schmuck, who, without
contradiction, credibly testified to a conversation with Binns in June.
wherein Binns indicated that he could not figure out what had happened to
Doug Schmuck, in that before Binns went on vacation they were good
friends and got along well, but that when he returned it was as if someone
had given Schmuck "a bum steer." Both Doug and Sharon Schmuck relate
that the April 30 trip was a vacation trip. Binns claims that it was a business
trip. Greg Case, though asked, could not confirm that the April trip was a
business trip. I am convinced that Binns was in Florida on vacation at the
end of April.
268
GLOBAL DOOR, INC.
was fully mindful that Doug Schmuck had been soliciting
cards on behalf of the Union.'1 These elements together
with the discharge of Schmuck, timed shortly after his
union activity became manifest, sufficed to establish a
primafacie case of discrimination.
Unquestionably, the conduct of Schmuck on May 4, if
the real reason for his termination, would constitute
legitimate cause. However, the question here is whether
Binns invoked that incident as a pretext for a reprisal based
upon Schmuck's involvement in the Union. The record
preponderates in favor of finding that this was the case.
May 4 was not the first occasion on which Schmuck had
displayed temperament. In the past, however, such out-
breaks were condoned because Schmuck was a good
worker." Neither these incidents nor Schmuck's some-
times difficult interaction with certain employees led Binns
to consider Schmuck's removal as a leadman or as aborting
the latter's inclusion in the group of employees whom
Binns was considering for management positions.
Contrary to Binns' explanation for the discharge, I am
persuaded that following his return from a vacation trip to
Florida during the last week in April, Binns harbored
strong resentment towards Schmuck and considered him to
be part of the group that had "turned against him," by
bringing the Union into the plant. Testimony by Binns that
the attitude of Schmuck changed after his return stemmed
directly, in my opinion, from Schmuck's actions on behalf
of the Union.'2 The conclusion is inescapable that
Schmuck's continued employment and potential for ad-
vancement to a management position would not have been
prejudiced by the May 4 incidents' were it not for Binns'
resenting Schmuck's having shattered Binns' own concep-
tion of the good relationship he held with employees, by
bringing in the Union. I am satisfied that Binns was not a
truthful witness and, contrary to his testimony, I find that
the incident of May 4 was a pretext seized upon to create
an aura of legitimacy to an outright act of union-related
discrimination. Accordingly, I find that by discharging
Douglas Schmuck, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
1' Binns afforded less than candid responses to inquiries concerning his
knowledge of Schmuck's role as a union protagonist. In my opinion, he
deliberately invoked a lack of recollection to conceal knowledge gained, in
this respect, during a phone conversation with Greg Case on Friday, April
30. Case admits to a conversation sometime in April with employee Reuben
Caceres, in which the latter informed Case that Schmuck asked him to sign a
card. Though denied by Krischan, Case indicates that in a telephone
conversation on or about April 30, he informed Krischan that Bob Burton
and Doug Schmuck were distributing union cards. Case indicates that he is
sure that at "one time or another" he communicated his knowledge in this
respect to Binns and thought this occurred prior to the discharge. Case
impresssed me as a reluctant witness. Yet, it is my opinion that his laboring,
under oath, with knowledge of facts prejudicial to Respondent's cause,
allowed the truth to emerge. I find that he informed Binns of Schmuck's role
in the union campaign on Friday, April 30.
" It is noteworthy that, prior to his discharge, Schmuck quit work after a
run-in with a female employee. At that time after learning of this incident,
Binns sent Harold Hill to get Schmuck to return, because "he was a good
man." Binns' explained that he took this action because the fact that
Schmuck had "a little spirit" wasn't a sufficient ground for allowing him to
leave Respondent's employ.
li Binns did not specifically define the nature of Schmuck's conduct
which reflected this change in attitude. On the other hand, other testimony
discloses that Binns regarded Schmuck as having been turned against him
In addition to the foregoing, the complaint includes
allegations that Respondent independently violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) by (1) creating the impression that union
activity was subject to surveillance, (2) informing employ-
ees that a discharged employee had been an instigator in
support of the Union, and (3) informing employees that the
Union had given the Respondent false information
concerning the Respondent. As to (3), the statements
imputed to Binns concerning Schmuck's having been given
"a bum steer" entailed neither threat of reprisal nor
promise of benefit and constituted communication protect-
ed by Section 8(c) of the Act. As to (1), testimony adduced
from witnesses for the General Counsel merely indicated
that Binns conveyed to employees his awareness of union
activity in general. Although this occurred during the
period when organizational activity was not a matter of
common knowledge, the identity of employee organizers
was not revealed, and in my opinion the evidence offered
by the General Counsel with respect to this allegation is too
vague to substantiate an 8(aXl) violation. Finally, with
respect to (2) above, after canvassing the record, I find no
evidence that such a statement was made under conditions
violating the Act. Accordingly, while I have heretofore
found that Respondent violated Section 8(aXl) by telling
employees that layoff procedures would be altered because
of the Union, I shall dismiss the remaining allegations that
Respondent in any other respects violated Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent independently violated Section 8(aXI)
of the Act by informing employees that it would revise its
layoff selection procedure, under conditions implying that
said change was provoked by their union activity.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the
Act by discharging Douglas Schmuck on May 5, in reprisal
for his union activity.
by some outside force; i.e., the Union. This is evident from a charge made to
Schmuck during the termination interview, that he had been given "a bum
steer" about Binns. Indeed, that this feeling on the part of Binns was deeply
held, and a continuous one, is evident from the subsequent conversation in
June with Sharon Schmuck in which credited, uncontradicted testimony,
establishes that Binns stated that Doug's attitude changed after his return
from vacation, as if he had been given a "bum steer," I am convinced that
the references on the part of Binns to "a bum steer," to a change in attitude,
and to Schmuck's turning against Binns. were not related to any misconduct
on the part of Schmuck, but stemmed directly and exclusively from his role
in bringing the Union into the plant.
13 While not necessary to the result, the May 4 outburst by Schmuck
might well have been deliberately provoked by Binns. As of May 4,
Schmuck, who, before the layoff, had employees working under him, was
the only rank-and-file employee assigned to the packing department. His
only assistance was that available through Superintendent Case and
foreman Hill. Binns could not have been insensitive to Schmuck's concern
about the layoff of the previous day. Binns clearly knew that Schmuck did
not get along with employee Caceres, the two having been involved in a
previous disagreement, and that the cutting of rubber was normally the
responsibility of Caceres. From Binns' point of view, that Schmuck would
react adversely to being called out of his department to perform work for
another employee whom he disliked, was perfectly predictable.
269
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. The unfair labor practices found above are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having found that Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged Douglas Schmuck, it shall be recommended that
Respondent offer him immediate reinstatement to his
former position or, if not available, to a substantially
equivalent position, without loss of seniority or other
benefits, and make him whole for any loss of pay resulting
from the discriminatory action against him, by payment of
a sum of money equal to the amount he normally would
have earned as wages from the date of his discharge to the
date of a bonafide offer of reinstatement. Backpay shall be
computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and shall
include interest at 6 percent as provided in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Finally, as the unfair labor practices, particularly the act
of discrimination against Schmuck, strike at the heart of
the Act, a broad cease-and-desist order shall be recom-
mended, precluding Respondent from "in any other
manner" interfering with, coercing, or restraining employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER 14
Respondent Global Door, Inc., Upper Sandusky, Ohio,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
(a) Coercing and restraining employees by advising them
that its practice in selecting employees for layoff would be
altered because of their union activity.
(b) Discouraging membership in labor organization by
discharging, refusing to reinstate, or in any other manner
discriminating against employees because they have en-
gaged in union activity.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Douglas Schmuck immediate reinstatement to
his former position or, if no longer available, to a
substantial equivalent position, without loss of seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any
loss of earnings sustained by reason of the discrimination
against him, in accordance with the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, payroll
and all other records necessary to determine backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Upper Sandusky, Ohio, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and
it hereby is, dismissed as to any alleged violations of the
Act not found herein.
15 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
270