Global Caps, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 2, 2000

No. 74659784 (T.T.A.B. May. 2, 2000)

Paper No. 13
RFC
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB MAY 2, 00
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Global Caps, Inc.
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Serial No. 74/659,784
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A. Todd Merolla of Strelzik & Shapiro, P.A. for Global
Caps, Inc.
Mary J. Rossman, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
109 (Ronald R. Sussman, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Cissel, Hohein and Hairston, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Cissel, Administrative Trademark Judge:
On April 12, 1995, applicant applied to register the
mark "GLOBAL CAPS" on the Principal Register for "clothing,
namely, caps and shirts," in Class 25. The application was
based on applicant’s claim of use of the mark in interstate
commerce since February 10, 1994.
The Examining Attorney required applicant to disclaim
the descriptive word "CAPS" apart from the mark as shown,
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and refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Lanham
Act based on several registered trademarks. Prior-filed
applications for registration of trademarks with which the
Examining Attorney thought applicant’s mark might be likely
to cause confusion were also noted, but in each instance,
the application was subsequently abandoned.
All but one of the registered marks cited by the
Examining Attorney were subsequently withdrawn as bars to
registration under Section 2(d). This application is now
before the Board on appeal from the Examining Attorney’s
final refusal to register based on Registration No.
1,807,6251 and the final requirement that applicant disclaim
the word "CAPS." Both applicant and the Examining Attorney
filed appeal briefs, but applicant did not request an oral
hearing before the Board.
Turning to the refusal to register based on likelihood
of confusion, we first note that the cited registration is
for the mark "GLOBAL GEAR," and the goods specified in that
registration are as follows: "men’s, women’s and
children’s clothing; namely, T-shirts, shirts, tank tops,
sweatshirts and shorts," in Class 25.

1 Issued on the Principal Register to Global Gear International
Clothing Company, a California partnership, on November 30, 1993.
The descriptive word "GEAR" was disclaimed apart from a mark as
shown.
Ser No. 74/659,784
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In view of the partial overlap in the goods enumerated
in the application and the cited registration, (both
include "shirts"), the issue of whether confusion is likely
turns on whether, as applied to these identical goods, the
mark sought to be registered, "GLOBAL CAPS," is
substantially similar to the cited registered mark, "GLOBAL
GEAR."
The Examining Attorney has pointed out several legal
principles which may come into play in determining whether
marks are so similar that confusion is likely. In
particular, the marks must be considered in their
entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, meaning
and commercial impression. In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB
1997). The issue is not whether distinctions between the
marks could be made if they were to be compared next to
each other, but rather, the focus should be on the
recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains
a general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks.
Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. of Vicon Industries
Inc., 209 the USPQ 179 (TTAB 1982); Chemtron Corp. v.
Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979).
Although some elements of the marks may be entitled to
greater weight, the ultimate conclusion as to whether
confusion is likely rests on consideration of the marks in
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their entireties. In re National Data Corp., 732 F.2d
1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
In the case now before us, the Examining Attorney
contends that confusion is likely because the marks, "when
considered in their entireties, create highly similar
commercial and overall impressions" (brief, pp. 4,5) by
virtue of the fact that each combines the suggestive term
"GLOBAL" with a generic term for apparel, which the
Examining Attorney finds does not provide a sufficient
basis for consumers to distinguish between the two marks.
To the contrary, we find that confusion is not likely
because when these marks are considered in their
entireties, they are not substantially similar in
appearance, in pronunciation, or in meaning. The
commercial impressions they create are distinctly
different.
Although both marks include the term "GLOBAL," each
mark combines this suggestive term with a different,
generic (and hence disclaimed) word. The term "GLOBAL,"
while suggestive of the worldwide availability, appeal or
usefullness of the apparel items sold under the respective
marks of applicant or registrant, is such that when used in
conjunction with "CAPS," the combination is quite different
than what results when "GLOBAL" is combined with "GEAR" in
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the registered mark. These marks are not substantially
similar in appearance, pronunciation or meaning. Simply
put, because of the differences between "GEAR" and "CAPS,"
the commercial impressions of these marks, when considered
in their entireties, are so different that even when they
are used as marks on the same items of apparel, namely
shirts, confusion is not likely.
Applicant’s chief argument appears to be that the
existence of the other four registered marks originally
cited, but subsequently withdrawn by the Examining
Attorney, demonstrates that marks which include the
suggestive term "GLOBAL" as one component should be allowed
to "coexist" on the register. The Board’s finding that
confusion is unlikely in this case should not be
misconstrued as adoption of this argument. The third-party
registrations of record do not establish that the marks
therein are in use, much less that members of the consuming
public for the goods at issue in this appeal are so
familiar with the use of marks containing "GLOBAL" as
components that they are able to distinguish among them by
virtue of differences in the elements with which this term
is combined. These third-party registrations do
demonstrate, however, that the term "GLOBAL" has a meaning
which is suggestive in connection with such goods, and the
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suggestiveness of this word can be just as readily
established by its dictionary definition, of which we may
take judicial notice. The word has the same suggestiveness
in each of these two marks, but in light of the differences
in meaning, appearance and pronunciation between "CAPS" and
"GEAR," when the marks are considered in their entireties,
they are not so similar that confusion is likely.
In its appeal brief, applicant offered to comply with
the requirement for the disclaimer. Accordingly, a
disclaimer of the word "CAPS" will be entered into the
record, and the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of
the Act is reversed.
R. F. Cissel
G. D. Hohein
P. T. Hairston
Administrative Trademark Judges
Trademark Trial & Appeal Board
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