Glenside Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 5, 1978

234 N.L.R.B. 62 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Glenside Hospital and Lewis Friedland. Cases 1-CA-
12431 and I-CA-12572
January 5, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND MURPHY
On August 25, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Lo-
well Goerlich issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and General
Counsel each filed exceptions, a supporting brief,
and answering briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.
While we agree with the Administrative Law Judge
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4), (3), and (1)
by discharging employee Lewis Friedland, we do not
adopt his recommendation that Respondent be re-
quired to make the other parties whole for their liti-
gation costs.
In Tiidee Products, Inc.,3 and then in Heck's Inc.,4
we explained that we would award litigation costs
only where Respondent's defense was "patently friv-
olous." In making this determination, we have con-
sidered, inter alia, whether a respondent has previ-
ously been found to have committed other violations
of a similar nature. But, where the respondent's de-
fense is "debatable," we have not awarded litigation
costs, even where the respondent has "engaged in
'clearly aggravated and pervasive misconduct' or in
the 'flagrant repetition of conduct previously found
unlawful.' "5 Here, while we agree with the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's finding that Friedland was dis-
charged for filing an unfair labor practice charge and
for union activity, we find that Respondent's primary
defense that Friedland was discharged for laxity in
making suicide checks and ward rounds, although
I We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent's
discharge of Lewis Friedland violated Sec. 8(aX3), (4), and (1) of the Act.
Indeed, while we have not acquiesced in the First Circuit's position in
Colerti's Furniture, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 1292 (C.A. 1, 1977), we find
that the evidence of record clearly establishes that, but for Friedland's filing
of an unfair labor practice charge on November 9, 1976, and his union
activity, he would not have been discharged.
2 We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of the allegation
that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)( 1) by verbally warning employee Frank
Hood about his keeping records on employees and threatening to report
them to the Board, on the ground that this allegation was not fully litigated.
3 194 NLRB 1234 (1972).
215 NLRB 765 (1974).
234 NLRB No. 4
ultimately rejected, was at least, debatable. We,
therefore, do not adopt the Administrative Law
Judge's recommendation that Respondent be re-
quired to pay litigation costs to the other parties.6
We agree with the General Counsel, however, that
the recommended Order should be modified to re-
quire that all documents collected and assembled by
Respondent in connection with its investigation of
Friedland's work performance, which investigation
was begun only because Friedland had filed an un-
fair labor practice charge, be removed from his per-
sonnel file. This is necessary in order to remove any
blot from Friedland's work record which resulted
from Respondent's misconduct.7
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Glen-
side Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modi-
fied:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a) and
renumber footnote 35 as footnote 36:
"(a) Offer Lewis Friedland immediate and full rein-
statement to his former position or, if such position
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of
pay he may have suffered by reason of Respondent's
discrimination against him with backpay and interest
thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and
Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).35
-35 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b):
"(b) Remove and expunge from Lewis Friedland's
personnel file all documents collected and assembled
in connection with its investigation of Lewis Fried-
land's unfair labor practice charge of November 9,
1976, including the 'Memorandum to Personnel File,'
dated November 15, 1976."
5 Hecks Inc., supra at 767; see also Kings Terrace Nursing Home and
Health Facility, 227 NLRB 251 (1976).
6 While Member Murphy agrees that the extraordinary remedy of
awarding litigation costs is not warranted here, she has found such a remedy
appropriate in other contexts. See her dissent in Betra Manufacturing Com-
pany, 233 NLRB 1126 (1977), where she would have directed that the union
be reimbursed for its attorney's fees.
7 In accordance with our decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977), we shall also apply for purposes of backpay the current 7-
percent rate for periods prior to August 25, 1977, in which the "adjusted
prime interest rate" as used by the Internal Revenue Service in calculating
interest on tax payments was at least 7 percent.
62
GLENSIDE HOSPITAL
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all parties participated and
had the opportunity to give evidence, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we committed cer-
tain unfair labor practices and has ordered us to post
this notice. We intend to abide by the following:
WE WILL NOT unlawfully discharge any of our
employees or discriminate against them in any
manner because of their union affection or be-
cause they engage in union activities, or because
they use the Board's processes or file unfair labor
practice charges.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully threaten to suspend or
discipline any of our employees for engaging in
protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully spy or create the im-
pression that we are spying on our employees'
union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act to engage in
self-organization, to bargain collectively through
a representative of their own choosing, to act to-
gether for collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all
these things.
WE WILL offer Lewis Friedland immediate and
full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job,
without prejudice to his rights and privileges.
WE WILL restore the above-named employee's
seniority and pay him the backpay he lost be-
cause we discharged him, plus interest.
WE WILL remove from Lewis Friedland's file
and expunge all documents collected and assem-
bled in connection with our investigation of Lewis
Friedland's unfair labor practice charge of No-
vember 9, 1976, including the disciplinary "Mem-
orandum to Personnel File," dated November 15,
1976.
GLENSIDE HOSPITAL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LOWELL GOERLICH, Administrative Law Judge: An or-
der consolidating cases, amended complaint, and notice of
hearing was issued on February 28, 1977. The charge filed
by Barbara Hart in Case l-CA-12430 on November 9,
1976, was served on Glenside Hospital, the Respondent
herein, on the same date. The charge filed by Lewis Fried-
land in Case 1-CA-12431 on November 9, 1976, and the
amended charge filed on December 23, 1976, were served
on the Respondent on December 9 and 27, 1976, respec-
tively. The charge filed by Friedland in Case i-CA-12572
on December 23, 1976, and the amended charge filed on
February 16, 1977, were served on the Respondent on De-
cember 27, 1976, and February 16, 1977, respectively. In
the consolidated complaint,' it was charged that the Re-
spondent did on or about December 20, 1976, unlawfully
discharge its employee Lewis Friedland in violation of Sec-
tion 8(aX3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, herein referred to as the Act, and violated Sec-
tion 8(aXl) in the following respects: created an impression
of surveillance, threatened Friedland with suspension, and
issued Friedland a counseling slip.2
The Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it
had engaged in or was engaging in the unfair labor prac-
tices alleged.
The consolidated cases came on for hearing at Boston,
Massachusetts, on May 2, 3, 4, 6, 23, 24, and 25. Each party
was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call, exam-
ine, and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally on the
record, to submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions, and to file briefs. All briefs have been carefully con-
sidered.
FINDINGS OF FACT,3 CONCLUSIONS, AND REASONS
THEREFOR
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is and has been at all times material
herein a corporation duly organized under and existing by
virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
At all times herein mentioned, the Respondent has main-
tained its principal office and place of business at 49 Ro-
binwood Avenue in the city of Boston (Jamaica Plain), and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and is now and continu-
ously has been engaged at said location in the operation of
a proprietary hospital (herein called the hospital).
I Upon agreement of the parties. Case I-CA-12430 was severed from the
consolidated cases and the complaint in said case dismissed.
2 Amendments were allowed to cover additional alleged 8(aXI) viola-
tions.
3 The facts found herein are based on the record as a whole and observa-
tion of the witnesses. The credibility resolutions herein have been denved
from a review of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard
for the logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the teachings
of N.LRB. v. Walton Manufacturing Company d Loganville Pants Co., 369
U.S. 404, 408 (1962). As to those witnesses testifying in contradiction to the
findings herein, their testimony has been discredited, either as having been
in conflict with the testimony of credible witnesses or because it was in and
of itself incredible and unworthy of belief. All testimony had been reviewed
and weighed in the light of the entire record. No testimony has been preter-
mitted.
63
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Respondent's gross annual revenue exceeds
$250,000, and it annually receives at its Massachusetts lo-
cation goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
points outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Respondent is and, at all material times, has been
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
District 1199, Massachusetts, National Union of Hospi-
tal and Health Care Employees, RWDSU, AFL-CIO
(herein called the Union), is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Alleged 8(a)(1) Violations
In the spring and summer of 1976, a union organization-
al campaign occurred among the Respondent's employees.
During the campaign, the Respondent vigorously opposed
the Union. Elections were conducted on August 5, 1976, in
which the Union was defeated. After the elections, certain
union proponents, including Friedland, continued their as-
sociation. Among other things they "congregated in the
cafeteria during [their] supper hours and break time."
In early November, a group of union sympathizers, in-
cluding Friedland, contacted Julia Davila, shift supervisor,
suggesting to her that they thought "the schedule was un-
fair, that it reflected unfairly regarding several specific
black workers that were there at the time." Employee Bar-
bara Hart called the schedule "schizophrenic." Davila res-
ponded that she did not have to talk to the employees and
that they "could report her to the Labor Board if [they]
wanted to." Hart was suspended 3 days without pay. Fried-
land, angry about Hart's treatment "since nobody else was
disciplined," procured permission to speak to Davila. Prior
to Friedland's presentation, Davila called employee Win-
ifred Mardia, stating, "I am going to call her over. She was
neither for nor against the Union." According to Fried-
land, he said, "How can you suspend a woman with three
children?. . . How, in good conscience, could you suspend
a woman with three children for an incident involving a
group of us?" Davila immediately committed Friedland's
statement to writing and asked him to sign it. Friedland
refused. Several days later Friedland was called to the of-
fice of Director of Nursing Marian Davis. Davis told
Friedland that he had "guilt tripped" Davila and "it was
none of [his] business to get involved in the suspension of
another employee." Friedland replied that it was his "busi-
ness, that it was the activity of the group, that this also
affected [him] as a member of the shift." He said that "it
was a concerted activity" and "it was [their] right . . .
protected by the National Labor Relations Act." Davis
replied, "[W]e have a policy of dealing with people as indi-
viduals," and that Friedland's activity was "improper and
inappropriate" and that "if [he] did it again [he] would be
I The Hlart incident is covered by pars. 9(a) and (b) of the consolidated
complaint.
5 "Section 7 guarantees, and §8(a)(1) protects from employer interfer-
ence the rights of employees to engage in concerted activities ....
N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor Corp. et al., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963).
suspended." Thereafter Davis submitted a "Memorandum
to Personnel File" in respect to her conversation with
Friedland dated November 15, 1976, noting that "Fried-
land was counseled today." (G.C. Exh. 13.) The memoran-
dum cited Friedland's "inappropriate remarks" to Davila
in reference to the suspension of Barbara Hart: "[Hlow
does it feel to take bread out the mouths of three children,
how can you live with your conscience." In regard to the
suspension of Hart, the memorandum reveals, "I told him I
would not discuss disciplinary action involving one em-
ployee with another employee. Mr. Friedland stated '[O]f
course you know I am filing charges with the Labor Board
around this issue.' "4 Friedland was not told that he was
being counseled nor did he receive a copy of the counseling
slip.
In protesting the alleged unjust suspension of Hart over
an incident in which Friedland participated as one of a
group, Friedland was exercising employee rights to engage
in concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the Act.5
"Even individual protests are protected as concerted activi-
ty if the matter at issue is of moment to the group of
employees complaining and if the matter is brought to the
attention of management by a spokesman, voluntary or
appointed for that purpose, so long as such person is speak-
ing for the benefit of the interested group." Carbet Corpora-
tion, 191 NLRB 892 (1971), citing Hugh H. Wilson Corpora-
tion, 171 NLRB 1040, 1046 (1968). Accordingly, the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(I) of the Act when, through
Director of Nursing Davis, it threatened Friedland with
suspension and issued a counseling slip in regard to the
incident because he had engaged in protected concerted
activities. 6
During the course of the foregoing counseling session,
Davis said there had been meetings going on or at least
rumors of meetings. Friedland responded that "the meet-
ings that had been going on were the result of the harass-
ment that people that had actively engaged in the union
had been subjected to since September. And if the Compa-
ny didn't want meetings to go on, the best way to counter
those meetings would probably be to ease up on the policy
of harassment and surveillance ... ."
Friedland testified without contradiction (as related to
Davis in the conversation above) that Davila one evening
said, "[W]hat is all the whispering... I am going to put a
stop to the whispering. I feel like this place is going to
explode." Later Davila remarked, "I know there are meet-
ings going on. The union business is starting up again."
The above statements of Davis and Davila created an im-
pression of surveillance in violation of Section 8(aX1) of
the Act.
After employee Edna Rockwood testified on May 4,
1977, as she and other employees were approaching the
elevator, she asked Davila, "What do you think about this?
Are you mad?" According to Davila, she answered, "I am
not mad. I am sorry that you do things like this, because
you will cut your own throat because you are no longer-
because you are all the time in the window.... all the
6 "Concerted activity exists when an employee's complaints and dissatis-
faction are directed to employment conditions of concern to other employ-
ees." Waco Insulation Inc., 223 NLRB 1486, 1487 (1976).
64
GLENSIDE HOSPITAL
time looking at Mr. Friedland passing by for supper." Dav-
ila explained, "[I ]f she was doing that, she was not doing
her duty." [Emphasis supplied.]
It would have been a dull employee indeed who would
not have reasoned that Davila's remark was a threat
against Rockwood's job security for giving testimony under
the Act. Moreover, the remark had the tendency of intimi-
dating and discouraging other employees from testifying.
Davila's remark, uttered in the presence of several employ-
ees, constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.7
See Dollar General Corporation, 189 NLRB 301, 307 (1971).
B. The Discharge of Lewis Friedland
Glenside Hospital is an accredited psychiatric hospital
licensed by the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health. Dr. Melvin E. Cohen8 is its administrator. Gerald
DeBlois is the chairman of the board.
Lewis Friedland, who was discharged on December 20,
1976, was hired on November 18, 1975. He worked as a
mental health worker in C-3, a locked ward for suicidal,
assaultive, and severely disturbed patients. Among these
patients are some who were placed on suicide precautions.
Such status required a suicide check 9 which was performed
by the mental health worker observing the patient at inter-
vals of 15 minutes. Among other reasons, a record of these
checks was maintained since the suicide of a patient might
subject the Respondent to a potential legal liability. Ward
checks 10 were also required of the mental health workers.
Friedland, who was known to the Respondent as an ac-
tive supporter of District 1199's electoral efforts, as noted
above, continued his union affection after the election loss
on August 5, 1976. For the first 6 months of his employ-
ment he was considered by the Respondent as a competent
and valued worker. He was studying for his doctor's degree
at Brandeis University where he had completed I year of
study." It was only after he filed an unfair labor practice
charge against the Respondent for interfering with, re-
straining, and coercing its employees in their exercise of
Section 7 rights by "threats, intimidation and other acts"
on November 9, 1976, that it was brought to Dr. Cohen's
attention that his work performance had allegedly deterio-
rated dramatically. This knowledge resulted from an inves-
tigation of Friedland's "work history" conducted by Dr.
Cohen, triggered by the filing of the unfair labor practice
charges. Dr. Cohen had conferred with Gerald DeBlois, the
chairman of the board, about the matter and, according to
Dr. Cohen, DeBlois said, "[I If there is information, that is
forthcoming that requires action you have the authority to
take whatever action it indicates."
7 In that the evidence offered to support the General Counsel's allegation
in par. 8(a) in respect to employee Frank Hood is unclear, the allegation is
dismissed.
8 Dr. Cohen is a doctor of educational psychology and administration.
9 Ronald Charles Althenn, Friedland's immediate supervisor, described
the duties in connection with suicide precaution checks as follows:
The mental health workers were assigned to teams of patients. There
may be one or two patients on a team on suicide precaution.
Now, that mental health worker is not necessarily expected to do all of
the checks throughout the entire 8-hour period on that particular patient.
That mental health worker is responsible for seeing to it that if he or she
cannot do it that somebody else does do it.
The suicide sheet is the documentation of the check made on the
patient. [Emphasis supplied.]
The investigation 12 principally concerned Friedland's
work habits. Written statements were solicited by Dr. Co-
hen from employees and supervisors, all of which were
unfavorable. After conferring individually with each of the
writers, by phone or in person, the chairman of the board,
and the Respondent's lawyers, Dr. Cohen composed a let-
ter of dismissal which was cleared by the latter group. Ac-
cording to Dr. Cohen, such clearance was sought because:
I think with the seriousness of the allegations and the
very active role that Mr. Friedland played during the
spring and summer of 1976 that I wanted the chairman
of the board to be aware of the decision that I was
going to make.
I wanted to make sure-not being an attorney my-
self-that I wanted to get clarification of any questions
I might have.
I also, in my own opinion and experience through
the years, expected pretty much that I would have to go
some hearing at some point.
a * *
I felt it would be fairly controversial. That I might
end up in a hearing day after day after day ....
Dr. Cohen further testified:
I say this loudly. We knew darn well we'd be in
court. I was not going to fire [Friedland] because you
would make me look like a fool. I wanted to get plenty
on him before firing him. I would document it and get
witnesses. I would not be done on one incident.
Thus, from the beginning, Friedland's discharge was pro-
grammed with the idea that any claim of unlawfulness re-
specting the discharge, which apparently the Respondent
anticipated, would be well rebutted. Indeed, the credible
record established that the investigation was not instigated
for the purpose of exonerating Friedland or of fairly weigh-
ing the facts but was orchestrated to obtain a guilty find-
ing. See Mueller Brass Co., a Subsidiary of U. V. Industries,
Inc., 208 NLRB 534 (1974). Nevertheless, I am not con-
vinced that this was Dr. Cohen's idea, for the credible
record supports the inference that the idea originated with
others and that Dr. Cohen was only an obedient function-
ary as were those who submitted statements against Fried-
land. Indeed, the investigation commenced with Friedland
wearing the wrong shoe, for Dr. Cohen observed, "In my
opinion, the person who filed this particular charge has got
some serious problems."
'0 In regard to ward checks Althenn testified:
The mental health workers were expected to check every room and
check every patient. They would check every room in relation to . . .
sharp instruments and to make sure that all patients were okay.
Anything else would be checked, anything that would have to be
dealt with, in the ward.
H Davis referred to him as a "brilliant young man."
12 Dr. Cohen testified that the investigation had not been conducted
earlier "lbJecause the information was not coming to Ihis) office about
[Friedland's ] poor work habits until the people were asked about this."
65
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is evident that the Respondent harbored union animus
and a deep-seated antipathy against Friedland. During the
election campaign, the Respondent "asked [its] employees
to vote for the hospital against the union." Publications to
this point were distributed by the Respondent. In mid-Oc-
tober 1976, when Neil Glickman was interviewed for hir-
ing, Davis asked him how he felt about the Union, after
which she said that the Respondent did not "want that to
start again." 13
Friedland's termination letter dated December 20, 1976,
cited 20 reasons for his discharge, to wit:
To: Lewis Friedland
Mental Health Worker, 3-11
Nursing Department
In order to respond to the N.L.R.B. unfair labor
practice charge that you filed against the Hospital we
have investigated your employment history to see if
there was any basis for the charge. We found that the
terms and conditions of your employment are on a par
with other individuals in your job classification; you
received the same wages, fringe benefits, and increases
as did other employees.
We have found no reason to believe the Hospital has
committed any unfair labor practice against you.?4
However, we have found that your work and conduct
have been seriously deficient and have therefore decid-
ed to terminate your employment here at Glenside ef-
fective today 12/20/76.
The reasons for your termination are as follows:
you have frequently not performed required suicide
prevention supervision of patients and reporting of this
information, thereby endangering those patients as-
signed to you, causing other staff to look after some of
your responsibilities, and diminishing the standard of
care the Hospital seeks to provide.
you have frequently not performed required ward re-
sponsibilities including ward rounds and checks. Here
again you have lowered the standard of care and ig-
nored your assigned responsibilities in a ward which
handles potentially violent and/or suicidal patients.
you have made unprofessional and denegrading [sic]
comments regarding patient care and Hospital proce-
dures within patient areas.
you have made inappropriate remarks and been insu-
bordinate to the evening Nursing Supervisor.
you have acted inappropriately by placing patients in
seclusion for minor infractions.
you have directed staff that they did not have to follow
instructions of the evening Nursing Supervisors.
13 "[E Ivery equivocal act that was done may be properly viewed in the
light of the respondent's animus toward the effort to organize its men."
N.L.R.B. v. Houston and North Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 193 F.2d
394, 398 (C.A. 5, 1951).
you have told a co-worker that you would attempt re-
venge on those individuals you consider to be anti-
union.
you have failed to correct the deficiencies in your work
for which you have been counseled by your Supervi-
sors, and in fact you have shown difficulty relating to
any staff with Administrative responsibilities.
your conduct has caused the Hospital difficulty in staff-
ing your shift on C-3 because many employees do not
want to work with you; in addition, we have had diffi-
culty getting staff to work double shifts when you are
on duty.
you have criticized the policies and nature of care given
by the Hospital subsequently affecting new workers at-
titudes towards the Hospital and towards the patients.
patients have conveyed their dissatisfaction and their
complaints to the Unit Supervisor regarding your au-
thoritarian attitude and indifference to patients in dis-
tress.
you have been late an unusual amount of times and
above the average for a mental health worker on your
shift.
you have verbally threatened co-workers and Supervi-
sors that you are keeping written reports on them and
that you will report them to Federal officials.
your work performance in the past several months has
deteriorated dramatically resulting in less attention to
patient needs and necessitating other staff to complete
some of your assignments.
by your actions you have caused devisiveness [sic] and
discontent with co-workers on your shift and within
your ward.
you have accused supervisory staff of racial discrimina-
tion and caused devisiveness [sic] with co-workers, es-
pecially black workers in relation to these unfounded
accusations.
you have neglected specific patients and spent an un-
usual amount of time with personal friends which has
created dangerous working situations, within your
ward.
you have spent an unreasonable amount of time off the
ward and also on the telephone engaged in activities
unrelated to patient care, and at times have interfered
with the communication system to other parts of the
Hospital.
you have been negative toward your work assignments
and at times antagonistic toward staff members which
has resulted in decreasing staff morale.
14 Unfair labor practices charges filed by Fnedland have been found to
have merit, supra.
GLENSIDE HOSPITAL
there are many examples in your work schedule where
you have not kept to a four day work week as agreed
upon, and your late call-outs has resulted in a shortage
of staff within a ward that has many emergencies.
Dr. Cohen testified that it was "[a]bsolutely correct" that
all these reasons were relied upon as "a basis for dis-
charge." However, he indicated that the "major ones" were
contained in the first and second paragraphs. It would
seem that if these matters were of the serious nature de-
scribed in the letter either the supervisors who had the
responsibility of protecting the patients and directing the
mental health workers would have been lax in their duties
or the charges against Friedland were not as crucial as the
letter indicated. The latter was obviously the case since
Friedland's work habits varied little from those of other
employees and, until the investigation, had not been con-
sidered as of such a character as to warrant either serious
disciplinary action or discharge. In fact, no significant dis-
ciplining was taken against Friedland until the occasion on
which Davis counseled him as above mentioned. More-
over, the first written report of Friedland's alleged short-
commings as an employee, composed by his immediate
supervisor, Ronald Althenn, was dated December 16, 1976,
more than a month after the charge was filed and 4 days
before Friedland's discharge. This report was the result of
Davis' inquiry and direction. In the report, Althenn re-
ferred to Friedland's performance as "quite high" which
shifted from a "patient care focus" to "an obsessional pre-
occupation regarding his critical feelings toward hospital
administration."i5 (Davis put it this way: "Apparently,
[Friedland] was not willing to let sleeping dogs lie and let
us go on and conduct the hospital in the way it should be.")
In his report, Althenn referred to his attempt to resolve the
"polarity" among the staff in C-3 at a staff meeting on
December 13, 1976.i6 (The credited record indicates that
this polarity sprang from the fact that workers in C-3 who
were against the Union were less than compatible with
workers for the Union and vice versa.) Althenn in his re-
port observed, "Mr. Friedland, appearing very anxious (ac-
tually seemed to be grinding his teeth) stated: You know,
they do keep records on us while pointing toward the ad-
ministration building. 7 . . . Mr. Friedland's only state-
ment seemed to be an attempt to reinforce Mrs. Hood's
feeling of discomfort." (Mrs. Hood, a union partisan had
said that "she did feel that she was under close observation,
thus causing her to feel uncomfortable.") While Althenn
did not specifically cite any of the reasons Cohen listed for
discharging Friedland he, nevertheless, recommended his
discharge. This seems incredible when it is considered that
Althenn and Friedland drank beer together after work and
Althenn thought that while off duty he and Friedland got
'5 When Respondent's counsel observed that he was a "little confused"
about this assertion, Althenn answered. "My opinion is that Mr. Friedland's
performance on the ward dropped because he was so involved, and I can use
no term other than this, he was preoccupied with criticisms of the hospital. It
was an obsessional preoccupation and this was causing him not to be able to
do his work." He cited as an example the second paragraph in the report.
(Resp. Exh. 7.)
56 Althenn explained that meetings of this character were utilized to exert
peer pressure as a means of accomplishing a desired objective. Herein they
are referred to as "peer pressure" meetings.
17 Hood testified credibly that Rosalie Joanne Minior, an antiunion par-
along "nicely." Teresa Brugman testified: "I felt [Althenn]
had a good relationship with Lewis [Friedland]. If Fried-
land was the employee depicted in the dismissal letter, Al-
thenn's relations with him do not reveal it, whether at work
or play.
Moreover, Althenn was tolerant and sympathetic toward
Friedland. Althenn testified: "[1 ]t seemed to me he looked
awfully tired and he looked kind of depressed. This was
after the union had lost the election. We talked about that
for a while. We came up with the conclusion that he had
been working very hard. .... We figure that this period of
depression or sadness or the fatigue would go after a while
and that would resolve the matter." In any event, Althenn
never gave Friedland a counseling slip. i8
When Althenn was asked if he had spoken to Friedland
about his performance, he answered: "I spoke to him on a
few occasions. [Emphasis supplied.] Generally speaking,
when there is a problem on the ward with any of the staff,
what I try to do is not put the person on the hot seat, so to
speak, but to deal with things in a group situation. .... I
would not say anything to the effect such as, 'Lou, you are
not doing the suicide precautions.'. . . I would rather say,
'We are having a problem with suicide precautions. Some
people are doing more than others. Some are doing far less
than others. I think we could talk about this. .... In this
way, I hope to create pressure to get the individual not
performing to raise his performance." This apparently was
the extent of Althenn's counseling of Friedland. Under
these circumstances, and from the credible record as a
whole, Althenn's thoughts of recommending the discharge
of Friedland, it is clear, were quickened and conditioned
by Cohen's investigation. The credible record is also clear
that the additional statements critical of Friedland were
obtained through the same stimulus. Generally, these state-
ments reflect the feeling that Friedland's shortcomings
stemmed from his continued union affection. For example,
mental health worker Bernard H. Suddette, who had once
been a union supporter, wrote on December 16, 1976:
"Since the election I find Lou to be defensive about his and
other pro-union people's actions." (Resp. Exh. I.) Mental
health worker Cathy L. Adams wrote: "My biggest com-
plaint regarding Louis Friedland is that I feel that he has
bred discontentment & suspicion among the staff on ward
C-3." (Resp. Exh. 2.) Registered Nurse Diane Auger
wrote: "He [Friedland] decreases moral [sic] by his general
attitude, i.e. facial expressions & posture indicate to me
that he sees his work as routine & monotonous." (Resp.
Exh. 3.) Mental health worker Rosalie J. Minior, who op-
posed the Union, wrote: "I personally do not like and often
find it unpleasant to work with Mr. Friedland." (Resp.
Exh. 5.)
tisan, told Friedman that she had been instructed to "watch his phone calls"
which heightened the tension. According to Teresa Brugman. unit supervi-
sor of C-3, she instructed Althenn to "keep a closer eye" on Friedman's
reporting on the suicide precaution sheets. Additionally, if the Respondent's
testimony is to be believed, Althenn was urged to document Friedland's
activities which, nevertheless, was not done. Thus, it appears that Friedland
had some justification for expressing his apprehension in Althenn's "peer
pressure" meeting. Strangely enough, considering the nature of the meeting,
Althenn's statement does not reveal that he did anything to alleviate the
apprehension of either Hood or Friedland.
18 A counseling slip was similar to a warning slip.
67
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Althenn and his supervisors were aware of the prounion
and antiunion sympathies of the employees in C-3.19 Ac-
cording to Althenn the polarity "basically started out with
... pro-union or anti-union .... After a period of time it
was like an 'us against them.' " Of the regular employees in
C-3 Rachel Hood and Friedland were on the union side
and Kathy Adams and Rosalie Minior were on the Re-
spondent's side. Crandall Huckins, an antiunion activist,
who described his position as being "extremely anti-
union," worked sometime with Friedland. 20 Huckins testi-
fied that he constantly brought Friedland's shortcomings
to his supervisors' ears, including Dr. Cohen's.
According to Althenn, the polarity was manifested by
the employees "not talking to each other about patients"
and "not working together." 2 1 Althenn handled the matter
by peer pressure meetings. He would say, "Look, it seems
that there is a lot of polarity going on. There is division.
People are not working together. I think the people on the
ward should have the most input into what we can do
about this." At one of these meetings Hood said that she
thought Minior was keeping "tabs on their comings and
goings." In fact, Hood had asked for a transfer as did
several other employees. Apparently the situation involving
polarity was not viewed as so critical as to warrant correc-
tion by transfer, even though Althenn said he had reported
it to his superiors.
Althenn testified that he received reports from Minior,
Adams, and Huckins that Friedland was not "performing
the suicide precautions and generally not doing his work."
Even though Althenn received these reports, he did not
thereafter "scrutinize" Friedland's work or reprove him.22
Moreover, Althenn testified that he had received no "in-
structions or directions from any of [his] supervisors with
respect to Mr. Friedland."
Apparently Althenn recognized that Friedland was not
solely responsible for the C-3 working ambiance. Said Al-
thenn: "I told him just as I have told other mental health
workers, especially when there was a lot of polarity and a
lot of friction among workers regarding the union, that I
did not want to come down on him. This is the word that I
used. I did not want to come down on him anymore than on
anyone else. I have said this to other people, not just to
Lewis." [Emphasis supplied.] The one time Althenn spoke
to Friedland, about not reporting to Althenn before leaving
the ward, Althenn noticed an improvement.
19 If Brugman is to believed, she told Dr. Cohen that she "felt Lewis was
bitter because of the union election." In response to this point and others,
including laxities in suicide precaution checks raised by Brugman, Dr. Co-
hen advised, "[C ontinue talking with Ron [Althenn] about speaking to
Lewis." Brugman was a disingenuous witness.
o0 Huckins testified that he did the orientation on Friedland and that at
the end of 2 months he reported to Davila that Friedland was "one of the
best mental health workers [he] had seen." An incompatibility developed
when Friedland opted for the Union.
52 Friedland and Hood were working together. They were assigned to the
same team.
a2 Such an attitude on the part of Althenn reflects the credence he placed
on the complaints.
2s In this respect, it is significant that Dr. Cohen devoted only a 3-minute
conversation to reviewing Friedland's work habits with Althenn, who, as
Friedland's immediate supervisor, was undoubtedly the best informed per-
son on the subject. This conversation was confined to Dr. Cohen asking
Althenn, "[W Ihat percentage of the time was Mr. Friedland not performing
his duties in terms of suicide precautions and the ward rounds." Althenn
The revelations above, and those in the record as a
whole, are clear and convincing that Friedland had not
been slated by Althenn as a subject for discharge until after
the filing of the unfair labor practices charges. Althenn's
basis for recommending Friedland's discharge, i.e., "the
passage of time," is at odds with the credible record. It is
quite clear that there would have been no such recommen-
dation had Althenn not been prodded by Davis, who was
engaged in assisting Dr. Cohen in amassing derogatory
evidence against Friedland. Althenn topped off his honest
feeling about Friedland's desirability as an employee by
saying, "I didn't want to lose him." Indeed, as noted above
Althenn's report does not include any of the specifics set
out in Friedland's discharge letter. Apparently, it was of
such an ambiguous nature that it "confused" counsel for
the Respondent. Not so with Dr. Cohen; he seized upon it
as one pretext to discharge Friedland.2 3
In United States Rubber Company v. N.LRB., 384 F.2d
660, 662-663 (C.A. 5, 1967), the court observed, "Perhaps
most damning is the fact that both [employees] were sum-
marily discharged after reports of their misconduct . . .
without being given any opportunity to explain or give
their versions of the incidents." See also Metal Cutting
Tools, Inc., 191 NLRB 536, 543 (1971). While counseling
was one of the Respondent's standard procedures,2 4 Fried-
land was summarily fired without counseling and without
an opportunity to defend against allegations of misconduct
solicited from employees who the Respondent had reason
to believe were biased antiunion partisans, 25 or supervisors
who shared the same union animus as the Respondent.
Cohen explained this apparent lack of fairplay by asserting,
"For two reasons. One, the evidence to me, was over-
whelming. The second is you will see in the policies and
procedures booklet, any offense of this nature does not
require a long discussion with the hospital administra-
tor." 26
The overwhelming evidence consisted almost entirely of
partisan accusations of doubtful probative value which pri-
or to the filing of the unfair labor practice charges had
generated no definitive disciplinary action. Moreover, Dr.
Cohen's reliance on the policies and procedures booklet
was misplaced since the rule therein obviously refers to
"acute" or "crisis" situations whereas Friedland's alleged
problem was a "chronic kind of situation," which, it is
replied, "[A ]t least 30 or 40 percent of the time." The fact that this informa-
tion was not included in Althenn's report suggests the conclusion that it was
omitted either because it was untrue or because Althenn, in view of the
manner in which the checks were administrated, did not think of it as
reflecting upon Friedland's desirability as an employee.
24 Dr. Cohen testified: "Most of the time termination does not take place
without prior counseling, which is documented."
25 For example: Minior, in response to an inquiry from Brugman, assert-
ed that Friedland was a "sociopath" and that she "would love" to see him
fired.
26 On this point, the Respondent offered the following:
If the hospital requires immediate termination ofemployment involving
behavior, such as wilful misconduct, gross negligence, dishonesty, in-
subordination, use of intoxicants, or violation of Hospital regulations
or ethics, such an employee will be dismissed without previous notice
and shall receive no further wages. [Resp. Exh. 10.]
68
GLENSIDE HOSPITAL
clear, never reached a seemingly critical stage until Fried-
land filed unfair labor practices with the Board.27
Dr. Cohen's testimony manifests a studied effort to
grasp at straws to buoy his apparent deviation from stan-
dard practices.
The Respondent's principal reasons for discharging
Friedland, i.e., endangering patients and diminishing the
standard of care the hospital seeks to provide by frequently
not performing the required suicide precautions and re-
ports and lowering the standard of care by frequently not
performing ward rounds and checks, are not supported by
substantial evidence and are pretextuous in nature. Both
Althenn and Brugman agree that Friedland's alleged fail-
ures in respect to suicide precautions did not endanger the
lives of any patients. This was true because the practice was
that the work in C-3 was shared by the mental health
workers, including suicide prevention checks and ward
checks. This ward was "the most difficult ward to work in."
It received those patients "requiring acute or close supervi-
sion or [who were] acutely ill." Thus, it is understandable
that workers would share tasks, which they did. In fact,
teams were assigned for the ward checks. If there were
delinquencies in regard to the checks, they were not con-
fined to one employee. Prounion employee Hood testified
that "Rosalie Minior and Randy and Huckins" "per-
formed the tasks the least in the fall of '76." On the other
hand, Minior, Adams, and Huckins complained about
Friedland's work habits.
In any event, the failure to initial the suicide precaution
sheet had not been subject to any disciplinary action or
threats of discharge as it pertained to C-3 mental health
workers. It was tolerated by Althenn and those supervisors
above him. In this connection it is indeed significant that
these supervisors insisted that nothing was occurring in C-
3 which endangered the lives of the patients.
The fact that Friedland was never called upon to answer
the charges and only statements were taken from those
who were antagonistic toward Friedland 2 8 supports a con-
clusion that the "real motive" of the Respondent in dis-
charging Friedland was to discourage union activity and
affection 29 and to effect a reprisal against an employee for
filing a charge of unfair labor practices under the Act.
"Illegal motive has been held supported by a combina-
tion of factors, such as 'coincidence in union activity and
discharge' . . . 'general bias or hostility toward the union'
. .. variance from the employer's 'normal employment
routine' . . . and an implausible explanation by the em-
ployer for its action." McGraw-Edison Company v.
N.L.R.B., 419 F.2d 67, 75 (C.A. 8, 1969). All these factors
are present in the instant case.
It is well established that the existence of even a proper
reason for discharge is no defense if the discharge was
actually made, as here, for an improper purpose. See The
27 Apparently there was no written rule covenng summary discharge for
chronic cases. At least none was produced. Such cases were given, in prac-
tice, the benefit of more or less protracted counseling before discharge. This
did not occur in Friedland's case.
28 Brugman testified that she did not solicit a statement from Hood
because "I felt she was a friend of Lewis and it would put her in a very bad
position."
29 "Obviously the discharge of a leading union advocate is a most effec-
tive method of undermining a union organizational effort." N.LR.B. v.
Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc.. 346 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.A 5. 1965).
John Klann Moving and Trucking Company v. N. L R. B., 411
F.2d 261, 263 (C.A. 6, 1969).
It would unduly prolong this Decision to analyze each of
the other reasons advanced by the Respondent as a basis
for its action in discharging Friedland. Suffice it to say
these reasons were drawn from the same well and manifest-
ed the same motives. They were additional pretexts to ice
the cake more thickly and to create an acceptability when,
in fact, the motive was tainted. However, two of the rea-
sons listed in the December 20 termination letter as justifi-
cation for the discharge, which the General Counsel main-
tains constituted a violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act,
warrant further comment, viz:
you have verbally threatened co-workers and Supervi-
sors that you are keeping written reports on them and
that you will report them to Federal officials.
you have accused supervisory staff of racial discrimina-
tion and caused devisiveness [sic] with co-workers, es-
pecially black workers in relation to these unfounded
accusations.
When the Respondent discharged Friedland, in part30
because he "threatened" to use the Board's procedures
(which is the inescapable meaning of the words used by the
Respondent in light of the credited record in this case), the
Respondent interfered with his rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act and hence violated Section 8(a)(4) of the
Act.
In light of the circumstances revealed by the credited
record, the discharge of Friedland, in part, for the latter
reason set out above involving racial discrimination3 l in-
terfered with Friedland's right to engage in protected con-
certed activities (see Diagnostic Center Hospital Corp. of
Texas, 228 NLRB 1215 (1977)), and was also a violation of
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
Accordingly, it is found that by the discharge of Lewis
Friedland on December 20, 1976, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(X), (3), and (4) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and it will
effectuate the purposes of the Act for jurisdiction to be
exercised herein.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(aXl1) of the Act.
30 "[I If his discharge was even partially motivated by his union activity.
there is a violation of § 8(a)3)." N. L R.B. v. George J. Roberts & Sons, Inc.,
d/b/a The Roberts Press, 451 F.2d 941, 945 (C.A. 2, 1971).
31 Among other things, Friedland told Davila that "none of the black
workers on our shift were given Thanksgiving off even though they had
seniority in terms of time" and that he "considered it a form of discrimna-
tion."
69
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. By unlawfully discharging Lewis Friedland on De-
cember 20, 1976, and refusing to reinstate him, the Respon-
dent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It
having been found that the Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged Lewis Friedland on December 20, 1976, and has
since failed and refused to reinstate him, because of his
protected concerted activities, in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, it is recommended in accordance with
Board policy, that the Respondent offer the foregoing em-
ployee immediate and full reinstatement to his former posi-
tion, or, if such position no longer exists to a substantially
equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges, dismissing if necessary any em-
ployees hired on or since December 20, 1976, to fill any of
said positions, and make him whole for any loss of earnings
he may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's acts
herein detailed, by payment to him of a sum of money
equal to the amount he would have earned from the date of
his unlawful discharge to the date of an offer of reinstate-
ment, less net earnings during such period, to be computed
on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board
in F. W. Wodlworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and
including Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 130 NLRB 716
(1962).
Relying on Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 1234 (1972), 196
NLRB 158 (1972); Heck's Inc., 215 NLRB 765 (1974); and
The Hartz Mountain Corporation, 228 NLRB 492 (1977),
the General Counsel requests that the Respondent be re-
quired to make the parties whole for litigation expenses
incurred as a result of the Respondent's unlawful conduct.
I have examined these cases and it is my opinion that the
policies therein enunciated justify the granting of the Gen-
eral Counsel's request.
In this case, the Respondent, deliberately, well knowing
the calculated risk, caused the discharge of an employee,32
obtaining thereby a carefully planned result, i.e., the dis-
couragement of union activity and the discouragement of
its employees' appealing to the Board for the correction of
and restraint on the Respondent's misconduct. Having ob-
viously reaped the benefit of its premeditated misconduct,
which is in the nature of an unjust enrichment, the Respon-
dent ought not now be allowed to object to the payment of
the full price, including the parties' litigation expenses.
Moreover, while the Respondent flouts the Act, the evil
32 "We believe that a discriminatory discharge of an employee because
of his union affiliations goes to the very heart of the Act." N.LR.B. v.
Entwistle Manufacturing Company, 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941). See also
May Department Stores Company d/b/a Famous-Barr Company v. N. L R.B.,
326 U.S. 376 (1945); Bethlehem Steel Company v. N.L.R.B., 120 F.2d 641
(C.A.D.C., 1941).
33 "A mere cease and desist order . . may serve only to represent
formal acknowledgment of the law while the offender maintains full posses-
which the Act seeks to eradicate continues unabated and
the Respondent is afforded "a chance to profit from a
stubborn refusal to abide by the law." See Franks Bros.
Company v. N.LR.B., 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944).33 The rem-
edy under the Act anticipates a restoration of the status quo
ante and the deterence of future violations of the Act. The
Board under Section 10(c) of the Act is authorized to order
an offender "to take such affirmative action . . . as will
effectuate the policies of this Act." Here it is patent that the
conventional remedies have not operated as a deterrent for,
in the face of their sanctions, the Respondent deliberately
flouted the Act. In choosing its course, the Respondent
obviously assumed the contingent liabilities flowing from
its misconduct as expenditures worth the risk. Thus, in
order that the Act does not cave in to the pressures of this
kind of tactic and that the Government and other litigants
are not put to great expense in obtaining even the conven-
tional relief, it seems meet and right that, if the Act is to be
effectuated, the parties be allowed their litigation costs ex-
pended in this case, the extraordinary relief requested by
the General Counsel. Such expenses are allowed.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER34
The Respondent, Glenside Hospital, Boston, Massachu-
setts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in District 1199, Massa-
chusetts, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Em-
ployees, RWDSU, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, or discouraging employees from availing themselves
of the Board's processes of filing unfair labor practice
charges by unlawfully discharging any of its employees or
discriminating in any other manner with respect to their
hire or tenure of employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (4) of the Act.
(b) Unlawfully threatening to suspend or discipline em-
ployees for engaging in protected concerted activities.
(c) Unlawfully spying or creating the impression that it is
spying on its employees' concerted or union activities.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing any employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, to engage in self-organization, to bargain
collectively through a representative of their own choosing,
to act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any and all these things.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Lewis Friedland immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former position or, if such position no longer
sion of the fruits of its violation." Montgomery Ward & Co., Incorporated v.
N. LR.B., 339 F.2d 889, 894 (C.A. 6, 1965).
34 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
70
GLENSIDE HOSPITAL
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered
by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him
in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled "Remedy," and otherwise
comply fully with the "Remedy."
(b) Remove the "Memorandum to Personnel File," dated
November 15, 1976, from Lewis Friedland's file.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms
of this recommended Order.
35 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
(d) Post at its Jamaica Plain hospital, Boston, Massachu-
setts, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 5
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by the Re-
spondent's representative shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily post-
ed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region I, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
71