Glenda F. Stewart, Complainant,v.Michael W. Wynne, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 17, 2009
0120080852 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 17, 2009)

0120080852

07-17-2009

Glenda F. Stewart, Complainant, v. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Glenda F. Stewart,

Complainant,

v.

Michael W. Wynne,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080852

Hearing No. 150-2006-00132X

Agency No. 8I1M04033

DECISION

On December 1, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's October

29, 2007 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as an Air Reserve Technician ("ART")1 for the Department of the Air

Force in its 919th Special Operations Wing at Eglin Air Force Base

in Florida. On November 2, 2004, complainant filed an EEO complaint

alleging that she was discriminated against and harassed on the bases

of race (African-American) and sex (female)2 when:

(1) On April 9, 2004, complainant's skill codes were not updated upon

her request, while others received expedited service;

(2) On June 23, 2004, she was required to perform strenuous mail room

duties;

(3) On June 25, 2004, she was required to move her belongings into the

mail room and her extra duties were terminated;

(4) On July 11, 2004, she was treated less favorably than a male co-worker

during reclassification of positions; and

(5) On November 3, 2004, she was qualified, but not considered for a

promotion to the Workgroup Manager's position.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on November 7, 2006 and

issued a decision on September 14, 2007.

In the case at bar, the AJ found that the agency has articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically,

the AJ found the following: as to issue (1) concerning the updating

of skill codes, the agency reviewed complainant's request relatively

quickly in comparison with her White, male co-worker's (C1) request.

The agency additionally explained that after conducting the review

of complainant's request, it concluded that the proper "skill codes"

(335 and 344) were already in complainant's Civilian Brief, and she was

not entitled to additional (2210) skill codes. In sum, complainant and

C1 were treated the same as they were both credited with the same skill

codes. Addressing issue (2), the agency explained that complainant,

C1, and her White female co-worker (C2) were all responsible for mail

room duties, none of which were overly strenuous (unless you were

injured), and that the three of them provided assistance when able.

When C2 became injured complainant was required to help more than she

had helped in the past. According to complainant, when C2 returned, she

no longer had to cover for her. With respect to issue (3) involving the

alleged taking away of duties from complainant, complainant's supervisor

(S1) articulated that C1 and complainant were treated the same in that

when S1 got tired of the bickering over who should be performing which

duties (outside of the employees' position descriptions), she decided

to perform all the duties herself. As to the claim concerning moving

her belongings to the mail room, S1 testified that C2 was also asked

to move into the mail room, therefore, the two were treated equally.

In any event, complainant refused the instruction to move her belongings

there, and admits that she received no discipline for such refusal.

As to issue (4), the AJ found that the agency indicated that it followed

regulations in this process of reclassification, and that complainant

was not eligible for the position which C1 obtained because she was

already a GS-7. Therefore, this would have been a lateral assignment,

not a promotion. As to issue (5), complainant was not selected for the

position in question because she was not among the top three candidates

based on the score she received. Moreover, complainant failed to

show that she had plainly superior qualifications as compared with the

selectee's qualifications. Although complainant asserted that she would

have been selected if her skill codes had been updated, the AJ noted

that this argument had been previously discounted. The AJ found that

complainant presented no evidence that the agency's reasons are pretexts

for discrimination.

The AJ then addressed complainant's claim that these incidents, taken

together, constituted race and sex-based harassment. The AJ found

that complainant did not show that the conduct at issue was severe or

pervasive enough to be unlawful, nor did she show that the agency's

actions were motivated by her membership in a protected group. The AJ

found no discrimination. The agency subsequently issued a final order

adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that she was

subjected to discrimination as alleged.

Complainant makes no arguments on appeal. The agency reiterates its

position that the AJ's decision was correct. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is

defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted).

A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a

factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293

(1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard

of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility

determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice

of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence

so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility

that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

The allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a

Title VII case alleging disparate treatment discrimination is a three

step procedure: complainant has the initial burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination;

the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action; and complainant must

then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate

reason offered by the employer was not its true reason, but was

a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Here, assuming complainant could establish a

prima facie case of discrimination on the alleged bases, the agency has

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for all of its actions.

The conclusion that complainant did not establish pretext, is supported

by substantial evidence in the record.

As to the harassment claim, we note that in order for harassment to

be considered as conduct in violation of the laws that the Commission

enforces, it must be pervasive or severe enough to significantly and

adversely alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create

an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510

U.S. 17 (1993). The conduct in question is evaluated from the standpoint

of a reasonable person, taking into account the particular context in

which it occurred. Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management Co., 805

F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986). The Commission notes that unless the conduct

is very severe, a single incident or group of isolated incidents will

not be regarded as discriminatory harassment. Walker v. Ford Motor Co.,

684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Here, the alleged harassment is

simply not severe or pervasive enough to be considered unlawful. Like the

AJ, we also find no persuasive evidence that the agency's actions were

motivated by complainant's membership in a protected group. Based on a

thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including

those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

________07/17/09__________

Date

1 As an ART, complainant holds both a military position in the rank

of Technical Sergeant and the civilian position, GS-344-05 Management

Assistant.

2 Complainant initially alleged age discrimination as well, but withdrew

this basis at the hearing, as well as some additional claims which she

had previously raised.

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0120080852

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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