Gil Don et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 31, 2019

14224129 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/224,129 03/25/2014 Gil Don PIS-PU-002-US2 2296
60956 7590 10/31/2019
Professional Patent Solutions
P.O. BOX 654
HERZELIYA PITUACH, 46105
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
OYEBISI, OJO O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
office@propats.com
utalmi@propats.com
vsherman@propats.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte GIL DON, ALON FEIT, and
VICTORIA NIEL KRAINE
____________________

Appeal 2018-001052
Application 14/224,129
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHN D. HAMANN, and
ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges.

YAP, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1–13 and 17–24.1 June 25, 2015 Final Office Action (“Final Act.”).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies “Pay It Simple Ltd.” as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
According to the Specification, Appellant’s invention “relates to a
system and method for facilitating financial credit installments.” (March 25,
2014 Specification (“Spec.”) ¶ 2.) Claim 1 is illustrative, and is reproduced
below (with minor reformatting):
1. A method for facilitating credit, said method comprising:
receiving, by processing circuitry, over a data
network, using communication circuitry:
(i) a request for credit or funds for a party
having a credit line with one or more credit
providers,
(ii) an amount of the credit or funds and
(iii) details of the credit lines;
automatically generating, using the received details,
one or more first credit requests for the amount;
securitizing, by the processing circuitry, over the
data network, an amount of the credit or funds,
against one or more credit lines provided by the one
more credit providers to the party by transmitting
the generated first credit requests to the one or more
credit providers and receiving from the one or more
credit providers authorizations of the requests;
upon successful securitization, granting the
requested credit or funds;
storing a first record of the granted credit or funds
within one or more data storages adapted to store a
record for each of multiple credit or fund grants,
which records include, for each given grant of credit
or funds: the received details of the given grant,
details of a latest received authorization relating to
the given grant, terms of payment of the given
granted credit or funds and a current outstanding
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balance of the given granted credit or funds;
monitoring, using monitoring circuitry functionally
associated with the data storages, dates of expiration
of latest received authorizations stored in said
records;
triggering, by the monitoring circuitry, a re-
securitization module to re-securitize a given grant
of credit or funds prior to expiration of a latest
received authorization relating to the given grant of
credit or funds; and
prior to expiration of a securitization of the credit
resulting from said securitizing, automatically re-
securitizing, by the processing circuitry, an
outstanding balance of the granted credit or funds
by:
(i) automatically generating, upon being
triggered by the monitoring circuitry, a
second set of one or more credit requests for
a current outstanding balance of the granted
credit or funds, based on the data stored in
said records,
(ii) transmitting the second set of credit
requests to the one or more credit providers
and
(iii) receiving from the one or more credit
providers second authorizations of the second
set of credit requests.

Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1–13 and 17–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as not
being directed to patent-eligible subject matter. (See Final Act. 2–3.)

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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We are not persuaded the Examiner
erred in rejecting the claims on appeal.

101 Rejection Legal Framework
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, our
inquiry focuses on the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in
Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
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omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The Office recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“Memorandum”), 84 Fed. Reg. 50.
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See generally Memorandum.
Applying the guidance set forth in the Memorandum, we conclude
that claims 1–13 and 17–24 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter.

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Step 1 – Statutory Claims and Memorandum
Alice involves determining whether the claims recite an exception to
an otherwise statutory category under 35 U.S.C § 101. See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 216–17. Similarly, under the Memorandum, the PTO first determines
“whether the claim is to a statutory category (Step 1).” Memorandum, 84
Fed. Reg. at 53. Here, the challenged claims recite a method, namely a
method “for facilitating credit.”

Step 2a Prong 1 – Abstract Idea
The Memorandum instructs us first to determine whether each claim
recites any judicial exception to patent eligibility. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. The
Memorandum identifies three judicially-excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices, and (3) mental processes. Id. at 52.
The Examiner finds that “the claims are directed towards the abstract
idea of facilitating financial credit installments [and because f]acilitating
financial credit installments is a fundamental economic practice[], claims 1–
13 [and] 17–24[, therefore,] include an abstract idea.” (Final Act. 2; Ans. 3.)
Appellant contends that claim 1 is “not directed to an abstract idea.” (App.
Br. 12.) According to Appellant:
The pending claims are not directed to facilitating credit, as the
Examiner alleges. Facilitating credit is a byproduct of the
claimed invention. The pending are directed to a novel
interface/proxy between a merchant payment system and
automated credit provider systems (e.g.[,] credit card provider
automated systems), which novel interface/proxy is designed to
improve the fund security service provided to consumers by the
automated credit provider systems. This is accomplished by the
novel interface/proxy using a uniquely configured database,
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server(s) and associated communication circuitry all designed to
interface between the merchant payment system and the credit
provider systems and enable an extended automated fund
securitization, based on a calculated series of properly timed
short term automated fund securitizations provided by the
automated systems of the primary credit providers. . . .
(Id. at 13.) When analyzing a claim under section 101, it is imperative to
“ensure . . . that we articulate what the claims are directed to with enough
specificity to ensure the . . . inquiry is meaningful.” Thales Visionix Inc. v.
U.S., 850 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Further, “it is not enough to
merely identify a patent-ineligible concept underlying the claim[s]; we must
determine whether the patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is
‘directed to.’” Id. at 1349, internal citation omitted.
Claim 1 recites “[a] method for facilitating credit.” Specifically,
claim 1 recites steps for (step a) “receiving [] (i) a request for credit or funds
for a party having a credit line with one or more credit providers, (ii) an
amount of the credit or funds and (iii) details of the credit lines;” (step b)
“automatically generating, using the received details, one or more first
credit requests for the amount;” (step c) “securitizing [] an amount of the
credit or funds, against one or more credit lines provided by the one more
credit providers to the party by transmitting the generated first credit
requests to the one or more credit providers and receiving from the one or
more credit providers authorizations of the requests;” (step d) “upon
successful securitization, granting the requested credit or funds;” (step e)
“storing a first record of the granted credit or funds . . . ;” (step f)
“monitoring [] dates of expiration of latest received authorizations stored in
said records;” (step g) “triggering [] a re-securitization module to re-
securitize a given grant of credit or funds prior to expiration of a latest
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received authorization relating to the given grant of credit or funds;” and
(step h) “prior to expiration of a securitization of the credit resulting from
said securitizing, automatically re-securitizing [] an outstanding balance of
the granted credit or funds by (i) automatically generating [] a second set of
one or more credit requests for a current outstanding balance of the granted
credit or funds, based on the data stored in said records, (ii) transmitting the
second set of credit requests to the one or more credit providers and
(iii) receiving from the one or more credit providers second authorizations of
the second set of credit requests.”
In applying guidance to the claims on appeal, we determine that the
independent claims recite an abstract idea in the recited steps a–h. These
steps, individually and collectively, recite certain methods of organizing
human activity such as fundamental economic practices. Appellant’s Step
a—receiving a request for credit or funds for a party having a credit line
with one or more credit providers—is a step of receiving a request for credit
or funds, which is a fundamental economic practice. Step b— automatically
generating, using the received details, one or more first credit requests for
the amount— is a step of requesting for credit or funds, which is a
fundamental economic practice. Step c—securitizing [] an amount of the
credit or funds, against one or more credit lines provided by the one more
credit providers to the party by transmitting the generated first credit
requests to the one or more credit providers and receiving from the one or
more credit providers authorizations of the requests—is a step of securitizing
and transmitting a credit request and receiving authorization of the request,
is a step of requesting and receiving authorization for credit or funds, which
is a fundamental economic practice. Step d—upon successful securitization,
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granting the requested credit or funds—is a step of granting the requested
credit, which is a fundamental economic practice. Step e— storing a first
record of the granted credit or funds . . .—is a step of storing the data
relating to the request and authorization for credit or funds, which is a
fundamental economic practice. Step f—monitoring [] dates of expiration of
latest received authorizations stored in said records—is a step of monitoring
the expiration date of authorization for credit or funds, which is a
fundamental economic practice. Steps g and h—triggering [] a re-
securitization module to re-securitize a given grant of credit or funds prior to
expiration of a latest received authorization relating to the given grant of
credit or funds; prior to expiration of a securitization of the credit resulting
from said securitizing, automatically re-securitizing [] an outstanding
balance of the granted credit or funds by (i) automatically generating [] a
second set of one or more credit requests for a current outstanding balance of
the granted credit or funds, based on the data stored in said records,
(ii) transmitting the second set of credit requests to the one or more credit
providers and (iii) receiving from the one or more credit providers second
authorizations of the second set of credit requests——are steps of restarting
a new request for credit or funds prior to expiration of the credit or funds
authorization (i.e., repeating the previous steps prior to expiration of the
credit or funds authorization), which is a fundamental economic practice.
Facilitating credit by requesting credit and securitizing the requested credit
is analogous to processing of financial transactions found to be fundamental
economic practices. See e.g., Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Taken together,
the Asserted Claims are directed to the formation of financial transactions in
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a particular field . . . and data collection related to such transactions,” which
is “an abstract idea under Alice step one.”); Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (summarizing precedent in which “claims directed to the
performance of certain financial transactions” involve abstract ideas and
holding that claims drawn to the abstract concept of financial transaction-
related “data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-
known.”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (Claims reciting sending and receiving communications over a
computer network to facilitate online commercial transactions are directed to
“contractual relations, which are intangible entities” and “constitute[] a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce.”). In sum, steps a–h recite a certain method of organizing human
activity such as fundamental economic practices. As such, the claimed steps
recite a patent-ineligible abstract idea.

Step 2a Prong 2 – Integration of the Judicial Exception
into a Practical Application
In applying step 2a, prong 2 of the Memorandum, we determine that
the independent claims do not integrate the recited judicial exception into a
practical application because the claims do not apply, rely on, or use the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
exception. Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
If a claim recites a judicial exception, we determine whether the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that
exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements
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recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating
those additional elements individually and in combination to determine
whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception. “[T]he term ‘additional elements’
. . . refer[s] to claim features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the
claim beyond the identified judicial exception.” Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55, n.24, emphasis added.
Claim 1, directed to a method for facilitating credit, recites additional
elements beyond the steps that constitute the identified abstract idea,
namely, the additional elements of a data network, data storages, processing
and monitoring circuitries, and a securitization module. As set forth in the
Specification, the method steps are processes of a computer or computing
system and the “apparatuses for performing the operations [] may be
specially constructed for the desired purposes, or it may comprise a general-
purpose computer selectively activated or reconfigured by a computer
program stored in the computer.” See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 43–44, 46. The
Specification further states that “[s]uch a computer program may be stored
in a computer readable storage medium” and the processes “are not
inherently related to any particular computer or other apparatus,” “are not
described with reference to any particular programming language [and] a
variety of programming languages may be used to implement the teachings
of the inventions.” Id. ¶ 46. In other words, these additional elements are
software modules (e.g., processing and monitoring circuitries and the
securitization module) or generic components (e.g., the data network and
data storages of a computer systems). Hence, these additional components
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are not distinguishable from a general purpose computer system and do not
integrate the exception into a practical application.2
We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that “if these
claims were patented, Visa would not be infringing them in any way.” App.
Br. 13–15. Appellant’s pre-emption arguments are not persuasive. First, the
abstract idea encompasses what Appellant sets forth as additional elements
in that Appellant’s proposed additional elements encompass the abstract
idea. See id. Second, the question of pre-emption is not grounded on
whether all methods for accomplishing the intended goal are pre-empted, but
rather on whether the claim pre-empts application of the abstract idea
embodied in the claim. See id. It is, accordingly, of no import that the
claims do not read on existing, conventional methods. Third, the absence of
complete pre-emption does not demonstrate patent eligibility because even
though the principle of pre-emption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to
patentability, the concern is fully addressed and rendered moot where the
claim is determined to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the
two-part framework described in Mayo and Alice. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As explained in
Alice, “the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the idea] to a particular
technological environment.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 222–23 (internal citations
and quotations omitted).

2 We agree with the Examiner’s finding that “the recited ‘computing
system,’ ‘data network’ and ‘processing and monitoring circuitry’ are recited
at a high level of generality to simply perform the generic computer
functions of receiving, processing, calculating, transmitting and storing
information.” Ans. 3–4.
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Furthermore, the alleged improvement (“monitoring expiration dates of
securitizations and automatically generating and transmitting a new request
prior to the expiration of the old one”) does not improve the functioning of a
computer itself. App. Br. 16. For claims directed to computer software, the
issue is whether “the focus of the claims is on [a] specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir.
2016), emphasis added. Here, the computer capabilities are not improved.
Rather, any alleged improvement is still using the computer as a tool.
Therefore, unlike the claims in Enfish, which were directed to a “self-
referential table for a computer database” that operated differently from
conventional databases and improved the computer’s function, claim 1, in
contrast, is merely implemented on a general purpose computer and does not
provide an improvement in the function of the computer.
For these reasons, we determine that claim 1 does not integrate the
recited abstract idea into a practical application.

Step 2b – Inventive Concept
Because we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea, we consider whether an additional element (or combination of
elements) adds a limitation that is not well-understood, routine, conventional
(“WURC”) activity in the field or whether the additional elements simply
append WURC activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Memorandum, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56. The Examiner’s finding that an additional element (or
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combination of elements) is WURC activity must be supported with a
factual determination. Id. (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d), as modified by the
Berkheimer Memorandum3).
Whether the additional elements are WURC activity is a question of
fact. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a
skilled artisan . . . is a factual determination.”).
Here, Appellant contends that the “‘transmitting,’ ‘storing,’
‘monitoring,’ and ‘triggering’ steps recited in the pending claims are clearly
not merely applying the abstract idea in a well-known and conventional
manner[, and] the steps are clearly not known and unconventional. In fact,
they have never been practiced in this fashion before, making them clearly
unconventional.” App. Br. 16. Appellant further contends that “monitoring
expiration dates of securitizations and automatically generating and
transmitting a new request prior to the expiration of the old one was not
performed by anyone in this field prior to the present application (hence the
lack of prior art rejections), thereby this is clearly not a conventional, nor
well known, manner.” Id.
The Examiner disagrees and notes that:
the recited “computing system,” “data network” and “processing
and monitoring circuitry” are recited at a high level of generality
to simply perform the generic computer functions of receiving,
processing, calculating, transmitting and storing information.
(i.e., That is, the computer processor is provided to process
certain instructions or data; input from the user is received to

3 R. W. Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.) (2018) (hereinafter “Berkheimer Memorandum”).
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provide an indication of a first consideration to be applied in the
process and to indicate an expression of interest by the user in
certain types of the descriptive material; a particular display of
information is presented based upon the first consideration and
the indication of expressed interest received; and a provision is
made to allow the user to complete an instance or session of the
process). Thus, generic computer components recited as
performing generic computer functions that are well-understood,
routine and conventional activities amount to no more than
implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system.
Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to
significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception
(the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination of elements add nothing that is not already present
when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no
indication that the combination of the elements improves the
functioning of a computer or improves any other technology.
Their collective functions merely provide conventional computer
implementation.
Id. at 3–4.
We agree with the Examiner’s findings. Appellant’s arguments are
not persuasive because they address the recited judicial exception itself,
rather than any additional element. The analysis in the second step of the
Alice/Mayo framework is a search for “an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18, internal citation omitted.
Furthermore, even if novel, judicial exceptions are patent ineligible
absent further elements amounting to significantly more that transforms
them into eligible subject matter. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92 (“[T]he novelty
of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.”); Ass’n for
Mol. Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)
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(“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d
1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“No matter how much of an advance in the
finance field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of
abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract
application realm.”); Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim directed to a newly discovered law of
nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of
that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility.”);
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”). The
relied upon steps Appellant contends are not conventional do not,
accordingly, transform the ineligible subject matter, because they are not
something more than, but are, rather, part of the ineligible concept.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–13 and
17–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–13 101 1–13
Overall
Outcome 1–13

DECISION
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We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–13 and 17–24 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED