Gerber & Hurley, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 4, 1984

269 N.L.R.B. 856 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gerber and Hurley, Inc. and Teamsters Local No.
443, a/w the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America. Case 39-CA-1214
4 April 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 26 August 1983 Administrative Law Judge
James F. Morton issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally
removing the position of counterman from the cer-
tified unit and thereby withdrawing recognition
from the Union as the exclusive representative of
the employee who held that position. The Re-
spondent has excepted to the judge's rejection of
its affirmative defense that the instant proceedings
are barred by Section 10(b) and his findings and
conclusions on the merits. We find merit in the Re-
spondent's exceptions.
The Respondent sells and distributes roofing ma-
terials at its warehouse and office facility located in
West Haven, Connecticut. In July 1981 the Union
filed a petition for an election in a unit consisting
of the Respondent's "drivers, warehousemen, and
yardmen" and excluding, inter alia, office clerical
employees and salesmen. At a preelection confer-
ence the Respondent requested that employee
McMinn be included in the unit assertedly because
he worked more than 50 percent of his time in the
warehouse; the rest of the time McMinn worked at
the counter. The Union reluctantly consented to in-
clude McMinn in the unit and the parties signed a
stipulated election agreement. McMinn was includ-
ed on the eligibility list furnished by the Respond-
ent and voted without challenge in the election.
The Union won the election, five votes to one, and
was certified on 4 September 1981.
Following certification the parties met four or
five times for negotiations that culminated in the
execution of a collective-bargaining agreement on
20 November 1981. The agreement expressly cov-
ered two classifications: straight driver-warehouse
and trailer driver-warehouse. Within a few days
269 NLRB No. 146
after the contract was signed the Union's business
agent Buonpane appointed a steward and asked
him to pass out insurance forms and signature cards
to the employees. Shortly thereafter the steward in-
formed Buonpane that McMinn either did not want
to, or was not allowed to, sign a card. Buonpane
testified that he spoke with the Respondent's presi-
dent Schnipper about McMinn "in the latter part of
1981 'and into the spring of 1982." On 14 April
1982 Buonpane wrote a letter to Schnipper stating,
inter alia, that McMinn "is part of the bargaining
unit" and that the Union "will pursue this issue
through legal means." Buonpane also wrote that
the Respondent had insisted on including McMinn
in the unit as a warehouseman and "[b]ased on
those issues I didn't negotiate a separate rate or
classification for Joseph McMinn."
On 26 April the Respondent's attorney respond-
ed in a letter to Buonpane that McMinn, whom the
attorney described as a "salesman," no longer per-
formed any warehouse duties and therefore the
Union's request" that he be included in the unit
was inappropriate. The Union filed the instant
unfair labor practice charge on 15 June 1982.
The judge found that the Respondent could not
rely on Section 10(b) as a matter of law because it
withdrew recognition of McMinn's position during
the certification year. Moreover, regarding the Re-
spondent's 10(b) defense on the facts, the judge
found that the "first unequivocal notice" given to
the Union of such withdrawal of recognition oc-
curred with the 10(b) period, i.e., in connection
with the Respondent's 26 April letter, although
finding that the Respondent had made earlier indi-
rect approaches to the Union "outside the negotia-
tions" to gain the Union's consent to exclude
McMinn. Further, on the merits, the judge rejected
the Respondent's argument that the parties, by the
contract, had agreed to exclude McMinn. He also
found that McMinn's duties were not changed until
16 April when he received a raise, and that any
such change in duties appears to have been nomi-
nal. Based on the above, the judge concluded that
the Respondent unilaterally removed the position
of counterman from the unit and thereby withdrew
recognition from the Union with respect to that
position in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5).
As an initial matter we find, contrary to the
judge, that the instant proceedings are barred by
the 6-month limitations period of Section 10(b).
First, regarding the judge's finding that the Re-
spondent could not rely on Section 10(b) as a
matter of law because the withdrawal of recogni-
tion of McMinn's position occurred during the cer-
tification year, we disagree with the judge's char-
acterization of the Respondent's conduct as a with-
856
GERBER & HURLEY, INC.
drawal of recognition. It is clear from the record
that McMinn was included in the unit in the first
place only because he assertedly spent more than
half his time in the warehouse performing unit
work. Thus, McMinn's duties as a counterman
never formed the basis for his inclusion in the unit;
the Union never claimed to be representative of the
counterman's position, nor was it ever recognized
as such. Consequently there could be no withdraw-
al of recognition when the Respondent changed
McMinn's duties so that he no longer worked in
the warehouse, regardless of when the change in
duties occurred.
Further, concerning the judge's finding that
there was no factual basis for the limitations period
of Section 10(b) to apply, we disagree with the
judge's finding that the Union did not receive
notice of the "withdrawal of recognition" until it
was advised by the Respondent's 26 April letter
that McMinn no longer performed warehouse
work. Rather, we find that the Union was on
notice that McMinn no longer worked in the ware-
house apparently as early as the start of contract
negotiations in September 1981, and at least around
the time of the execution of the contract on 20 No-
vember 1981.
We derive support of this finding from the testi-
mony of union representative Buonpane himself.
On direct examination Buonpane testified that there
was no discussion of McMinn during the negotiat-
ing sessions. On being asked when he first learned
that there was a dispute concerning McMinn,
Buonpane indicated that it was a short time after
the contract was signed, i.e., when the steward re-
ported back to him that McMinn did not sign a
card. Buonpane further testified that he first talked
to Schnipper about this in the "latter part of 1981,"
when Schnipper "said that McMinn no longer did
any warehouse work and he was strictly a counter
person, and he didn't feel a [sic] though he should
be part of the bargaining unit."
On cross-examination Buonpane was asked to
deny that Schnipper "during those [bargaining] ses-
sions and before the contract was concluded" in-
formed him that McMinn no longer performed any
unit work. Buonpane responded as follows:
That was Mr. Snipper's [sic] position all along
in all the conversations I ever had with him,
but I don't believe that during the regular
direct negotiations that at any particular time
did Mr. Snipper [sic] raise the point that-oh,
his contention all long was that Mr. McMinn
shouldn't be part of the bargaining unit.
I don't recollect whether it was discussed spe-
cifically during the negotiations or afterward.
After the election, that was always Mr. Snip-
per's [sic] position.
Later, in response to a question posed by the judge,
to wit, "as of the time that you signed that contract
and when you were negotiating the contract, as I
understand it, you had been told by Mr. Snipper
[sic] that McMinn was no longer doing warehouse
work. Right?" Buonpane answered, "Right."
Thus it is apparent, by Buonpane's own admis-
sions, that some discussion of McMinn's status oc-
curred during or at the time of the bargaining ses-
sions, which undeniably was more than 6 months
prior to the filing of the charge in June 1982. It is
further apparent that as a result of these discussions
the Union was aware that McMinn no longer was
performing unit work, a fact that the Respondent
merely reiterated in its letter of 26 April.
McMinn's testimony is not inconsistent with this
finding. Although the judge stated that McMinn
testified that his duties as a counterman did not
change until he was told on 16 April, when he was
given a raise, that he was no longer to perform
warehouse work, the record does not clearly sup-
port such a finding. Thus, on direct examination
McMinn was asked, "Since the election, have you
worked in the warheouse at all?" to which he re-
sponded, "No." On cross-examination the follow-
ing exchange occurred:
Q. [By Respondent's counsel] After the
union election, did you ever work in the ware-
house any more?
A. [By McMinn] No, not since.
Q. In fact, didn't Mr. Snipper [sic] tell you,
"That's it. You are now exclusively a sales
person."
A. Yes.
Q. Didn't you in fact subsequently receive a
raise commensurate with that promotion? [Em-
phasis added.]
A. I did.
Later, when the judge asked McMinn when he re-
ceived the raise, McMinn responded, "One year, I-
1/2 years or so. As soon as I was totally inside the
office." It subsequently was stipulated that
McMinn received a raise on 16 April 1982.
Thus, on the one hand it appears that McMinn
stopped working in the warehouse immediately
after the election, which would have been about a
year and a half prior to the hearing in this case,
and that he received the pay raise subsequent to
the change in his duties. On the other hand it ap-
pears that the change in duties and the pay raise
may have occurred about the same time, i.e., in
April 1982. In any event the record provides only
857
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
equivocal support for the judge's finding that
McMinn's duties were changed on 16 April. In our
view such ambiguous testimony by McMinn is in-
sufficient to rebut the Respondent's 10(b) defense.
Even assuming that the judge correctly found
that the instant proceedings were not barred by the
provisions of Section 10(b), we still would not find
that the Respondent violated its duty to bargain
with the Union. As we have found above, the Re-
spondent did not "withdraw recognition" from the
Union as to the position held by McMinn. All that
was involved here was the change in the job duties
of one individual. This change in McMinn's duties
merely operated to take him out of the unit, much
as when a unit employee is promoted to a supervi-
sory position. The Board has held that an employer
is not obligated to bargain about such a change in
personnel so long as it does not involve the aboli-
tion of unit jobs.' There has been no showing here
that the change in McMinn's duties had any ad-
verse impact on the unit, such as a decrease in the
amount of unit work. If anything the change in
McMinn's duties would have had a favorable
impact on the unit; that is, if he no longer per-
formed warehouse work, most likely more war-
house work became available for the regular
driver/warehouse employees to perform. In these
circumstances we cannot find that the Respondent
had an obligation to bargain with the Union about
the change in McMinn's job duties or status. Ac-
cordingly, we find that the Respondent's unilateral
action with respect to McMinn did not constitute a
refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5).
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
I See, e.g., Central Cartage, 236 NLRB 1232, 1258 (1978); KONO-TV-
Mission Telecasting Corp., 163 NLRB 1005, 1008 (1967).
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES F. MORTON, Administrative Law Judge. The
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a complaint on August.4, 1982, against Gerber and
Hurley, Inc. (herein Respondent), after having investigat-
ed the underlying unfair labor practice charges filed on
June 15, 1982, by Teamsters Local No. 443, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America (herein the Union). That com-
plaint alleges that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act
(herein the Act) by having since about December 20,
1981, "failed to recognize and bargain with the Union as
the exclusive representative of its employee, Joseph E.
McMinn." McMinn was alleged in the complaint to have
been employed in the unit for which the Union has been
certified. Respondent filed an answer to that complaint
which denies that Respondent violated the Act as al-
leged and which asserts, as an affirmative defense, that
litigation of that issue was barred by reason of the 6-
month limitation period set forth in Section 10(b) of the
Act. I heard this case in Hartford, Connecticut, on
March 8, 1983.
Based on the entire record, including my observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after full consider-
ation of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and by
Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is engaged as a wholesaler and retailer of
roofing materials at its facility in West Haven, Connecti-
cut. Its answer admits, in essence, that the volume of its
operations meets the Board's jurisdictional standard for
nonretail business enterprises.
II. THE UNION
Based on the parties' stipulation at the hearing, I find
that the Union is a labor organization as defined in Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Relevant Facts
Respondent's facility in West Haven consists of a
warehouse and an adjacent office. It employs two trailer-
drivers, two straight truckdrivers, a warehouseman, a
counterman, and an unspecified number of salesmen and
office clerical employees. The truckdrivers perform
warehouse duties on those occasions when they are not
on the road.
On July 17, 1981, the Union filed a petition in Case
39-RC-228 for an election among the four drivers and
the one warehouseman. At a conference held in that
case, Respondent insisted that its counterman, Joseph
McMinn, had to be included in the voting unit. It repre-
sented to the Union that McMinn spent more than 50
percent of his working time performing warehousemen's
duties. In an uncontroverted statement set out in a letter
later sent to Respondent by the Union, the Union had re-
luctantly accepted this representation and agreed that
McMinn could vote. Respondent and the Union then
signed a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Elec-
tion for an election among employees in the following
unit:
All full-time and regular part-time drivers, ware-
housemen and yardmen employed by (Respondent)
at its West Haven, Connecticut location excluding
all office clerical employees, salesmen and guards,
professional employees and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
858
GERBER & HURLEY, INC.
Pursuant to the terms of that stipulation, Respondent
furnished an Excelsior list which contained the names
and addresses of the six employees eligible to vote in the
unit. McMinn was listed as one of the six. He voted
without challenge in the election held on August 27,
1981. The Union won and was certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative therefor on September 4, 1981.
Thereafter, the Union's business representative, Antho-
ny Buonpane, met with Respondent's president and Re-
spondent's counsel four or five times before reaching
agreement on a 3-year contract. Buonpane testified
before me that Respondent's president had, after the
election, expressed the "contention all along ... that
Mr. McMinn shouldn't be part of the bargaining unit."
Buonpane's testimony, on cross-examination, indicates
that Respondent's president, in furtherance of that effort,
stated that McMinn no longer did unit work. It appears
that the Union ignored those comments. Buonpane also
testified that, in the conract negotiations sessions, there
was no discussion of McMinn and no statements then by
Respondent's president or counsel that McMinn was no
longer performing unit work. The collective-bargaining
agreement reached is effective November 20, 1981, to
November 19, 1984. Article I thereof provides that Re-
spondent recognizes the Union as the representative "of
all employees in the classifications of work covered by
this Agreement." Exhibit A to the contract provides an
hourly wage rate in 1981 of $6.40 for the classification,
straight driver-warehouse, a rate of $7.40 for the classifi-
cation, trailer driver-warhouse. As noted earlier, the four
truckdrivers occasionally perform warehouse work.
There is no separate hourly rate or classification express-
ly listed in Exhibit A for the one unit employee who
works full time in the warehouse and no express classifi-
cation for counterman, i.e., McMinn. The testimony of
the Union's representative indicates that the warehouse
employee was paid in 1981 at the $6.40 rate and that that
rate was also to be applied to McMinn's position.
After the contract was signed, the Union's steward
passed out insurance forms and membership cards to the
employees who voted in the election. He later informed
Buonpane that McMinn said that he did not want "to
sign a card or [that Respondent] didn't want to allow
[him] to sign a card at that time." Buonpane testified that
he then spoke with Respondent's president, Carl Schnip-
per, about that report. This was in late 1981 or early in
1982. Buonpane related that Schnipper informed him
then, for the first time, that McMinn was "not part of
the bargaining unit." Buonpane offered to negotiate a
special rate for McMinn but Schnipper declined. On
April 14, Buonpane wrote Schnipper that it was Re-
spondent who had insisted on putting McMinn in the
unit, that the Union had initially opposed this effort, and
that the Union changed its position because of Respond-
ent's assurances, at the representation case conference,
that McMinn "spent a majority of his time" as a ware-
houseman. Buonpane concluded his letter by suggesting
that Schnipper may be following the wrong legal advice
and asked for an early reply.
Respondent's counsel replied by letter dated April 26,
1982, to Buonpane's letter. Therein, Respondent referred
to McMinn as "a salesman" who "no longer performs
any warehouse" duties. The letter concludes that "there-
fore [the Union] request that he be included in the unit is
totally inappropriate.
McMinn testified that his duties as counterman did not
change until he was told by Respondent on April 16,
1982, when given a raise (from S6.32 an hour to $7.62 an
hour) that he was no longer to perform warehouse
work. ' He further testified that, as of the hearing, he oc-
casionally goes into the warehouse "to look at materials"
but not to work there.
B. Analysis
I shall first treat with Respondent's affirmative defense
that Section 10(b) of the Act bars any determination of
the merits, or lack thereof, in this case. It is now settled
that the duty to bargain gives rise to an obligation con-
tinuing for at least the certification year.2 As it is obvi-
ous that Respondent, during the year immediately fol-
lowing the Union's certification, effectively has with-
drawn recognition from the Union as bargaining repre-
sentative for the position McMinn held, both when he
voted and until after Respondent notified the Union of
its effective withdrawal of recognition, I find that Re-
spondent cannot, as a matter of law, rely on Section
10(b) as a defense. As a factual matter also, I find no
merit to Respondent's contention. The onus is on Re-
spondent to establish that the actionable conduct oc-
curred more than 6 months before the unfair labor prac-
tice charge was filed.3 The uncontroverted evidence is
that Respondent's president had on various occasions ex-
pressed the opinion to the Union's business representative
that McMinn should not be kept in the unit and, in con-
nection therewith, asserted that McMinn no longer did
bargaining unit work. Respondent however never
broached that subject during the course of the five nego-
tiations sessions leading up to agreement on the terms of
the current contract. At best then, this evidence indicates
that Respondent, outside of the bargaining sessions,
sought the Union's agreement to exclude McMinn from
the unit even though he was included initially at Re-
spondent's insistence. There is no evidence that the
Union assented to that wish. Rather, its conduct consist-
ently indicates that it ignored the request, perhaps justifi-
ably so. When Respondent asserted, however, that
McMinn's duties had been changed to those of a sales-
man, and that McMinn was no longer in the unit, the
Union immediately contested Respondent's attempt to
exclude McMinn unilaterally. The uncontroverted testi-
mony establishes that the first unequivocal notice given
by Respondent to the Union that it unilaterally withdrew
recognition from the Union as McMinn's representative
took place within the 10(b) period. There is no doubt
that Respondent had made earlier repeated, indirect ap-
proaches to the Union to secure its consent to remove
McMinn from the unit and that those efforts were ig-
nored and not pursued in the course of the contract ne-
gotiations. It would not, in my view, promote the inter-
' The present contractual rates in force range from $7.40 to $8.40 an
hour.
2 Dardanell Enterprises, 250 NLRB 377, 379 (1980).
s Al Bryant, Inc, 260 NLRB 128, 133-134 (1982).
859
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ests of good-faith bargaining to require a party, such as
the Union here, to press for a formal unequivocal resolu-
tion of McMinn's unit placement while the parties are
seeking to work out the provisions of an initial contract.
The fact that Respondent itself did not broach the sub-
ject of McMinn's unit placement as a matter to be defini-
tively resolved during those negotiations suggests that
Respondent was not then openly engaged in any unilat-
eral action contrary to the position it had openly taken in
the course of the representation case proceedings as to
McMinn's unit placement.
On both legal and factual bases then, I find that Re-
spondent has not established that these proceedings are
barred by the provisions of Section 10(b) of the Act.
Respecting the merits of this case, Respondent relies
on the recognition clause of the current contract and the
fact that there is no express classification for McMinn's
counterman position set out in Exhibit A, annexed to
that agreement. In essence, Respondent is contending
that the parties, by the express terms of the contract, had
agreed to exclude the counterman position. That conten-
tion clearly lacks merit as the uncontroverted evidence
established that McMinn's unit placement was never al-
luded to in the negotiations. In that regard, I note that
Exhibit A contains no classification for the job of the
one individual who performs warehouseman's duties ex-
clusively and, yet, he is concededly in the unit. More sig-
nificantly, I note that Respondent's letter of April 14,
1982, does not suggest that the parties had, by the con-
tract provisions, agreed to exclude McMinn. Rather, Re-
spondent asserted in that letter that McMinn's duties had
been changed to those of a salesman and argued that
McMinn thus is outside the unit. In fact, however, as
McMinn's testimony discloses, his duties were not
changed until 2 days later at the earliest when he was
given a raise. Moreover, the change that took place ap-
pears to have been but nominal.
Respondent, in the 10(b) period, has attempted to
remove the position of counterperson, including
McMinn, from the certified unit, has unilaterally with-
drawn recognition from the Union as the exclusive rep-
resentative therefor and has thereby violated its duty to
bargain collectively with the Union.4
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Section 10(b) of the Act does not bar further pro-
ceeding in this case.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the
Act by unilaterally removing the employee performing
counterman duties from the unit and contract coverage
without prior notice to, bargaining with, or consent of,
the Union.
5. The unfair labor practices set out in paragraph 4 af-
fects commerce as defined in the Act.
4 El Centro Community Mental Health Center, 266 NLRB 1 (1983).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I recommend the issuance of the
followings
ORDER
Respondent, Gerber and Hurley, Inc., West Haven,
Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally withdrawing recognition from and re-
fusing to recognize Teamsters Local No. 443, a/w the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America as the sole and ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of the indi-
vidual it employs as a counterperson at its West Haven,
Connecticut location, including Joseph McMinn, without
prior notice to, bargaining with, or consent of Teamsters
Local No. 443.
(b) Unilaterally failing and refusing to apply any col-
lective-bargaining agreement between Respondent and
Teamsters Local No. 443 to the employee working as
counterperson, including Joseph McMinn, without prior
notice to, bargaining with, and consent of Teamsters
Local No. 443.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Apply all the terms and conditions of any collec-
tive-bargaining between Respondent and Teamsters
Local No. 443 to the employee performing the duties of
counterperson, including Joseph McMinn, unless and
until Respondent has obtained the consent of Teamsters
Local No. 443 to remove the employee so classified from
the coverage of any agreement.
(b) Make whole any employee performing the counter-
person's duties, including Joseph McMinn, for any loss
of wages and benefits, with interest, such employee may
have suffered, and Teamsters Local No. 443 any loss of
dues suffered, with interest thereon, as a result of Re-
spondent's failure to apply the collective-bargaining
agreement now in force.6
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its West Haven, Connecticut facility copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of
I If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
6 Interest shall be computed in the manner prescribed in Florida Steel
Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB
716, 717-721 (1962).
' If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
Continued
860
GERBER & HURLEY, INC.
the notice, on forms provided by the Officer-in-Charge
of Subregion 39, after being signed by Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
tive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Notify the Officer-in-Charge in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally refuse to recognize Team-
sters Local No. 443, a/w the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America, as the sole and exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of any employee classified as counterperson, includ-
ing Joseph McMinn, without prior union notice, bargain-
ing, and consent.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally refuse to apply all the terms
and conditions of our collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union, to any employee classified as counter-
person, including Joseph McMinn, without prior notice
to, bargaining with, and consent of the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed under Section of the Act.
WE WILL apply all the terms and conditions of our
collective-bargaining agreement with the Union to any
employee classified as counterperson, including Joseph
McMinn, until and unless we notify the Union of our
desire to remove the classification and the employee(s)
within that classification from the coverage of the agree-
ment, the Union has had an oppportunity to bargain con-
cerning the terms for such removal, and consented there-
to.
WE WILL make whole any employee classified as
counterperson, including Joseph McMinn, for any loss of
wages and benefits they may have suffered, and the
Union for any loss of dues suffered, with interest, by
reason of our failure to apply the terms of our collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union to that classifica-
tion.
GERBER AND HURLEY, INC.
861