Gerald A. Rather, Complainant,v.Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 17, 2003
01A23798 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 17, 2003)

01A23798

03-17-2003

Gerald A. Rather, Complainant, v. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Gerald A. Rather v. Department of Agriculture

01A23798

03-17-03

.

Gerald A. Rather,

Complainant,

v.

Ann M. Veneman,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A23798

Agency No. 950316

Hearing No. 370-99-X2497

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Zone Manager, GS-09 at the agency's

Shasta/Trinity National Forest facility, filed a formal EEO complaint

on March 9, 1995, alleging that the agency had discriminated against

him on the bases of race (Caucasian) and sex (male) when:

(1) his request on October 3, 1994 for approximately five months of

sick leave for the period from September 28, 1994, to March 31, 1995,

was denied; and

he was temporarily charged with annual leave instead of sick leave for

a six week period during approximately November to December 1994.

The record reveals that in September 1994, complainant saw his

doctor regarding stress that he was experiencing. Complainant's doctor

recommended that complainant seek counseling and provided a note, dated

September 8, 1994, excusing complainant from work due to medical illness

from September 8, 1994 through September 25, 1994. Complainant also

sought assistance from the Concern Program, a program designed to help

agency employees. Complainant went on extended sick leave for stress

and depression on October 3, 1994. The record reflects that complainant

requested 1,000 hours of sick leave in order to improve his health.

Complainant was told that because his request was for more than three days

leave, he would have to submit medical documentation from a physician.

Complainant submitted a note from a clinical psychologist. Complainant was

informed that the procedures for extended sick leave did not recognize the

recommendation from a clinical psychologist and that he would need a note

from a medical doctor. Complainant was evaluated by a psychiatrist on

December 8, 1995. During this time, complainant noticed, while reviewing

his payroll slip, that he was being charged annual leave instead of sick

leave. On December 15, 1994, complainant sent a letter to the agency

pointing out the leave mistake. He also submitted additional medical

documentation which excused him from work for medical reasons for the

six weeks that he had been charged annual leave. On December 20, 1994,

complainant received a letter which indicated that his leave had been

changed to sick leave.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no

discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to established a prima facie

case of race and sex discrimination as to all claims because he did not

show that similarly situated employees, not in his protected classes,

were treated differently when requesting sick leave. The AJ found that

complainant presented no evidence that any female or non-white employee

who had also requested such an unusually large amount of sick leave was

allowed to take it without first presenting documentation from a medical

doctor covering the entire duration of the requested sick leave period.

Nevertheless, the AJ found that the agency articulated legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for its action, namely, that the agency

required all employees to submit medical documentation for extended

sick leave. The AJ found that complainant failed to show that the

agency's articulated reason was pretext. Therefore, the AJ found that in

the absence of any evidence of pretext, the complainant had not met his

burden of persuasion with respect to issue #1. With respect to issue #2,

the AJ found the agency had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its action, namely, that as soon as it received documentation

from complainant's physician for that time period, complainant's annual

leave was converted to sick leave. The AJ again found that complainant

failed to show that the agency's reasons were pretext to mask unlawful

discrimination

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant restates arguments previously made at the hearing.

He also contends that he has located in the warehouse a few records that

the agency denied having. Complainant maintains that he is certain

that women have been granted extended leave and leave without pay.

He indicates that they may not have taken 1,000 hours of sick leave

because they did not have 1,000 hours of sick leave to use. He contends

that he should not be penalized. Finally, complainant contends that the

agency's regulations were in direct conflict with The Family Medical Leave

Act (FMLA), with respect to the definition of a health care provider.

In response, the agency restates the position it took in its FAD, and

requests that we affirm its final order.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record

and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that

complainant failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions

were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's race or sex.

We also find that complainant failed to show how the documentation that he

allegedly found proves that the agency discriminated against him. We also

find that complainant failed to show that the agency's regulations were

different for women than for men. Further, we note that based on the

record, all employees were required to provide medical documentation

to support an extended leave request. Finally, we find that other

than complainant's mere assertion regarding the agency's regulation,

he failed to provide any evidence of how the agency's regulation is

in conflict with the FMLA. As such, we discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,

including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response,

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we affirm the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____03-17-03_____________

Date