Georgia-Pacific Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 5, 1975

217 N.L.R.B. 761 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

- GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION
Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Carol Ann Harris.
Case 26-CA-5247
May 5, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On December 30, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
David S. Davidson issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent
filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
1 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made
by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Adnunistrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibil-
ity unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces
us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Administrative Law Judge: Pursuant
to a charge filed by Carol Ann Harris on August 9, 1974, a
complaint issued on September 27, 1974, alleging that Re-
spondent discrimmatorily transferred Carol Ann Harris from
its night shift to its day shift and subsequently terminated her
because she joined or assisted a union or engaged in other
concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protec-
tion, thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. In
its answer Respondent denies the commission of any unfair
labor practices.
A hearing was held before-me on November 11, 1974. At
the conclusion of the hearing the parties waived oral argu-
ment. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel
and Respondent.
761
Upon the entire record in this case, including my observa-
tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the follow-
ing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is engaged in Crossett, Arkansas, in the manu-
facture of wood products. During the 12-month period prior
to issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Re-
spondent purchased and received products valued in excess
of $50,000 at its Crossett, Arkansas, location directly from
points located outside the State of Arkansas and also sold and
shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 from that
facility directly to points outside the State of Arkansas. Re-
spondent concedes and I find that Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that
it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO-
CLC, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Employment and Termination of Mrs. Harris
Respondent operates several facilities in Crossett, Arkan-
sas, engaged in the manufacture of a variety of wood pro-
ducts. Among them are two plywood plants known as Plants
1 and 2. Directly involved in this case is what is known as the
"green end" of Plant 1. There logs are placed on a large lathe
which cuts a thin layer of veneer. The veneer is clipped into
sheets 96 inches long and varying widths. The sheets of ve-
neer then move down a chain conveyor known as the "green
chain" from which they are removed by crews of employees
and stacked according to size on buggies. There are four
green chains in Plant 1.
The employees at the plywood plants have been repre-
sented for sometime by a local of the International Wood-
workers of America. At the times material herein Charles
Harris, husband of the Charging Party Carol Ann Harris,
worked as a millwright for the green ends of both plywood
plants, and held the office of Warden in the local. The exact
nature and duties of that office are not disclosed in the record.
Mrs. Harris worked for Respondent in its flake board plant
from October 16, 1973, until sometime in April, 1974, when
she quit. Thereafter, she again applied for employment with
Respondent and sought work at Plant 1. To assist her effort
her husband asked Robert Hampton, the green end superin-
tendent for both plants, if there was any possible way that he
could get Mrs. Harris a job in the plywood plants. Hampton
told Harris that he would do what he could to help, and
thereafter told Noble he would like Noble to hire Mrs. Harris
if he needed to hire a woman.
On July 5, 1974, Mrs. Harris and another woman, Fannie
James, were interviewed for employment by Noble. He told
them at that time the only jobs he had open were on the green
217 NLRB No. 130
762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
chain, and he took them to view the operation. As the chain
was not operating at the time of their visit, he was not able
to demonstrate fully what was involved, but told them that
it was a difficult job and suggested to Mrs. Harris that she
might be better off to wait about a month when he thought
other work might become available. Mrs. Harris said she
needed the work then and that she would take the job. That
night she started to work on the night shift. She worked on
the night shift until July 22, 1974, when she was transferred
to the day shift where herhourly pay was either 11 or 15 cents
less as a result of losing a night-shift differential. Three days
later, on July 24, at the end of her shift Mrs. Harris was told
that she was terminated.
B. The Issues
The General Counsel contends that Mrs. Harris was trans-
ferred and then terminated because of her husband's and her
concerted and union activities in conjunction with an incident
which occurred on July 12. The General Counsel would label
as pretexts Respondent 's claims that Mrs. Harris had not
shown sufficient progress in learning her job, was transferred
to the day shift because the day shift foreman was better
equipped to train her, and was discharged by the day shift
foreman when he became convinced that she would not im-
prove sufficiently to warrant her retention.
The General Counsel does not contend that Charles Har-
ris' union office or union activities in general were the cause
of discrimination against Mrs. Harris, and indeed it is clear
that they could not have been. For Respondent hired Mrs.
Harris with full knowledge of her husband's identity and
indeed at least in part as a consequence of his request for aid
from management in-getting her a job. The General Counsel
does contend, however, that when Mrs. Harris on July 12
along with two other employees complained to Charles Har-
ris of an alleged change in water fountain and restroom privi-
leges and he in turn complained to Assistant Superintendent
A. J. Harris (no relation), either their complaint alone or in
conjunction with the fact that Charles was a union officer
motivated Respondent to get rid of Mrs. Harris. The events
of July 12 thus are critical to the determination of this case.
C. The July 12 Incident
On the- night of July 11, Fannie James, who had been
interviewed for employment with Mrs. Harris, started work
as a green chain puller on the night shift in Plant 1. On her
first night on the job, Mrs. James and Mrs. Harris worked on
the same line and took their breaks together.
On the following night, July 12, they were assigned to
separate lines. At one point that night between breaks, which
were scheduled every 2 hours, both were away from their
lines at the same time. According to Mrs. Harris she had left
to use the restroom and Mrs. James had left to get a drink
of water. According to Mrs. Harris, under policy which had
been previously explained to her by Night-Shift Foreman
Stanley, it was permissible to leave the line for this purpose
so long as three people remained behind on the crew to pull
wood from the line
During their absence from the lines Assistant Superintend-
ent A. J. Harris noticed that they were gone and told Fore-
man Eddie Stanley to speak to them about it. After Mrs.
Harris and Mrs. James returned to their lines, Stanley spoke
first to Mrs. James and then he and A. J. spoke to Mrs.
Hams.'
According to Mrs. Harris, A. J. Harris came up to her and
asked her what she had been doing in the restroom for 15
minutes. She denied that she was away from the line that
long, and he said it seemed like she and Fannie James had
planned on going to the restroom together. Mrs. Harris de-
nied that either had known of the other's intentions. She tried
to explain that Stanley had told them that as long as three
people were left on the line, the fourth person in the crew
could leave to go to the restroom or get a drink. According
to Mrs. Harris, A. J. Harris said that they were not to go for
water or to the bathroom except during the scheduled
break every 2 hours. She testified that when she tried to
explain what she had been told about leaving the line, A. J.
Harris acted as if he didn't understand what she was talking
about, and she asked Stanley to explain the policy to A. J.
According to her Stanley explained the policy as she had
previously understood it, and he and A. J. Harris left.
According to Stanley and A. J. Harris, Stanley told Mrs.
Harris that she and Mrs. James were both observed going to
the restroom at the same time and that it would have to stop.
Mrs. Harris asked A. J. if that meant that she couldn't go to
the restroom. He said that was not what they were saying,
and they tried to explain to her that she should try to contact
her foreman before leaving the chain unless it was an emer-
gency. Mrs. Harris grew angry and asked more than once if
they were saying that she could not go to the restroom.
At the next regular break, Mrs. Harris and Mrs. James
went to the break room. According to Mrs. Harris and her
husband, as she and Mrs. James entered the break room, a
forklift operator was complaining to her husband and Union
Secretary-Treasurer Steve Price that the employees weren't
supposed to be able to get any water or go to the restroom
except during scheduled.breaks. They testified that Mrs. Har-
ris and Mrs. James then told Charles Harris and Steve Price
about A. J. Harris' similar instruction to them. Charles Har-
ris testified that he discussed it with Price and then tele-
phoned Buddie Mann, who was shop steward and a member
of the union bargaining committee. Mann was home but was
scheduled to come into the plant on the next shift. According
to Charles Harris, Mann told him that he would be in later
but suggested that Charles Harris could see what A. J. Harris
had to say about the matter and could relate it to him later
when Mann arrived at the plant.
Some time thereafter, Charles Harris spoke to A. J. Harris
in the presence of Stanley. Charles testified that he asked A.
J. what was going on about the restroom and drinking foun-
tain situation. According to him, A. J. replied "You are not
going to come up here and tell me what to do because I am
superintendent of this Mill here and I will run it the way I
please, and you are not going to come up here and tell me how
to do things." Charles testified that A. J. then asked if he had
come to him on account of his wife. According to Charles,
when he replied that he had come up for the whole line and
1 Mrs James did not testify in this proceeding According to Stanley and
A J. Harris, at A. J Harris' direction Stanley told Mrs. James that she was
not to leave her line at the same time as Mrs Harris and she acquiesced
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION
was representing them and not only his wife, A. J. said,
"Well, you or the union or nobody else can tell me how to
run my mill, because I am superintendent and I will run it
the way I please." Harris testified that he then told A. J. that
he knew that he was only an officer of the union and was not
a shop steward, that he could not write a grievance, but that
he could relay information. Charles then left. He took no
other action about the matter that night, and to his knowl-
edge no grievance was ever filed.
According to A. J. Harris, Charles Harris came to the
chain and told him with some anger that A. J. was refusing
to let people go to the restroom. According to A. J., he told
Charles he knew that he had come to represent his wife, and
Charles replied that he was kind of a shop steward, which was
the first A. J. had heard about that. A. J. testified that he told
Charles that he would prefer that Charles get someone else
to represent his wife. Charles then said he was representing
the other people in the department. According to A. J., he
then asked Charles to prove his assertion that A. J. was
refusing to allow people to go to the restroom, and Charles
said he could. A. J. testified that they then went to an identi-
fied employee to whom Charles had referred and it turned out
that A. J. knew nothing about the subject matter of his com-
plaint. According to A. J. after that Charles Harris said that
he was sorry and the matter was not mentioned again.
!Stanley's version was somewhat different but closer to that
of A. J. than Charles. He did not mention visiting another
employee and was vague as to what Charles said about the
Union and his role in bringing the complaint to A. J. But
Stanley also testified that when Charles asked if they were
refusing to let employees go to the restroom or get drinks
outside of scheduled break times, they replied negatively and
explained the policy to him.
[Neither A. J. Harris nor Stanley heard anything more of
this incident until the charge in this case was filed.
No one other than Mrs Harris testified as to any alleged
restriction against going to the restroom or the water fountain
outside scheduled break times, and other than hearsay tes-
timony as to what was told Mrs. James and the forklift opera-
tor there is no evidence that A. J. Harris or any other supervi-
sor made any change in the rule relating to restroom
privileges. It is clear that Mrs. Harris construed what she was
told as a flat restriction but it is less clear what her basis was
for that construction, for even under her own version Stanley
agreed that she could leave the line between scheduled break
periods. There is substantial reason to doubt her version of
her conversation with Stanley and A. J. Harris. It would seem
more likely that she intentionally misconstrued the instruc-
tion not to go to the restroom with Mrs. James, reacting
hostilely to the implied accusation that she and Mrs. James
had abused restroom privileges and seeking to avoid that
charge by accusing A. J. Harris of having changed the rules,
consistent with the versions of Stanley and A. J. Harris.
When one looks at the testimony relating to Charles Har-
ris" complaint to A. J. Harris, the conclusion is even more
compelling that A. J. Harris must be credited. If Charles
Harris is to be believed, A. J. Harris refused to answer his
question, asserted the right to do as he pleased, and in effect
defied Charles Harris and the Union to do anything about it.
Had that happened, I find it difficult to believe that Charles
Harris and his wife would have simply dropped the matter.
763
But they did. Accordingly, I credit - A. J. Harris, as cor-
roborated by Stanley, as to the crucial incidents of July 12.
D. Concluding Findings
The burden is on the General Counsel to prove that Mrs.
Harris' transfer and termination were caused by her con-
certed or union activities; it is not upon Respondent to prove
that she was discharged for other cause. Apart from the
evidence as to the July 12 incident, the other evidence relied
upon by the General Counsel is testimony of Mrs. Harris and
her husband, the only witnesses for the General Counsel, to
establish in sum that her work received unqualified compli-
ments from her night-shift supervisors, Plant Superintendent
Mel Noble, and her day-shift supervisor Charles Anderson;
that after Noble showed her the job at the time of her hire
when the chain was not operating, she received little if any
instruction on her work during the entire period of her em-
ployment; and that she was unable to learn the reason for her
discharge despite repeated inquiries at the time and there-
after. Although several witnesses testified for Respondent to
contradict this testimony of the Harrises I do not believe that
any further purpose would be served by setting forth and
analyzing any of this testimony in detail. For even if the
testimony of Charles Harris and Mrs. Harris were credited
and the testimony of Respondent's witnesses were discredited
as to all matters other than the July 12 incident, the evidence
would be insufficient to warrant the inference that the trans-
fer and termination of Mrs. Harris were caused by the com-
plaint of Mrs. Harris and the other employees which Charles
Harris brought to A. J. Harris.
There is no evidence other than the discredited testimony
of Charles Harris to show any animus on the part of Re-
spondent against the Union or against employees for filing
grievances or complaining. Further, there is no reliable evi-
dence that Respondent or A. J. Harris harbored any
animosity toward Mrs. Harris because of the July 12 incident.
The incident itself appears to have been a matter of slight
significance. Neither of the Hamses pursued the matter, and
no grievance was ever filed.
What remains of the General Counsel's case is the conten-
tion that if Respondent' s reasons for transferring and ter-
minating Mrs. Harris are discredited, this taken with the
tuning of the transfer and the discharge would support the
inference that these actions were discriminatory. I cannot
agree. If there were any evidence of animus or hostility to-
ward Mrs. Harris based on union or concerted activity, the
result might well be otherwise. In the absence of such evi-
dence discriminatory motive may not be inferred, even if the
reasons advanced by Respondent for the actions taken
against Mrs. Harris were to be rejected.
In sum, although I may not be persuaded that I know the
true cause of Mrs. Harris' transfer and termination , I am also
not persuaded that the General Counsel has shown any plaus-
ible basis to conclude that concerted or union activities were
a motivating cause for them. In that case, I must find that the
General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proof and
recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the entire
record in this case, I make the following:
764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in the unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from
publication.]