George S. Sinko, Complainant,v.Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 7, 2008
0120081639 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 7, 2008)

0120081639

08-07-2008

George S. Sinko, Complainant, v. Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


George S. Sinko,

Complainant,

v.

Pete Geren,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120081639

Agency No. ARFTLEAV07MAY04513

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the agency's

decision dated December 10, 2007, dismissing his complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

Complainant filed his formal complaint alleging that he was subjected

to discrimination on the basis of age (63) when:

1. On May 9, 2007, complainant was removed from working under the

subcontract between BAE Systems, Inc. (BAE) and Echota Technologies

Corporation (Echota); and

2. Later in May 2007 BAE did not select complainant for continued

employment at Fort Leavenworth with BAE where BAE and the agency would

be joint employers.

The agency dismissed claim 1 because it failed to state a claim, and

dismissed claim 2 by omission.1

The record indicates that complainant worked for Echota as an Area

Specialty Officer (ASO) at the agency's Fort Leavenworth base in

Leavenworth, KS. BAE contracted with the agency to provide a workforce

for the Human Terrain Systems Program (HTS). Complainant was assigned

by Echota to HTS at Fort Leavenworth under a subcontract between BAE

and Echota.

Prior to the allegedly discriminatory event, a representative from the

agency traveled to Fort Leavenworth to investigate complaints about

the working environment within HTS. As a result of his investigation,

the representative met with officials from Echota and suggested that

personnel changes needed to be made. In this meeting, complainant

was singled out as a problem that needed to be addressed. The record

reflects that Echota disputed any problems within HTS, and on May 11,

2007, unilaterally withdrew its involvement in HTS. The record is

unclear whether Echota terminated complainant's employment as a result.

Subsequently, complainant unsuccessfully applied for employment with

BAE for the purpose of continuing in HTS.

The agency dismissed the complaint finding that complainant was not an

employee of the agency for purposes of the ADEA. In so holding, the

agency determined that Echota was responsible in at least ten different

ways for complainant's terms of employment. Accordingly, the agency found

that it did not have sufficient control over complainant's employment to

afford it jurisdiction over the complainant's claim. Complainant filed

the instant appeal.

On appeal, complainant argues that that the agency has ultimate

control over HTS, and therefore he is an employee of the agency, not an

independent contractor. Thus, complainant argues, the record reflects

that he successfully states a claim with respect to both claims.

The agency argues in opposition that the record shows complainant is

an independent contractor and not an employee. In support, the agency

analyzes the several ways in which Echota employs complainant.

The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) provides, in

relevant part, that an agency shall dismiss a complaint that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. Id. �� 1614.103,

1614.106(a).

The Commission must first determine whether the complainant was an

agency employee or applicant for employment within the meaning of

the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. � 794a(a). The Commission has applied the common

law of agency test to determine whether an individual is an agency

employee under Title VII. See Ma v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,

EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390 (May 29, 1998) (citing Nationwide

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)). Specifically,

the Commission will look to the following non-exhaustive list of factors:

(1) the extent of the employer's right to control the means and manner of

the worker's performance; (2) the kind of occupation, with reference to

whether the work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or

is done by a specialist without supervision; (3) the skill required in

the particular occupation; (4) whether the "employer" or the individual

furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (5) the length of

time the individual has worked; (6) the method of payment, whether by

time or by the job; (7) the manner in which the work relationship is

terminated, i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and

explanation; (8) whether annual leave is afforded; (9) whether the work

is an integral part of the business of the "employer"; (10) whether

the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (11) whether the "employer"

pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention of the parties. See

id. at n.4. In Ma, the Commission noted that the common-law test contains

"no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the

answer . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed

and weighed with no one factor being decisive." Id. (quoting Natl Labor

Relations Bd. v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).

Under the Commission's Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to

Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other

Staffing Firms (December 3, 1997)(available at www.eeoc.gov.), we

recognize that a "joint employment" relationship may exist where both

the agency and the staffing firm may be joint employers. There are

different types of staffing firms. Those that contract with a client

to perform a certain service on a long-term basis and place its own

employees, including supervisors, at the client's work site to carry

out the service are contract firms. Id. at Introduction section.

Clients of contract firms, including the federal government, qualify

as employers of workers assigned them if the clients have sufficient

control over the workers, regardless of whether the worker is on the

federal payroll. Id. and Baker v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A45313 (March 16, 2006). For example, the client is an employer

of the worker if it supplies the work space, equipment, and supplies,

and if it has the right to control the details of the work performed,

to make or change assignments, and to terminate the relationship.

Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contigent Workers

Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms,

Staffing Service Work Arrangements section. The test to determine

employment status turns on whether the employer controls the means

and manner of the worker's work performance. EEOC Compliance Manual,

Section 2: Threshold Issues, 2-III.A.1, page 2-25.

Echota was responsible for complainant's supervision. Complainant's

direct supervisor was on site at Fort Leavenworth. Agency Opp. Exs. H, I.

Further, the contract terms under which the Echota operated specifically

provided that the agency could not directly supervise complainant at

any time. Agency Opp. Ex. A at 59.

Echota was further responsible for personnel decisions relating to

complainant. Echota hired complainant, assigned him to HTS, established

his wage and pay structure, established his hours, withheld the applicable

taxes, handled complainant's leave requests, and had sole authority to

terminate complainant. See Agency Opp. Exs. H, I, J.

The agency's only duty to complainant was to provide a computer and

standard office supplies. Agency Opp. Exs. H, I. Further, there is no

evidence that any agency actions that caused complainant to be removed

from HTS at Fort Leavenworth resulted in complainant's termination.

See, e.g., Ames v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073926

(Feb. 12, 2008).

Complainant was removed from HTS when Echota decided to terminate

its involvement in HTS. Agency Opp. Ex. L. In fact, complainant's

second-line supervisor stated that all employees previously involved

with HTS "at their choice, will either transfer to BAE and remain on

the HTS project or Echota will place them in a part-time on-call status,

keeping them as Echota employees until something else is available." Id.

This statement indicates that the agency did not, in any way, control

the terms of complainant's employment with Echota.

With respect to claim 2, however, we find that the record contains

insufficient information to warrant dismissal. BAE implemented plans

to take over HTS operations at Fort Leavenworth following Echota's

withdrawal. Complainant argues that he was discriminated against

when his application for continued employment with BAE was rejected.

In support of his claim, complainant provided a copy of an email from

BAE's representative saying that complainant's resume was "forwarded to

the government for their evaluation and rank. . . . [T]he government makes

the final call." Complaint Ex. 3. In that email, BAE's representative

said that BAE's only role was to collect resumes and submit them to

the government, who then made the final determination. Id. The email

indicates that BAE would be more receptive to complainant's application

for positions not associated with an agency contract. Id.

As a matter of law, the record does not reflect whether complainant,

through his application to BAE, meets the common law of agency test

and may be properly viewed as a prospective agency employee for the

purposes of the ADEA. For example, despite the statements of BAE's

representative, the record contains insufficient information regarding

BAE's hiring criteria and the degree of control the agency retained over

the position for which complainant applied (control over hiring method

is a significant factor in determining control).2 The evidence in the

record is insufficient to properly apply Ma.

Accordingly, we find that the agency's dismissal of claim 1 was

appropriate, but dismissal of claim 2 was in error and we MODIFY the

agency's final decision and REMAND with instructions below.

ORDER

The agency is ordered to process claim 2 in accordance with 29

C.F.R. Part 1614. The agency shall acknowledge to the complainant that

it has received the remanded claim within thirty (30) calendar days of

the date this decision becomes final.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to complainant must be

sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0408)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0408)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it

also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in

an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar

days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after

one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your

complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until

such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 7, 2008

__________________

Date

1 Complainant properly raised claim 2 with his EEO counselor and stated

it in his formal complaint. He raises it again on appeal. In its notice

of right to file a complaint, the agency recognized that complainant

raised claim 2.

2 McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp.2d 1281, 1294 (D. Wyo. 2004).

??

??

??

??

2

0120081639

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

6

0120081639