George Banta Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 14, 1978

236 N.L.R.B. 1559 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

GEORGE BANTA COMPANY
George Banta Company, Inc., Banta Division and
Graphic Arts International Union, Local No. 88L,
AFL-CIO-CLC and Graphic Arts International
Union, Local No. 32B, AFL-CIO-CLC. Cases 30-
CA-4033, 30-CA4121, 30-CA4044, and 30-
CA4 120
July 14, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND MURPHY
On August 11, 1977, George Banta Company, Inc..
Banta Division, herein called the Respondent, and
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board entered into a settlement stipulation over the
objection of the Charging Unions, subject to ap-
proval of the Board, providing for the entry of a con-
sent order by the Board and a consent judgment by
any appropriate United States court of appeals. Sub-
sequently, on October 8, 1977, Graphic Arts Interna-
tional Union, Local No. 88L, AFL-CIO-CLC, and
Graphic Arts International Union, Local No. 32B,
AFL-CIO-CLC, herein called Local 88L and Local
32B, respectively, and Charging Unions, collectively,
entered into the settlement stipulation.' The parties
waived all further and other procedure before the
Board to which they may be entitled under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, and the
Rules and Regulations of the Board, and the Re-
spondent waived its right to contest the entry of a
consent judgment or to receive further notice of the
application therefor.
Thereafter, by letter dated October 25, 1977, the
Respondent sought to withdraw from that settlement
because of the delay in approving the settlement stip-
ulation and because of the new issues relative to the
settlement raised by the 8(a)(3) charges filed in Case
30-CA-4396. By letter dated November 9, 1977, the
Charging Unions opposed the Respondent's with-
drawal request. By letter dated November 15. 1977,
the Respondent filed an answer to the Charging
Union's opposition. On December 30, 1977, the
General Counsel filed an opposition to the Respon-
By letter dated August 5, 1977. to the Regional Director the C hargilg
Unions filed objections to the settlement stipulation. Subsequently. the Act-
ing Regional Director by letter dated August 12. 1977. advised that he had
carefully considered all the objections and, notwithstanding the objections.
he was forwarding the stipulation to the General Counsel for approva;l it
letter dated September 22. 1977. the General ( ounsel advised the ( h;arging
Unions that he was approving the stipulation and was submitting it to the
Board. After the settlement stipulation had been submitted to the Boalrd for
approval, the Charging Unions, bs letter dated October 8. 1977. submitted
the signed stipulation whic., li effect. w ithdrei their obleci.ons.
dent's withdrawal request, and, on January 16, 1978,
the Respondent filed a memorandum in support of
its withdrawal request.
The above-entitled proceeding is hereby trans-
ferred to and continued before the Board in Washing-
ton, D.C. All the documents mentioned above, includ-
ing the settlement stipulation, are made a part of the
record herein.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Upon the basis of the aforesaid settlement stipula-
tion and the entire record in the proceeding, the
Board makes the following:
Rulings on Motion To Withdraw From Settlement
Stipulation and on Approval of the Settlement
Stipulation
The basic issue herein is whether a party which has
executed with the General Counsel a formal settle-
ment stipulation, requiring Board approval, has the
right unilaterally to withdraw therefrom prior to
Board approval.2 The Respondent argues that it has
a right to withdraw and that the Board should honor
its withdrawal request. The General Counsel and the
Charging Unions disagree, contending that the Re-
spondent may not unilaterally withdraw and that the
Board should proceed to pass on the adequacy of the
settlement stipulation. We agree with the General
Counsel and the Charging Unions.
A review of the file and record herein, including
the submissions of the parties, reveals that, in sub-
stance, there is no factual dispute giving rise to the
legal issue herein. After the General Counsel, the Re-
spondent, and the Charging Unions had approved
and executed the settlement stipulation herein,3 the
Respondent, in a letter dated October 25, 1977, ad-
vised the Board that it was withdrawing from the
settlement because of the great delay in approving
the said stipulation and because new issues, relative
to the settlement, were raised by the 8(a)(3) charges
filed against it in Case 30- CA--4396. 4 In response to
:In pertinent part. the language of the settlement stipulation proi.des in
par II that "the Stipulation is subject to the approval of the Board, and
shall be of no force and effect until the Board has granted such approval
Upon the Board's approval of the Stipulation. the Respondent will immedl-
atels complN Slth the provlsions of the Order
Originally the (Charging U nions had objected to the settlement stipula-
tion, but the (ieneral ( ounsel had overruled the objections and forwarded
the settlement stipulation to the Board with his recommendation for ap-
prosal on September 22. 1977. the ( harging Unions executed the settle-
ment stipulation on October S. 1977
l In support of this latter contentlion. the Respondent. in its letter of No-
vember 10. 1977. to the (tenteal (Counsel, stated that In viesw of the Board's
recent decision in I alntrln t.lrri ( ,rporaliln. 231 NIRB 1014 11977). the
settlement agreemnent migh he ued as a hasis for a finding of an §(a.t3
Continued
236 NLRB No. 224
1559
DECISIONS OF NATIONAl. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Cnarging Unions' letter to the Board opposing
withdrawal, the Respondent, in its letter of Novem-
her 15, 1977, stated that, at the time it signed the
settlement stipulation early in July 1977, it was ad-
vised that the agreement would not be binding until
it was approved by the Regional Director, the Gener-
al Counsel, and the Board. In addition, the Respon-
dent cited the statement from the Board's Decker de-
cision that "it is well settled that only formal
approval by the Board will make a settlement bind-
ing upon the parties." 5 Accordingly, it contended
that the Respondent's signature on the settlement
stipulation constituted, at best, an offer of settlement
which had to be approved and accepted by the
Board, a necessary party, in order to be binding and
that its withdrawal from the settlement stipulation
prior to Board approval must be permitted. In its
memorandum in support of withdrawal, the Respon-
dent further argues that the Decker statement is di-
rectly relevant to the withdrawal issue herein, and
that court precedents in Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) cases cited by the General Counsel, discussed
infra, are distinguishable. In those cases, the FTC it-
self had originally accepted the consent order settle-
ment before it refused to permit unilateral with-
drawal during the 60-day public comment period
which it had reserved for any reconsideration, while
in the situation herein it is admitted that only the
General Counsel. but not the Board, had accepted
and approved the settlement stipulation.
In his opposition to the Respondent's attempt to
withdraw unilaterally from the settlement stipulation
approved by him. the General Counsel asserts that
there are no Board or court precedents directly in
point 6 and therefore he relies on two United States
court of appeals decisions which arose in the context
of the FTC's consent decree procedures which, like
the Board's rules, are silent as to whether unilateral
withdrawal prior to FTC's final approval is permit-
ted.' Noting that the FTC, unlike a private litigant,
violation without the Respondent being afforded the opportunits to fulls
litigate the 8(a)l3) issue.
he Respondent noted that this statement which was taken from the
Board's Decision in Loren .4 De)vir d i a Decker TnruA L.nes. 139 NLRB
65, 66 (1962). was cited with aIpproval bh the Eighth (Circuit in its decision
enforcing the Board's Order in 322 F.2d 238. 242 (1963).
w 'Ae agree with the General Counsel that the Respondent's reliance on
the Bolrd's statenent in Decker is misplaced Decker involved compliance
with the Board's backpay order and the statement., cited bh the Eighth
('rcuit without comment. was dituml as the Board had found there had
been no settlement with the Regional Office as to compliance. Further. the
"so-called hackpas settlernents" with the Region were merely preliminar?
negotiations, not binding on the Board, while here the issue is the right if
the Respondent to withdraw from its agreement with the GCeneral (Counsel
prior to Board approval. Jo'hnson Products Companv v. F T ('. 549 F. 2d 35
(C A. 7. 1976\: also Ford Motor Companv v. I:T.C. 547 F.2d 954 (C.A. 6,
1976).
7
Johnson Products (omparno v. ::T(C, 549 F.2d 35 (CA. 7. 1976); also
Ford Motor Compant, v. F T., 547 F.2d 954 (C.A. 6. 1976)
must act in the public interest, the Seventh Circuit, in
Johnson, agreed with the FTC's position that permit-
ting unilateral withdrawals prior to final approval
would pose a serious risk of undermining the contin-
ued efficacy of its consent order procedures as an
alternative to lengthy adjudication. The General
Counsel argues that, since similar policy considera-
tions underlie the Board's settlement procedures, the
Board must act in the public interest and must refuse
to permit, prior to its final approval, unilateral with-
drawal by the Respondent from the settlement stipu-
lation made with the General Counsel in order to
prevent the undermining of the continued efficacy of
its settlement procedures and the use of such proce-
dures as a dilatory factor.
The General Counsel also contends that the lan-
guage of paragraph 11 of the settlement stipulation
does not establish the Respondent's right unilaterally
to withdraw from its settlement stipulation made
with him, pending Board approval. He contends that
the settlement stipulation imposes two commitments
on the Respondent. First, the Respondent commits
itself to take certain remedial action if and when the
Board approves the settlement stipulation and the
General Counsel agrees that the remedial action
when taken would be considered a full remedy for
the alleged unfair labor practices. Paragraph 11 ad-
dresses itself to that commitment. The other commit-
ment is an implied one to the effect that the first
commitment will remain outstanding until the Board
acts, while the General Counsel promises not to insti-
tute litigation while the matter is pending before the
Board.
The basic disagreement between the Respondent
and the General Counsel, in effect, comes down to a
disagreement as to the identity of the parties to the
settlement stipulation which, by its terms, is subject
to approval of the Board.8 The Respondent argues
that, because the settlement of the case is not binding
on it until approval by the Board, the Board is a
necessary party whose approval is required before
there can be binding agreement to settle. Therefore,
continues the Respondent, its offer to settle can be
withdrawn any time prior to Board acceptance of the
offer as signified by Board approval of the settlement
stipulation and this is the situation herein. The Gen-
eral Counsel, however, contends that, to the extent
that contract law of offer and acceptance governs the
situation herein, there has been an effective agree-
ment between him and the Respondent requiring the
Respondent to maintain and continue outstanding its
" A charging party may be a necessary party to the extent that it is enti-
tled to he heard upon its objections to a settlement stipulation between the
General counsel and a respondent. Here the Charging Unions have joined
in the stipulation.
1560
GEORGE BANTA COMPANY
express commitment to take certain remedial action
pending Board approval. The General Counsel's
view would avoid the risk of undermining the effica-
cy of settlement procedures and is more in accord
with the factual, statutory, and policy considerations
bearing on this question than is the view of the Re-
spondent.
The actual parties to the settlement stipulation
submitted herein to the Board for approval are the
Respondent and the General Counsel, through the
Regional Director as agent for the General Counsel
but subject to approval by the General Counsel him-
self. Thus, if contract law of offer and acceptance
applies, as the Respondent argues, the Respondent's
offer to settle, having been accepted by the General
Counsel, results in a binding agreement to settle and
to submit the settlement stipulation to the Board for
approval, with Board approval triggering the duties
required of the parties to the settlement stipulation.
This view as to the identity of the parties to the
settlement stipulation accords with the provisions of
Section 3(d) of the Act which gives the General
Counsel "final authority, on behalf of the Board .
in respect of the prosecution of such complaints
.. . In formal settlement stipulations, he exercises
that statutory authority by agreeing not to litigate the
matter in consideration for the Respondent's agree-
ment to consent to the entry of a Board Order and a
consent court decree requiring the Respondent to
take certain remedial action. Because of this final au-
thority to prosecute, the General Counsel is a neces-
sary party to a settlement agreement. Therefore,
viewing the General Counsel and the Respondent as
the parties to whom the contract law of offer and
acceptance applies enables the General Counsel to
exercise his statutory authority as to how unfair labor
practice complaints are to be prosecuted and affords
the Respondent, who need not have offered to settle,
its due process with respect to such prosecution.
Unlike the General Counsel, the Board's statutory
function is judicial rather than prosecutory in nature
and is to decide those issues raised and litigated by
the General Counsel in his prosecution of the unfair
labor practice complaints. The Board's adjudicatory
function is exercised herein by its approval or disap-
proval of the settlement stipulation which is a substi-
tute for litigation of the unfair labor practice issues.
To construe the language of the settlement stipula-
tion as making the Board a necessary party whose
approval is required before there can be a binding
agreement between the Respondent and General
Counsel on unfair labor practice issues would not
only intrude the Board into the General Counsel's
statutory role of exercising his final and exclusive au-
thority in respect of the prosecution of complaints
under Section 3(d) of the Act but would, in addition.
join the prosecutors and adjudicatory functions in
the Board contrar) to the congressional mandate
that these functions he separated in the manner pro-
vided in the Act.'
FIinall', policy considerations militate against
granting respondents the right to withdraw from for-
mal settlement stipulations executed with the Gener-
al Counsel pending Board approval. Such a right
would undermine the continued efficacy of the settle-
ment process which, as an alternative to lengthy ad-
judication, allows the Board as well as respondents
and charging parties to save time, expense. and the
inevitable risk of litigation. In Johnson, supra, the
Seventh Circuit alluded to such considerations which
it found justified the refusal to permit a respondent
to withdraw from a consent order prior to FT'("s fi-
nal approval. A similar approach is warranted herein
where the situation is basically analogous to that in
Johnl.son. Thus, the FTC's acceptance of the consent
order agreed to by the Respondent is equivalent to
the General Counsel's acceptance and approval of
the Respondent's offer finally to settle a case. while
the FTC's reservation of the right to withdraw its
original acceptance after hearing public comment is
analogous to the requirement that the settlement stip-
ulation shall be subject to Board approval before it
becomes binding. As the FTC itself is both prosecu-
tor and adjudicator. it therefore had to act in both
capacities. On the other hand, under the Act. the
General Counsel is the prosecutor and the Board is
the adjudicator and each must and does act sepa-
rately. As in Johnson where the court agreed with the
FTC that the respondent had no right unilaterall' to
withdraw from the consent agreement prior to the
FTC's action, so, too, here the Respondent, having
agreed to the settlement stipulation herein with the
General Counsel, has no right unilaterallv to with-
draw therefrom pending Board action but must await
the Board's determination to approve or disapprove
the settlement stipulation. Accordingly, the Respon-
dent's request of October 25, 1977. unilaterally to
withdraw from the settlement stipulation herein is
denied."'
'lhe language of rpar II of the settlentr t tipul atln proidine for
Board approral and reHuqlllr the Respondent to .ompl lth Ihe :;etle-
ment stipuation upon such approval is consistent Wth and reflect, the sepa-
rate statutor. authorit, of the (ieneral ( ounsel and the Board and their
separate indl idual responlhibilties To construe the language otherA se
.ouid combine and confu.e the separate functions of the G(eneral (Counsel
and Board.
"i Bx letter dated March I1 1978, the Respondent requested that the
Board take offlclll notice ,of the Fehruars 9. 1h78, letter from the (General
('ounsel's Freedonm Of Information Officer, herein he stated that a charged
parts's lithdr;.,al frn, a settlement agreement would he "the same is if
the part, had rcfued Io coimpl' .ith the settlement agreemnent and the
agreement mill he set ;aiilc and forma; l pT.ceediug, instituted " tcc,ordinelg.
('OrnltlntJd
1561
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Having considered the entire matter and being of
the opinion that the settlement stipulation fully reme-
dies the allegations of the unfair labor practice com-
plaint herein, providing as it does for the entry of a
Board Order and a consent judgment in the appro-
priate United States court of appeals, we are of the
opinion that it would effectuate the policies of the
Act to approve the settlement stipulation. Accord-
ingly, the settlement stipulation is approved and, pur-
suant to the provisions thereof, we shall make the
appropriate findings of fact and enter the appro-
private Order.
FINDINGS OF FAC'I
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Wisconsin corporation, is en-
gaged in the printing and bookbinding business from
its facilities located at Menasha. Wisconsin.
During the past calendar year, a representative pe-
riod, in the course and conduct of its business, Re-
spondent sold and shipped goods and products val-
ued in excess of $50,000 to customers located directly
outside the State of Wisconsin, and purchased and
received goods valued in excess of $50,000 from
sources located directly outside the State of Wiscon-
sin.
The Respondent admits, and we find, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. THE I.ABOR ORGiANIZATIONS INVOI.VEiD
Graphic Arts International Union, Local No. 88L.
AFL-CIO-CLC, and Graphic Arts International
Union. Local No. 32B, AFL-CIO-CLC, are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act. Local 88L has been at all times since about
1959 the recognized statutory representative of all
employees in the appropriate unit (a) below for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act. Local 32B has been at all
times since about 1951 the recognized statutory rep-
resentative of all employees in the appropriate unit
the Respondent argued that this statement is dispositive of the question
before the Board and that the settlement stipulation herein is not binding on
the Respondent which withdrew therefrom prior to Board approval. How-
ever, the Respondent's argument is misplaced. It is clear from the FOI
Officer's reference to sec. 10154 of the (asehandling Manual and a reading
of that provision that he was referring to informal settlements where the
complaint had not been issued or had been withdrawn and where, following
noncompliance, formal unfair labor practice proceedings are then instiut-
ed. Obviously, it would have no applicabilit) to formal Board settlements
where, in the event of nonconmpliance, a court judgment would be entered
enforcing the Board's Order.
(b) below for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
(a) All employees engaged in lithography,
offset, photoengraving, intaglio and gravure op-
erations at the Respondent's facilities, but ex-
cluding office and clerical employees and super-
visors as defined in the Act, and all other
employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
(b) All bindery and finishing operations em-
ployees employed at the Respondent's Menasha
and Midway, Wisconsin, plants, but excluding
office and clerical employees and supervisors,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(b) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, the
settlement stipulation, and the entire record in the
proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board hereby orders that:
The Respondent, George Banta Company, Inc.,
Banta Division, Midway, Wisconsin, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing or failing to bargain in good faith
with Graphic Arts International Union, Local No.
88L, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of its lithography, offset, pho-
toengraving, intaglio and gravure operations employ-
ees, but excluding office and clerical employees and
supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other em-
ployees.
(b) Refusing or failing to bargain in good faith
with Graphic Arts International Union, Local No.
32B, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of its bindery and finishing
operations employees at its Midway and Menasha,
Wisconsin, plants, but excluding office and clerical
employees and supervisors.
(c) Unilaterally changing wages, hours of work,
and other terms and conditions of employment dur-
ing negotiations with the above-named Unions un-
less a valid impasse is reached.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which we
find will effectuate the policies of the Act:
1562
GEORGE BANTA COMPANY
(a) Revoke implementation of the following terms
of its "last contract offer" of April 4, 1977: elimina-
tion of the percentage contribution to employees' in-
surance carrier, increasing the workweek from 35 to
38 hours, and insistence on its proposed contract
items.
(b) Revert to the wages, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment which existed
prior thereto, but excluding cost-of-living adjust-
ments, arbitration procedure, and union security,
and maintain such wages, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment, subject to col-
lective bargaining thereafter, pursuant to paragraph
(c) below.
(c) Upon request, bargain collectively with Graph-
ic Arts International Union, Local No. 88L, AFIL
CIO-CLC, and with Graphic Arts International
Union, Local No. 32B, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the ex-
clusive representative of employees in the respective
units with respect to wages, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment, and, if under-
standings are reached, embody such understandings
in signed agreements.
(d) Upon the making of unconditional offers to
return to work by striking employees, who were on
strike on or after April 4, 1977. made within 60 calen-
dar days from the posting of the Notice to Employ-
ees, offer immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, if such
jobs are available, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges unless they have been,
or are, lawfully discharged, dismissing any persons, if
necessary, hired by the Respondent between April 4.
1977, and the 61st calendar day after the posting of
the Notice to Employees. If insufficient jobs are
available for those employees, or if they make uncon-
ditional offers to return to work and they have been
permanently replaced after the 60th day' following
the posting of the Notice to Employees, and absent
any findings of new unfair labor practices which
cause prolongation of the strike, place such employ-
ees on a preferential hiring list in accordance with
seniority, and offer employment to them before other
persons are hired.
(e) Post at its Midway plant and at its Menasha
plant, in Menasha, Wisconsin, copies of the attached
Notice to Employees. Copies of said notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 30,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by Re-
spondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in
writing. within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POS-ItD BY ORDER OF THE
NA11ONAI LABOR RFI.ATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Pursuant to a stipulation providing for a consent
judgment of any appropriate United States Court of
Appeals, we hereby notify our employees that:
After an investigation the National Labor Relations
Board has found that we have violated employee
rights under the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. In order to remedy these violations, we
have agreed to refrain from such conduct in the fu-
ture, to post this notice, and to comply with its provi-
sions.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join. or assist labor organizations
I-o bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any' or all of these things.
Wt wiIt N ot do anything that interferes with,
restrains, or coerces you with respect to these
rights.
iWE win. NOI refuse or fail to bargain in good
faith with Graphic Arts International Union,
Local No. 88L, AFIL--CIO-CLC, as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of our
lithography, offset, photoengraving. intaglio,
and gravure operations employees, but exclud-
ing office and clerical employees and supervis-
ors as defined in the Act, and all other employ-
ees.
Wr[. WIL.l Noi refuse or fail to bargain in good
faith with Graphic Arts International Union,
Local No. 32B. AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of our
bindery and finishing operations employees at
our Midway and Menasha plants. but excluding
office and clerical employees and supervisors.
WFi WILL NOI unilaterally change wages., hours
of work, and other terms and conditions of em-
ploNment during negotiations with the above-
1563
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
named Unions unless a valid impasse is reached
between us.
Wi wVII.. NOI in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed to you by Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Wij wiiL. revoke implementation of the follow-
ing terms of our "last contract offer" of April 4,
1977: our elimination of the percentage contri-
bution to employees' insurance carriers, our in-
creasing the workweek from 35 to 38 hours, and
our insistence on our proposed contract term.
WI: wi . revert to the wages, hours of work,
and other terms and conditions of employment
which existed prior thereto, but excluding cost-
of-living adjustments, arbitration procedure,
and union security. and maintain such wages,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions
of employment, subject to collective bargaining
thereafter, with the Unions as indicated below.
WEt wui.i, upon request, bargain with Graphic
Arts International Union, Local No. 88L. AFLl
CIO-CLC, and with Graphic Arts International
UInion, Local No. 32B. AFL-CIO CLC. as the
exclusive representatives of employees in the re-
spective units with respect to wages, hours of work,
and other terms and conditions of employment,
and, if understandings are reached, embouy
such understandings in signed agreements.
WE WitL. upon the making of unconditional
offers to return to work which are made within
60 calendar days from the posting of this notice
by striking employees, who were on strike on or
after April 4, 1977, offer immediate and full re-
instatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions. if such jobs are available,
without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, unless they have been (or
are) lawfully discharged, dismissing any persons,
if necessary, hired by us between April 4, 1977,
and the 61st calendar day after the posting of
this notice. If insufficient jobs are available for
employees who make such offers, or if uncondi-
tional offers are made by employees who have
been replaced after the 60th day following the
posting of this notice, and if there are no other
findings of unfair labor practices, which cause
prolongation of the stirke, WE WILL place such
employees on a preferential hiring list in accor-
dance with seniority and offer employment to
them before any other persons are hired.
GEORGE BANTA COMPANY, INc.. BANTA DIVI-
SION
1564