Geoffrey Paul et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 18, 20202020000461 (P.T.A.B. May. 18, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/873,699 09/01/2010 Geoffrey Aaron Paul 10102.0001USU1 5808 44305 7590 05/18/2020 WITHERS & KEYS, LLC P. O. BOX 2049 MCDONOUGH, GA 30253 EXAMINER TIEDEMAN, JASON S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3626 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/18/2020 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte GEOFFREY AARON PAUL and ROBERT BAXTER SHUMARD ____________ Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before DONALD E. ADAMS, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and JAMIE T. WISZ, Administrative Patent Judges. ADAMS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8 and 21 (Appeal Br. 3). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as LocumsMart, LLC (Appellant’s August 1, 2019 Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.) 3). Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s disclosure “relates to automated methods and web-based systems for matching healthcare providers with healthcare organizations on a temporary basis” (Spec.2 1). Appellant’s claim 1 is reproduced below: 1. A method for matching a healthcare provider with a healthcare organization on a temporary basis, said method comprising: [a] maintaining, by a secure web-based system, accounts for each of a plurality of healthcare organizations and for each of a plurality of vendors, wherein the maintaining comprises maintaining an electronic form of a master agreement between a specific healthcare organization and a specific vendor that have agreed to terms of the master agreement, such that for each healthcare organization there is only a subset of the plurality of vendors that have agreed to terms of the master agreement of that healthcare organization, the master agreement specifying terms for a specific vendor to provide a healthcare provider for purposes of fulfilling a temporary assignment of the healthcare organization; [b] providing independent access to the secure web-based system via individual user names and passwords for (i) one or more healthcare facility administrators of each healthcare organization, (ii) the plurality of vendors, and (iii) one or more support personnel; [c] providing a first set of website selection options to each of the one or more healthcare facility administrators wherein providing the first set of website selection options comprises presenting to each of the one or more administrators by the secure web based system a list of only the subset of vendors that are specific to the healthcare organization of each of the one or more administrators; [d] receiving, via the first set of website selection options, temporary assignment information provided by an 2 Appellant’s September 1, 2010 Specification. Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 3 administrator of the one or more administrators and creating from the information a specific temporary assignment to be fulfilled, wherein receiving the temporary assignment information comprises receiving at the secure web based system a selection of select vendors from the list of the subset of vendors by the administrator and associating the specific temporary assignment created by the administrator to only the select vendors; [e] presenting by the secure web based system the specific temporary assignment to be fulfilled to only the select vendors that are associated to the specific temporary assignment; [f] providing a second set of website selection options in relation to the temporary assignment for only the select vendors of the subset of vendors; [g] determining which providers are available for each vendor to present for each healthcare organization by eliminating for a given vendor those providers that are subject to procuring cause protection in effect for all other vendors in relation to each healthcare organization; [h] providing a second set of website selection options in relation to creating a bid for the specific temporary assignment to only the select vendors of the subset of vendors, the second set of options including within a graphical user interface a list of providers that are eligible to be included in the bid for the specific temporary assignment according to the determining of which providers are available for the vendor being presented the second set of website options that have not been eliminated due to the procuring cause protection that is provided to the other vendors besides the vendor of the subset that is being presented the second set of website selection options; [i] receiving at the secure web based system a selection of an option to create a bid for the specific temporary assignment to be fulfilled by a plurality of the select vendors and receiving bid information from the plurality of select vendors to create the bids including receiving a selection of a provider from the list; Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 4 [j] providing each bid from the select vendors to the healthcare organization; [k] receiving a selection by the healthcare organization of a winning bid from the bids; and [l] providing notice of the winning bid to the select vendor that created the winning bid. (Appeal Br. 15–16 (bracketed lettering added to label each step of the claim for reference).) Claims 1–8 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. ISSUE Does the preponderance of evidence of record support Examiner’s finding that Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter? PRINCIPLES OF LAW A. Section 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 5 determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 6 formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 7 Under the Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. 4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 8 ANALYSIS Appellant’s claim 1 is representative. (Step 1) We first consider whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories set forth in § 101, namely “[p]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54; see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellant’s claims are directed to a method, which we understand to be a “process,” and, therefore, squarely fall within the statutory categories set forth in § 101. Therefore, we proceed to the next steps of the analysis. (Step 2A, Prong 1) In the first prong of Step 2A, the Guidance instructs us to determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claim. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. In this regard, the Guidance identifies three judicially- excepted groupings identified by the courts as abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human behavior, and (3) mental processes. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54. On this record, Appellant disclosed, as background to its invention: Locum tenens is the common term used to refer to the temporary staffing of healthcare professionals at healthcare organizations, such as hospitals, clinics and private medical practices. Historically, the matching of medical professionals with temporary work has been facilitated by staffing agencies focusing on locum tenens recruitments. Such facilitation is often manual in nature in that it involves telephone and/or written solicitations, contract negotiations, resume review, and rate negotiations between a healthcare organization and staffing Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 9 agencies so that the an appropriate individual can be identified and referred for the necessary dates and at an appropriate rate. (Spec. 1; see Ans.5 6 (Examiner finds “[a]s indicated by the Background section of [Appellant’s] Specification at Pg. 1, selecting employees for a temporary position is a human-based task, i.e., a human following a series of rules/steps for selecting employees for a temporary position”).) Thus, Appellant disclosed that a manual method of utilizing staffing agencies, e.g., vendors,6 to match healthcare providers, e.g., doctors,7 with healthcare organizations, e.g., hospitals,8 was well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by this community. According to Appellant, because the foregoing “manual staffing model is time consuming and expensive in that it requires multiple contracts between healthcare organizations, staffing agencies and locum tenens healthcare professionals,” “[w]hat is needed in the art is an automated system and method for matching healthcare providers with healthcare organizations on a temporary basis, as well as an automated system and method for managing aspects of such a temporary/supplemental staffing relationship” (Spec. 1). Thus, Appellant’s claim 1 provides an automated method of matching a doctor with a hospital, on a temporary basis (see Appeal Br. 15; see also Ans. 4). As Examiner correctly explains, the method of Appellant’s claim 1 is a method of organizing human activity, which involves, commercial or 5 Examiner’s August 26, 2019 Answer. 6 Appellant disclosed that a “staffing agency” is a “vendor” (Spec. 2). 7 Appellant exemplifies a doctor as a healthcare provider (see Spec. 18). 8 Appellant disclosed that a “healthcare organization[]” includes “hospitals, clinics and private medical practices” (Spec. 1). Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 10 legal interactions, including agreements in the form of contracts, legal obligations, marketing, and business relations (see generally Ans. 5; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52). The steps, [a]–[l], of Appellant’s claim 1 recast the necessary and inherent steps of the manual staffing model, discussed above, in terms of an automated process (see Appeal Br. 15–16). Thus, we find no error in Examiner’s finding that, “but for recitation of generic computer components,” steps [a]–[l] of Appellant’s claimed method “covers a method of organizing human activity” (Ans. 5; see also id. at 5–6 (Examiner finds, “but for the secure web-based system, the claims encompass a person performing the human-based task of matching a temporary employee to a particular position based on various rules”); id. at 6 (citing Spec. 2) (Examiner finds “but for the secure web-based system, the claims encompass formulation of a contract between people)). For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in Examiner’s conclusion that Appellant’s claimed method recites an abstract idea, specifically, a method of organizing human activity, which involves, commercial or legal interactions, including agreements in the form of contracts, legal obligations, marketing, and business relations (see generally Ans. 3, 4, and 6). We find that Examiner’s August 26, 2019 Answer addresses the January 2019 Guidance (see generally Ans. 4–15). Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that Examiner’s August 1, 2018 Final Office Action, which was entered into this record prior to the Guidance, fails to address the January 2019 Guidance (Appeal Br. 8). Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 11 (Step 2A, Prong 2) Having determined that Appellant’s claim recites a judicial exception, the Guidance requires an evaluation as to whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. On this record, Examiner finds that Appellant’s claim 1 recites the additional elements of a secure web-based system encompassing website selection options and an electronic form. The secure web-based system is described by the Appellant as either a computer system [Pg. 4, first full paragraph; Pg. 15, first full paragraph] or a server [Pg. 15, first full paragraph], both of which are described at a high-level of generality (i.e., a generic computer performing/implementing generic computer functions) such that it amounts no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The Examiner notes that the master agreement form being electronic is a consequence of computerizing the human-based task of selecting employees for a temporary position. (Ans. 6–7.) We find no error in Examiner’s findings. “In cases involving software innovations, th[e] inquiry often turns on whether the claims focus on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an abstract idea for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration original). On this record, a computer is used merely as a tool, which automates an art recognized manual staffing method (see Spec. 1–2 (Appellant describes the claimed method as an automation of an art recognized manual staffing method)). In this regard, we note that “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 12 more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[M]ere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”). For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that its claimed method “improve[s] . . . the way a computer system functions, which is consistent with the Enfish decision” (Appeal Br. 9). For the same reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that by invoking a computer, merely as a tool, to automate an art recognized manual staffing method, that performs, inter alia, according to the terms of a master contract, results in “technical improvements and advantages, namely filtering out the providers that are eliminated by procurement cause protection so that they cannot be selected by a vendor” (see id. at 9–10).9 9 Appellant discloses: The systems and methods of the present invention may also be utilized to provide automatic procuring cause protection, wherein an agencies’ procuring cause status over one or more providers that the agency presents to hospitals is automatically enforced according to the terms of a master contract between the HCO and the agency. For example, if a contract gives 12 months of procuring cause protection over bids from an agency, then after Agency X presents Dr. Y to Hospital Z, no other Agency will be able to present Dr. Y to Hospital Z for the next 365 days. This may be accomplished by omitting Dr. Y from every vendor's provider drop-down menu on the “Create Bid” screen (discussed in the Example below), except Agency X, and only for bids to be submitted to Hospital Z. After 365 days have passed, all Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 13 For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that “even if procuring cause protection itself is an abstract idea, . . . the specific implementation brought about by the recitations in the present claims offers more than the idea itself of procuring cause protection and further offers more than the notion of ‘apply it’” (Appeal Br. 11). According to Appellant, the specific implementation . . . is essentially to filter the potential providers that the vendor could select into a list of providers that are available to the vendor for the particular temporary assignment due to the procuring cause protection to thereby enforce the procuring cause protection. In other words, the filtered list of providers makes it impossible for the vendor to select a provider that is invalid due to procuring cause protection considerations. (Id.) Stated differently, Appellant claims a process that qualifies as an abstract idea for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1303. Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that “the filtering of the list being provided to the vendors when creating a bid based on procuring cause protection is not routine or conventional much like the filtering of website content in Bascom was not routine or conventional” (Appeal Br. 12 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Reply Br. agencies that have a provider record for Dr. Y will be able to view Dr. Y on their provider drop-down menu on the “Create Bid” screen when trying to submit a bid to Hospital Z, at least until an agency actually does submit a bid to Hospital Z that includes Dr. Y, and at that point the process would repeat with the presenting agency being the only one that can present Dr. Y for the next 365 days. (Spec. 17–18.) Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 14 2 (“the ability of the computer system to effectively provide a filter . . . is in addition to any alleged abstract idea”)). According to Appellant, filtering at the web-based computer system that the various entities such as vendors and healthcare organizations interact with is directly comparable to the filtering at the server in Bascom where such filtering certainly was NOT held to be part of the abstract idea considering the filtering at the server in Bascom is exactly what established the inventive concept by way of being a non-conventional arrangement of parts. (Reply Br. 3; see id. (Appellant contends that “[t]he ability of the web-based system as claimed to provide such filtering by eliminating providers and preventing the eliminated providers from being included in the list of options being displayed is certainly an improvement to the operation of the web- based computer system”); see also id. at 3–4.) We are not persuaded. BASCOM found “that filtering content is an abstract idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method of organizing human behavior, similar to concepts previously found to be abstract.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348. In addition, BASCOM instructs that “[a]n inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot[, as on this record,] simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” Id. at 1349. Unlike Appellant’s claimed method, which as discussed above, recasts the necessary and inherent steps of a prior manual staffing model in terms of an automated process, in BASCOM the “specific method of filtering Internet content cannot be said, as a matter of law, to have been conventional or generic.” Id. at 1350; see id. (“Filtering content on the Internet was already Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 15 a known concept, and the patent describes how its particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering such content”). In upholding the patent-eligibility of the claims, the BASCOM court emphasized that, unlike Appellant’s claimed method on this record, “[t]he claims [in BASCOM] do not merely recite the abstract idea of filtering content along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet, or to perform it on a set of generic computer components. Such claims would not contain an inventive concept.” Id. at 1350. Appellant has not provided evidence that the claimed filtering step is achieved by an inventive, i.e., non- conventional, arrangement of different elements as was the case for the BASCOM claims (cf. Reply Br. 3 (Appellant contends that its “filtering at the web-based computer system” is “comparable to the filtering at the server in Bascom” that was “exactly what established the inventive concept [in Bascom] by way of being a non-conventional arrangement of parts”)). Argument by counsel cannot take the place of evidence. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997). For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in Examiner’s finding that the additional elements of Appellant’s claimed method fail to integrate the judicial exception, i.e. method of organizing human activity, into a practical application of the exception (see Ans. 7). (Step 2B) Having determined that Appellant’s claim 1: (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, the Guidance requires that we evaluate whether Appellant’s claim 1: (a) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or (b) simply Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 16 appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. On this record, Examiner explains: As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element of using a secure web-based system to perform the noted steps amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept (“significantly more”). There are no additional elements exclusive of the secure web-based system and, as such, the claim is not patent eligible. Still further, a well-known, general-purpose computer has been determined by the courts to be a well-understood, routine, and conventional element (see, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank; see also MPEP [§] 2106.05(d)). And, as indicated by the prior art of record, the additional element of a well-known, general-purpose computer is a well-understood, routine, and conventional element in the art. (Ans. 7–8 (citing Singletary10 ¶ 15, De Gheest11 9, and LaRue12 ¶ 15).) Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that Examiner failed to meet the requirements set forth in Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (see Appeal Br. 12). As discussed above, the evidence of record supports a finding that Appellant’s claimed method automates a previously well-understood, routine, conventional manual method, already engaged in by this 10 Singletary et al., US 2004/0204948 A1, published Oct. 14, 2004. 11 De Gheest, WO 00/50970 A3, published Aug. 31, 2000. Examiner refers to this document by the name of the Agent, Milliken, rather than the inventor, De Gheest. 12 LaRue, Jr. et al., US 2006/0031109 A1, published Feb. 9, 2006. Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 17 community, which utilizes staffing agencies, e.g., vendors, to match healthcare providers, e.g. doctors, with healthcare organizations, e.g., hospitals, according to the terms of a master contract. We do not find, and Appellant has not identified, an evidentiary basis on this record to support a finding that Appellant’s claimed method does more than recast the necessary and inherent steps of the manual staffing model, discussed above, in terms of an automated process. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that even if the notion of procuring cause protection is known and may applied by vendors and healthcare organizations independently using their own spreadsheets or other tools at their local computer when submitting a bid, the ability of procuring cause protection to be provided automatically by filtering the list being provided from a secure web-based system accessible by vendors and healthcare organizations is not routine or conventional. Providing the procuring cause protection at the secure web-based system provides many advantages over procuring cause protection self-enforcement being attempted by the vendors and healthcare organizations themselves. (Appeal Br. 12; see generally id. at 13–14.) Further, “[i]t has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Thus, the foregoing limitations set forth in Appellant’s claim 1 simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. Appeal 2020-000461 Application 12/873,699 18 CONCLUSION The preponderance of evidence of record supports Examiner’s finding that Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to patent ineligible subject matter. The rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. Appellant’s claims 2–8 and 21 are not separately argued and fall with Appellant’s claim 1. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–8, 21 101 Eligibility 1–8, 21 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation