Generations Products, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 30, 2000

No. 75294636 (T.T.A.B. May. 30, 2000)

Paper No. 17
BAC
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB MAY 30, 00
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Generations Products, Inc., changed from Generations
Products, L.L.C.1
________
Serial No. 75/294,636
_______
Gunther J. Evanina of Price, Heneveld, Cooper, Dewitt &
Litton for applicant.
Lourdes D. Ayala, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
106 (Mary Sparrow, Managing Attorney)
_______
Before Chapman, Rogers and McLeod, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Chapman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant has filed an application to register the
mark shown below2

1 Applicant submitted a copy of the articles of incorporation of
Generations Products, Inc., and the Examining Attorney accepted
applicant’s statement that it is a corporation of Michigan. It
is recommended that applicant record the transfer of interest
with the Assignment Branch of this Office. See Section 10 of the
Trademark Act, and Patent and Trademark Office Rules 3.25, 3.31,
3.41 and 3.85.
2 The Board notes that in the original drawing the first word of
the mark is GENERATIONS, whereas in the substitute drawing, the
first word is GENERATION. Although the presence or absence of
the letter “S” in applicant’s word “GENERATION[S]” is not a
Ser. No. 75/294636
2
for “hair products, namely, hair lotions, hair shampoos,
hair conditioners, hair sprays, and hair pomades; skin care
products, namely, body lotions, astringents for cosmetic
purposes, sunscreen preparations, sun block preparations,
sunscreens, sun tan gels, sun tan lotions, sun tan oils,
skin cleansing lotions, skin conditioners, skin cleansing
creams, skin lotions” in Class 3.3
The Examining Attorney refused registration under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on
the ground that applicant’s mark, if applied to its
identified goods, would so resemble the registered mark,
GENERATION for “hair groom, hair conditioner and hair
shampoo” in Class 3, as to be likely to cause confusion,
mistake or deception.4
When the refusal was made final, applicant appealed.
Briefs have been filed, but an oral hearing was not
requested.

decisive factor in this decision, nonetheless, the Examining
Attorney should have obtained clarification of this matter during
the ex-parte prosecution of the application.
3 Application Serial No. 75/294,636, filed May 19, 1997. The
application is based on applicant’s assertion of a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce. Applicant disclaimed the
term “products.”
Ser. No. 75/294636
3
We reverse the refusal to register. In reaching this
conclusion, we have considered all of the relevant du Pont5
factors.
We turn first to a consideration of applicant’s goods
vis-a-vis those of the cited registrant. We find that the
goods are in part identical (hair shampoo and hair
conditioner are in both the application and the
registration), and the goods are otherwise related personal
grooming products. Applicant did not argue to the
contrary. See In re American Safety Razor Co., 2 USPQ2d
1459 (TTAB 1987); Royal Hawaiian Perfumes, Ltd. v. Diamond
Head Products of Hawaii, Inc., 204 USPQ 144 (TTAB 1979);
and Frances Denney v. ViVe Parfums Ltd., 190 USPQ 302 (TTAB
1976).
Likewise, we do not find any differences in the
channels of trade or purchasers. We must presume, given
the identifications, that the goods travel in the same
channels of trade, and are purchased by the same class of
purchasers. See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir.

4 Registration No. 845,152, issued February 27, 1968, Section 8
affidavit accepted, renewed. The claimed date of first use is
October 24, 1966.
5 See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973).
Ser. No. 75/294636
4
1987); and In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB
1994).
Turning to a consideration of the marks, it is well
settled that marks must be considered in their entireties,
not dissected or split into component parts and each part
compared with other parts. That is, because it is the
entirety of the involved marks which is perceived by the
purchasing public, it is the entirety of the marks that
must be compared. It is the impression created by the
marks as a whole that is important. See Opryland USA Inc.
v. The Great American Music Show Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23
USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS
U.S.A. Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
See also, 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and
Unfair Competition, §23:41 (4th ed. 2000).
The Examining Attorney argues that the words
GENERATION PRODUCTS are the dominant feature of applicant’s
mark. In fact, the Examining Attorney states that “it is
entirely appropriate to view GENERATION PRODUCTS singularly
to make a determination on the likelihood of confusion
since one feature of a mark may be recognized as more
significant in creating a commercial impression and greater
weight may be given to that dominant feature.” (Brief, p.
5). We disagree with the Examining Attorney that with
Ser. No. 75/294636
5
regard to applicant’s mark the words GENERATION PRODUCTS
may be viewed alone in the likelihood of confusion
analysis.
Rather, we agree with applicant’s argument that the
additional words “BECAUSE FAMILY IS WHAT IT’S ALL ABOUT!”
should be afforded at least equal weight because they form
an integral part of applicant’s mark, and because there is
an additional emphasis on those words due to their
enclosure in emphatic punctuation (quotes and an
exclamation point).
In the case before us, the cited registrant’s mark is
a typed presentation of the word GENERATION, whereas
applicant’s mark is composed of two equally significant
lines consisting of nine words and some punctuation--one
line with the words GENERATION PRODUCTS and a second line
consisting of the words “BECAUSE FAMILY IS WHAT IT’S ALL
ABOUT!”. When considered in its entirety, we find that
applicant’s mark presents a different commercial impression
from that of the cited registrant’s mark. Specifically,
applicant’s mark connotes a very clear connection to
generations of individual people within a family, whereas
the cited mark simply connotes the general word
“generation” which could relate to any one of various
meanings of the word “generation,” such as offspring of
Ser. No. 75/294636
6
people, or a stage in a life cycle, or a group of people
living at about the same time, or sequential development of
the products themselves.6
Moreover, applicant argues that the word GENERATION is
weak as shown by several third-party registrations in the
field of hair care products which include the word
GENERATION in the mark.7 Third-party registrations are not
evidence of commercial use of the marks shown therein, or
what happens in the marketplace, or that consumers are
familiar with the third-party marks. See Olde Tyme Foods
Inc., v. Roundy’s Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542, 1545
(Fed. Cir. 1992); and Spoons Restaurants Inc. v. Morrison
Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735 (TTAB 1991), aff’d unpub’d, Appeal No.
92-1086 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1992). However, such
registrations are competent to show that others in a
particular industry have registered marks incorporating a

6 See The American Heritage Dictionary (3rd ed.) definition of
the term “generation” submitted by the Examining Attorney with
the brief.
7 Applicant submitted third-party applications and registrations
in the form of a printout from a private company’s trademark
database. (The evidence of third-party pending applications is
of no probative value.) Normally this submission would not be an
appropriate method of submitting credible evidence of the
existence of the registrations listed therein. Rather, third-
party registrations should be submitted in the form of plain,
soft photocopies of the registrations or the electronic
equivalent thereof printed from the Patent and Trademark Office’s
automated search system. See TBMP §703.02(b), and cases cited
therein. However, the Examining Attorney did not object and, in
fact, treated the submission as if of record. Accordingly, the
Board also treated them of record.
Ser. No. 75/294636
7
particular term, and that the registrations in that trade
are entitled to only a narrow scope of protection. See
Henry Siegel Co. v. M & R International Manufacturing Co.,
4 USPQ2d 1154 (TTAB 1987); In re Hamilton Bank, 222 USPQ
174 (TTAB 1984); and BAF Industries v. Pro-Specialties,
Incorporated, 206 USPQ 166 (TTAB 1980).
Here applicant has made of record third-party
registrations including the word GENERATION which are for
the same or related goods as those of applicant and the
cited registrant. Among the third-party registrations are
(i) NEXXT GENERATION and design for hair styling
preparation, finishing spray and instant conditioner; (ii)
THE SECOND GENERATION for hair care products including a
hair permanent kit, curl/wave activator creams, sprays and
mousses, and vitamin-enriched hair lotion; (iii) MY
GENERATION for, inter alia, shampoos, preparations for the
hair, body lotions and body creams; and (iv) GENERATION
SOUIRIRE for, inter alia, hair lotions and skin and body
lotions. Thus, it appears that the term GENERATION is
hardly a unique term for use in connection with hair care
products. Rather, there is a limited meaning and scope of
protection for each mark within its own niche.
When the marks, GENERATION and ,
are considered in their entireties as the purchasing public
Ser. No. 75/294636
8
views them, we find that the sound, appearance, and
commercial impressions created by the two involved marks
are dissimilar.
Decision: The refusal to register under Section 2(d)
is reversed.
However, applicant is allowed until twenty days from
the mailing date stamped on this order to submit a
substitute drawing, as explained in footnote 2 above. If
applicant does not submit a substitute drawing, then the
application will be forwarded for publication with the mark
as it now appears in the drawing (i.e., with the word
GENERATION in the singular).
B. A. Chapman
G. F. Rogers
L. K. McLeod
Administrative Trademark Judges,
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board