General Warehouse Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 14, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 1073 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

GENERAL WAREHOUSE CORP.
General Warehouse Corp. and John Coon. Case 22-
CA-8635
February 14, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND PENELLO
On September 27, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Bernard Ness issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, General Warehouse
Corp., North Bergen, New Jersey, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
MEMBER PENELLO, dissenting in part:
I would defer the complaint allegation that John
Coon was unlawfully discharged to the arbitration
award herein. Respondent and the General Counsel
stipulated that all parties participated in the arbitra-
tion, that evidence was adduced as to Coon's concert-
ed activities, and that the hearing was fair and
impartial. Although the arbitrator did not specifically
discuss the evidence of Coon's concerted activities, the
key is the evidence presented. Thus, I believe that the
arbitrator's denial of the grievance and finding "just
cause" for the discharge is effectively a finding that
the discharge was for the reasons stated in the
award-namely, excessive absenteeism. In my opinion
the award is, therefore, not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act and fully meets the
Spielberg standards' for deferral. Accordingly, I would
dismiss the allegation of the complaint relating to
Coon's discharge.
'Spielberg Manufacturing Company. 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
247 NLRB No. 142
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BERNARD NESS, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a
charge filed on August 9, 1978,' by John Coon, the General
Counsel issued a complaint on October 23, alleging that on
April 4 Respondent assigned John Coon to more arduous
tasks and on April 5 discharged him because of his union
and concerted activities in violation of Section 8(aX)() and
(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The
complaint further alleges that Respondent engaged in
unlawful threats in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent has denied the commission of any unfair labor
prL,tices. A hearing was held before me in Newark, New
Jersey, on February 21, 1979.'
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
the General Counsel and Respondent, I hereby make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a New Jersey corporation, is engaged in
warehousing operations in North Bergen, New Jersey. It
annually provides and performs the services of warehousing
freight transported in interstate commerce from which it
derives in excess of $50,000 in gross revenue. Based on the
foregoing, and as admitted by Respondent, I find that
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Local Union No. 641, a/w International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, herein called the Union, is and has been at all
times material herein a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The warehouse employees have been represented by the
Union for about 30 years. At the time of the events involved
herein, the parties were governed by the Teamster National
Master Freight Agreement and the New Jersey-New York
Area General Trucking Supplement Agreement. (1976-79.)'
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1978.
The hearing was scheduled to open on February 20, but because of
extremely inclement weather the hearing was postponed one day on short
notice.
Resp. Exh. 3.
DECISION
1073
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The contract provides for cost of living increases annually on
April , 1977, and again on April 1, 1978.
There are three buildings constituting the warehouse
operations and the employee complement is broken down
into three units, each represented by a union steward.
Respondent employs approximately 120-140 employees.
The supervisory hierarchy of Respondent involved consists
of the following: Michael Goldfarb, president, Philip Fine,
executive vice president, Philip Falzone, manager of ware-
house operations, and Frank November, warehouse manag-
er.4
In January, Fine held a meeting with the employees and
requested they give up bidding rights they would otherwise
have been entitled to under the collective-bargaining con-
tract on work to be performed for a particular customer at a
new building. There was considerable discussion, pro and
con, and the employees did not agree on whether to accept
Fine's request. Coon, a warehouse employee, was present,
but did not speak out. After the meeting, Fine took Coon
aside and asked him to induce the employees to waive their
bidding rights. Coon informed Fine he was opposed to a
waiver of the bidding rights and said he would not ask the
men to waive their rights. Fine then told Coon he knew
Coon was an instigator and troublemaker and was instru-
mental in the employees retaining an attorney several years
earlier.
In or about the first week in March, Goldfarb held a
meeting with all the warehouse employees. Goldfarb spoke
of the poor economic condition of Respondent and the high
cost of energy and said he could not afford to pay the cost of
living increase due under the collective-bargaining contract
on April I, in the amount of 38 cents an hour. Goldfarb told
the men he had owned a company where he had labor
trouble and closed up and he could do it again. He told the
employees if the employees did not waive the cost of living
increase due them, he would close down and open elsewhere.
At least five employees, including Coon, spoke up against
waiving the increase. Coon said the employees were also
suffering from the spiralling inflation and Respondent's
unfavorable position with its competitors was not the fault of
the employees. He argued against waiving the cost of living
increase.'
By letter dated March 9, to the employees, Goldfarb
invited the employees and their spouses to a breakfast
meeting at a local motel on Saturday, March 18. At this
meeting, Goldfarb spoke of the higher wage rates received by
the employees as compared to employees of Respondent's
competitors and once again asked the employees to waive
the 38 cents cost of living increase. He said he did not have
' At the time of the hearing, November was no longer employed by
Respondent. He was not called as a witness. Respondent's counsel stated at
the hearing, November had not been notified of the postponement of the
hearing and had appeared on February 20, but apparently refused to return
again the following day. No request was made by Respondent's counsel for an
adjournment to enable him to call November as a witness.
' Based on the credited testimony of Coon. In 1976. Coon took up a
collection among the employees and retained an attorney in an attempt to
claim additional past wages allegedly due the employees. Fine testified he did
not recall talking to Coon after the meeting and denied telling Coon he was
stirring up the employees, nor did he mention an attorney. Coon credibly
testified that sometime after retaining the attorney, Goldfarb remarked he
knew the employees had hired an attorney. Goldfarb was not questioned on
this point.
* Based upon the composite testimony of Coon and Harold Finnegan, the
the money to pay the increase and if he was compelled to
make such payment he would be forced to close the
operation.'
Toward the end of March, Goldfarb held a meeting with
the three union stewards. He said the April deadline for
the cost of living increase was drawing near and he had to
know if the employees would agree to waive the increase. He
reiterated he would close the operation if he did not get the
employees to agree to waive the increase. The stewards told
Goldfarb they would poll the employees to ascertain
whether they would agree to waive the increase." The
following day each of the stewards held a meeting in the
warehouse with the employees in the respective units. At the
meeting of the employees in unit 1, presided over by
Finnegan and which Coon attended, Finnegan told the
employees of the stewards' meeting with Goldfarb and
informed them Goldfarb had said he would close down the
facility if he had to pay the increase.' A number of
employees, including Coon, voiced their opposition to
waiving the increase. Coon spoke of past instances where
Goldfarb had successfully appealed to the men to give up
monetary increases due them under the contract. The
employees in unit 1 voted against the waiver, 33-31. The
combined poll of the three units resulted in a count of about
five votes short of accepting the waiver. On about March 30,
Finnegan reported the results of the poll to Fine. Fine then
told Finnegan that since the employees were not disposed to
helping the Company, the employees would no longer be
granted work time to cash their paychecks and the employ-
ees would no longer be rotated on Wrigley car work."' The
Union subsequently filed a grievance because of Respon-
dent's failure to pay the cost of living increase. Prior to
arbitration, Respondent agreed to comply.
The Alleged Discrimination Against Coon
Coon had been employed as a warehouseman from July
1967, until his discharge on April 5, 1978. He worked in the
unit 1 group of employees where Finnegan was the union
steward. The warehousemen load and unload trucks and
freight cars. The General Counsel contends that Coon was
assigned to the Wrigley work on April 4, and discharged on
April 5, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act
because of his open opposition to a waiver of the employees'
rights under the collective-bargaining contract to receive a
cost of living increase. Respondent's position is that Coon
was discharged because of excessive absenteeism.
The employees viewed the Wrigley work as the least
desirable. The cartons are tightly packed with gum and
union steward for the employees in unit I. Goldfarb testified he did not
specifically recall Coon speaking at the meeting. He testified that he did tell
the employees at the meeting of Respondent's economic condition and that
"we were about as far as we can go and I wanted them to know exactly what
the situation was." He denied "threatening" the employees, but was not
specifically asked if he made any reference to closing the operation.
' Coon did not attend this meeting. The account is based upon the credited
testimony of Finnegan. Goldfarb admitted speaking of Respondent's poor
economic condition. He was not asked whether he made any statement
regarding closing the facility.
' Based upon the uncontradicted testimony of Finnegan. Goldfarb was not
questioned about this meeting.
i Finnegan indicated in his testimony the Union was aware of the events
and left the decision up to the wishes of the employees.
"' More about the Wrigley work infra.
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GENERAL WAREHOUSE CORP.
stacked by hand and not on pallets. It is a one man operation
and requires constant bending. In the past Respondent had
used this assignment as a form of punishment when
employees were looked upon with disfavor for one reason or
another. In about 1976, Respondent agreed to assign the
Wrigley work among the warehousemen by rotation. Several
employees were exempt from this assignment because of
physical infirmities or other justifiable reasons. Coon was
not exempt. The Wrigley work was the only assignment by
rotation. November made the assignments each day. There
were about 3-6 Wrigley loads each week and, according to
Finnegan, individual employees performed this assignment
about four times a year.
Coon testified he injured his back in 1971, and a herniated
disk was removed. The injury was not work connected. He
testified that from 1971 until one time in a winter month of
1977-78 he was not assigned to any Wrigley work. At that
time he was assigned to a Wrigley freight car and did not
protest the assignment. The next day he was again assigned
to the Wrigley freight car and this time he complained to
November he had worked on it the day previously. Novem-
ber replied the cartons did not contain packaged gum the
day before." Coon performed the work and the following
day he was absent. Coon testified he was absent because of
the strain on his back from the strenuous work performed on
the second day of the Wrigley assignment.
Coon was next assigned to the Wrigley work by Novem-
ber on April 4. He did not register a complaint about the
assignment when it was made. The next day, April 5, he did
not report for work. Coon testified his back hurt because of
the strenuous work performed the day before.' That
morning his wife telephoned November and reported that
because of his back pain, Coon would not be in to work.
About I I a.m., Coon received a telegram notifying him of
his discharge because of his absentee record. (G.C. Exh. 14)
Upon receipt of the telegram, he telephoned Falzone and
protested his discharge. Falzone told him the order to
discharge Coon came from "up front.""
Although I have credited Coon's testimony in a number of
instances, I find, contrary to his testimony, that he had been
assigned Wrigley work even before the one assignment in the
winter months of 1977-78. Union Steward Finnegan, a
witness for the General Counsel, worked the same shift as
Coon. He testified he became a steward in January 1976. In
about April 1976, he set up a rotation list of about 80
employees on his shift to perform Wrigley work. Excluded
from this list were the exempt employees-those with
infirmities of one sort or another. Coon was not exempt. If
employees were assigned to Wrigley work out of turn, he
would be aware of it by referring to his list. This did occur a
couple of times. According to Finnegan, Coon was assigned
to Wrigley work in 1976 and also in 1977. He recalled one
time Coon told him he should not have received a Wrigley
assignment, but then decided not to press the issue.
Moreover, had Coon not received the assignment for
approximately 7 years, it seems logical to assume that when
he received such assignment in the winter month (1977-78)
" Coon testified that the work the first day was relatively light because the
packages contained wire racks used for display purposes rather than gum.
' He visited a doctor the evening of April 4.
" Falzone denied he told Coon the decision to discharge him was made "up
front." I credit Coon's version.
he would have registered a protest. He did not. His
complaint at that time was that he was assigned the work
again on the second day.
Although Coon had been assigned to Wrigley work in the
past, it does not follow that the assignment on April 4 was
not discriminatorily motivated. Respondent was extremely
anxious to get the employees to forego the April I cost of
living increase, to the point of threatening to shut down the
plant. When the results of the stewards' poll of the
employees was reported to Respondent on about March 30,''
Respondent's resentment was evident. It was at that point
that Fine announced that the employees would no longer be
granted working time to cash their paychecks and that
Respondent would no longer follow rotation in assigning the
Wrigley work, an assignment known by Respondent to be
one least desired by the employees. It is in this setting that
we must examine the timing of the assignment to Coon. He
had been a vociferous opponent to waiving the cost of living
increase at the meeting conducted by Goldfarb in early
March. Respondent also was aware he had been instrumen-
tal in retaining an attorney about 2 years before in an
attempt to collect wages due to the employees under the
collective-bargaining contract. Although not exempt from
Wrigley assignments, I am of the view that the assignment of
the Wrigley work to Coon on the heels of the employees'
rejection of Respondent's request they waive the cost of
living increase was in retaliation for such rejection. Accord-
ingly, I find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act by assigning the Wrigley work to Coon on April 4.
We turn now to the discharge on April 5. Respondent
contends he was discharged because of excessive absences,
the most recent being on April 4. That he was absent a
considerable number of times is amply supported by the
record. But because justifiable grounds for discharge existed,
it does not necessarily follow such was the motivating
reason. The entire record must be examined. On July 2,
1976, Coon received a notice from Respondent that from
April I until July 2 1976, he had been absent 12 of the 66
working days. The letter said it was a final warning. (G.C.
Exh. 4) By letter dated December 1, 1976, Respondent
pointed out to Coon he had been absent five of seven Friday
working days during October-November. Coon was warned
to get "on the ball". (G.C. Exh. 5) On December 20, 1976,
Respondent reminded Coon of the December I letter and
referred to his being absent again on December 17. Once
again, it said-final warning. (G.C. Exh. 6)" On September
1, 1977, Respondent pointed out to Coon that his absence on
August 31 was his 28th unexcused absence since January
1977. (G.C. Exh. 7) By letter dated September 12, Respon-
dent pointed out to Coon that since the September I letter he
had been absent three additional days. Again-a final
warning. (G.C. Exh. 8) By letter dated September 15, Robert
Simmons, superintendent of warehouse operations, men-
tioned that a meeting had been held with union representa-
tives to review Coon's attendance records. Simmons stated
he had agreed that eight of the days should have been
excused and the two warning letters be rescinded. Simmons
" It may well have been on March 31. April I and 2. were nonworking
days.
"This was voided by Respondent's letter, dated January 4. 1977.
acknowledging that Coon had been under a doctor's order not to work. (G.C.
Exh. 11)
1075
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
also mentioned Coon's attendance record must improve.
(G.C. Exh. 9) By letter dated November 22, Respondent
pointed out to Coon that he had been absent on November 2,
16-18. Coon was suspended without pay for one week, later
changed to 2 days-December 5 and 6. (G.C. Exhs. 10 and
13) Respondent's records show he was out 14 work days in
1978 prior to his April 5 absence when he was discharged-
January 5-6, 13, 16-19, February 13 and 20, and March 6,
14-17. The record further shows he called in to report his
absence on only three of these occasions. (G.C. Exh. 3A) Yet
after his suspension in early December 1977, he received no
written or oral warnings. And then Respondent lowered the
boom on him when he was absent on April 5.
Falzone at one time had been the warehouse manager. He
left in about 1975 to manage a related company. He returned
as Respondent's manager of warehouse operations on
January 2, 1978. Falzone testified that he received the list of
absentees early in the afternoon of April 5. He then asked
November if Coon had called in and when it was reported to
him that Coon had not called, he decided to discharge Coon
and sent the telegram." He testified he alone made the
decision to discharge Coon for excessive absenteeism, with-
out consulting with any other management official. He also
testified he had spoken to Coon twice about his excessive
absences. I was not impressed with Falzone's testimony. He
testified that November had told him Coon's absence was
not reported to management nor was he aware at the time of
his decision to discharge Coon, that Coon had hurt his back.
Yet, Mrs. Coon credibly testified she had telephoned
November and told him of Coon's back complaint and that
Coon had been to a doctor the night before. November did
not testify. I believe Falzone was aware that Coon's absence
was reported to November and that he was aware of the
reason for the absence. I have also considered the fact that
no written or oral warnings were directed to Coon since the
November 22, 1977, letter, yet he was absent on seven
different occasions thereafter totalling 14 days. (G.C. Exh.
3A) In the past, Respondent apparently condoned excused
absences as noted in Respondent's letter to Coon of
September 15, 1977. (G.C. Exh. 9) Yet Falzone did not wait
to ascertain whether Coon's excuse for his absence was
excusable. Coming on the heels of the employees' rejection
of Respondent's attempts to avoid paying the cost of living
increase, followed by the change in check cashing policy and
elimination of rotation for Wrigley work only days before,
and culiminating in the discriminatory assignment of Wrig-
ley work to Coon, I am convinced that Coon was dis-
charged, not for his absences, but in retaliation for the
opposition by the employees to waive the cost of living
increase and Coon's known participation in such rejection.
Accordingly, I find that Coon's discharge violated Section
8(aXl 1) and (3) of the Act.
Respondent has also raised the Spielberg defense to a
finding of unfair labor practices." Coon's discharge became
the subject of a grievance which led to an arbitration hearing
on May 23, 1978. On June 21, 1978, the arbitrator" issued
his decision upholding Respondent, finding that there was
" Later in his testimony, he said he may have noted Coon's absence from
looking at the work assignment sheet in the morning. The telegram to Coon
was sent at 10:19 a.m. (G.C. Exh. 14)
" Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
just cause for Coon's discharge. (Resp. Exh. I) The unfair
labor practice charge in the instant matter was then filed on
August 10, 1978. At the hearing the General Counsel and
Respondent stipulated that all the parties participated in the
arbitration hearing, that evidence was adduced relating to
Coon's concerted activities with regard to the Union and
working conditions of the employees. The General Counsel
and Respondent further stipulated the hearing before the
arbitrator was fair and impartial.
Respondent contends that all the criteria of the Spielberg
doctrine have been met and the issue of Coon's discharge
therefore should not be considered by the Board. The
premise for his contention is that all the parties acquisced to
the arbitration, the proceedings before the arbitrator were
fair and regular, the issue of discrimination was raised at the
hearing, and the arbitrator's award was not repugnant to the
policies of the Act. The General Counsel, on the other hand,
argues that the arbitrator did not consider and made no
findings on the unfair labor practice issues which were
presented to him during the arbitration hearing and thus,
deferral to the arbitration award would be repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act.
In his decision, the arbitrator framed the issue to be
whether just cause existed under the contract for Coon's
discharge. The arbitrator referred to Coon's history of
absences and the Company's actions in the past concerning
his absences. He then concluded, "Therefore, based on the
clear thrust of the facts in evidence and the credible
testimony, there was just cause for the discharge of John
Coon. The grievance is denied." Not the slightest reference
is made in the decision to the evidence concerning Coon's
protected activities which the parties stipulated was present-
ed to him, nor did he make any findings thereto. Nor is there
any indication whatsoever that he considered such evidence
concerning Coon's protected activities as they may have
related to his discharge. We do not have a situation here
where the grievant sought two bites at the apple. Evidence of
the protected activities was not held back, but was presented
at the arbitration proceeding. It was after the award and the
nature of the decision that the unfair labor practice charge
was filed. I conclude, therefore, in agreement with the
General Counsel, deferral to the arbitration award would
not effectuate the Board's protection of Section 7 rights, but
rather would be repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the Act.'9
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening employees with reprisals or plant
closure if they refused to waive their rights under a
collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
" Selected through the auspices of the New Jersey State Mediation Service.
The contract provides for final and binding arbitration. (Resp. Exh. 3, 46. sec.
I(a)).
" See Max Factor & Co.. 239 NLRB 804 (1978).
1076
GENERAL WAREHOUSE CORP.
4. By discriminatorily assigning arduous work to John
Coon and thereafter discharging him because of activities
protected by the Act, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I)
and (3) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it shall be recomended that Respon-
dent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully discharged
John Coon, I recommend that Respondent be ordered to
offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former
position or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantial-
ly equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other employee benefits, and make him whole for any loss of
earnings and employee benefits he may have suffered from
the date of his discharge to the date reinstatement is offered.
The amount of backpay shall be computed in the manner set
forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest thereon to be computed in the manner
prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977).2'
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER2 '
The Respondent, General Warehouse Corp., North Ber-
gen, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with reprisals or plant closure
if they refused to waive their rights under a collective-
bargaining contract.
(b) Discharging, assigning arduous work to, or otherwise
disciplining employees because employees exercise their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to John Coon immediate and full reinstatement
to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole
for his loss of earnings in the manner set frth in the section
of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary or
useful to a determination of the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its facilities in North Bergen, New Jersey,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."`: Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 22, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative Board shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are custom-
arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
:" See. generally. sis Plumbing Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
:' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its
findings. conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had a chance to give
evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice. We intend
to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the
following.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WI.L NOT threaten our employees with reprisals
or plant closure if they refuse to waive their rights
under a collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WI.L. NOT assign arduous work to, discharge, or
otherwise discipline our employees because they exer-
cise their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WI.l. NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
1077
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL offer John Coon immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or, if such job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent job, without preju-
dice to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and
WE WILL make him whole for any loss of earnings he
may have suffered as a result of our discrimination
against him, together with interest.
GENERAL WAREHOUSE CORP.
1078