General Motors LLCv.Bolt Ride, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 8, 2021

91240088 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2021)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Hearing Date: August 11, 2021 Mailed: October 8, 2021

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

General Motors LLC

v.

Bolt Ride, Inc.
_____

Opposition No. 91240088
_____

Mary A. Hyde, Anessa Owen Kramera and Ka’Nea K. Brooks
of Honigman LLP for General Motors LLC.

Charles B. Welch, Jr. and Tyler A. Cosby of Farris Bobango PLC,
and Ann I. Dennen of Dennen IP Law, LLC for Bolt Ride, Inc.
_____

Before Zervas, Adlin and Hudis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Hudis, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Bolt Ride, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard character mark BOLT for “downloadable computer software for
transportation services” in International Class 9.1

1 Application Serial No. 87439619 was filed on May 7, 2017, based upon Applicant’s allegation
of its first use of the mark anywhere at least as early as June 30, 2014 and its first use in
commerce at least as early as March 1, 2016 under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C.
§1051(a).
Opposition No. 91240088
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In its Notice of Opposition,2 General Motors LLC (“Opposer”) opposes registration
of Applicant’s BOLT mark under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on
the ground that Applicant’s mark, as applied to the goods identified in the
Application, so resembles Opposer’s registered marks:
Mark Reg. No. Goods
BOLT 5171924 Motor land vehicles, namely, automobiles in the
nature of cars3
BOLT EV 5182238 Motor land vehicles, namely, electric automobiles4
as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception. Opposer further alleges that
Applicant committed fraud in the filing of its Application with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
Applicant admits that Opposer’s BOLT and BOLT EV marks and registrations
are valid, subsisting, and are prima facie evidence of Opposer’s ownership of the
marks for the goods recited therein.5 Applicant also admits Opposer’s priority of
rights in the BOLT mark regarding the goods set forth in the registration for that
mark.6 Applicant additionally admits that its BOLT mark is identical to Opposer’s
BOLT mark and closely similar to Opposer’s BOLT EV mark.7 Applicant further

2 1 TTABVUE. Citations to the pleadings, the evidence of record and the parties’ briefs refer
to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. Coming before the designation TTABVUE is the
docket entry number; and coming after this designation are the page and paragraph
references, if applicable.
3 Registration No. 5171924 was issued on March 28, 2017.
4 Registration No. 5182238 was issued on April 11, 2017; “EV” disclaimed.
5 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 4-5, ¶¶ 12-13; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3, ¶¶ 12-13.
6 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 5, ¶ 19; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3, ¶ 19.
7 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 6, ¶ 20; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3, ¶ 20.
Opposition No. 91240088
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admits the filing date and particulars of its BOLT trademark application.8 Applicant
otherwise denies the salient allegations of the Notice of Opposition.9
The case is fully briefed. The parties appeared for an oral hearing before this
panel.
Opposer bears the burden of proving its Trademark Act Section 2(d) claim by a
preponderance of the evidence. Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Network Inc.,
104 F.3d 336, 41 USPQ2d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1997); West Fla. Seafood, Inc. v. Jet
Rests., Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 31 USPQ2d 1660, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Having considered
the evidentiary record, the parties’ arguments and applicable authorities, as
explained below, we find that Opposer has carried this burden, and sustain the
Opposition. We need not, and do not, reach Opposer’s fraud claim. See Azeka Bldg.
Corp. v. Azeka, 122 USPQ2d 1477, 1478 (TTAB 2017) (Board has “discretion to decide
only those claims necessary to enter judgment and dispose of the case”) (quoting
Multisorb Tech., Inc. v. Pactive Corp., 109 USPQ2d 1170, 1171-72 (TTAB 2013)).

8 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 5, ¶¶ 14-17; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3, ¶¶ 14-17.
9 Answer, 4 TTABVUE.
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I. The Evidentiary Record
The record consists of the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of Applicant’s involved BOLT application. In addition,
the parties introduced the following evidence:10
A. Opposer’s Evidence
 Opposer’s First Notice of Reliance (“Opp NOR 1”) on Applicant’s Initial
Disclosures, Applicant’s Discovery Responses, and the transcripts with
exhibits from the Discovery Depositions of Applicant’s principals: Applicant’s
President, J. Frank (“Frank”) Warmath, Sr. (“Frank Warmath Depo. Tr.”);
Applicant’s Treasurer, J. Frank (“John”) Warmath Jr. (“John Warmath Depo.
Tr.”); and Applicant’s Creative Director, William Baker Grant Warmath
(“Baker Warmath Depo. Tr.”) [public and redacted, 21 TTABVUE; confidential,
22 TTABVUE].11

10 In this Opposition, both parties filed under Notices of Reliance the transcripts and exhibits
from discovery depositions taken during the discovery period. Both parties filed the
deposition transcripts in condensed format, multiple pages per sheet. Deposition transcripts
filed in such a format are difficult to read, and require double citations to the TTABVUE
docket and to the condensed transcript pages. Trademark Rule 2.123(g), 37 C.F.R. § 2.123(g),
expressly provides that “deposition transcript[s] [filed with the Board] must be submitted in
full-sized format (one page per sheet), not condensed (multiple pages per sheet).” However
the parties had their discovery deposition transcripts formatted for discovery purposes, once
offered into evidence at trial they became trial evidence that had to comply with the
appropriate formatting rules for the filing of deposition transcripts. The parties’ counsel are
admonished that their future filings of deposition transcripts with the Board must meet the
requirements of the Trademark Rules of Practice.
Additionally, both parties at points submitted evidence that was not in procedural compliance
with the Trademark Rules pertaining to Notices of Reliance. See Trademark Rule 2.122(g),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(g); TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP)
§ 704.02 (2021). Neither party objected to the procedural infirmities of its adversary’s Notice
of Reliance evidence. Where objections were not timely asserted we deem the parties to have
stipulated to the submission of the evidence outside of the rules. See Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd., 124 USPQ2d 1160, 1163 (TTAB 2017) (“Objections to testimony or
to a notice of reliance grounded in asserted procedural defects are waived unless raised
promptly, when there is an opportunity to cure.”).
11 Opposer filed the entirety of Applicant’s Disclosures, Interrogatory Answers, Production
Responses and Admissions Responses, as well as the transcripts and exhibits from
Applicant’s Discovery Depositions, as confidential with no public filing in redacted format
serving to shield only truly confidential information. Turdin v. Trilobite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d
1473, 1476 n.6 (TTAB 2014) (documents that are designated confidential do not appear in
the electronic docket, TTABVUE). “Board proceedings are designed to be transparent to the
Opposition No. 91240088
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 Opposer’s Second Notice of Reliance (“Opp NOR 2”) on websites and online
articles regarding Opposer’s and competitors’ electric vehicles and
ride-sharing/ride-hailing services [23 TTABVUE].
 Opposer’s Third Notice of Reliance (“Opp NOR 3”) on website articles published
in 2017 regarding awards given to Opposer’s BOLT EV vehicle; and Applicant’s
Facebook, Instagram and website pages [24 TTABVUE].
 Opposer’s Fourth Notice of Reliance (“Opp NOR 4”) on third-party U.S.
trademark applications and registrations for vehicle reservation services and
vehicles; and Opposer’s application in Brazil to register the BOLT mark [25
TTABVUE].
 Testimony Declaration of Opposer’s Lead Architect of EV Infrastructure,
Alexander Keros (“Keros Decl.”), with exhibits [26 TTABVUE].
 Testimony Declaration of Opposer’s Senior Manager for Global Product
Research, Dennis Socha (“Socha Decl.”), with exhibits [public and redacted, 27
TTABVUE; confidential, 28 TTABVUE].
 Testimony Declaration of Opposer’s Lead Counsel for Trademarks and Design
Patents, Timothy Gorbatoff (“Gorbatoff Decl.”), with exhibits [public and
redacted, 29 TTABVUE; confidential, 30 TTABVUE].
 Testimony Declaration of Opposer’s Marketing and Advertising Manager,
Kata Beslic, with exhibits (“Beslic Decl.”) [public and redacted, 31 TTABVUE;
confidential, 32 TTABVUE].
B. Applicant’s Evidence
 Applicant’s Notice of Reliance (“App NOR”) on the transcripts from the
Discovery Depositions of Opposer’s witnesses, Ms. Belsic (“Belsic Depo. Tr.”)
and Messrs. Keros and Socha (“Keros Depo. Tr.” and “Socha Depo. Tr.”) [39
TTABVUE], with exhibits filed separately [43 TTABVUE].

public and the contents of proceeding files publicly available. The improper designation of
materials as confidential thwarts that intention. Moreover, it is more difficult to make
findings of fact, apply the facts to the law, and write decisions that make sense when the
facts may not be discussed. The Board needs to be able to discuss the evidence of record,
unless there is an overriding need for confidentiality, so that the parties and a reviewing
court will know the basis of the Board’s decision.” Couch/Braunsdorf Affinity, Inc. v. 12
Interactive, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1458, 1461 (TTAB 2014). In any event, Applicant filed the
same material (except its Admissions Responses) in public, non-confidential format, without
redaction. App Updated NOR, 43 TTABVUE 70-198, 816-30, 1172-1350. Therefore, in
rendering our decision, we will not be bound in this opinion by Opposer designating the
materials submitted with its First Notice of Reliance as “confidential.” We will treat only
testimony and evidence that is clearly of a private nature or commercially sensitive as
confidential.
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 Applicant’s Updated Notice of Reliance (“App Updated NOR”) [43 TTABVUE]
on:12
o Transcripts from the Discovery Depositions of Applicant’s principals:
Frank Warmath, John Warmath, and Baker Warmath, with exhibits.
o Applicant’s Interrogatory Answers and Responses to Requests for
Production.
o Select exhibits from Opposer’s Testimony Declarations (Gorbatoff Exhs.
A, L and V; Socha Exh. Q, P and R; and Belsic Exh. S).
o Trademark Electronic Search System (“TESS”) Search Results for the
term “BOLT” (TESS registration abstracts provided).
o TESS Search Results for the term “SILVERADO” (only TESS list of
marks provided, no registrations or abstracts).
o Consent Agreement between Opposer and Yamaha Hatsudoki K. K.13
o Websites and other online articles regarding the company Bolt Mobility
Corporation.
o Online article regarding TESLA car sales.
o Third-party applications and registrations for marks including or
comprising the term “BOLT”.

12 Applicant inappropriately duplicated many of Opposer’s evidentiary filings in the Updated
Notice of Reliance including discovery deposition transcripts and exhibits thereto. The
Trademark Rules do not permit a party to file the discovery deposition transcripts and
exhibits of its own witnesses, or its own discovery responses. Trademark Rules 2.120(k), 37
C.F.R. § 2.120(k)(1). However, once Opposer made these items of record, as well as the
exhibits annexed to Opposer’s Testimony Declarations, Applicant was entitled to rely on
them without re-filing this evidence with the Board and unnecessarily burdening the Board
with additional, duplicative materials to review. Trademark Rules 2.120(k)(7), 2.122(a); 37
C.F.R. §§ 120(k)(7), 2.122(a). Also, in its Updated Notice of Reliance (43 TTABVUE),
Applicant duplicated many, but not all, of the exhibits in its original Notice of Reliance (39
TTABVUE). Where duplicated, we cite only to the exhibits filed with Applicant’s Updated
Notice of Reliance.
13 Opposer did not timely move to strike this consent agreement, or object to it as having been
introduced improperly. Opposer only objected – in its Reply Brief – that the agreement is
irrelevant. 55 TTABVUE 21-22. We overrule Opposer’s relevance objection, because the
objection is untimely and the consent agreement is relevant to the scope of protection for
Opposer’s marks. Since Opposer did not assert a timely procedural objection to this
document, such an objection is waived and Opposer is deemed to have stipulated to the
submission of this evidence – even though the consent agreement was not properly filed
through Applicant’s Notice of Reliance. See Barclays Capital, 124 USPQ2d at 1163 (TTAB
2017).

Opposition No. 91240088
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o Examples of third-party uses from the Internet of marks including or
comprising the term “BOLT”.
o Applicant’s Answer to Notice of Opposition.
o Applicant’s ride report, Santa Fe and Albuquerque, NM,
January-February 2017.14
o TESS Search Results for the term “VOLT” (only TESS list of marks
provided, no registration abstracts).
o TESS Search Results for the term “CAMARO” (only TESS list of marks
provided, no registration abstracts).
o Testimony Declaration of John Warmath, with exhibits.
C. Opposer’s Rebuttal Evidence
 Opposer’s Fifth Notice of Reliance (“Opp NOR 5”) on:
o Registration copies, TESS registration abstracts and (if applicable)
assignment records for Opposer’s marks: BOLT, BOLT EV, BOLT EUV,
VOLT, and Opposer’s pending Application to register the VOLT mark.
o Numerous TESS abstracts of abandoned applications filed by Bolt
Mobility Corporation for marks including the term “BOLT”.
o TESS abstracts of pending applications filed by Bolt Mobility
Corporation for the marks “BOLTMOBILITY” and “BOLT”.
II. The Parties
Opposer, General Motors, LLC, asserts, and Applicant concedes, that Opposer is
one of the world’s largest automotive manufacturers.15 Opposer uses the registered
marks BOLT and BOLT EV in connection with an all-electric vehicle offering an

14 Normally, Bolt Ride’s Ride report would not be an appropriate submission through a Notice
of Reliance. See Trademark Rule 2.122(g). Opposer did not assert a timely procedural
objection to this document, so the objection is waived and Opposer is deemed to have
stipulated to the submission of this evidence. See Barclays Capital, 124 USPQ2d at 1163
(TTAB 2017). In any event, Opposer made this document of record with the transcript from
one of Applicant’s discovery depositions. See John Warmath Depo. Tr. 22 TTABVUE 163-64,
364, Tr. pp. 109-11, Exh. 19.
15 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 3, ¶ 4; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 2, ¶ 4. See also Applicant’s
Brief, 54 TTABVUE 10.
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EPA-estimated 238 miles of range on a single charge.16 Opposer, through its
Chevrolet Division, began sales of the BOLT EV vehicle in December 2016.17
Applicant, Bolt Ride, Inc., was founded in June 2014 by Frank Warmath and his
two sons, John and Baker.18 Frank is the company’s President (who functions mainly
as a consultant to the business), John is the Treasurer (who handles all the company’s
day-to-operations), and Baker is the Creative Director (who handles logo, website and
advertising design).19 The company has no other employees.20
Applicant provides a downloadable mobile software application (an “app”) that
connects users to a curated selection of carbon-free transportation options. To date,
those transportation options have been provided by electric vehicles,21 including
TESLA models S and X, and Chevrolet BOLT EVs.22 Baker Warmath conceived of

16 Gorbatoff Decl., 29 TTABVUE 5-6, ¶¶ 3, 9. Actually, Opposer does not market or sell a
vehicle named BOLT. The car Opposer sells is called the BOLT EV. Beslic Depo. Tr., App
NOR, 39 TTABVUE 52-53, Tr. pp. 13-14. However, consumers and others in the marketplace
on social media websites and in online newspapers and publications simply refer to the
vehicle as BOLT. Beslic Depo. Tr., App NOR, 39 TTABVUE 61, Tr. pp. 47-4.
17 Beslic Depo. Tr., App NOR, 39 TTABVUE 55-56, Tr. pp. 25-27.
18 John Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 141, 143, Tr. pp. 18, 26-27; Frank
Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 71, Tr. pp. 13-14; Baker Warmath Depo. Tr.,
Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 371-72, Tr. pp. 17-18.
19 Frank Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 70, 73, 78, Tr. pp. 10, 18, 39-41; John
Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 141, Tr. pp. 19-20; John Warmath Decl., App
Updated NOR, 43 TTABVUE 1164, ¶ 2; Baker Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22
TTABVUE 372, Tr. p. 18
20 Baker Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 371-72, Tr. pp. 17-18; Applicant’s
Facebook pages, Opp NOR 4, 24 TTABVUE 37-38.
21 John Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 143-44, 153-54, Tr. pp. 27-31, 69-72;
Frank Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 73, Tr. p. 20; Baker Warmath Depo.
Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 372-73, Tr. pp. 20-22.
22 John Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 153, Tr. pp. 67-68.
Opposition No. 91240088
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the BOLT name for Applicant’s software-as-a-service, which was approved by John
Warmath on behalf of the company.23
Most of the drivers who have provided rides to customers connected through
Applicant’s mobile app do not own their own electric vehicles. A separate company
called Zero TN, LLC (“Zero”) primarily owns the electric vehicles used by drivers
connected through Applicant’s BOLT app. Applicant’s three founders started Zero to
own a small fleet of vehicles to rent to drivers because the supply of electric vehicles
in the marketplace was too low.24
The first, web-based, version of Applicant’s BOLT app was developed in late 2014
to early 2015; a second, stand-alone mobile app version in July 2015; and an updated
mobile app version in early 2016, which Applicant currently uses. The first,
web-based, version of the BOLT app was used over one weekend in Nashville, TN, in
connection with the Vanderbilt University 2015 graduation, and at no other time.
The mobile app version of the BOLT app was first made commercially available
during the summer of 2015,25 and was available for download on the Apple App Store
and Google Play Store as of the date that Applicant’s BOLT trademark application
was filed on May 7, 2017.26

23 John Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 156-57, Tr. pp. 81-82; Baker Warmath
Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 377, Tr. p. 41; Frank Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1,
22 TTABVUE 73, Tr. p. 20.
24 John Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 148-49, Tr. pp. 49-51; Frank Warmath
Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 76-77, Tr. pp. 33-36.
25 John Warmath Depo. Tr., Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 151-54, Tr. pp. 59-64, 69-72.
26 Id. at 160, Tr. pp. 95-97.
Opposition No. 91240088
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III. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a threshold issue that must be proven
by the plaintiff in every inter partes case. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar
Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To establish entitlement
to a statutory cause of action under Trademark Act Section 13, 15 U.S.C., § 1063, a
plaintiff must demonstrate “an interest falling within the zone of interests protected
by the statute and … proximate causation.” Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d
1298, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (2021),
(citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 109
USPQ2d 2061, 2067-70 (2014)).27 Stated another way, a plaintiff is entitled to bring
a statutory cause of action by demonstrating a real interest in the proceeding and a
reasonable belief of damage. Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM,
LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___ (2021); see also Empresa Cubana, 111 USPQ2d at 1062.
There is “no meaningful, substantive difference between the analytical
frameworks expressed in Lexmark and Empresa Cubana.” Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d
11277 at *4. Thus, “a party that demonstrates a real interest in [oppos]ing a
trademark under [Trademark Act Section 13, 15 U.S.C.] § 106[3] has demonstrated
an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by [the Trademark Act] .…

27 Our decisions have previously analyzed the requirements of Trademark Act Sections 13
and 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64, under the rubric of “standing.” We now refer to this inquiry as
entitlement to a statutory cause of action. Despite the change in nomenclature, our prior
decisions and those of the Federal Circuit interpreting Trademark Act Sections 13 and 14
remain applicable.
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Similarly, a party that demonstrates a reasonable belief of damage by the registration
of a trademark demonstrates proximate causation within the context of § 106[3].” See
Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277 at *7.
As noted, Applicant concedes Opposer is the owner of valid federal trademark
registrations for the BOLT and BOLT EV marks in connection with vehicles and
electric vehicles, respectively.28 Opposer made of record copies, as well as TESS
database abstracts, of these registrations.29 Because Opposer's registrations are of
record, and Applicant concedes Opposer’s ownership and the validity thereof,
Opposer has established its entitlement to bring its Trademark Act Section 2(d) claim
in this proceeding. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842,
1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lipton Indus. Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213
USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982).
IV. Priority
Because Opposer relies on its asserted BOLT and BOLT EV trademark
registrations that have been made of record, and Applicant has not challenged these
registrations by way of any cancellation counterclaim(s), Opposer’s priority is not at
issue with respect to its registered marks for the goods identified in its registrations.
King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110

28 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 3-4, ¶¶ 12-13; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3, ¶¶ 12-13.
29 Opp NOR 5, 42 TTABVUE 6-15.
Opposition No. 91240088
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(CCPA 1974). Applicant also concedes Opposer’s priority at least with respect to
Opposer’s BOLT mark and registration.30
V. Likelihood of Confusion
Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), prohibits the registration of a
mark that:
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered
in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously
used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Our analysis is based on all of the probative evidence of record. In re E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (noting the
elements, or factors, to be considered). In making our determination, we consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See In re Guild Mortg. Co.,
912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Varying weights may be
assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented. See Citigroup
Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“[T]he various evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any
particular determination”).
In applying the DuPont factors, we bear in mind the fundamental purposes
underlying Trademark Act Section 2(d), which are to prevent confusion as to source

30 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 4, ¶ 19; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3, ¶ 19. See also
Applicant’s Brief, 54 TTABVUE 8-9.

Opposition No. 91240088
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and to protect trademark owners from damage caused by registration of confusingly
similar marks. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 224 USPQ
327, 331 (1985); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 34 USPQ2d 1161,
1163 (1995); DuPont, 177 USPQ at 566.
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities
between the marks and the similarities between the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc.
v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The
fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”). These
factors, and the other DuPont factors for which there is evidence and argument, are
discussed below.
A. The Parties’ Marks
In our evaluation of the similarity or dissimilarity of the parties’ marks, we first
consider the strength of Opposer’s marks and then compare the respective marks in
their entireties.
1. Strength of Opposer’s Marks
Before we turn to the similarity of the marks, we consider the strength of
Opposer’s mark under the fifth and sixth DuPont factors, DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567,
as that will affect the scope of protection to which they are entitled. In determining
the strength of a mark, we consider its conceptual strength, based on the nature of
the mark itself, and its commercial strength, based on marketplace recognition of the
mark. See In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength
Opposition No. 91240088
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(distinctiveness) and its marketplace strength (secondary meaning).”). The
commercial strength of the mark also is affected by the number and nature of
third-party use of similar marks for similar goods. DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.
As Opposer’s BOLT and BOLT EV marks are registered on the Principal Register
without a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f), 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f), they are presumed to be inherently distinctive and at the very least
suggestive. Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1881, 1889 (TTAB
2006). The Chevrolet BOLT EV is a fully electric vehicle, operated with an electric
motor and driven by a battery. Opposer thus chose the BOLT name for its vehicle as
the best among several under consideration, most of which (including BOLT) were
associated with electricity.31 The acronym “EV” stands for “electric vehicle,”32 and
thus has been disclaimed apart from the BOLT EV mark as a whole in Opposer’s
Trademark Registration No. 5182238.
Applicant disputes the inherent strength distinctiveness of Opposer’s BOLT and
BOLT EV marks by making of record 604 pages of third-party applications (many
abandoned) and registrations (several cancelled) comprising or including the term
“Bolt.”33 Evidence that a mark, or an element of a mark, was adopted or at some time
appropriated by many different registrants may undermine the common element’s
conceptual or inherent strength as an indicator of a single source. Jack Wolfskin

31 Socha Depo Tr., 39 TTABVUE 29, Tr. pp. 26-28.
32 Id. at 36, Tr. p. 55.
33 Applicant’s Brief, 54 TTABVUE 17, 20; App Updated NOR, 43 TTABVUE 308-605,
831-1138.
Opposition No. 91240088
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Austrang Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millenium Sports, S.L.U., 797
F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence of third-party
registrations is relevant to ‘show the sense in which a mark is used in ordinary
parlance,’ ... that is, some segment that is common to both parties’ marks may have
‘a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning,
leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively weak.’”) (quoting Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1675 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (the extent of third-party use or registrations may indicate that a term carries
a suggestive or descriptive connotation and is weak for that reason)); see also Top
Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1173 (TTAB 2011)
(third-party registrations indicate term CLASSIC has suggestive meaning as applied
to tobacco products); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693,
694-695, (CCPA 1976) (finding third-party registrations may be used “in the same
way that dictionaries are used.”).
However, many of Applicant’s third-party references recite goods and services far
removed from vehicles, car parts and accessories, or automobile-related services.
These references are not probative. See In re I.AM.Symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123
USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (disregarding third-party registrations for other
types of goods where the proffering party had neither proven nor explained that they
were related to the goods in the cited registration).
Regarding the third-party applications and cancelled or expired registrations
Applicant submitted, applications, whether pending or abandoned, are evidence only
Opposition No. 91240088
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of the fact that they have been filed, In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266,
1270 n.8 (TTAB 2009), Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., 94 USPQ2d
1399, 1403 n.4 (TTAB 2010) (quoting In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 63 USPQ2d
1047, 1049 n.4 (TTAB 2002)), and have no other probative value, Interpayment
Services Ltd. v. Docters & Thiede, 66 USPQ2d 1463, 1468 n.6 (TTAB 2003). A
cancelled or expired registration has no probative value other than to show that it
once issued. See Action Temp. Servs. Inc. v. Labor Force Inc., 870 F.2d 1563, 10
USPQ2d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“a cancelled registration does not provide
constructive notice of anything.”).
Stripped of the irrelevant third-party application and registration evidence, we
find the following references probative, to one extent or another, of conceptual
strength:34
Mark Reg. No. Goods/Services Owner
AIR DESIGN SUPER
BOLT
6159077 Truck and SUV parts
and accessories, Cl. 12
Air Design S.A. de
C.V.
BOLT 5795846 Scooter sharing
services, Cl. 39
Bolt Mobility
Corporation
HALO BOLT 5337781 Portable car battery
chargers; portable car
battery jumping kits,
Cl. 9
Zagg Inc.
BOLT ON TECHNOLOGY 5053537 Computer software
development for use by
automotive repair,
parts and service
businesses, Cl. 42
Bolt On Technology,
LLC
BOLT CUSTOM TRUCKS
AND MANUFACTURING
4748817 Truck parts, namely, a
premium-outfitted
truck cab, Cl. 12
Gracie Industries
LLC

34 App Updated NOR, 43 TTABVUE 316, 372, 570, 870-71, 875-876, 898, 970, 1008-09, 1023,
1026, 1111, 1135.
Opposition No. 91240088
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Mark Reg. No. Goods/Services Owner

4748816 Truck parts, namely, a
premium-outfitted
truck cab, Cl. 12
Gracie Industries
LLC
BOLT CUSTOM TRUCKS
AND MANUFACTURING
4721070 Service and repair in
connection with truck
sleeper cabs, Cl. 37
Gracie Industries
LLC

4721069 Service and repair in
connection with truck
sleeper cabs, Cl. 37
Gracie Industries
LLC
BOLT 4429759 Motorcycles and
structural parts
therefor, excluding
wheels, Cl. 12
Yamaha Hatsudoki
K. K.
BLS POLY BOLT-ON
TUFPADS HIGHTOP
3969495 Track pads for tracked
vehicles, Cl. 12
BLS Enterprises,
Inc.
BOLT 3233301 Freight transportation
by car, van, and truck,
Cl. 39
Bolt Express, LLC
CO-BOLT 2899319 Vehicles and apparatus
for locomotion by land
…, namely, …
automobiles and
structural parts
therefor, Cl. 12
Carrosserie Hess AG
BOLT EXPRESS 2593090 Freight transportation
services by car, van,
and truck, Cl. 39
Bolt Express, LLC

3887710 Security products for
use with automotive
keys and key codes, Cl.
6
Strattec Security
Corporation
ULTIMATE BOLT-ON
PERFORMANCE!
4172052 Internal combustion
vehicle engine parts, Cl.
7; Land vehicle
transmission parts, Cl.
12
Autosales,
Incorporated
BLS POLY BOLT-ON 2947550 Track pads for tracked
vehicles, Cl. 12
BLS Enterprises,
Inc.
LITENING BOLT
PERFORMANCE
PRODUCTS
1868178 Automobile body
panels; automobile
chassis parts, Cl. 12
Crites Industries
Opposition No. 91240088
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Considering that Opposer’s goods identified in its registrations are confined to
motor vehicles, we find less relevant those of the above-listed registrations that do
not recite automobiles or structural parts therefor in the identification of goods. We
also find less relevant those third-party registrations including the term BOLT that
do not have the connotation of the definition of this term associated with electricity
(e.g., BOLT ON TECHNOLOGY, BLS POLY BOLT-ON TUFPADS HIGHTOP,
ULTIMATE BOLT-ON PERFORMANCE, etc.).
Dictionary definitions of the term “Bolt” include: “a lightning stroke,” “a wood or
metal bar or rod used to fasten a door,” “the part of a lock that is shot or withdrawn
by the key,” “a metal rod or pin for fastening objects together that usually has a head
at one end and a screw thread at the other and is secured by a nut,” and “a metal
cylinder that drives the cartridge into the chamber of a firearm, locks the breech, and
usually contains the firing pin and extractor.”35 Opposer’s Mr. Socha testified that
Opposer chose the term “Bolt” due to its connection with electricity,36 and a number
of these third-party registrations submitted by Applicant make use of that definition,
thereby indicating the suggestiveness of the term in connection with the goods
identified in Opposer’s registration. See Top Tobacco, 101 USPQ2d at 1173 (TTAB
2011) (third party registrations indicate term CLASSIC has suggestive meaning as

35 Dictionary definitions of “Bolt” taken from the online version of the MERRIAM-WEBSTER
dictionary (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bolt, last visited Oct. 6, 2021). The
Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries that
exist in printed format. In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014),
aff’d, 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
36 Socha Depo. Tr. 39 TTABVUE 29, Tr. pp. 27-29.
Opposition No. 91240088
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applied to tobacco products); Tektronix, 189 USPQ at 694-695 (third-party
registrations may be used “in the same way that dictionaries are used.”).
Because one of the dictionary definitions of “Bolt” is associated with electricity,
third-party registered marks exist that comprise or include the term “Bolt” which
have similar relevance to Opposer’s type of goods, and the acronym “EV” stands for
“electric vehicle,” we find that BOLT and BOLT EV are suggestive marks for
Opposer’s goods. Jack Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136.
Turning to the fifth DuPont factor, “a mark with extensive public recognition and
renown deserves and receives more legal protection than an obscure or weak mark.”
Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453,
1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Under the fifth DuPont factor, a finding regarding the
commercial strength of a plaintiff’s mark for purposes of likelihood of confusion is not
“an all-or-nothing measure.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings,
LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017). It “varies along a
spectrum from very strong to very weak.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
Commercial, or marketplace, strength is the extent to which the relevant public
recognizes a mark as denoting a single source. Tea Bd. of India, 80 USPQ2d at 1899.
Commercial strength may be measured “by the volume of sales and advertising
expenditures of the goods sold under the mark …, length of time of use of the mark;
Opposition No. 91240088
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wide-spread critical assessments; notice by independent sources of the products
identified by the marks; and the general reputation of the products ….” Weider Pubs.,
LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., LLC, 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1354 (TTAB 2014).
In support of its argument that the BOLT and BOLT EV marks are “very strong”
and “well known,”37 Opposer states its electric vehicles are promoted and sold in
connection with these marks via digital (Internet and social media), print,
out-of-home (dealerships), and radio spot means,38 and have been featured in the
press and received numerous awards and accolades including: 2017 MOTOR TREND
Car of the Year, North American Car of the Year in 2017 at the North American
International Auto Show, and one of TIME magazine’s 25 Best Inventions of 2016.39
Opposer also points to its not-insubstantial (but confidential) advertising
expenditures, sales numbers and income received from BOLT EV car sales since the
vehicle was introduced in December 2016.40 Opposer, however, did not provide
market share or other degree-of-notoriety information, which would have been
helpful to determine the level of marketplace strength Opposer’s marks enjoy. Omaha
Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 128 USPQ2d 1686,
1690 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (discussing “contextual evidence of the type of advertisements
and promotions … [the trademark owner] uses to gain sales”). Bose Corp. v. QSC

37 Opposer’s Brief, 49 TTABVUE 35-37.
38 Opposer’s Brief, 49 TTABVUE 34; Beslic Decl. (confidential version), 32 TTABVUE 5, ¶ 7;
Keros Depo. Tr., 39 TTABVUE 35-36, Tr. pp. 53-55.
39 Opp NOR 3, 24 TTABVUE 6-23, 30-33.
40 Beslic Decl. (confidential version), 32 TTABVUE 5, 11-16, 23-30, ¶¶ 5-6, Exhs. A, B and V.
All sales and advertising figures filed under seal.
Opposition No. 91240088
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Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing
market share as one means to place advertising and sales number in context);
Applicant challenges Opposer’s claim of marketplace strength with several pieces
of evidence. First and foremost, Applicant provided publicly available information
that Tesla’s sales of its all-electric vehicles dwarfed Opposer’s BOLT EV sales by
comparison for the 2016-18 period that Opposer provided its sales information.41
Applicant also introduced documentation demonstrating that Opposer is not the
only company selling a transportation-related product named “Bolt.”42 Notably,
Opposer entered into a co-existence agreement with Yamaha Hatsudoki K.K.,
consenting to the latter’s U.S. use and registration of the BOLT trademark in
connection with “two-wheeled vehicles, including motorcycles, mopeds and scooters;
three-wheeled vehicles including three-wheeled scooters; and their parts and-
fittings.”43 Opposer argues that the “consent agreement between Yamaha and GM …
is of little to no probative value” because it involved motorcycles, whereas Applicant’s

41 App Updated NOR, 43 TTABVUE 812-15.
42 Due to lack of sufficient contextual information, we give very little value to the Google
search results discussed in and attached to John Warmath’s Testimony Declaration
regarding third-party company, service and product names including the term “Bolt.”
Warmath Decl., 43 TTABVUE 1164-65, 1167, 1169- 71, ¶¶ 5-8, Exhs. A and C-E. Alcatraz
Media Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1759 (TTAB 2013) (results
from search engine introduced by testimony admissible but of limited probative value
because they lack sufficient context), aff’d mem., 565 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We also
decline to consider the webpage material originating with the Netherlands scooter company
Bolt Mobility B.V., whose product is offered for sale in Euros, Id. at 1164, 1168, ¶ 6, Exh. B,
because Applicant did not provide sufficient evidence of exposure of this company and its
product to U.S. consumers. Chanel, Inc. v. Makarczyk, 110 USPQ2d 2013, 2021 n.9 (TTAB
2014) (“Articles submitted by opposer from foreign publications … have not been considered
insofar as opposer did not provide evidence of U.S. circulation”).
43 General Motors/Yamaha Trademark Consent Agreement, App Updated NOR, 43
TTABVUE 696-97.
Opposition No. 91240088
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product in this opposition is an “app offering transportation services in 100% electric
vehicles such as GM’s BOLT vehicles.”44 While there is some merit to Opposer’s
argument, we find its co-existence agreement with Yamaha to be one dent in
Opposer’s BOLT trademark armor.
Applicant further made of record a series of online articles and a third-party
company’s website regarding the Bolt Mobility Corporation, a business reported to
have been co-founded in 2018 by Olympic gold medalist Usain Bolt and whose
executives include a number of former General Motors’ executives.45 We consider
these articles as demonstrating consumer exposure to their content, not for the truth
of any assertion made therein. According to the articles, Bolt Mobility provides
carbon-free electric BOLT CHARIOT, BOLT ORIGINAL and BOLT ONE scooters,
bikes and mopeds for rent, in multiple urban areas where there is a dearth of public
transportation options or there is significant traffic congestion. Applicant’s evidence
also includes several articles discussing Bolt Mobility’s development of a two-seat
electric micro-car called the BOLT NANO for short, intra-city journeys, which we also
consider for consumer exposure and not for the truth of any assertion contained
therein. However, the materials Applicant submitted do not indicate whether the
BOLT NANO vehicle has ever been manufactured, or rented or sold to consumers,
and published reports from 2020 inform consumers that Bolt Mobility has pulled out
of some U.S. markets where its electric scooter rentals have been unprofitable.

44 Opposer’s Rebuttal Brief, 55 TTABVUE 21.
45 App Updated NOR, 43 TTABVUE 720-811.
Opposition No. 91240088
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Applicant additionally introduced five webpages demonstrating third-party uses
of “… BOLT …” marks in the transportation sector. This evidence includes the marks
HUCKBOLTS used by Duncan Bolt for bolts used in the assembly of truck cabs and
trailers, and BOLT used by Gracie Industries LLC in connection with custom truck
cabs and sleepers.46
Considering the evidence as a whole, we find Opposer’s BOLT and BOLT EV
marks to be suggestive and hence somewhat inherently weak and of moderate
commercial strength.
2. The Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We now consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, See Palm Bay Imps.,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 369 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d
1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the first DuPont factor. As noted, Applicant admits in its
Answer that its BOLT mark is identical to Opposer’s BOLT mark and closely similar
to Opposer’s BOLT EV mark.47 In its brief, however, Applicant argues that “[w]hether
or not the marks are similar is irrelevant to this proceeding” because the parties’
goods and classes of goods (for registration purposes) are different. Moreover, argues
Applicant (providing no further reasoning),“[e]ven though both GM’s marks and the
Applicant’s contain the word “BOLT” each have [sic] entirely different commercial
impressions.”48

46 App Updated NOR, 43 TTABVUE 1139-48.
47 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 6, ¶ 20; Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3, ¶ 20.
48 Applicant’s Brief, 54 TTABVUE 13-14.
Opposition No. 91240088
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We discuss below Applicant’s arguments regarding the differences in the parties’
respective goods. Here, we hold Applicant to the admission in its Answer, which is
supported by the involved application and pleaded registrations, and we find, that
Applicant’s BOLT mark is identical to Opposer’s BOLT mark and closely similar to
Opposer’s BOLT EV mark in appearance, sound, meaning and commercial
impression.49 Applicant does not seriously argue otherwise. This factor weighs
heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of Goods,
Channels of Trade and Purchasers
The second, third and fourth DuPont factors are “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity
and nature of the goods … described in an application or registration”; “[t]he
similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels”; and
“[t]he … buyers to whom sales are made ….” (including the nature of the transactions
consummated in connection with the mark). DuPont, 177 USPQ 567.
Regarding the second DuPont factor, “the greater the degree of similarity in the
marks, the lesser the degree of similarity that is required of the products … on which
they are being used in order to support a holding of likelihood of confusion.” L’Oréal
S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (TTAB 2012). The identity or close similarity

49 While we compare Applicant’s BOLT mark and Opposer’s BOLT EV mark in their
entireties, Quiktrip W., Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 2021 USPQ2d 35, *2 (Fed. Cir. 2021), the
presence in Opposer’s BOLT EV mark of the descriptive and disclaimed term “EV” (meaning
“electric vehicle”) does not meaningfully distinguish the parties’ marks. See In re Chatam
Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (descriptive terms are properly
given less weight); In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically
less significant or less dominant when comparing marks).
Opposition No. 91240088
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of the parties’ marks therefore influences our evaluation of how close the parties’
goods need to be for us to find that confusion is likely.
In making our determination regarding the relatedness of the goods, trade
channels and purchasers, we must look to the goods as identified in Applicant’s
application and Opposer’s registrations. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion
Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Computs. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783,
1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of registrability of an
applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth
in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature
of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to
which the sales of goods are directed.”)). The goods of Registrant and Applicant need
not be identical or competitive, or even be offered through the same channels of trade,
to support a holding of likelihood of confusion. It is sufficient that the respective goods
are related in some manner, or that the conditions and activities surrounding the
marketing of the services are such that they would or could be encountered by the
same persons under circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the marks,
give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from the same source. See Coach
Servs., 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Opposer’s recited goods are automobiles and electric automobiles. Applicant’s
identified goods are downloadable computer software for transportation services.
There are no limitations regarding trade channels or target consumers, and thus we
Opposition No. 91240088
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do not read any such limitations into the identifications of goods of either party. See
Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Thus,
regardless of the parties’ actual business activities, the goods in Applicant’s
application and Opposer’s registrations are construed to include all goods of the types
identified, sold in all normal channels of trade for such goods, to all usual purchasers
of them. Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1825-26
(TTAB 2009).50
Opposer first argues that “the parties’ goods are closely related because they both
either are or center around electric vehicles. [Opposer]’s BOLT goods are electric
vehicles, and Applicant’s [BOLT] downloadable software purports to offer users rides
in electric vehicles.”51 As we noted above, we must look to the goods as identified in
the Application and Opposer’s Registrations – not based upon the parties’ actual
business practices. Stone Lion Capital Partners, v. Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at
1162.

50 Applicant argues that the parties’ marks and goods are distinguishable because the
opposed Application and Opposer’s Registrations are in different registration classes. This
argument is wholly without merit. See Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 29 USPQ2d
1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[C]lassification is wholly irrelevant to the issue of registrability
under section 1052(d), which makes no reference to classification.”); INB Nat’l Bank v.
Metrohost Inc., 22 USPQ2d 1585, 1587 (TTAB 1992) (“[T]he system of dividing goods [and
services] into classes is purely a manner of convenience[,] and … a determination on the
question of likelihood of confusion cannot be restricted by the artificial boundary created by
classification.”); Trademark Act Section 30, 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (“The Director may establish a
classification of goods and services, for convenience of Patent and Trademark Office
administration, but not to limit or extend the applicant’s or registrant’s rights.”); Trademark
Rule 2.85(f), 37 C.F.R. 2.85(f) (“Classification schedules shall not limit or extend the
applicant’s rights.”).
51 Opposer’s Brief, 49 TTABVUE 26.
Opposition No. 91240088
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Opposer’s better, and more persuasive, argument is that “Applicant’s [BOLT]
[A]pplication does not exclude transportation in electric vehicles, so it must be
interpreted as broadly as reasonable,” citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 107 USPQ2d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013); (“An
opposition or cancellation proceeding requires consideration not only of what the
applicant has already marketed or has stated the intention to market, but of all the
items for which registration is sought.”) (internal quotation omitted).52 Thus, the
“downloadable computer software for transportation services” identified in
Applicant’s BOLT Application is broad enough to encompass use of the software for
transportation services provided by electric vehicles such as the BOLT EV.
Given the breadth in scope of Applicant’s identified goods, although not
determinative we find somewhat persuasive that ride hailing services53 through
Applicant’s app have been provided only using electric vehicles,54 the Chevrolet BOLT
EV is one of the brands of electric vehicles promoted for use by the drivers involved
with this service,55 and, until Opposer complained, electric vehicles used to provide

52 Id. at 28.
53 A “ride hailing service” involves facilitating the transportation of people from one place to
another for a fee. Examples of services include Uber and Lyft. Keros Depo. Tr. 39 TTABVUE
12, Tr. p. 14. The services provided through Applicant’s BOLT app are ride hailing services.
Applicant’s response to Admission Request No. 12, Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 18; Applicant’s
Initial Disclosures, 22 TTABVUE 8.
54 John Warmath Depo. Tr., 22 TTABVUE 143-44, Tr. pp. 27-32; Applicant’s response to
Admission Request No. 16, Opp NOR 1, 22 TTABVUE 18-19.
55 John Warmath Depo. Tr., 22 TTABVUE 152-53, 358-59, Tr. pp. 65-67, Depo. Exh. 16.
Opposition No. 91240088
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the ride hailing service to consumers through Applicant’s app at one time had
Applicant’s BOLT mark emblazoned on them.56
Opposer’s further evidence that the parties’ goods are related comprises
third-party applications and registrations made of record reciting both software for
coordinating transportation services and automobiles.57 Third-party use based
registrations that cover goods of the type recited in both Opposer’s registrations and
Applicant’s Application are relevant to show that the respective goods are of a type
that may emanate from a single source under one mark. Joel Gott Wines LLC v.
Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1432 (TTAB 2013) (finding that third-
party registrations covering both wine and water were probative of the relatedness of
those beverages). However, as we noted above regarding the third-party trademark
evidence Applicant made of record, pending or abandoned applications, and cancelled
or expired registrations, are irrelevant to the analysis of relatedness.
Thus, stripped of the non-probative evidence, Opposer made of record the
following active third-party registrations:
Mark Reg. No. Goods Owner
INMOTION 5003520 Downloadable mobile
applications to match
drivers with individuals
for rides, Cl. 9; Motor
land vehicles, Cl. 12
Jaguar Land Rover
Limited

5539117 Mobile application
software for connecting
drivers and passengers,
Cl. 9; Motor land
vehicles, Cl. 12
Jaguar Land Rover
Limited

56 Id. at 150-51, Tr. pp. 57-58; Applicant’s Facebook and Instagram pages; Opp NOR 3, 24
TTABVUE 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56.
57 Opposer’s Brief, 49 TTABVUE 29-32; Opp NOR 4, 25 TTABVUE 29-34, 41-45.
Opposition No. 91240088
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Mark Reg. No. Goods Owner
TOQN 5625164 Computer software for
coordinating,
scheduling, booking,
and dispatching
vehicles for
passenger; Land
vehicles, automobiles,
Cl. 12
No Tie Ventures
GmbH
AMBER 5784575 Electric cars, Cl. 12;
Booking of
transportation via a
website, Cl. 39
P33 Holding d/b/a
Amber Besloten
Vennootschap (B.V.)
By itself, the quantity of this third-party registration evidence is only slightly
persuasive, particularly considering that two of the four cited registrations are owned
by the same entity.
Opposer’s further evidence of product relatedness includes examples of Opposer’s
and its competitors’ uses of their vehicles to provide ride-sharing, ride-hailing and
online rental services. Opposer, for example, has developed and deployed
downloadable software used for connecting vehicle drivers and passengers and for
coordinating transportation services called MAVEN.58 Opposer’s BOLT vehicle and
the MAVEN app were developed in tandem, such that Opposer deployed both
products in furtherance of a common strategic mission.59 The BOLT vehicle was

58 Keros Decl., 26 TTABVUE 5, ¶ 4; Gorbatoff Decl., 29 TTABVUE 8, ¶ 21; Beslic Decl., 31
TTABVUE 6-7, ¶¶ 14-15; Beslic Decl. (confidential version), 32 TTABVUE 17-22, Exh. S; Opp
NOR 2, 23 TTABVUE 35-66, 75-84, 116-120.
59 Keros Decl., 26 TTABVUE 5, ¶ 9; Beslic Decl., 31 TTABVUE 6, ¶ 13.
Opposition No. 91240088
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intended for use with the MAVEN app60 so that drivers would use the BOLT EV to
earn money by performing rideshare and product delivery services.61
In its Trial Brief, Opposer described its MAVEN app in the past tense.62 When
questioned about this during the oral hearing, Opposer’s counsel represented that the
MAVEN app was developed in 2016, but its use was discontinued in 2020.
Opposer also points to plans in development by its competitors – TESLA, VOLVO
and NISSAN – to make their vehicles available for ride sharing or ride hailing
services.63 The articles Opposer made of record reflect consumer exposure to the
future intentions of competitors, rather than actually-implemented services.
Applicant argues that the parties’ goods are different, in that its product is
software used for a ride-hailing service and that Opposer’s products are vehicles.
Applicant further contends that the services provided through its software are
purchased through a smartphone app – not a detailed process; whereas Opposer’s
vehicles are purchased as a major investment – through a very detailed process that
occurs in a dealer’s showroom.64

60 Keros Decl., 26 TTABVUE 6, ¶ 10; Gorbatoff Decl., 29 TTABVUE 8, ¶ 22.
61 Keros Decl., 26 TTABVUE 6, 16-36, 74-75, 78-127, ¶ 11, Exhs. E-F, I, K-M.
62 Opposer’s Brief, 49 TTABVUE 32-33: “[Opposer]’s prior ride-share or car-sharing app,
‘Maven,’” “[t]he BOLT vehicle was available for rental through the Maven app”, “[t]he two
products also were marketed heavily together”, the “strong historic association between
[Opposer]’s BOLT vehicles and a GM-created app for coordinating transportation services”.
63 Opposer’s Brief 49 TTABVUE 33; Opp NOR 2, 23 TTABVUE 67-74, 85-100, 111-115.
64 Applicant’s Brief, 54 TTABVUE 15-16. Actually, Applicant did not provide sufficient
evidence and linking argument regarding the entirety of the ride hailing service enabled by
its BOLT app. Applicant focuses on a customer’s purchase at the moment he or she desires
to go from point A to point B. In order to hail a car ride, the customer first must have already
downloaded the BOLT app to a smartphone, signed up for the service, and inputted payment
information. These are a more detailed set of transactions than Applicant discusses in its
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Apart from Opposer’s evidence discussed above, its additional arguments rely on:
(1) the lack of restrictions in the identification of goods in Applicant’s Application and
Opposer’s Registrations; (2) both parties promoting and offering their goods via
similar trade channels – the Internet and social media;, and (3) both parties’
customers tending to be smart phone users.65
Overall, we find Opposer’s evidence and arguments as to the relationships
between the parties’ trade channels and purchasers to be more persuasive than those
asserted by Applicant. Opposer and its competitors either have offered or plan to offer
their electric vehicles in connection with ride hailing apps and related services.
Applicant itself, as its app has been promoted, advertises that its ride hailing services
would be provided either in BOLT EV vehicles or (until Opposer complained) cars
emblazoned with the BOLT name on them.
In the end we cannot ignore, and we find influential in evaluating the second
DuPont factor (the similarity of the goods), that Applicant’s BOLT mark is identical
or closely similar to Opposer’s BOLT and BOLT EV marks, respectively. L’Oréal, 102
USPQ2d at 1439. Moreover, if we focus (as Applicant has done in its brief) on the
non-detailed nature of how the purchase of a ride hailing service is consummated
through Applicant’s BOLT app (after the customer has downloaded the app and set
up the service), we find it likely, in evaluating the fourth DuPont factor, that

brief. When these additional transactions are taken into account, the entire process for
hailing a ride via Applicant’s BOLT app approaches nearly as many different steps as are
needed for Opposer’s customers to purchase a BOLT vehicle.
65 Opposer’s Brief, 49 TTABVUE 34.
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Applicant’s customers would be confused as to the relationship between Opposer’s
BOLT and BOLT EV vehicles and the ride hailing service enabled by Applicant’s
BOLT app. See Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1472
(TTAB 2016) (“[C]ommon sense facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute” may
be sufficient to decide customer care.); Floralife, Inc. v. Floraline Int’l Inc., 225 USPQ
683, 686 (TTAB 1984) (“[O]rder[ing Applicant’s goods] while rushing through airport
terminals and the like … [is] a marketing situation which is fraught with the
possibility of mistake or confusion of marks.”).
Based on the evidence of record, we find that the nature of the parties’ goods and
trade channels, and the overlapping potential customers, weigh in favor of finding a
likelihood of confusion.
C. Actual Confusion
Applicant argues that “[f]or more than five years, the parties’ products have co-
existed in the marketplace bearing their respective marks. During that extended time
period, there has been no evidence of any confusion between the marks.”66 These
arguments call upon us to evaluate the seventh DuPont factor, the “nature and extent
of any actual confusion,” and the eighth DuPont factor, the “length of time during and
conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.
In its decision on remand from the Federal Circuit in In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912
F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2019), the Board held that the eighth DuPont

66 Applicant’s Brief, 54 TTABVUE 10.
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factor “requires us to look at actual market conditions, to the extent there is evidence
of such conditions of record.” In re Guild Mortg., 2020 USPQ2d 10279, *15 (TTAB
2020). The absence of any reported instances of confusion is meaningful only if the
record indicates appreciable and continuous use by Applicant of its mark for a
significant period in the same markets as those served by Opposer under its mark.
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1645, 1660 (TTAB 2010),
aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Barbara’s Bakery Inc.
v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1287 (TTAB 2007) (probative value of the absence
of actual confusion depends on there being a significant opportunity for actual
confusion to occur).
Applicant’s BOLT app was first made available for the Vanderbilt graduation in
2015. One could use the BOLT app to go from campus to any one of the five major
boroughs in Nashville. The purpose of the first iteration of the BOLT app was to
service the Vanderbilt graduation. It was not used for any other purpose.67
From the founding of Applicant’s business to the filing of its trademark application
in May 2017, its company was in “operational ramp-up” mode, which entailed
“launching several iterations” of the BOLT app, “publishing the app[] on the app
store,” and getting customers to order “rides through the BOLT app[].”68 Other than
Nashville, TN, the only other evidence of Applicant arranging for ride hailing services
through the BOLT app was in Santa Fe and Albuquerque, NM from June 2016

67 John Warmath Depo. Tr., 22 TTABVUE 151, Tr. pp. 59-61.
68 Id., 22 TTABVUE 160, Tr. pp. 96-97.
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through February 2017,69 after which Applicant stopped offering services in those
cities because the drivers were dismissed and the cars were moved to Nashville.70
Thereafter, Applicant claims to have offered ride hailing services through the BOLT
app, once again in Nashville, for off-and-on periods since mid- to late 2017.71 The best
that Applicant’s President, Frank Warmath, could say of the continuity of Applicant’s
services from 2015 to 2018 is that were “sporadic.”72
Applicant’s argument that there has been no actual confusion between the parties’
marks and goods, is therefore not persuasive. The evidence shows limited and
sporadic use by Applicant of its BOLT mark; hence, there has been little opportunity
for confusion to occur. Therefore, we cannot gauge whether or the extent to which
there has been an opportunity for confusion to occur if it was likely to occur. See Nina
Ricci S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters. Inc., 889 F.2d 1070, 12 USPQ2d 1901, 1903 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (“The absence of any showing of actual confusion is of very little, if any,
probative value here because … no evidence was presented as to the extent of ETF’s
use of the VITTORIO RICCI mark on the merchandise in question in prior years ….”);
In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025, 1026-27 (TTAB 1984). This factor is thus
neutral.

69 Id., 22 TTABVUE 163-64, 361-64, Tr. pp. 107-11; Depo. Exhs. 18-19.
70 Frank Warmath Depo. Tr., 22 TTABVUE 76, Tr. pp. 31-33.
71 John Warmath Depo. Tr., 22 TTABVUE 147, Tr. pp. 42-44.
72 Frank Warmath Depo. Tr., 22 TTABVUE 150, 56-57.
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VI. Conclusion regarding Likelihood of Confusion
From the evidence of record, Opposer’s BOLT and BOLT EV marks are suggestive,
and hence somewhat inherently weak, and are of moderate commercial strength. As
Applicant concedes, the parties’ marks are identical or closely similar. There is
sufficient evidence that the parties’ goods are related, and the trade channels and
potential customers overlap in part. Due to the limited and sporadic nature of
Applicant’s use of its BOLT mark, we find the absence of actual confusion to be a
neutral factor in our analysis. Balancing the DuPont factors for which there is
evidence and argument, we conclude that confusion between the parties’ marks and
goods is likely.
Decision:
The opposition to registration of Applicant’s BOLT mark is sustained on grounds
of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d). Because we have
sustained the opposition on the ground of likelihood of confusion, we need not and do
not address Opposer’s claim of fraud.