General Motors Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 30, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 396 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of
posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional office, Boston
Five Cents Savings Bank Building, 24 School Street , Boston, Massachusetts,
Telephone No. 523-8100, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
General Motors Corporation , Buick-Oldsmobile -Pontiac Assem-
bly Division and International Union , United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural' Implement Workers of America
(UAW), AFL-CIO. Case No. 01-CA-5401. October 30, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 5, 1964, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his De-
cision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's De-
cision. Thereafter, Respondent, the Union, and the General Counsel
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting
briefs, and the General Counsel also filed an answering brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings,
conclusions, and recommendations only to the extent that they are
consistent with this Decision and Order.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent failed and refused to
fulfill its bargaining obligation in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and
(1) of the Act by not giving prior notice to or consulting with the
Union when it leased the OK parking lot at its South Gate, Cali-
fornia, plant, to Pacific Motor Trucking Co.' on June 17, 1963, and
contracted with that' firm to have the latter's employees do work
which Respondent's drivers had previously performed. We disagree
for the reasons given below.
The record shows'that prior to June 17, 1963, an area near the
plant was occupied by two parking lots. The OK parking lot in the
western section of the area adjoined the end of the assembly line and
was used by Respondent for temporarily parking cars while its car
distribution department made up the loads to be turned over to PMT.
The other lot, which was adjacent to but separated by a fence with a
gate from the OK lot, was leased from Respondent by PMT for
1 Herein called PMT.
149 NLRB No. 40.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ETC. 397
temporarily parking cars to be loaded on PMT haulaway trucks or
multilevel rail carriers.
Upon approval of the assembled cars in Respondent's car condi-
tioning department, employees in the bargaining unit, known as
drivers of unlicensed cars, drove the cars to the end of the assembly
line. Before June 17, 18 employees,2 who were also in the bargaining
unit, then drove the cars to numbered "spots" in the OK lot, which
they noted on the manifests that accompanied each car. The mani-
fests were sent to Respondent's car distribution department,3 which
made up the loads for various dealers, and were returned to the de-
partment 66 drivers who drove the cars from their spots in the OK
lot to the shipping building near the PMT lot. These drivers then
raised the hood and deck lid of the car, checked the battery to make
sure there was a sufficient charge, emptied and partly refilled the
gasoline tank, and picked up certain uninstalled accessories from the
shipping building and placed them in the trunk.4 PMT next as-
sumed responsibility for the cars and its employees known as yard-
men or gatemen came through the gate and drove the cars to the
PMT lot where they were parked for PMT shipment by haulaway
trucks or multilevel railcarriers as directed by PMT dispatchers.
As indicated above, the OK lot was leased to PMT on June 17 and
the two lots were consolidated into one PMT lot. Since then the
nondriving or service functions are performed by assembly line em-
ployees of Respondent before the cars are taken by. drivers of un-
licensed cars to the end of the assembly line where the cars and the
manifests are turned over to PMT yardmen and gatemen 5 who drive
the cars to spots designated in the manifest either in the former OK
lot for rail shipment or to the old PMT lot for shipment by truck.
The PMT driver then indicates in the manifest the spot in which the
car is parked and returns to the end of the assembly line to pick up
and park another car. The manifests, which at this point are re-
ferred to as car shippers, are turned over to the PMT truck or rail
dispatchers, who, in contrast to the pre-June 17 situation, now have
the responsibility for making up loads which are to be handled by
PMT loaders and truckdrivers.
The Union received definite information from Respondent about
the contemplated change when, at the behest of Sherman Kelton,
chairman of the shop committee at the South Gate plant, Frank
2 Herein called department 66 drivers
3 Employees therein were not in the bargaining unit.
* Department 66 drivers returned to their original starting point in the OK lot and once
again picked up the newly assembled cars
5 The number of PMT yardmen and gatemen stood at 9 in January 1963, temporarily rose
to 14 because of the "newness " of the consolidated operation , and was 10 in January 1964.
PMT loaders increased from 26 to 40 after October 1963, because PMT then arranged to
receive additional cars from Respondent's plant in Fremont, California.
398 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
James, an administrative assistant to Leonard Woodcock, vice presi-
dent of the Union's General Motors Department in Detroit, tele-
phoned Vernon M. Schneider, a Respondent official in Detroit, and
was told on May 2 that "there was going to be definitely a move ...
the jobs were going to be changed" in the OK lot. James protested
that "this was our work; that management was wrong in giving the
job to someone else." On June 3 James telephoned John Holmes, the
personnel manager for Respondent's Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac en-
tire assembly division, and told Holmes that the Union was still pro-
testing any transfer of work at South Gate to PMT employees.
Although the Trial Examiner found that plant officials at South
Gate during May 1963 denied knowing anything about the transfer
plan, the former called a special management-shop committee meet-
ing on June 4 at which South Gate officials advised the shop com-
mittee of its plan to commence "one-car shipments" to PMT in the
near future.6 The shop committee contended that the contracting
out of jobs of department 66 drivers was in violation of the Local
wage and National agreements as the jobs were within the bargain-
ing unit. ' i
On June 12, some UAW International representatives and mem-
bers of the shop committee met at South Gate with Schneider, Bruce
Buckley, personnel director at South Gate, and other plant represent-
atives. Buckley stated that the OK lot had been leased to PMT and
that, effective June 17, Respondent would be turning over its finished
cars to PMT near the end of the assembly line, and department 66
drivers would no longer be working on the OK lot. Schneider stated
that management was taking this action by virtue of paragraph (8)
of the National Agreement 7 which deals with management rights.
When International representative Burrows contended that the
change did not come within the National Agreement, Schneider sug-
gested that the Union had "a recourse to follow," namely, the griev-
ance procedure.
At the request of the Local', special meetings were held between
plant officials and the shop committee on June 13, 18, 19, and 20, to
discuss Respondent's assignment of department 66 drivers at their
old rate of pay to assembly line jobs in the bargaining unit. The
Union contended that under paragraph (59) of the National Agree-
9 Paragraph (15) of the National Agreement provides for meetings "between repre-
sentatives of the Local Management and the Shop Committee."
7 Paragraph ( 8) reads : "The right to hire ; promote ; discharge or discipline for cause ;
and to maintain discipline and efficiency of employees , is the sole responsibility of the
Corporation except that Union members shall not be discriminated against as such. In
addition , the products to he manufactured , the location of plants , the schedules of produc-
tion, the methods , processes and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the
responsibility , of the Corporation."
^:c
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ETC. 399
ment 8 department 66' drivers were entitled to "comparable work" as
drivers of unlicensed cars. Management pointed out that the assem-
bly line jobs paid the same rate as the jobs the department 66 drivers
had been doing and that the rate for drivers of unlicensed cars was
five cents less. In this connection, management took the position
that paragraph (59) required that department 66 drivers be placed
in those jobs in the unit which had a comparable rate.
The settlement of this dispute included the following : Management
agreed with the Union's request to transfer the department 66 drivers
to jobs as drivers of unlicensed cars and other classifications where
the employees were capable of doing the job. The Union waived any
claim for any difference in pay. Employees displaced by the trans-
fers would be assigned pursuant to the Local Seniority Agreement
and the Union would not process grievances on behalf of the em-
ployees displaced. Thereafter, on July 1, 1963, the shop committee
presented to management a grievance, dated' June 21, charging that
the removal of the department 66 drivers from their jobs on the OK
lot violated the National Agreement and requesting their return
thereto. The* shop committee took no further action in connection
with this grievance which it withdrew on September 6, 1963. Gen-
eral Counsel stated at the hearing that he was not contending that
management had refused to bargain about this grievance.
As indicated above, the Trial Examiner, in finding that Respond-
ent was under an obligation to bargain ' with the Union concerning
the OK lot, relied on Fibreboard Paper Products 9 and Town &
Country Mfg. Co.,10 wherein the Board held that a management de-
cision to subcontract work out of an existing unit, albeit for economic
reasons, was a mandatory bargaining subject . Respondent contends
that its plan to transfer the department 66 drivers to other jobs is
not within the contemplation of the foregoing decisions as such a
move was essentially a change of method without resultant layoffs
or discharges and was permitted under the management rights pro-
visions of its National Agreement with the Union. We find merit in
this position.
Paragraph ( 59) reads: "Seniority shall be by non -interchangeable occupational groups
within departments , group of departments or plant -wide, as may be negotiated locally in
each plant and reduced to writing It is mutually recognized by the parties that written
local seniority agreements are necessary . All local seniority agreements and modifications
or supplements thereto shall be reduced to writing and be subject to the approval of the
Corporation and the International Union.
"When changes in methods ,, products, or policies would otherwise require the permanent
laying off of employees , the seniority of the displaced employees shall become plant-
wide and they shall be transferred out of the group in line with their seniority to work
they are capable of doing, as comparable to the work they have been doing as may be
available , at the rate for the job to which they have been transferred."
0 138 NLRB 550, enfd . 322 F. 2d 411 (.C.A.D.C ).
11136 NLRB 1022, enfd 316 F. 2d 846 (C.A., 5).
L.
400 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is clear from the foregoing that the reassignment of the depart-
ment 66 drivers to other jobs in the same bargaining unit did not
result in any substantial impairment of the bargaining unit. As
already indicated, the nondriving or servicing functions of the
department 66 drivers, which represented a sizable part of their job,
remained within the bargaining unit. That Respondent retained the
freedom to make such changes is evident from paragraph (8) of the
National Agreement which reserved, as the "exclusive responsibility"
of Respondent, actions and decisions concerning "the method ... and
means" of its operation. Similarly, Respondent's right unilaterally
to make changes is clear from paragraph (59), wherein the parties
agreed upon a procedure for the transfer of employees who would
otherwise be laid off by "changes in methods, products, or policies."
In addition, exclusive management rights in this regard are further
provided for in paragraph (63) which states that "the transferring
of employees is the sole responsibility of Management . . ." subject to
such factors as seniority.
We conclude that Respondent's changes respecting the OK lot and
the department 66 drivers were within the scope of its managerial
prerogative as explicitly recognized by the Union in the National
Agreement. We also find it significant that, to the extent that the
Union may have had a grievance as to the change, the grievance was
fully discussed between management and the Union, particularly at
the four meetings of local management and the shop committee from
June 13 to 20, and was resolved by a settlement worked out at these
meetings.
Accordingly, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act, as Re-
spondent's leasing of the OK lot and transfer of the department 66
drivers pursuant to its managerial rights was a work reassignment
and change of method under the provisions of the contract with the
Union.-
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH took no part in the consideration of the
above Decision and Order.
n In view of our disposition of the case on this basis, it is unnecessary to pass on the
other grounds relied on by the Trial Examiner in finding a violation of the Act.
Member Leedom joins his colleagues in finding no violation for the reasons which they
have indicated. However, even accepting the Trial Examiner's theory of the case, I e., that
the situation here is embraced by the Fibreboard line of cases, he would, nevertheless, be-
cause of his dissenting position in this area, find no violation.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed on June 14, 1963 , by International Union , United
Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ETC. 401
(UAW), AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, herein respectively called the General Counsel i and the
Board, through the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region (Los An-_
geles, California ), issued a complaint , dated January 27 , 1964, against General
Motors Corporation , Buick-Oldsmobile -Pontiac Assembly Division , herein called
Respondent , alleging that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1 ) and Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended from time to time , 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act.
Copies of the charge, complaint , and notice of hearing were duly served upon
Respondent and copies of the complaint and notice of hearing were duly served
upon the Union.
Specifically , the complaint alleges that: ( 1) Since December 14, 1962, the
Union has been the duly designated and selected collective bargaining represent-
ative of Respondent 's employees in a certain appropriate unit ; ( 2) since on or
about March 1, 1963 , the Union has requested Respondent to bargain collectively
with respect to the subcontracting of certain work and the elimination of certain
jobs at Respondent 's OK Parking lot at its South Gate, California, plant, which
work and jobs belonged to the employees in the aforesaid certain appropriate
unit; and ( 3) since on or about June 17, 1963, the Respondent has engaged in
the following acts and conduct : ( a) unilaterally subcontracted certain work and
eliminated certain jobs at its South Gate, California , plant ; ( b) since December
14, 1962, and until May 2 , 1963, failed and refused to inform the Union of its
intention to subcontract and eliminate said certain work and jobs ; (c) from on
or about December 14, 1962, until June 3, 1963 , Respondent failed and refused to
answer any and all inquiries of the Union's local shop committee of its intention
to subcontract work and eliminate certain jobs ; and (d ) since on or about De-
cember 14, 1962, Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union
concerning the subcontracting of any work or the elimination of any job at its
South Gate , California , plant.
On February 6, 1964, Respondent duly filed an answer denying the commission
of the unfair labor practices alleged.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held from February 27 through March
4, 1964, before Trial Examiner Howard Myers. Each party was represented by
counsel who participated in the hearing . Full and complete opportunity was
afforded the parties to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence
pertinent to the issues , to argue orally on the record at the conclusion of the
taking of the evidence , and to file briefs on or before April 3, 1964. Briefs have
been received from each party, which briefs have been carefully considered.
At the conclusion of the General Counsel 's case-in-chief, Respondent 's counsel
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of proof. Decision thereon was re-
served. At the conclusion of the taking of the evidence the said motion to dismiss
was renewed . Decision was reserved . The motion is disposed of in accordance
with the findings, conclusions , and recommendations hereinafter set forth.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS OPERATIONS
General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in, among
other things, the manufacture, sale, and distribution of automobile parts at var-
ious plants located throughout the United States. For business reasons, General
Motors Corporation functions through numerous divisions, one of which is
known as the Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Assembly Division, herein called the
South Gate Plant or BOP which is located at South Gate, California.2
The South Gate plant's annual out-of-State purchases of goods and materials
exceed $50,000 and its annual out-of-State sales exceed $50,000.
Upon the basis of the foregoing facts, I find, in line with established Board
authority, that Respondent is engaged in, and during all times material was
engaged in, business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act and that its business operations meet the standards fixed by
the Board for the assertion of jurisdiction.
1 This term specifically includes counsel for the General Counsel appearing at the hearing.
2 The production and maintenance employees of this plant are the only ones involved in
this proceeding.
770-076-65-vol. 149-27
402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of
Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Prefatory statement
The Union is, and at all times material has been , the statutory collective-bar-
gaining representative of the Respondent 's production and maintenance em-
ployees in a single company -wide bargaining unit, including the production and
maintenance employees of the South Gate plant.3
At all' times material , Respondent and the Union have been , and now are,
parties to a national collective-bargaining agreement , dated September 20, 1961,
covering the employees in a company-wide bargaining unit represented by the
Union , including those employed at the BOP plant.
The BOP plant assembles passenger automobiles for shipment to General Mo-
tors dealers in California and surrounding area.
As new automobiles are assembled at the South Gate and are approved for
shipment they are turned over to Pacific Motor Trucking Company, herein called
PMT. Thereafter PMT has the responsibility for loading the automobiles onto
multilevel rail cars or onto haulaway trucks for delivery to General Motors
dealers.
Prior to June 17, 1963, two paved parking lots of approximately equal size
occupied the western one-third of the BOP plant. The southernmost of these two
lots was known as the BOP's OK Parking lot and was used by BOP for temporar-
ily parking cars ready for delivery to PMT while the BOP Car Distribution
Department made up the loads to be turned over to PMT for shipment.
The other paved lot, adjacent to the BOP OK Parking lot on the north, was
leased from Respondent by PMT and was used by PMT for temporarily parking
cars to be loaded on PMT haulaway trucks or on multilevel rail carriers. These
two lots were separated by a wire fence with a gate through which cars were
driven into the PMT lot by employees of PMT.
Before June 17, 18 BOP bargaining-unit employees classified as "car loaders"
were employed to drive cars from the wax booth 4 located at the end of the final
shipping line 5 in the plant to numbered parking spaces in the OK Parking lot.
After parking a car, the carloader noted the number of the parking space on the
manifest which accompanied each automobile ,6 turned the manifest over either
to his foreman or to the departmental clerk; and then returned to the wax booth
ready to drive another car.
Several times each hour , manifests which had been turned in by the car loaders
were sent by means of a pneumatic tube from the BOP shipping building which
was located about 15 feet from the wire fence at the north end of the OK
Parking lot, to the car distribution department , located in the main administration
building of the plant.
In the car distribution department nonrepresented BOP clerical employees made
up loads of cars for shipment by PMT . Manifests sent from the OK Parking lot
were matched with duplicate copies filed by dealer and town in the car distribution
department . Normally, four cars would comprise a load, although there could
be as many as six. A clerk in the car distribution department would staple
together the manifests for the cars comprising a load and send the manifests by
the pneumatic tube to the shipping building in the OK Parking lot.
There, the manifests for a particular load were picked up by the car loaders
who, by reference to the parking spaces noted thereon, drove the cars from the
OK Parking lot to the' shipping building. At ' that point, the car loader raised
the hood and deck lid of the car, checked the battery to make sure there was a
sufficient charge, put an evacuator hose into the gas tank and, while the gas
3 See General Motors Corporation, et al., 120 NLRB 1215, 1218-1221. N .L.R.B. V.
General'Motors Corporation , 373 U.S 734, 746.
Also referred to In the record as "Line #7."
s Also referred to in the ' record as the "Maypole "
e The manifest is a, document consisting of multiple copies on which appears a descrip-
tion of the automobile , a list of the various accessories or options to be installed , and the
name and address of the dealer who ordered the car . The manifest accompanies the car
from an early point in the assembly process to the point where the car is delivered to
PMT. A copy of the manifest goes with the car when It is delivered to PMT at which
time it becomes known as a car shipper or bill of lading.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ETC. 403
was being evacuated, picked up certain uninstalled accessories from the shipping
building and placed them in the trunk of the car. He then reversed the lever on
the gas pump to put two gallons of gasoline into the tank of the car, thereby
completing his work with respect to that car.
When this procedure had been completed on each of the cars comprising a
load, a final check of the cars was made against the manifests by BOP plant-
protection personnel and a PMT checker. If everything was in order, the cars
comprising the load were accepted by the PMT checker and then PMT drivers,
classified either as "yardmen" or "gatemen" by PMT, drove them through the
gate into the adjacent PMT lot.
Just inside the PMT side of the gate, the PMT driver handed the car shipper
(manifest) to a PMT employee who put a letter or a number on it designating
the aisle in the PMT lot where the cars comprising a particular load were to
be parked, and then directed the PMT driver to the aisle so designated. The
PMT employee at the gate retained the car shipper.
Certain aisles in the PMT lot were used for parking cars which were to be
shipped by haulaway truck and others for parking cars which were to be shipped
by multilevel rail car. After the PMT driver had parked the car in the proper
aisle, he returned to the BOP shipping building and the same process was
repeated.
In the meantime, the car shippers which had been retained by the PMT em-
ployee just inside the gate were turned over to the PMT truck or rail dispatch-
ers. The truck dispatcher allocated the haulaway loads to PMT over-the-road
truckdrivers. These truckdrivers then loaded the cars comprising the load which
had been assigned to them onto a haulaway truck and proceeded on their way.
Similar procedure was followed by the rail dispatcher with respect to multilevel
rail carloads except that the loading was performed by PMT employees classified
as "loaders."
At no time during the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
charge herein, did any of the BOP carloaders perform any loading of automo-
biles onto carrier equipment or perform any other work in the PMT leased lot.
B. The pertinent facts?
Commencing in either February or in March 1963,8 some BOP officials dis-
cussed among themselves the feasibility, especially from an economic standpoint,
of changing the plant's automobile shipping method to "single car" shipping
and transferring and leasing the OK Parking lot to PMT and have the latter
handle all car shipments.
Rumors of the contemplated change in car shipping reached the officials of the
local Union during the last week in April, and on or about April 29, Sherman
Kelton, the then chairman of the local union shop committee, asked Lyle Rayborne,
supervisor of labor relations of the BOP plant, `If he knew anything about PMT
taking over our jobs . . . in the parking lot, and I asked him what he was going
to do with the 18 or 19 people that was going to lose their job ...... Rayborn
replied that he did not know anything about such a move.
That same day, on or about April 29, Kelton telephoned Frank James, the
administrative assistant to Leonard Woodcock who is, and at that time was, vice
president in charge of General Motors department of the Union and was in De-
troit, and informed James that there were rumors circulating in the BOP plant to
the effect that PMT was going to take over some jobs in the BOP OK Parking lot.
7In the light of my observation of the conduct and deportment at the hearing of all the
persons who testified herein, and after a very careful scrutiny of the entire record, all of
which has been carefully read and parts of which have been reread and rechecked several
times, and being mindful of the contentions of the parties with respect to the credibility
problems here involved, of the fact that in many instances testimony was given regaiding
events which took place months prior to the opening of the hearing, and of the fact that
very strong feelings have been generated by the circumstances of this case, coupled with
the fact that it would unnecessarily protract this Decision to summarize all the testimony
or to spell out fully the confusion and inconsistencies therein, the following is a composite
picture of all the factual issues involved and the conclusions based thereon The patties
may be assured that in reaching all resolutions, findings, and conclusions herein, the record
as a whole has been carefully considered , relevant cases have been studied , aiid each con-
tention advanced has been weighed, even though not specifically discussed.
8 Unless otherwise noted, all dates hereinafter mentioned refer to 1963.
404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On or about April 30, Kelton had a conversation with Bruce Buckley, the person-
nel director of the BOP plant, wherein Kelton stated, to quote from Kelton's
undenied and credited testimony,9 "I [understand] that the PMT was taking over
our jobs, and I [wonder] what they were going to do with the 18 or 19 people
they had out there. And Mr. Buckley said at that time he didn't know anything
about the PMT parking lot."
On May 1 James telephoned Vernon M. Schneider, director of labor relations for
the entire Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Assembly of General Motors and whose offices
are in Detroit, Michigan,10 and inquired about the rumored elimination of jobs at
the OK Parking lot. Schneider replied that he was aware that a change in car
shipping at the South Gate,plant was being discussed; that if any change is made
it will be similar to the changes already made at one or two other plants of
Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Assembly Division; and that he would make a check of
the situation and advise James the next day. -
Either on May 1 or May 2, Schneider telephoned from Detroit to Buckley at the
South Gate plant and asked about the contemplated car shipping change. Buckley
replied that a change was going to be made but no definite date had been set.
On May 2 Schneider telephoned James. During the course of this approximately
10-minute conversation, Schneider stated that a change in the South Gate
plant's car shipping was in the making. Thereupon, James protested such a move,
taking the position that the OK Parking lot jobs belonged to members of the
Union. Schneider, apparently, took the opposite stand.
Thomas T. Edwards, the vice president and general manager of PMT, testified,
and I find that from February 1, 1958, until December 1, 1963, he was the southern
district manager of PMT with offices located in Los Angeles; that his company's
business with the BOP plant came under his jurisdiction and supervision; that he
was entirely familiar with the method used by BOP in delivering automobiles to
PMT for shipment by PMT to dealers of General Motors; 11 that in May he at-
tended a meeting between representatives of his company and officials of BOP
wherein discussion was had as to the feasibility of PMT taking over the delivery
jobs which then were being done jointly by BOP and PMT; and that, after consid-
erable discussion, it was announced that BOP would turn over all new cars as-
sembled at the South Gate plant to PMT for shipment to General Motors dealers.
On May 3 the local Union's' shop committee met with representatives of BOP
plant management. Kelton, the then chairman of the shop committee, brought up
the question of the loss of jobs by BOP plant employees if PMT took over the OK
Parking lot. He also stated that it seemed "funny" to him that management had
not broached the Union about the contemplated move especially since the PMT lot
employees knew about such a change and had been kidding the 18 or 19 BOP
drivers about taking over the jobs of said drivers. The only response made by
management was Rayborn's denial of knowing anything about the contemplated
change.
During the first week in May James Jackson was elected in Kelton's place as
chairman of the shop committee.
On or about May 8 Jackson went to Rayborn's office and, to quote from Jack-
son's undenied and credited testimony,12 the following ensued:
I told Mr. Rayborn it was rumored there was going to be changes in the OK
Parking Lot, and that the jobs were going to be turned over to Pacific Motor
Transportation Corporation, and I wanted to know if he had any information
on it. And he said he didn't know anything about it; that was a rumor; or
sounded like a rumor ....
6 Buckley was called as a Respondent witness but he was not questioned about this
Incident.
10 Schneider's duties consist of supervising the personnel activities of the central office
labor relations section ; acts as liaison between General Motors relations staff and the
plant labor relations staff ; sits in on negotiations between unions , both on the national
and local levels, and his employer ; assists plants in any local negotiations; and offers
guidance and counsel in labor relations.
u Edward's detailed description of the method used by his company and by BOP Is In sub-
stantial accord with the facts as set forth above under section III, A. Edwards added,
however, that BOP-PMT shipping methods had been in effect from either 1960 or 1961
until June 17, 1963.
12 Rayborn did not testify.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ETC. 405
Week after week from about May 8 until about June 4 Jackson inquired of
Rayborn about the truth or falsity of the "rumored" change to be made at the OK
Parking lot and each time Rayborn would deny knowing anything about such a
change.
At the May 10, 24, and 31 meetings between the shop committee and BOP plant
officials, inquiries were made by Jackson relative to the "rumored " OK Parking lot
changes On each occasion , Rayborn would either reply that he did not "have
anything to report" or that he did not "have any information on it."
The minutes of the June 4 management -shop committee meeting, which meet-
ing, incidentally , was hurriedly called by Respondent, reads, in part , as follows:
On June 4, 1963 , at a special Shop Committee Meeting Management ad-
vised the Union of its tentative plans to commence "one-car shipments" to the
Pacific Motor Transport Company in the near future. The Union submitted
the following statement.
1. It is The Unions [sic] contention [sic] that to contract out the jobs
regarding the drivers in Dept #66 is in Violation of the Local Wage Agree-
ment in as much as the jobs are within the bargain unit and negotiated wage
rates for these jobs -
II. The Union also regard mgt. removing these jobs from the bargaining
o,
unit is arbratrarially [sic] abridging the Nat Agreement.
JIM JACKSON,
Chairman.
On June 3 James telephoned John Holmes, the personnel director for all Respond-
ent's Buick-Oldsmobile -Pontiac' Assembly Divisions and who was then in Doville,
Georgia. After informing Holmes of his two previous conversations with
Schneider and what his "understanding of those conversations were," James stated
that the Union was still protesting any transfer of the work at the South Gate plant
to employees of PMT; that he wanted to send Charles Burrows, an international
representative to the South Gate plant to "check first hand " and make "entry and
survey of the situation right on the scene ." Holmes replied that he could not send
anyone to said plant until June 12, and that he would send Schneider. James
stated that the June 12 date was agreeable to him.
Burrows arrived at the South Gate plant at about 1 p in. on the afternoon of
June 11, accompanied by Lester Learned, an international representative , and the
local's then president , Harold Dunne, where they met with Buckley and Schneider.
Buckley greeted Burrows and his associates by remarking to Burrows that he
had not expected him until the following day,13 adding , "Well, what do you have
on your mind ?" When Learned replied, "We would like to get management's
position on the alleged work movement anticipated in the drivers ' group and we
would like to have the shop committee brought in for a discussion on the matter,"
Buckley replied , "It [is] nearly impossible to get the shop committee due to the
hour of the day [because] some of the members of the shop committee [work] on
the second shift." Schneider then remarked , "[I see] no need to have the shop
committee called in, as the management statement as to the elimination of jobs
would only take 5 or 15 minutes , and [I see] no need for the shop committee to
be brought in." Burrows then stated that the shop committee should be present
"because the alleged work movement , as we understood [sic] it had a direct
bearing on the welfare of the members of (the local union ), and certainly the shop
committee could [sic] be brought in to bear management 's statement and air their
views and have a right to bargain on this issue."
The meeting , referred to immediately above, concluded with arrangements be-
ing made for a meeting between management and the Union to be held at 2 30
the following afternoon , June 12, and arrangements made to allow Learned, Bur-
rows, and the chairman of the shop committee to enter the plant an hour before the
scheduled June 12 meeting so that Burrows could get "a geographical - outline and
look at the anticipated work movement first hand."
Regarding what took place at about 1 p.m. on June 12, Burrows credibly
testified as follows:
I went over the plant with Mr. Learned and we met Chairman Jackson and
Mr Buckley , Mr Rayborne, Mr. Schneider , and on the'way to the OK lot we
picked up the District Committeeman Robinson.
"It was Burrows ' understanding that lie was to meet Schneider at the South Gate plant
on June 1 , instead of on June 12 , as previously arranged because of some other commit-
ment of Schneider.
406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In going to the OK lot, Mr. Buckley along with Mr . Schneider explained
as to the anticipated movement of work . They showed us the fence that was
being built ; that was then under construction and nearly completed, and they
explained to us that the turn over point for the finished cars would be at this
gate, which I would judge was 15 or 20 feet from the canopy or maypole, as
you formerly discussed this with another witness.
I raised the question with Mr . Schneider . I said , "What happens to this OK
lot?"
And he said , "We are leasing it to PMT."
And I said , "It would still be your property ? Only you are leasing it; you
are not selling it?"
And he said, "We are leasing it."
I said, "Well , if it is still General Motors' property , this certainly is a
deviation from this comparable situation that we had in the BOP Wilmington
plant former to this."
He said , "No difference."
I said , "Well, on that particular situation when I called you in Detroit, you
assured me " and the ultimate settlement of that one was me calling back the
Wilmington local union people and telling them that through a commitment
from Mr. Schneider that there would be none other than UAW bargaining
unit drivers driving on plant property.
He says, "There is no difference in the situation."
We then walked the entire OK lot over, and went to what has been referred
to as the shipping building; watched the operation , as has been formerly
described by Palermo ; the removing of the . gas ; putting the gas back in;
observed some repairmen , UAW repairmen doing certain repair work in the
OK lot; and then we then walked to the receiving building.
At about 2:30 p in . on June 12, Burrows , Learned, Jackson , Dunne, and members
of the shop committee met with Schneider , Buckley, Rayborn, and other managerial
representatives . The meeting opened with Jackson's remarking that the meeting
was requested for the purpose of obtaining "management 's position on the alleged
work movement , whereby we would be losing drivers out of the OK Parking
Lot." Buckley replied that the section of the OK Parking lot had been leased to
PMT and that effective June 17 Respondent would be turning its finished automo-
biles on a single man basis . When Burrows asked if the leasing of the parking
lot would cause a reduction in the number of men in the bargaining unit, Buckley
replied that the 18 Respondent employees involved would be released from the
parking lot group . Burrows then inquired under what provision of the national
collective-bargaining agreement between the parties, permitted Respondent to
make the contemplated change. Schneider replied that management was acting
by virtue of paragraph 8 of said agreement . 14 Respondent was privileged to
make the change unilaterally . Burrows then stated that the change did not come
within the agreement, as the action did not constitute a change of method within
the meaning of the phrase; that the jobs had not been eliminated but had been
transferred to PMT. He cited, as an example of the job elimination pursuant to
a change of method under Section 8 of the agreement , the elimination of an
inspector 's station on the assembly line when it decided that said job was unneces-
sary. Burrows further maintained that Respondent 's action with respect to its con-
templated elimination of the OK Parking lot drivers ' jobs was nothing more than
an erosion of the unit and was therefore in derogation of the unit for which the
Union was certified.
Schneider replied that Burrows was entitled to his opinion adding, "We have told
you what we are going to do and you have a recourse . under the contract's
grievance procedure ." After a short colloquy between Buckley and Learned, the
meeting concluded when Buckley remarked, "We have given you our position. I
see no reason to belabor the point any longer."
On June 17 Respondent leased its OK Parking lot to PMT and placed the 18
carloaders on assembly -line jobs. After a dispute had arisen over Respondent's
initial placement of the carloaders , Respondent agreed to give them available
14 Paragraph 8 reads: "The right to hire ; promote , discharge or discipline for cause ;
and to maintain discipline and efficiency of employees , is the sole responsibility of the
Corporation except that Union members shall not be discriminated against as such In
addition , the products to be manufactured , the location of plants , the schedules of produc-
tion, the methods, processes and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the
responsibility of the Corporation."
,o
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ETC. 407
driving jobs and the Union agreed not to process grievances for any difference in
pay between the old OK Parking lot scale and the scale of the jobs now held by
the former carloaders.
Since the change on June 17 Respondent delivers the finished automobile to
PMT at the gate of the recently erected fence. A PMT employee drives the car
into the PMT lot and parks it in any available parking space, marks the space
number on the manifest and deposits the manifest at a central office. There the
manifests are assembled into loads and returned to PMT parking lot em-
ployees. Then the automobiles are extracted from the OK Parking lot and driven
to the haul-away truck trailer or to a railroad car and loaded.
C. Concluding findings
It is undisputed that the Union was, during all times material , the statutory
collective-bargaining representative of the employees here involved. It thus follows
that any change by Respondent in the terms and conditions of employment of
those employees without prior notice to or consultation with the Union con-
stitutes a refusal to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
Respondent takes the position that the determination to unilaterally lease part of
its property to PMT and to enter into a contract with PMT whereby employees of
PMT would perform certain operations which Respondent's employees had been
doing prior to the aforesaid leasing and contracting was not violative of the Act
because (1) such acts and conduct were a matter of managerial prerogatives; (2)
under the provisions of the national collective-bargaining agreement between the
parties Respondent was privileged to unilaterally make such a lease and contract;
and (3) the Union, if it felt aggrieved by the aforesaid acts and conduct of
Respondent, should have,invoked the grievance procedure of the aforementioned
bargaining agreement instead of filing the charge herein.
As to (1), controlling law is basically as the Tenth Circuit pointed out in
N.L.R.B. v. Brown-Dunkin Company, Inc., 287 F. 2d 17, regarding a case very
similar to the instant one:
The contention is also made that the respondent did not deny the Union the
right to bargain concerning the terms and conditions of employment in
violation of Section 8(a)(5). The unassailed facts are, however, to the con-
trary. While the Union appears to have had some intimation of the impend-
ing Anderson-Rooney contract, it was not until the morning of the effective
date of the contract that the Union learned it had been consummated. And
this information was obtained through the employees not the employer. Under
no stretch of the imagination can it be said that these circumstances gave
the Union a fair opportunity to bargain with respondent about not subcontract-
ing the work, or with Anderson-Rooney concerning the conditions of the new
employment. This is not to say that the Union must first approve before an
employer may contract out work, but it is to say that reasonable notice and a
chance to bargain must be afforded before an employer enters into a contract
affecting the hire or tenure of its Union workers' employment. This is so
because "Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargain-
ing. It interferes with the right of self-organization by emphasizing to the
employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent." May
Dept. Stores, v. N.L.R.B., 326 U.S. 376, 385. See also N.L.R.B. v. Crompton-
Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217; N.L.R.B. v. Burton-Dixie Corp., 210 F. 2d 199.
As to (2), I am not unmindful of the fact that a labor organization may waive
the statutory rights granted to it and to the employees it represents, but the Board
has said that it will not lightly infer such a waiver. The waiver, the Board said,
must be in clear and unmistakable terms. Tide Water Associated Oil Company, 85
NLRB 1096; Hekman Furniture Company, 101 NLRB 631.
The "change of method" phrase in paragraph 8 of the national collective-bar-
gaining contract does not spell out a waiver of negotiations over Respondent's
decision to transfer its intermediate storage function to PMT. Though there was
much dispute over whether to.call the transaction "subcontracting" or "job elimina-
tion," the facts are not in dispute. PMT employees now maintain an intermediate
storage area involving the parking of cars and the assembling of the automobiles
for loading after nonunit employees have grouped the manifests into appropriate
loads. That function was performed by Respondent's 18 drivers before June 17.
That this was a simple transfer of functions to PMT employees is not altered or ob-
scured by the elimination, which accompanied the transfer, of some functions
408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
previously performed by PMT employees , and some previously performed by Re-
spondent 's 18 driver employees . If, by some legal legerdemain one chooses to
call this transfer of functions "subcontracting" or some kind of "change ," it is not
a mere "job elimination " pursuant to a "change of method" as provided for by
Section 8 of the agreement-and that section cannot be construed as a waiver over
bargaining about such change in clear and unmistakable terms. Tide Water
Associated Oil Company , supra.
Paragraph 225 15 of the agreement which waives the making of contract propo-
sals does not clearly and unmistakably waive bargaining about the application and
implementation of the agreement which is a continuing duty. Rapid Roller Co.,
33 NLRB 557 , 587, 590 , enfd. in part and remanded in part; Rapid Roller Co. v
N.L.R.B ., 126 F. 2d 452 , 459-460 (CA. 7) cert. denied , 317 U.S. 650 . In other
words, whether the Union waived its right to make proposals and negotiate on the
general subject of subcontracting is not herein in issue. What is in issue is the
Union's right to negotiate on a specific decision to transfer the OK Parking lot
drivers' functions to another employer and the above contract clause does not waive
that right . Square D Company , 142 NLRB 332.
As to ( 3), the grievance procedure does not constitute a waiver or bar of any
sort. Hekman Furniture Company, supra . The grievance procedure and arbitra-
tion is not the proper forum in which to determine what constitutes a waiver of
rights established by the Act . Further, the processing of a grievance , after the
fact, is not an adequate substitute for full and open negotiations prior to the final
decision and effectuation of the charge . It is this factor of anticipatory negotia-
tion that the Board emphasized in Town & Country 16 and Fibreboard 1 7 decisions
as being necessary for meaningful collective bargaining.1S
Furthermore , the credited evidence , as epitomized above, clearly discloses that
Respondent made all available efforts to conceal from the Union the impending
move to lease the OK Parking lot to PMT and to contract with that concern to
have its employees perform the very work then being performed by Respondent's
employees. Whenever the local union representatives sought to ascertain the truth
or falsity of the rumors that Respondent intended to abandon its OK Parking lot
operations , they were refused any and all information , thus not affording the Union
an opportunity to exercise its statutory right of bargaining.
I find, upon the entire record in the case, that Respondent did not bargain with
the Union as the statutory representative of its employees in the appropriate unit
and thus has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a) (5) of the Act. I further find , that by the foregoing , Respondent has inter-
fered with , restrained , and coerced its respective employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act , within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
thereof.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connec-
tion with the business operations of Respondent as described in section 1, above,
have a close , intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce
m Paragraph 225 reads , "The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which re-
sulted in this Agreement , each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands
and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of
collective bargaining , and that the understandings and agreements arrived at by the
parties after the exercise of that right and opportunity are set forth in this agreement
Therefore , the Corporation and the Union , for the life of this agreement , each voluntarily
and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated,
to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred to, or covered in
this agreement , or with respect to any subject or matter not specifically referred to or
covered in this Agreement , even though such subject or matter may not have been within
the knowledge or contemplation of either or both of the parties at the time that they nego-
tiated or signed this Agreement
16 Town & Country Mfq Co Inc , 136 NLRB 1022
17 Fibreboard Paper Products , 13'8 NLRB 550.
1s See, Adams Datiry, Inc, 137 NLRB 815; The Renton News Record , 136 NLRB 1294 ;
American Manufacturing Company of Texas , 139 NLRB 815 ; Hawaii Meat Company,
Limited, 139 NLRB 966 , Esti Neiderman and Gszela Eisner, co-partners doing business as
Star Baby Co., 140 NLRB 678; Brown Transport Corp , 140 NLRB 954 ; National Food
Stores, Inc, 142 NLRB 340, and Northwestern Publishing Company, 144 NLRB 1069
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ETC. 409
among the several States and, such of them as have been found to constitute unfair
labor practices, tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I will recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
Having found that Respondent failed and refused to fulfill its statutory bargain-
ing obligations within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when,
without prior notice to or consultation with the Union it leased its OK Parking lot
to PMT and contracted with that firm to have its employees perform the work
which Respondent's 18 drivers performed before the execution of the aforesaid lease
and contract was violative of the Act, I will recommend that Respondent be ordered
to bargain with the Union respecting such leasing and contracting. Having also
found that Respondent transferred the aforementioned men to other jobs without
prior notice to or consultation with their statutory collective-bargaining representa-
tive, I will recommend that Respondent be ordered and directed to take appropriate
steps to reinstate the aforementioned 18 men by resuming operations of its OK
Parking lot and assign said 18 men to the jobs each held prior to June 17, 1963,
at the same wages and working conditions, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make each whole for any loss of earnings. It is
important to note in this connection that an order reinstating the aforesaid 18
employees by Respondent and making them whole for loss of earnings is warrant-
ed on the basis of the 8(a)(5) violations of the Act found above. The transfer of
employees to less desirable jobs, and in some instances at less pay, flowed directly
from Respondent's unilateral action.19 In order, therefore, to adapt the remedy to
the situation which calls for redress and to give substance to the remedial order to
bargain, it is necessary to restore the status quo ante without which effective
bargaining in behalf of the 18 employees here involved cannot be conduct-
ed. The broad remedial powers vested in the Board by the Act afford ample
authority in the Board to order Respondent to reinstate said 18 parking lot drivers
to the jobs they held immediately prior to June 17, and to give them backpay, with
interest at the rate of 6-percent per annum, where deprivation of employment status
is a consequence of a Section 8(a)(5) violation. Backpay and interest to be
computed and paid in accordance and in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 and in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
The unfair labor practices found to have been engaged in by Respondent are of
such a character and scope that in order to insure Respondent's employees of their
full rights guaranteed them by the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the record as a
whole, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is, and during all times material has been , an employer engaged
in commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The International Union, United Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO, is, and during all times ma-
terial has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
19 The record clearly establishes, and I find, that the leasing of the OK Parking lot and
contracting with PMT to have its employees perform the work previously performed by
Respondent's parking lot employees took place prior to any notice to or consultation with
the Union. The fact that Respondent met on June 11 and 12 with representatives of that
labor organization and there announced that it had leased its OK Parking lot to PMT and
had contracted with that company, to have its employees perform the work Respondent's
18 parking lot drivers were then performing, did not fulfill its obligation within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. National Food Stores, eupra; Mayer B. Cohen, Bernard
Cohen and Peary Cohen d/b/a Riverside Wholesale Distributors, 142 NLRB 580, Central
Illinoss PaSize Service Company, 139 NLRB 1407.
410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. All employees covered by the national collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the Union and Respondent , dated September 20, 1961 , constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material the Union has represented a majority of Respondent's
employees in the appropriate unit, and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has
been , and is now, the exclusive representative of all employees in said unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining with respect to grievances , rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of employment.
5. By refusing to answer all pertinent inquiries from April 29, to June 3, 1963,
of the Union 's shop committee about its intention to transfer its OK Parking lot
operation to PMT, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. By unilaterally discontinuing and transferring its OK Parking lot operations
to PMT on June 17, 1963, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 ( a)( I) and (5) of the Act.
7. By refusing to discuss and negotiate with the Union on June 11 and 12, 1963,
its intention to discontinue and transfer its OK Parking lot operations , Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid acts are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Peggy E. Hiroskey d/b/a Logan Dairy Company and Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 175, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen &
Helpers of America . Cases Nos. 9-CA-3100 and 9-CA-3155.
October 30, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 21, 1964, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that it would not
effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to exercise jurisdic-
tion in these cases and recommending that the complaints be dis-
missed in their entirety, as set forth in the attached Decision. There-
after, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's Decision with supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
these cases to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision and the entire record in these cases, including
the General Counsel's and the Charging Party's exceptions and
149 NLRB No. 33.