GENERAL MILLS, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 17, 2021

2020006065 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 17, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/763,017 07/23/2015 Jeffrey F Enz 7779US02 2070
106306 7590 09/17/2021
DIEDERIKS & WHITELAW, PLC
4196 Merchant Plaza, #815
Woodbridge, VA 22192
EXAMINER
TRAN, LIEN THUY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1793
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/17/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
gmi.mail@dwpatentlaw.com
mail@dwpatentlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEFFREY F. ENZ, DANA DRONEN, and
ANDREA KLOSTERMANN
Appeal 2020-006065
Application 14/763,017
Technology Center 1700
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, JAMES C. HOUSEL, and
N. WHITNEY WILSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOUSEL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5 and 7–28. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies General Mills, Inc. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed May 4, 2020, at 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention recited in the claims on appeal relates to a shelf-stable
baked brownie and brownie batter. Specification (“Spec.”) filed July 23,
2015, 1–17.2 Appellant discloses that the brownie has a moisture level of
about 16% and is formed from a batter comprising 11–14 wt% flour, 40–50
wt% sweetener, 14.5–16.5 wt% whole egg, shortening, and, optionally
cocoa, wherein the sweetener includes sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose,
present in a ratio of 2.5–3.5/0.5–1.5/0.05–0.15. Id. at 1:18–21. Appellant
further discloses that the moisture content is carefully managed by product
design in order to achieve brownies with extended shelf life. Id. at 2:31–32.
Appellant also discloses that undesirable sugar and fat recrystallization is
also inhibited by product design. Id. at 3:1–2.
Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal
Brief, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A shelf stable, baked, brownie formed from a batter, the
batter comprising:
11–14 wt% flour;
40–50%-sweetener comprising sucrose, corn syrup and
fructose, present in wt% ranges of 20–40, 5–15 and 1–5;
14.5–16.5% whole egg;
a humectant, and
shortening,

2 This Decision also cites to the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) dated June 26,
2020, and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed August 24, 2020.
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the baked brownie having a moisture level of 15–18%,
retarded sugar recrystallization, stabilized water activity and a
shelf life of during and after 12 months.
Independent claim 18 recites a brownie batter having similar
ingredients and amounts as the batter of claim 1.3
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Narayanaswamy et al. US 6,228,403 B1 May 8, 2001
Boldon US 6,391,366 B1 May 21, 2002
Karwowski et al. US 2010/0303991 A1 Dec. 2, 2010
Cristadoro et al. US 2010/0310749 A1 Dec. 9, 2010

REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains, and Appellant requests our review of, the
following rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a):
1. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–17, and 25 as unpatentable over
Narayanaswamy in view of Cristadoro and Karwowski;4

3 Claim 18 recites two percentages of ingredients, the sweetener and the
whole egg, and claim 1 recites those two percentages of ingredients along
with a third percentage for the moisture level, without specifying whether
these percentages are wt% consistent with the flour and the individual
sweetener ranges. In addition, claim 1 recites “a shelf life of during and after
12 months” which is grammatically awkward. For purposes of this appeal,
we assume that all the percentage limitations in claim 1 are wt%, consistent
with Specification Tables 1–3, and the shelf life is at least 12 months
consistent with the Specification, page 13, lines 16–19.
4 Claim 1 recites “a shelf life of during and after 12 months.” Each of
dependent claims 14–16 recite shelf lives ranging from at least 1 month to at
least 6 months. If the shelf life recited in claim 1 is at least 12 months, it is
not clear how claims 14–16 further limit claim 1. The Examiner and
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2. Claim 3 as unpatentable over Narayanaswamy in view of
Cristadoro and Karwowski, and further in view of Boldon; and
3. Claims 18–24 and 26 as unpatentable over Narayanaswamy in
view of Cristadoro and Boldon.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
Appellant identifies, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential)
(cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”). After considering the
argued claims and each of Appellant’s arguments, we are not persuaded of
reversible error in the appealed rejections, which we affirm for substantially
the findings, reasoning, and conclusions set forth in the Examiner’s Answer,
which we adopt as our own. We offer the following for emphasis.
For purposes of this appeal, to the extent that the claims and above
rejections on appeal are separately argued, we will address them separately
consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2019). We also incorporate our
prior Decision on Appeal in this case dated March 4, 2019, to the extent that
many of the issues raised here have been previously addressed therein.
Rejection 1
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–17, and 25 as unpatentable
over Narayanaswamy in view of Cristadoro and Karwowski. Ans. 3–6.

Appellant may wish to consider whether claims 14–16 further limit claim 1
upon any further prosecution ofthis application.
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Claim 1
Appellant does not argue claims 1, 3, 4, 7–12, and 25 or Rejections 1
and 2 separately. We select claim 1 as representative in addressing
Appellant’s arguments. Claims 3, 7–16, and 25 stand or fall with claim 1.
The Examiner finds that Narayanaswamy discloses a brownie baked
from a batter comprising about 10–40% flour, about 25–70% sugar, about 0–
5% egg solids, and about 0–20% fat, wherein the sugar can be sucrose, with
up to 30% corn syrup, and that ordinary granulated sugars may be used
including fructose. Ans. 4. In addition, the Examiner finds that
Narayanaswamy discloses that the batter may include about 1–8%
humectant. Id. The Examiner further finds that Narayanaswamy discloses
that the batters have a moisture content of about 5–20% which is provided
primarily by liquid eggs yielding a whole egg content within the range
recited in claim 1. Id. The Examiner acknowledges that Narayanaswamy
fails to teach the moisture content of the baked brownie and the recited
proportions of sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose. Id.
However, the Examiner finds that Cristadoro discloses moisture-
retaining baked goods including a humectant sugar such as fructose. Ans. 4.
The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to use fructose in
addition to sucrose and corn syrup in Narayanaswamy’s brownie batter in
order to serve as both a sweetener and a humectant because Narayanaswamy
teaches that sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose may be included as the
sweetener and the batter may include 1–8% humectant, and because
Cristadora teaches that fructose is a humectant sugar. Id. at 5. With regard to
the relative proportions of sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose, the Examiner
determines that it would have been obvious to vary the amount/proportion of
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these sugars as a matter of taste preference (sweetness). Id. (citing In re
Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
The Examiner also finds Karwowski teaches that brownies generally
have moisture contents of less than about 20%. Ans. 4. The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to bake Narayanaswamy’s batter
to obtain a brownie having a moisture content normally found in brownies as
taught in Karwowski. Id. at 5. In addition, the Examiner finds that the
ordinary artisan would have expected Narayanaswamy’s brownie to have a
long shelf life because it is made from the same ingredients as recited in
claim 1. Id. In support of the obviousness of the claimed product, the
Examiner cites In re Levin, 178 F.2d 945, 948 (CCPA 1949):
new recipes or formulas for cooking food which involve the
addition or elimination of common ingredients, or for treating
them in ways which differ from the former practice, do not
amount to invention merely because it is not disclosed that, in
the constantly developing art of preparing no one else ever did
the particular thing upon which the applicant asserts his right to
patent. In all such cases, there is nothing patentable unless the
applicant by a proper showing further establishes a coaction or
cooperative relationship between the selected ingredients which
produces a new, unexpected, and useful function.
Ans. 6.
Appellant argues that the applied prior art fails to disclose the claimed
amounts of sucrose (20–40 wt%), corn syrup (5–15 wt%), and fructose (1–5
wt%), and, in particular, fails to teach or suggest the inclusion of fructose in
Narayanaswamy’s brownie. Appeal Br. 5. Appellant asserts that
Narayanaswamy discloses a total amount of sugar between 25–70%, of
which up to 30% may be corn syrup. Id. Appellant also asserts that
Narayanaswamy discloses a list of sugars including sucrose, dextrose,
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maltose, fructose, lactose, brown and invert sugars, alone or in combination,
but does not disclose the amounts of sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose
recited in claim 1. Id. Appellant next asserts that Cristadoro teaches that 1–
35% of humectants may be added which may include sugar-based
humectants such as sucrose, glucose, fructose, dextrose, corn syrup, corn
syrup solids, invert syrup, high fructose corn syrup, maltose, honey sorbose,
mannose, lactose, galactose, and combinations thereof, but fails to provide
further guidance on which or how much sugar-based humectant should be
selected. Id. Appellant further asserts that Narayanaswamy teaches a
humectant in an amount of 1–8%, but only lists sorbitol, xylitol, mannitol,
glycerin, glycerol, propylene, and glycol as suitable humectants. Id. at 6. As
such, Appellant contends that there is no reason why an ordinary artisan
would select fructose as one of Narayanaswamy’s sugars or humectant. Id. at
5, 6.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of reversible error. As the
Examiner finds (Ans. 9), Narayanaswamy discloses that the sweetener may
include sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose, because each is listed as a
satisfactory sweetener for use alone or in combination. This disclosure alone
is sufficient to motivate an ordinary artisan to select any combination of
listed sweeteners including a combination of sucrose, corn syrup, and
fructose. However, we further note that Cristadoro discloses that 1–35%
humectants may be used including both sugar-based humectants such as
sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose, and non-sugar-based humectants such as
sorbitol, xylitol, mannitol. Cristadoro ¶ 17. Cristadoro also teaches the
humectants provide browning during baking, tenderize the batter, and further
retain moisture. Id. Because Narayanaswamy teaches 1–8% humectant may
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be added, Cristadoro provides additional motivation to include sucrose, corn
syrup, and fructose in a baked brownie product. In other words,
Narayanaswamy and Cristadoro disclose that fructose, as well as sucrose and
corn syrup, may be added both as a sweetener and a humectant with a
reasonable expectation of success.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s position
regarding Narayanaswamy’s humectant is in direct contradiction to
Narayanaswamy’s teachings regarding the humectant. Reply Br. 2. We
disagree. Although Narayanaswamy discloses that the humectant may be a
non-sugar-based humectant, Cristadoro discloses that sugars may
alternatively be used as humectants, both instead of, or in addition to the
same non-sugar-based humectants that Narayanaswamy teaches. Compare
Narayanaswamy 5:58–67 with Cristadoro ¶ 17.
Appellant next argues that the Peterson decision does not apply to the
present case because, unlike in Peterson, there is no broader disclosed range
of sucrose or fructose in which to optimize. Appeal Br. 6. Appellant
contends that first the Examiner has not established that it would have been
obvious to select sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose from a long list of sugars,
and second the Examiner has not established that it would have been
obvious to optimize the amounts of those sugars based only on a broad
overall amount of sugar. Id. (citing Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Appellant further argues that the claimed
amounts of sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose have been found to be critical
because they lead to extended shelf stability. Id. at 7. Appellant contends
that even if it is known to adjust the overall amount of sugars in a batter to
adjust sweetness, it was not known that adjusting the amounts of sucrose,
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corn syrup, and fructose would have an effect on shelf stability, as well as
leading to sugar recrystallization retardation, and stabilization of water
activity. Id. (citing Spec. 5:12–18 and Table 2).
Appellant’s arguments regarding the amounts of sucrose, corn syrup,
and fructose are not persuasive of reversible error. Although Appellant is
correct that Narayanaswamy teaches only the overall range for sweeteners
and lists a variety of possible sugars, including sucrose, corn syrup, and
fructose, Narayanaswamy nonetheless suggests combinations of the listed
sugars. Narayanaswamy 3:62 (“alone or in combination”). An ordinary
artisan, following Narayanaswamy’s teaching, would have understood that,
for combinations of sugars, the total amount would be from about 25–70%,
meaning that the amounts of individual sugars could be varied so long as the
total amount of such sugars falls within this range. Narayanaswamy teaches
a range of sweeteners, 25–70%, that encompasses the claimed range of 40–
50%, as well as a range of com syrup, up to about 30%, that encompasses
the claimed range of 5–15%. In other words, Narayanaswamy teaches a
broader range not only for the total amount of sweetener, but also a broader
range for each of the individual sugars when combined, in accord with the
Peterson decision. See also, In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (explaining that overlapping ranges typically support a conclusion of
obviousness and where the claimed ranges are completely encompassed by
the prior art, the conclusion is even more compelling); Iron Grip Barbell
Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As such,
it would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan to have selected any
combination of Narayanaswamy’s listed sugars, and varied the amounts of
such sugars as a matter of taste preference so long as the total amount of
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sugars is within the range of 25–70%, absent a showing of unexpected
results.
We turn next to Appellant’s contention that the Specification
evidences that the selection and amounts of sugars as recited in claim 1 is
critical. Although we agree that the applied prior art fails to disclose or
recognize that shelf stability of at least 12 months may be obtained, we note
that Appellant provides only a single brownie composition exhibiting a shelf
stability of at least 12 months. That composition comprises 30 wt%
powdered sucrose, 10.128 wt% corn syrup (42 DE), 3.102% crystalline
fructose, 15.06 wt% pasteurized whole eggs, 13.983 wt% palm-canola oil
shortening, 12.705 wt% soft red winter blend flour, 6.617 wt% dark Dutched
cocoa,, 3.084 wt% glycerin, 2.427 wt% high oleic canola oil, and 1 wt% or
less of water and other ingredients. Spec. 11, Table 2. We note that
Comparative Example C only differed from the inventive Example in using
33.101 wt% powdered sucrose and no fructose. Id. The Specification teaches
that the inventive “Example, after 12 months, maintained cohesive
properties, and no objectionable flavor or texture degradation was observed
during the storage period. The formulation of the Example retarded sugar
recrystallization and stabilized water activity of the product.” Id. at 13:16–
19. On the other hand, “[t]he Comparative C product failed after 9 months
due to sugar recrystallization, which detrimentally affected the texture, and
oxidation that produced an undesirable off-flavor.” Id. at 13:13–15. Thus,
there is some evidence that using 3 wt% crystalline fructose (and 3 wt% less
powdered sucrose) yields an improved shelf life.
Appellant may overcome what would otherwise be a prima facie case
of obviousness by establishing that the claimed ranges are critical, or
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generally by showing that the claimed ranges achieve unexpected results
relative to the prior art range. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-70 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). The burden of establishing that unexpected results support a
conclusion of nonobviousness rests with the Appellants. In re Huang, 100
F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, the record is devoid of any
evidence that such a result is both commensurate in scope with claim 1.
Claim 1 not only recites broader ranges for all the ingredients, but also a
broader range of 1–5 wt% for fructose, than disclosed in the single inventive
Example. Appellant does not even attempt to establish that the disclosed
evidence (the single inventive Example) is commensurate in scope with
claim 1. The relied-upon results must be commensurate in scope with the
claims. See In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329–31 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
“Establishing that one (or a small number of) species gives unexpected
results is inadequate proof, for ‘it is the view of [the CCPA] that objective
evidence of non-obviousness must be commensurate in scope with the
claims which the evidence is offered to support.’” See In re Greenfield, 571
F.2d 1185, 1189 (CCPA 1978) (quoting In re Tiffin, 448 F.2d 791, 792
(CCPA 1971)).
Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence that the superior result
shown in the inventive Example would have been unexpected to one of
ordinary skill in the art. “[I]t is not enough to show that results are obtained
which differ from those obtained in the prior art: that difference must be
shown to be an unexpected difference.” See In re Klosak, 455 F.2d 1077,
1080 (CCPA 1972) (emphasis in original). Doing so requires more than
“[m]ere argument or conclusory statements in the specification,” or a
counsel’s argument in a brief. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed.
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Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re
Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a
brief cannot take the place of evidence.”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of
claim 1, and claims 3, 7–16, and 25 for the reasons set forth above and in the
Examiner’s Answer.
Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further requires that the corn syrup
has a DE of 42.
The Examiner rejects claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Narayanaswamy in view of Cristadoro and Karwowski.
Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to provide any evidence supporting
the conclusion that it would have been obvious to select corn syrup of
varying DE depending on the sweetness intensity desired. Appeal Br. 7.
However, the Examiner finds that DE (“Dextrose Equivalent”) is an
indication of the degree of sweetness of the corn syrup. Ans. 12. As such,
the Examiner maintains that it would have been obvious to vary the DE of
corn syrup used depending on the desired sweetness in the final product. Id.
We agree. As the Examiner finds, Appellant has not asserted that corn syrup
having a DE of 42 was unknown in the art. Id. Nor has Appellant argued or
shown that the DE of the corn syrup is critical or otherwise produces an
unexpected result. Id. Therefore, the Examiner has established a prima facie
case that selecting a corn syrup having a DE of 42 would have been within
the ordinary skill in the art and obvious to the ordinary artisan.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 2.
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Claim 4
Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and further requires that the fructose is
crystalline.
The Examiner rejects claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Narayanaswamy in view of Cristadoro and Karwowski.
Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to address this limitation.
Appeal Br. 7. However, the Examiner finds that Narayanaswamy discloses
granulated sugars including fructose and that granulated sugars are
crystalline. Ans. 12. As Appellant fail to identify reversible error in these
findings, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 4.
Claim 5
Claim 5 depends from claim 1, and further requires that the sucrose,
corn syrup, and fructose are present in a ratio of 3/1/0.1.
The Examiner rejects claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Narayanaswamy in view of Cristadoro and Karwowski.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reasoning for varying the
amounts of sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose in Narayanaswamy’s batter
does not provide motivation as to why an ordinary artisan would have
selected the particular ratio of these sweeteners recited in claim 5. Appeal
Br. 8. Appellant also urges that Specification page 5, lines 12–18, and Table
2 demonstrate that the claimed ratio is critical because it leads to a more
shelf stable product. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of reversible error as to the
limitation of claim 5. As explained above, the Examiner’s findings regarding
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Narayanaswamy provide sufficient motivation to vary the relative amounts
of sweeteners, including sucrose, corn syrup, and fructose, so long as the
total amount of such sweeteners is in the range of 25–70%. In addition, as
explained above, Appellant’s evidence is insufficient to establish that the
amounts of these sweeteners, including a ratio as recited in claim 5, is
critical or produces unexpected results. Indeed, we note that the ratio of
sucrose/corn syrup/fructose in the single inventive Example is 3/1/0.3. In
addition, inventive Example 3 is only a single example within the fructose
range of 1–5 wt%, and, therefore, is not commensurate in scope with the
entire range of amounts of fructose for a ratio of 3/1/0.3.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 5.
Claim 17
Claim 17 depends from claim 1, and further limits the batter to
include 12–13 wt% flour; 43–44% sweetener comprising sucrose, corn syrup
and crystalline fructose; and 15% whole egg.
The Examiner rejects claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Narayanaswamy in view of Cristadoro and Karwowski.
Appellant argues that the specific ranges of sucrose, corn syrup, and
crystalline fructose are critical and provide unexpected results of retarded
sugar recrystallization, stabilized water activity, and a shelf life of at least 12
months. Appeal Br. 8–9. Although this claim appears to closely map to the
single inventive Example in the recited ingredients so as to likely be
commensurate in scope, as we previously explained, there is no evidence of
record, such as might be provided in a Declaration, establishing that the
superior result shown in this example would have been unexpected to one of
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ordinary skill in the art. Klosak, 455 F.2d at 1080; Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470;
De Blauwe, 736 F.2d at 705; Pearson, 494 F.2d at 1405.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 17.
Rejection 3
The Examiner rejects claims 18–24 and 26 as unpatentable over
Narayanaswamy in view of Cristadoro and Boldon. Ans. 6–8.
Appellant does not argue claims 18, 19, 21–24, and 26 separately. We
select claim 18 as representative in addressing Appellant’s arguments.
Claims 19, 21–24, and 26 stand or fall with claim 1.
Claim 18
Claim 18 recites a similar composition to that of claim 1, without
requiring shortening. Appellant’s arguments raised against the rejection of
claim 18 are substantially the same as raised against claim 1, which we did
not find persuasive. Appeal Br. 9–11. Accordingly, for the same reasons
given in the Examiner’s Answer and above, we likewise sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 18, and claims 19, 21–24, and 26.
Claim 20
Claim 20 depends from claim 18, and further requires that the sucrose,
corn syrup, and fructose are present in a ratio of 3/1/0.1. This limitation is
the same as set forth in claim 5 and Appellant’s arguments raised against the
rejection of claim 20 are substantially the same as raised against claim 5,
which we did not find persuasive. Appeal Br. 12. Accordingly, for the same
reasons given in the Examiner’s Answer and above, we likewise sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 20.
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CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of the record and for the reasons set forth above
and in the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5
and 7–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 5,
7–17, 25
103(a) Narayanaswamy,
Cristadoro, Karwowski
1, 2, 4, 5,
7–17, 25

3 103(a) Narayanaswamy,
Cristadoro, Karwowski,
Boldon
3
18–24, 26 103(a) Narayanaswamy,
Cristadoro, Boldon
18–24, 26
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7–26

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED