General Meats, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 12, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 1036 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Meats, Inc. and General Teamsters Local
174, affiliated with the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America and John Young and Judith
Cunningham. Cases 19-CA-9692, 19-CA-10681,
19-CA-10997, and 19-CA-11118
February 12, 1980
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
AND DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On November 6, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Martin S. Bennett issued the attached Supplemental
Decision and Decision in this proceeding.' Thereafter,
Respondent filed exceptions2 and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Supplemental Decision and Decision in light
of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm
the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, to adopt his recommended Order
in Cases 19-CA-10997 and 19-CA-11118, and to
adopt his recommended Order in Cases 19-CA-9692
and 19-CA-10681, as modified herein.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Orders the recommend-
ed Orders of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, General Meats,
Inc., Tukwila, Washington, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Orders, except that the amount of
backpay to be paid John Young shall be $12,528.48,
and the amount of backpay to be paid Carl Hodges
shall be $12,729.14, plus interest.
' The Board's original Decision and Order in Case 19-CA-9692 is not
reported in bound volumes of Board Decisions.
No exceptions have been filed with respect to the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision in Cases 19-CA-10977 and 19-CA-I 1118.
We find no merit in Respondent's contention that by letters dated
September 5 and 27 and October 17. 1978. and February 6, 1979, it made
valid offers of reinstatement to discriminatees Young and Hodges. Thus.
Respondent at no time specifically offer Hodges his former position as a long-
haul driver, although such positions existed. Similarly. Respondent did not
offer Young reinstatement to his former dispatcher position, which was
occupied by Yovino during the above period.
In determining the amount of backpay due Young and Hodges. the
Administrative Law Judge relied upon figures set forth in the Acting Regional
Director's backpay specification However. the Acting Regional Director
247 NLRB No. 153
made certain inadvertent errors in computing the amount due Young. Thus,
the net backpay due Young for 1978, fourth quarter, should be S5,131.70 and
the total net backpay due Young through March 2. 1979, should be
$12,528.48. The Administrative Law Judge also inadvertently listed the total
net backpay due Hodges through March 2, 1979, as $12,729.54, whereas the
correct figure is S12,729.14.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
AND
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARTIN S. BENNETT, Administrative Law Judge: This
consolidated matter was heard at Seattle, Washington on
April 9 and 10, 1979.
By way of introduction, these cases embrace seriatim (I) a
Supplemental Decision in three backpay cases involving an
alleged refusal to reinstate three discriminates to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, with ensuing
losses, and (2) various alleged acts of interference, restraint,
and coercion as well as discrimination directed at Judith
Cunningham.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, including their demeanor, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Jurisdictional Findings
The record already establishes, and I find, that General
Teamsters Local 174, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, herein the Union, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) and that the
operations of Respondent, General Meats, Inc., affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act.
The Backpay Case
The backpay case originates with Case 19-CA-9692
wherein, on July 28, 1978, Administrative Law Judge James
M. Kennedy ordered the reinstatement of discharged strik-
ers John Young, Mike Foley, and Carl Hodges. By order of
August 31, 1978, this was affirmed by the National Labor
Relations Board and, in a decision filed January 25, 1979,
the Court of Appeals fbr the Ninth Circuit filed its judgment
enforcing the Board order. Therein, it directed that Young,
Foley, and Hodges be offered immediate reinstatement "to
their former or substantially equivalent positions" and that
they be made whole for lost earnings as provided in the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge which was
attached thereto as an appendix. The court thus directed
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions with backpay and interest thereon.
At basic issue herein is whether on August 9, 1978,
Respondent reinstated these three as ordered; more specifi-
cally, were they returned to work but, as the General
Counsel urges, and I agree, not to the same or substantially
equivalent positions, as described below.
1036
GENERAL MEATS, INC.
Thereafter, the General Counsel issued a backpay specifi-
cation covering the three men from the specified date
through the first quarter of 1979, although it was conceded
that as of that date no backpay was due Foley because of
interim earnings.
The General Counsel sought judgment on the pleadings
because Respondent's answer to the backpay specification
did not comply with Section 102.54(b) of the Rules and
Regulations of the Board. Initially, it was not sworn to,
unlike the procedure with a complaint, which does not
require such an answer to a basic unfair labor practice.
In addition, Respondent's answer may best be termed as a
general denial, and the General Counsel's motion for
judgment on the pleadings was granted with the exception
that Respondent had contended that identical or substantial-
ly equivalent positions had been offered. In essence, this is
the only issue before me, as framed by the pleadings, namely,
whether the three complainants were returned to work on
August 9, 1978, consistent with the terms of the Board and
court orders. It may be noted this stemmed from an offer to
return from Respondent dated August 4, 1978.
Although a computation was made by the General
Counsel reflecting an alternative lesser award to Young in
the event reinstatement could have been offered at a lower
paying position as a local driver rather than dispatcher; in
essence, on the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, I conclude below that the
higher award is in order and therefore I deem it unnecessary
to pass upon the lower computation.
To repeat, the motion of the General Counsel for
judgment on the pleadings is granted except to the extent
indicated above.'
All three employees reported to work as scheduled on
August 8.2 Testimony as to what then took place is in basic
agreement as John Young, a dispatcher but formerly a local
driver, testified, I find, the three men were addressed by
Chairman of the Board Larry Salkield, who did not testify
herein, although presumably available. Salkield stated that
Respondent expected a full day's work from the men and
promptly accused Foley of returning to work in an effort to
see to it that Respondent went "broke."
Mike Foley similarly testified, and I find, that he had been
an employee since August 1966, had been a local driver, had
been "the California dispatcher," and also had long distance
driving experience. He testified that in the presence of other
officials and local drivers as well as Respondent's counsel
Salkield stated that Respondent was starting to make money
and that this also applied to Foley who allegedly wanted to
"break the Company"; this Foley disputed.
It was shortly after this that Supervisor Darwin Chevalier,
as Foley uncontrovertedly testified and I find, told the three
men that their function was solely to ride with the meat
drivers, that they were not to do any driving as in the past,
that they were not to enter any restaurants, and that their
sole function was to assist the driver in delivering the
merchandise. This in essence meant moving the delivery to
the rear of the truck so that the driver could then load it on a
' Although it might well be urged, as the General Counsel has noted, that
the nonverification of the answer warrants its being stricken in its entirety. See
Airports Service Lines, Inc.. 231 NLRB 1272 (1977). See. also, 4riga Textile
Corp., 241 NLRB 1257(1979).
' The General Counsel has placed reliance on the fact that they parked their
handtruck or carry it physically into the store while they as
lumpers stayed with the truck. It appears that Salkield got
into this exchange.
Hodges, as he testified, had been a local driver since 1972,
but for almost 3 years prior to his last work for Respondent
had been doing long-haul driving. His testimony was in
accord with that of the other two. Indeed, on two very brief
occasions he had also worked as a dispatcher. He as well
recalled the accusation by Salkield that Foley was attempt-
ing to "break" the Company.
In essence, Hodges identified the same group as being
present. He testified and I find that Salkield spoke of the
need to make money and he again accused Foley of
attempting to "break" Respondent. Either Chevalier or
Assistant Plant Manager Bill Cox stated that they could not
drive the vehicles because they were owned by the lessor,
that certificates were necessary, and that health exams were
also required which the employees would have to pay for
personally. Hodges protested that he already enjoyed current
certification by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
There is nothing in the testimony of Cox to refute any of
the foregoing. I find, therefore, that all three were told
initially that they would work only as lumpers or helpers
and indeed this is precisely what took place. As is readily
apparent, they had not been lumpers during their prior
employment with Respondent.
While it is perhaps superfluous, in view of the convincing
evidence that the terms of the Board and court orders as to
the nature of the reinstatement of the three men were not
met, the General Counsel has directed attention to addition-
al facts, some of which are treated below, and these are
credited and found. The three men were given various forms
and documents. Thus, one form as of May 1, 1978 (G.C.
Exh. 2) classified them as new employees and imposed as a
prerequisite a physical examination.
Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 issued to Young and
Hodges, respectively, purport to be forms for reinstated
personnel. But a close analysis indicates that they were
initial application forms; this is shown by the fact that the
heading is in a different type case obviously added to the
printed body which manifestly reflects a new employee
application with queries directed to employment of a new
employee. Indeed, page 2 contains a query as to whether the
applicant has ever previously worked for Respondent.
It is manifest that the three men were assigned to lesser
work as helpers or lumpers on the local delivery trucks and
to lesser work than they had previously performed.
As for their first day of work, Young and Foley returned
from work early with their drivers and were paid for less
than 7 hours, unlike the drivers. There was also evidence
that on this first day Young was directed by dispatcher
Yovino to move some items with a forklift and knocked over
a locker without significant damage. While Yovino at one
point indicated that Young volunteered for the assignment,
he testified that he admitted knowing that this secondary
forklift, unlike the primary forklift, had brake trouble. Thus
the credited testimony of Judith Cunningham discloses that
cars that morning on company property as they had in the past, but were
directed to move them to an adjacent location, which they did. I see no need
to place any reliance herein on this factor because there are more substantial
factors which support the General Counsel.
1037
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the defective status of the brakes on this vehicle was
common knowledge in the plant. Young received a written
warning on August 10 because of this incident to which he
accurately noted the deficient status of the brakes.
On Friday night, Foley attempted unsuccessfully to reach
Yovino by telephone, but did manage to reach Cox on
Saturday. He stated that the reinstatement was not working
out as had been directed and that he would not return. Cox
asked, according to Foley, if he were quitting and Foley
replied that he was.
Young and Hodges reported for work on Monday, August
14, but were assigned janitorial jobs for the day such as
washing trucks, stacking pallets, loading trucks, and sweep-
ing out the loading area. More particularly, they were given
no driving duties of any nature. Adding support to the
General Counsel's position is the fact that Hodges, previous-
ly a long-haul driver, was assigned to load the trucks he had
"lived in" for almost 3 years while the parent driver merely
observed this activity.
Foley, as noted, had been a local driver prior to the strike
and there were ample driver positions available upon his
return when he was placed in the position of a helper. And,
as in the case of long-haul driver Hodges, the true nature of
his reinstatement has been set forth. As for Young, he was a
dispatcher prior to the strike and Respondent contends that
the job had since been made supervisory in nature. Yovino
described himself as part of the supervision, but there is no
evidence to support this.
Indeed, in a letter dated August 15 to Young and signed
by Respondent's attorney and labor relations consultant
William Simmons, the latter made reference to the job in the
future becoming part of management. This belies the
testimony of Bill Cox that Yovino was part of the manage-
ment "team." The admission on the August 15 letter was
raised at the hearing, but was not explained or refuted.
To sum up, the three union adherents were constructively
discharged by Respondent as amply shown above. Also, on
their first day back Foley and Young were not permitted to
work a full shift. Inter alia. Hodges and Young were paid
$7.20 per hour, less than prevailing rates paid a long-haul
driver or a dispatcher. Evidence of Respondent's true motive
is shown by other facts. Thus, employee Michael Connell, a
packer, temporarily disabled from a back injury, testified,
and I find, that on the day of the return of the three, or, on
the prior day, Darwin Chevalier addressed all the employ-
ees, He told them that the three had been returned to work
on a technicality, would only be accompanying other
drivers, and "they wouldn't be driving." As shown, this was
precisely the fact.
Meat packer Katherine Miller testified similarly, and I
find, that on the day prior to the return of the three,
Chevalier told the employees that Respondent had lost the
case, that the men were returning through a technicality,
and that they "would be working in the trucking area."
Manifestly, this was not a return to their former positions.
Corroborating the previous two is the testimony of Shirley
Fortney who testified, and I find, that she left the employ of
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules
and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its
Respondent 2 weeks prior to the hearing due to a doctor's
recommendation. She recalled that this took place a day or
so before the return of the three and that they were told the
men were returning on a "legal technicality" and would be
returning to comparable positions. As noted, this is not what
Respondent did. Yovino expressed concern over his position
and either Chevalier or Salkield told him not to worry
because the three "probably wouldn't be there that long."
Respondent's defense is rejected.
On the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
The Respondent, General Meats, Inc., Tukwila, Washing-
ton, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall pay the
following named employees net backpay through March 2,
1979, the dates specified in the backpay specification of the
General Counsel in Case 19-CA-9692, the amount set
opposite their names plus interest,' less tax withholdings
required by Federal and state law: John Young, dispatcher,
$12,577.93; and Carl Hodges, $12,729.54.
In addition, it is further the thrust and intent of this Order
that Young, Hodges, and Foley are entitled to any further
backpay, plus interest, that may be appropriate from March
2, 1979, the cutoff date in the backpay specification (G.C.
Exh. -o) to the date Respondent complies fully with the
Board and court orders described herein.
The Judith Cunningham Case
For reasons not entirely clear to me, the case of Judith
Cunningham was consolidated with that of three discrimina-
tees described above. Be that as it may, among the various
charges and complaints involved in this facet of the case are
the following:
The General Counsel's Exhibit (f), although not stressed
by the General Counsel in his brief, is essential to his case in
that on December 22, 1978, Cunningham filed a charge in
Case 19-CA-10997 alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act. This was duly followed by a complaint dated
February 6, 1979, alleging unlawful interrogation of Cun-
ningham in December 1978 and a suspension, without pay,
of Cunningham in the same period.
Thereafter, charges were filed on her behalf in Case 19-
CA-11118 on February 13 and March 15, 1979, leading to
the issuance of the complaint on March 20, 1979, wherein it
was alleged that she suffered a suspension without pay in
December 1978; that various restraints were imposed upon
her at work, including warnings; and that she duly quit her
employment on or about February 7, 1979, because of this
conduct, all of the foregoing within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
While upon a preponderance of the credible evidence I
credit and agree with the testimony of the witnesses of the
General Counsel, it should be noted that Cunningham was a
verbose and prolix witness as the transcript discloses. Be that
findings. conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
' See Hanson Cakes. Inc., 242 NLRB 472 (1979).
1038
GENERAL MEATS, INC.
as it may, I find her to be an honest witness although it
would most unduly extend this Decision to set forth her
extensive and repetitious testimony in full.
Cunningham, as she testified, entered the employ of
Respondent in March 1977 and was trained as a packer.
While she was working as a full-time packer, the lengthy
strike commenced, in which the three above-treated discri-
minatees participated, but Cunningham continued to work
and did not participate in the strike.'
Cunningham was transferred to the post of quality control
supervisor around October 1978, but was not, and so I find,
made a supervisor. Neither party contends otherwise.
In September or October 1978, she expressed concern to
management about the operation of Respondent's profit-
sharing plan. Within I hour she was summoned to the office
of Plant Manager Norman Reitner who told her he
disapproved of her conversation in this area and that any
employee who persisted therein "would be down the road."
Reitner was not questioned on this topic.
In December 1978, she observed that another employee
was using her title of quality control supervisor. Her
complaints to Reitner were ignored and she made the same
complaint to President Chevalier with similar negative
results. She did complain, as she testified, to Chevalier about
the profit-sharing plan and he expressed interest in the
names of other complainers.
At or about this time, Bill Cox questioned her about the
union activities of coworkers and she expressed her anti-
union sentiments. Her working during the strike would
appear to support this view. Cox did not specifically deny
the incident and I credit Cunningham.
Later that day Chevalier called her to his office and said
that he was laying her off until after Christmas. This lasted
for about I week. As noted, the original charge involving
Cunningham was filed on December 22 and she was not
returned to work until December 26.
Here as well, she went through another interrogation by
Chevalier, Attorney Simmons, and others. She was then
assigned to packing rather than quality control work; before
that, her packing duties had involved merely several hours a
week on her part. Foreman Burns, Thorpe, and Reitner
testified that Cunningham spent about 30 percent of her
time on quality control work, but the record does not
support this because the preponderance of the evidence
strongly shows that her quality control functions were
substantial and greatly reduced thereafter.
On or about January 10, 1979, an employee meeting to
discuss Respondent's profit-sharing plan was convened.
Cunningham, as apparently was her wont, asked a number
of pointed questions of a bank executive who was present
and Salkield, according to Cunningham, instructed the
employees not to question the operation of this plan, which
he termed as highly desirable.
The following morning, as Cunningham testified, Supervi-
sor Burns Thorpe instructed a group of employees, including
Cunningham, to stop talking. Then, or the next day,
Katherine Miller testified, and I find, that she asked Thorpe
what the no-talking rule was all about and he replied that a
"certain someone" asked too many questions. On this
'Certain antiunion comments during the strike attributed to President
Chevalier by Cunningham are not specific as to the date and no 8(a)() finding
is based thereon pursuant to Sec. 10(b) of the Act.
record, I find that this was manifestly a reference to
Cunningham.
In mid-January, Cunningham became ill with the flu and
was absent due to her sickness for about I week under the
care of a doctor. As she testified, she called in daily to the
answering service, consistent with prior instructions that she
was to nofity Respondent prior to the start of each shift, she
did precisely that and, on her last call, she reached Dave
Cox to advise him that she would report the following day,
Wednesday. She so reported and was immediately asked for
a doctor's note of excuse.
In early February Cunningham received two warnings for
her alleged failure to call in because of her sickness. These
warnings were briefly discussed by her with Reitner and
Cox, Cunningham left the meeting to contact her personal
attorney. She promptly received a third warning for using
Respondent's telephone for this purpose.
That she was treated disparately is shown by the fact that
employee Shirley Fortney, as the latter testified, had been
absent from work due to illness for 3 to 4 weeks in January
1978, but had not notified Respondent, merely telling
Cunningham to so advise them. In addition, she had called
in a couple of days before her return and nothing was said to
her about this. Likewise, employee Mike Connell, who had a
back injury for 2 months, as he testified, did not call in for 2
months without reprisal. There is also evidence that Respon-
dent issued but seven warnings in the past year, five of them
to two employees, that Cunningham received three in I day,
again conduct which I view and find to be disparate.
More of the same is reflected by the fact that, by the end
of January, Supervisor Thorpe initiated a special "sign-in-
out" procedure for Cunningham, whenever she left for
nonwork purposes. Yet an employee working beside her was
told only to account for this time at the end of the day.
Moreover, Thorpe conceded that Cunningham was a good
worker who needed very little supervision.
It is undisputed that Cunningham quit the employ of
Respondent on February 7, 1979. As she testified, she
reported for work and commenced her duties as a packer.
Thorpe then asked her if she were ready for the "latest,"
namely, that she would no longer be allowed to perform
packing duties as she had been performing on a full-time
basis since late in December. He said that this was an order
from Reitner. She went to the office of Reitner and asked
about this. He said that he could "care less" and that he did
not care what she found to do. He added that so far as he
was concerned she had already caused enough trouble. She
left and performed various other tasks.
Thrope then contacted her and complained that she had
not signed out. Chevalier got into the act this point and
instructed her to get back to work-just where is not clear.
All of this in my judgment, with ample cause, upset her
greatly and she decided to leave work. Two hand-delivered
letters to Cunningham dated February 8 and 13 were
delivered to her by counsel for Respondent. These are
entirely self-serving and do nothing to refute the conduct of
Respondent.
To sum up, Respondent singled out Cunningham for a
pattern of harassing treatment, not all of which has been
1039
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
deemed necessary to set forth herein, all violative of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act and fully warranting her
decision to quit.
After some questioning on her part of certain of Respon-
dent's policies, Respondent saw fit to give her a week's
disciplinary layoff just prior to Christmas. At that point, she
filed her original charge on December 22, and Respondent's
conduct to her worsened. Her job functions were changed
and shifted around without ostensible reason. Indeed, the
testimony of Katherine Miller reflects that she was ques-
tioned about employee contacts with Cunningham.
The Board has found a constructive discharge in less
onerous situations. Fidelity Telephone Company, 236 NLRB
166 (1978), Liberty Markets, Inc., 236 NLRB 1486 (1978). I
find that Respondent has by the foregoing conduct engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. See Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Company, Incorporated, 244 NLRB 1097 (1979).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of facts, and upon
the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. General Meats, Inc., is an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(2) of the Act.
2. General Teamsters Local 174, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By suspending and then causing Judith Cunningham to
quit her employment, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (4)
of the Act.
4. By the foregoing and harassing an employee because of
her concerted activities, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
I have found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(4) of the Act by suspending and thereafter causing the
termination of Judith Cunningham. I shall therefore recom-
mend that Respondent offer her immediate and full rein-
statement to her former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges.
See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San
Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB 827 (1946).
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules
and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
I shall further recommend that Respondent make her
whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result of this
discrimination against her by payment of a sum of money
equal to that she normally would have earned during her
layoff and from the date of her termination. Loss of earnings
shall be computed as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as set forth in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), and
Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
The Respondent, General Meats, Inc., Tukwila, Washing-
ton, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
i. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in or activity on behalf of
General Teamsters Local 174, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, or any other labor organiza-
tion of its employees by discriminating in regard to hire or
tenure of employment, or any term or condition thereof.
(b) Harassing employees for engaging in concerted activi-
ties or in any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization; to restort to the processes of the
Board; to join or assist General Teamsters Local 174,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any
other labor organization; to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing; or to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Judith Cunningham immediate and full rein-
statement to her former job, or, if this job no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole
for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against her, plus interest, in the manner
provided above in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve, and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(c) Post at its premises at Tukwila, Washington, copies of
the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix."' Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 19, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representatives, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
1040
GENERAL MEATS, INC.
days, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT suspend, discharge, or otherwise
discriminate against any employee for engaging in
concerted or union activities on behalf of General
Teamsters Local 714, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, or any other labor organiza-
tion, or resorting to the process of the Board.
WE WILL NOT harass any employee for engaging in
concerted activities or in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the right to self-organization, to resort to the
process of the Board, to join or assist the above-named
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing or to
engage in concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL offer Judith Cunningham immediate and
full reinstatement to her former position, or, if this
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to seniority and other rights
and privileges and WE WILL make her whole for any
loss of pay suffered as a result of our discrimination
against her, with interest.
GENERAL MEATS, INC.
1041