General Electric Company

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 15, 2021

2021002506 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/723,303 10/03/2017 Steven Clayton Vise 319546-
US-1/146674.534993
1706
175855 7590 12/15/2021
VENABLE LLP (GE Aviation)
P.O. BOX 34385
WASHINGTON, DC 20043-9998
EXAMINER
GOYAL, ARUN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3741
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/15/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
GE.patent@venable.com
PTOMail@Venable.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN CLAYTON VISE, DUANE DOUGLAS THOMSEN,
RICHARD WADE STICKLES, CLAYTON STUART COOPER,
DONALD LEE GARDNER, GEORGE CHIACHUN HSIAO,
MICHAEL ANTHONY BENJAMIN, and SHAI BIRMAHER
Appeal 2021-002506
Application 15/723,303
Technology Center 3700
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.
GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Alexander2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as General
Electric Company. Appeal Br. 3.
2 US 2017/0089266 A1; published Mar. 30, 2017.
Appeal 2021-002506
Application 15/723,303

2
We REVERSE.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to gas turbine engine assemblies. Spec.
¶ 1. Claims 1 and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of operating a combustion system comprising
a fuel nozzle defining at least one main fuel circuit and at least
one pilot fuel circuit, the method comprising:
determining an overall flow of fuel, the overall flow of
fuel defining a sum total fuel through the main fuel circuit and
the pilot fuel circuit;
determining a plurality of ranges of ratios of main fuel
flow through the main fuel circuit versus pilot fuel flow through
the pilot circuit from the overall flow of fuel, wherein each
range of ratios is based on a combustion criterion different from
one another;
determining a resultant range of ratios of main fuel flow
versus pilot fuel flow based on a hierarchy of combustion
criteria, wherein the hierarchy of combustion criteria provides a
priority ranking of the combustion criterion; and
flowing the overall flow of fuel to the main fuel circuit
and the pilot fuel circuit based on the resultant range of ratios of
main fuel flow versus pilot fuel flow.
OPINION
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Alexander
discloses, inter alia, the claimed method, including determining an overall
fuel flow (i.e., the sum total fuel through the main and pilot fuel circuits),
and also determining a plurality of ranges of ratios of main versus pilot
circuit fuel flows, wherein each range of ratios is based on a combustion
Appeal 2021-002506
Application 15/723,303

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criterion different from one another (i.e., with reference to Alexander’s
“different bands in [Figure] 5”: “either engine load, X axis; or the
temperature and pressure at the via [sic] sensors 32 and 33 . . . ; or the
Wobbe Index”), and further, determining a resultant range of ratios of main
versus pilot circuit fuel flows based on a hierarchy of combustion criteria
that provides a priority ranking of the combustion criterion. Final Act. 2–3
(citing Alexander ¶¶ 79–80, Fig. 5). More specifically, regarding the claim
requirement that each range of ratios is based on a combustion criterion
different from one another, the Examiner finds that Alexander discloses that
each range of ratios is based on an engine load and a Wobbe Index for “a
specific fuel” or “a single fuel.” Ans. 3–4. In other words, we understand
the Examiner’s finding to be that the fuel types are each different
combustion criterion (or standards), such that Alexander’s range of ratios is
each based on a combustion criterion (i.e., a particular fuel type having a
defined Wobbe Index range3) different from one another. Ans. 3–4.
First, Appellant argues that “the claimed invention employs
combustion criterion different from one another to form the ranges of ratios,
while the outputs from the sensors 32, 33 of Alexander are employed to
select from bands 100, 100’, 100’’, 100’’’ that have already been formed.”
Appeal Br. 12. See also id. at 14 (“selecting a range is not determining a
plurality of ranges”). We agree with Appellant that, to the extent the
Examiner solely relied on sensors 32, 33 for disclosing the claimed method
step of determining a plurality of ranges of ratios, the Examiner erred.
Alexander discloses that sensors 32, 33 obtain information used to select one

3 See Alexander ¶ 83 (“The Wobbe Index range defines a range of allowable
heating values for the supplied fuel.”).
Appeal 2021-002506
Application 15/723,303

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of the bands representing a fuel split range of ratios, rather determine the
bands, as required by claim 1. See, e.g., Alexander ¶¶ 80, 88–90.
Notwithstanding, as set forth supra, the Examiner additionally relies
on the fuel type as a combustion criterion upon which the determination of
Alexander’s plurality of ranges of ratios is based. See, e.g., Alexander ¶ 82
(with reference to Figure 5, “several bands of operation are shown, each
band defined for a specific fuel type”). Appellant concludes that “Alexander
explicitly discloses that bands 100, 100´, 100´´, and 100´´´ are set on a single
criteria, i.e., ‘Wobbe Index range of the fuel.’” Appeal Br. 14. However,
Appellant does not adequately explain why Alexander’s fuel type is
excluded from being a combustion criterion. See Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply
Br. 2–3; cf. Spec. ¶ 9 (“In various embodiments, the combustion criterion
includes two or more of an emissions limit, a lean blow out limit, a rich blow
out limit, a combustion stability limit, a desired combustion efficiency, and a
fuel pressure range.”); see also id. ¶¶ 59–60. Attorney argument cannot take
the place of evidence in the record. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A., 129
F.3d 588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Finally, Appellant argues that “Alexander is completely silent
regarding any hierarchy of combustion criteria,” and further, that the
Examiner fails to make specific findings relative to Alexander disclosing
this claim limitation. Appeal Br. 15. We agree with respect to Appellant’s
latter point. The Examiner merely cites to Figure 5 of Alexander as
disclosing the claim limitation: “determining a resultant range of ratios . . .
based on a hierarchy of combustion criteria, wherein the hierarchy of
combustion criterion provides a priority ranking of the combustion
criterion.” See Final Act. 3. The Examiner does not address this claim
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Application 15/723,303

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limitation in the Advisory Action dated May 19, 2020 or the Examiner’s
Answer. See Appeal Br. 15. In other words, aside from a broad reference to
Figure 5, the Examiner fails to identify where Alexander discloses the
combustion criterion, namely, the fuel type, is used as a priority ranking and
a basis to determine a resultant range of ratios, relative to other combustion
criteria, as claimed. See Alexander ¶ 91 (disclosing only that “[i]f an
operating point would fall in an overlapping region in FIG. 5, two bands are
candidates to be selected as [a] relevant band” and “[t]o select the more
appropriate band of both potential bands, possibly historical data or
extrapolated future data can be evaluated”). A rejection must be set forth in
sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice
requirement of § 132, such as by identifying where or how each limitation of
the rejected claims is met by the prior art references. In re Jung, 637 F. 3d
1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (“When a
reference is complex or shows or describes inventions other than that
claimed by the applicant, the particular part relied on must be designated as
nearly as practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must
be clearly explained and each rejected claim specified.” It is neither our
place, nor Appellant’s burden, to speculate as to the basis for rejecting
claims. In re Stepan, 660 F. 3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that
it is the PTO’s obligation “to provide prior notice to the applicant of ‘all
matters of fact and law asserted’ prior to an appeal hearing before the
Board”).
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1, and claims 2–14 depending therefrom. The Examiner
relies on the same deficient findings relative to Alexander in the rejection of
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Application 15/723,303

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independent claim 15, and therefore, for the same reasons as stated supra,
we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 15 and
claims 16–20 depending therefrom. Final Act. 5–6.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 102(a)(1) Alexander 1–20

REVERSED