General Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 27, 1962

137 N.L.R.B. 1684 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

1684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Electric Company and Hanford Atomic Metal Trades
Council. Case No. 19-CA-2310. July 27, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 14, 1962, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed
in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Union filed exceptions to
the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. The Respondent filed
a brief and supplemental brief in support of the Intermediate Report
and a reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Rodgers, Leedom, and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report and the entire record in the case, including the ex-
ceptions and the briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendation of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed October 2, 1961, by Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council,
herein called the Council, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board issued his complaint on November 17, 1961, against General Electric Com-
pany, Richland, Washington, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Re-
spondent had by refusing to bargain with the Council violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act.
The matter came on for hearing before Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster in
Richland, Washington, on January 23, 1962. Upon the basis of the entire record 1
in the case, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
General Electric Company is a New York corporation engaged at the Hanford
Works, Richland, Washington, in the manufacture of plutonium and in other opera-
tions pursuant to a contract with the United States Government for which it annually
receives compensation in excess of $100,000. In the performance of this contract
the Respondent annually purchases from outside the State of Washington and brings
into that State on behalf of the United States Government materials and supplies
valued at more than $100,000. The Respondent concedes, and I find, that it has
been at all times material to this proceeding an employer within the meaning of
1 The unopposed motion of counsel for the Respondent to correct the transcript in cer-
tain particulars Is granted . The motion is hereby received as Respondent 's Exhibit No 5.
137 NLRB No. 188.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1685
Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act and has for a number of years represented certain em-
ployees of the Respondent in an appropriate unit.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The facts giving rise to the charge in this matter and upon which the complaint
is based are undisputed and follow. The Council, the majority representative of
certain of Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit, entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement with the Respondent on May 1, 1961, effective to October 1,
1963.
The Hanford Works of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, which is
operated by the Respondent, occupies an area of approximately 600 square miles
in southeastern Washington near Richland. Many of Respondent's employees live
in Richland and commute to and from their work at the several dispersed points
of their employment. The areas where work is carried on are designated by numbers.
The complaint here relates to the 300 area which is located just north of Richland
within a driving time of 10 or 15 minutes. At the 2 components operating in the
300 area about 900 of the 3,300 employees constitute a segment of the bargaining
unit represented by the Council. Employees on the day shift begin their work at
7:48 a.m. and quit at 4:18 p.m. The policy of the Respondent uniformly has been
that employees in the 300 area reach the gatehouse or badge house by 4:18 p.m.
When timeclocks were installed in May 1952, employees were advised that they
could punch out not earlier than 4:08 p m. Effective March 5, 1956, a whistle at
4:07 p.m. signaled that employees in the 300 area could be released from their work
locations at that moment. All employees in the area who required time to change
clothes or to clean up were released in sufficient time so that they would be ready
to start for the gatehouse at 4:07. All employees who clocked out from 4:07 to 4:18
were paid until 4:18 p.m.
The Respondent authorized this early departure from work stations because of
certain limiting factors on free departure from the area. In general that amount of
time was needed to permit employees to arrive at the gatehouse or badge house by
4:18. During the years, improvements were made in procedures for checkout,
reducing the amount of time necessary to pass through the gatehouse. On August 28,
1961, 700 employees outside the bargaining unit were relieved from the necessity of
using the timeclock at the end of their shift, thus further minimizing congestion at
the gatehouse. Studies by the Respondent revealed that some employees in the 300
area were reaching the gatehouse before 4:07 and that most employees had clocked
out and departed by 4:13. Because of these circumstances and because of changes
in clock-out procedures, relief from congestion at the gatehouse, and other improve-
ments speeding the exit of employees from the area, the Respondent concluded that
it need no longer allow 11 minutes for travel from work station to checkout point
and that a lesser time would suffice. In consequence the Respondent prepared a
change in procedure effective in the 300 area on August 28. Thereafter employees
were released by their supervisors from their work stations in time to enable them
to walk to the gatehouse and to pass .through there between 4:13 and 4.18. All who
left before 4:13 were paid only to the time that they clocked out.
Before making this change, the Respondent called a meeting of the Council's
stewards in the 300 area and explained what it intended to do. Although the Re-
spondent has since processed grievances filed by individual employees alleging that
they were not allowed sufficient time to proceed from work station to checkout point,
it has refused to bargain with the Council as to its right without consulation with
the Council to make such changes in releasing its employees. The complaint alleges
that the Respondent thus unlawfully refused to bargain.
The contract in effect between the Council and the Respondent since May 1961
provides in pertinent part:
Article II-Responsibility
1. The parties recognize that under this Agreement each of them has respon-
sibilities for the welfare and security of the employees.
(b) Subject only to any express limitations stated in this Agreement, or in
any other agreement between the Company and the Council, the Company re-
tains the exclusive right to manage its business, including (but not limited to)
the right to determine the methods and means by which its operations are to
1686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be carried on, to direct the work force and to conduct its operations in a safe
and effective manner.
Article VII-Hours of Work
2. The standard hours of work are as follows:
Standard Hours
( a) Straight Days------------------------------ 7:45 a.m . to 4.30 p.m.
45 Minute Lunch
8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
30 Minute Lunch
7:48 a.m . to 4:18 p.m.
30 Minute Lunch
The Respondent contends that it has a right to make the changes set forth above
without consultation with the Council as a part of its exclusive right to manage its
business . The General Counsel says this change in release time is a change in em-
ployees' working conditions about which the Respondent must bargain I am con-
vinced that the Respondent's position is the correct one. The Council has agreed
with the Respondent that the hours of work in respect to the day shift are from
7:48 a.m. to 4:18 p.m. with a 30-minute lunch period. It must have been in the
contemplation of the parties that those in the bargaining unit would work a full
shift. It can hardly be questioned and, indeed, is not questioned here, that the
Respondent was wholly free to improve its clock-out procedures so as to permit it to
get more productive time from its employees. The General Counsel says that the
Respondent must bargain about it. I am convinced that it has done so. The contract
which is in evidence sets forth the hours of work. The Council has agreed in behalf
of those it represents to these workhours. There is no contract right permitting an
employee to leave the checkout point before 4:18 p.m. The right retained by the
Respondent to manage its business necessarily encompasses the right to direct its
work force in such a fashion between the beginning and the end of a shift so as to
get as much productive effort as reasonably may be accomplished. The fact that
for a number of years many employees found it possible, without interference by
the Respondent, to leave their work stations earlier than was necessary did not vest
in them any right to do so. As the manager of the operation the Respondent at all
times had a right to require the employees in the unit to work up until the moment
that would allow sufficient time to check out at 4:18. The Respondent has done no
more here than to exercise that right. It had no obligation to bargain with the
Council in the matter and it did not violate the Act by refusing to do so.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act
and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Council is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act and is the exclusive bargaining representative of certain of Respondent's em-
ployees in an appropriate unit.
3. The Respondent has not unlawfully refused to bargain with the Council in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATION
Upon the basis of the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above, and
upon the entire record in the case, it is hereby recommended that the complaint
herein be dismissed.
Harbison-Walker Refractories Company , Leslie Works and
United Stone and Allied Products Workers of America , AFL-
CIO-CLC, Petitioner . Case No. 5-RC-3735. July 27, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Robert A. Gritta, hearing
137 NLRB No. 173.