General Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 28, 1958

119 N.L.R.B. 1821 (N.L.R.B. 1958)

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 1821
ULTIMATE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the Trial Examiner finds and concludes
'(1) The evidence adduced in this proceeding satisfies the Board 's requirements
for the assertion of jurisdiction herein.5
(2) Building & Construction Trades Council of Boston, AFL-CIO (Metropoli-
tan District), is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act and John E
Deady is its agent within the meaning of the Act
(3) The Council and its agent , John E Deady, by inducing and encouraging
employees of Cliff Compton, Inc , Carlson Construction Company, and Sandy Plumb-
ing Company to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services with an object
of forcing or requiring Adams & Swett Cleansing Company, Inc, to cease doing
business with J J Reddington Electric Service Co engaged in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act
(4) The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act
[Recommendations omitted from publication ]
5 At the hearing before the Trial Examiner it was stipulated that
J J Reddington Electric Service Co during the yeai 1956 performed services in
excess of $100,000 for the Boston Edison Company, a public utility doing an annual
gross business in excess of $3,000,000 , Massachusetts Cement Block Company, New
England Metallurgical Company, white Bros Milk Company, and the Bay State
Chemical Company, all of which ship products valued in excess of $50,000 annually
to States outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and are engaged in interstate
commerce v ithin the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act
General Electric Co.-Apparatus Service Shop and International
Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.
Case No 14-CA 1548. February 28, 1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 31, 1957, -Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Membera
Bean and Jenkins]
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The-
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi-
ate Report,' the exceptions and brief,2 and the entire record in the
'We correct a typographical error in the Intermediate Report respecting the hearinp,
dates The hearing was held on March 27 and April 23 through April 25, 1957
2After the Respondent filed its exceptions and supporting brief, it filed a motion to re-
open the record The General Counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion..
Because we dismiss the complaint for reasons set out in this Decision and Order, we find.
that it is not necessary to rule on the Respondent's motion
119 NLRB No 219
1822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
case, and hereby adopts the findings of the Trial Examiner, but rejects
his conclusions and recommendations for the reasons set forth below.
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act by interrogating employees concerning union
•activities and by threatening them with discriminatory treatment
-because of such activities. He found that the acts of interrogation
were unlawful because made in a context of threats. We do not agree
with the Trial Examiner's findings for the following reasons :
In April 1954, the Respondent opened a service shop in Decatur,
Illinois, for the repair and rebuilding of electrical apparatus. This
shop was under the jurisdiction of the manager of a similar estab-
lishment in St. Louis, Missouri. In the spring of 1955, Gerald Still
was transferred to the Decatur shop from St. Louis, first on a tem-
porary and then on a permanent basis. Together with his permanent
assignment he received a wage increase. At first Still worked alone;
later a second employee, Gordon, was hired. In his assignment, Still
learned that the IBEW had "tied up" potential repair customers in
the Decatur area and that the latter would not give their repair work
to any company which did not employ members of the IBEW. Still
complained of the situation to Raymond Rettig, the St. Louis man-
ager. Rettig replied that he could not influence Still in his union
affiliation, that it was up to Still whether he wanted to join the IBEW.
According to the Trial Examiner :
The testimony indicates that Still wanted the opportunity which
the transfer, first temporary and then permanent, to Decatur
offered; that he then concluded that advancement of the business
and for himself depended on membership in the IBEW; that
he was willing to submerge whatever organizational scruples
he had [he was a member of the IUE] but balked at paying the
high initiation fees and dues; and that, when he was told that a
reduction had been arranged, he was then unwilling to take the
step because he thought that, under a grievance filed on his behalf
by the IUE, he might become entitled to an award of two to four
thousand dollars for expenses as a temporary transferee to
Decatur.
Still thus encouraged Rettig to intervene with the IBEW in his be-
half but, after doing so, vacillated in his attitude about joining that
labor organization.
The interrogation found by the Trial Examiner consisted of Rettig's
inquiring of Still and his fellow employee Gordon on several occa-
sions over a period of months whether an official of the IBEW had
been to see them and whether they had joined or planned to join the
IBEW. One time Rettig also asked Still whether the latter had sent
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 1823
his dues to the IUE (the Respondent having discontinued Still's dues
checkoff), and whether the IUE had instructed him to do so.
The incidents of interrogation, whether considered separately or
together , are not by themselves coercive .' The Trial Examiner found,
however, that the interrogation took on a coercive character in the
context of certain alleged threats uttered by Rettig. These alleged
threats were all made by Rettig during the course of a 4- or 5-hour
discussion which took place at the Decatur shop on May 24, 1956,
among Rettig , Still , Gordon , and a company sales engineer named
Shelton. At one point in the discussion when Still said he would not
join the IBEW because he was already a member of the IUE, Rettig
said, "You better listen to me." The Trial Examiner found this to be
a threat. We do not attach such significance to what appears to us
to be nothing more than a verbal mannerism . At another point in the
same discussion, Rettig said that an IBEW official had two qualified
men interested in the Decatur operation, but that Rettig wanted to
give Still the first opportunity to get into and develop the shop and
to join the IBEW. On its face this statement could be deemed
coercive. However, it is undisputed that Still had repeatedly asked
to be transferred from the Decatur shop back to St. Louis. In fact,
at this very meeting Still asked again for a transfer. Rettig's asser-
tion that the IBEW had two men to take over could therefore hardly
have been unpleasant news to Still and would seem to be an assurance
of the transfer requested. Accordingly, we find that this statement
of Rettig was not coercive. Finally, when Still said he wanted to be
returned to his old job in St. Louis, Rettig said that he would have
to work for less than he was getting in Decatur and that he would
never get anywhere with the Company. Still's transfer to Decatur
had been in the nature of a promotion and he had received a wage
increase when his new assignment was made permanent . That Still
would lose the wage increase if he returned to his job would seem
logical and a statement which Rettig had the right to make; it is not
an unlawful threat. Moreover , Still 's former job had been abolished
so that a new job would have to be found for him. Rettig 's state-
ment that if Still returned to St. Louis, he would never get anywhere
with the Company we deem to be an expression of Rettig's opinion
that there were no real opportunities for Still at St. Louis and that
Still would fare better at Decatur. We do not see in this statement
a job threat to Still for not joining the IBEW and it therefore does
not justify a finding that it violated Section 8 (a) (1).
We conclude that the Respondent did not interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. We
shall therefore dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
3 Blue Flash Pxp) ess, No 109 NLRB 591
1824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint issued herein
against the Respondent, General Electric Co.-Apparatus Service
Shop, St. Louis, Missouri, and Decatur, Illinois, be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
The complaint herein, as amended, alleges that the Company has violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136, by ques-
tioning employees and applicants for employment concerning union membership,
activities , and attitude , and threatening and promising benefits to employees in order
to discourage union membership and activities . The answer denies that the Company
committed any unfair labor practices as alleged.
A hearing was held before me at St. Louis, Missouri , on March 27 and April 23
thiough 25, 1956. Pursuant to leave granted to all parties , briefs have been filed
by the Company and the IUE, the time to do so having been extended.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR)
1. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It was admitted and I find that the Company, a New York corporation, operates
branch establishments in many States of the United States, including the service
shop in Decatur, Illinois, which is involved in this proceeding , and where it is engaged
in the repair and rebuilding of electrical apparatus for customers ; and that during
the 12-month period prior to February 8, 1957, it sold and shipped in interstate
commerce electrical equipment valued at more than $250,000. I find that the
Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
It was admitted and I find that the IUE is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 8 (a) (1)
While the General Counsel and counsel for the Company proposed a stipulation
that the Decatur service shop was "carved out" of the Company's St. Louis region,
counsel for the IUE maintains that the Decatur service shop is an extension of the
St. Louis shop and is included in the company -IUE contract covering the St. Louis
shop . For present purposes it is unnecessary to consider whether Decatur is an
independent or a suboperation . The violations here alleged are in fact violations
or they are not regardless of the relation between the St. Louis and Decatur shops.
We need not decide whether employee Still was correct or mistaken in his belief that
the Decatur plant was included in the St. Louis unit and that as an employee in
Decatur he was therefore covered by the certification issued to the IUE for the
employees in the St. Louis unit. But even if mistaken in this respect , Still was not
to be interfered with in his union activities vis-a-vis the IUE, or in his desire to
refrain from union activities with or in support of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, in Decatur.
The Decatur shop was opened in April 1954. Early the following February the
only man then employed there quit. Still , a working leader electrical mechanic,
Class A, in the St. Louis shop , was offered the Decatur job and indicated his interest
in it. He was given some slight instruction and Harth , a sales engineer,' promised
to assist him further . Then , as an emergency measure and on a temporary basis,
Still was assigned to the Decatur shop , receiving a personal and so-called lob,expense
allowance. (These were also referred to as living expenses and a cash advance
for personal expenses.)
Shortly before June 1, 1955, Still received a one-step increase and his job classi-
fication was changed to assembly and test; he was assigned to the Decatur shop on
1 Without proot or objection, Still iefeiied to hint as a foreman
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 1825
a permanent basis and his moving expenses were paid, but his expense allowance
as on temporary transfer was now terminated. As Rettig, who described himself
as manager of the St. Louis shop with responsibility for the Decatur operation, had
told Still before the latter went to Decatur, Still's work there was similar to what
he had performed in St. Louis, but more complicated. On April 2, 1956, another
employee, Gordon, was hired. He quit during the latter part of September, and
another man, Born, was hired early in October.
As a defense to the allegations of interference, the Company claims that Still
has been a supervisor in Decatur. While Gordon and Born were admittedly rank-
and-file employees, the evidence is centered primarily on alleged interference
vis-a-vis Still, and it is necessary to determine whether he was in fact a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act.
Counsel for the Company argues that Still became a supervisor when he was first
transferred to Decatur, although for more than a year he was the only employee
assigned 'there. Company witnesses testified, however, that Rettig described to
Still the opportunity for expansion of the shop and for pay increases and advance-
ment. There was even reference to the ultimate possibility that Still might become
foreman or supervisor of the shop. As late as May 24, 1956, Rettig admittedly
told Still that he would earn more if he became a working leader. Rettig was
honest and straightforward, and keen enough to realize as he gave this testimony
that he was indicating that Still was not a supervisor. Again, denying that increases
were dependent on Still's joining the IBEW, Rettig did connect future increases
with attainment of supervisory status if the shop grew. Whether or not Rettig
is familiar with the Act's definition of a supeivisor, he indicated an understandably
excellent working knowledge of the various relationships. Still's supervisory status
is as much in the future as are the various increases in pay.
Rettig looked to Still to keep him informed concerning the Decatur shop opera-
tions. No one else could do that effectively while Still was the only one there. After
a second man was hired, it was as natural for Rettig to continue to look to Still as
it was for the latter to advise, instruct, or help the newcomer. Such relationships
do not indicate that Still was a supervisor. Both Gordon and Born were learners.
Still was never told that he had authority of any kind over either of them, whether
to direct their work or to discipline, nor did he exercise any.
On March 28, 1956, Rettig met Gordon in the IBEW office in Decatur, and there-
after told him to come to his office in St. Louis. There Rettig interviewed him and
told him to report to Still in Decatur. This was hardly more than telling Gordon
that he would find Still there. Not only did Still not play any effective part in hiring
Gordon, he did not even know Gordon until the latter appeared on the job, hired
and ready to work. Had Still had even a modicum of authority, it would have
been natural and certainly simpler for him to have interviewed Gordon or checked
his qualifications in Decatur instead of the latter reporting to Rettig in St. Louis
and then returning to Decatur. Further, before he quit, Gordon telephoned Rettig
in St. Louis and it was with Rettig that he discussed possibilities for an increase.
As for the hiring of Born, Still recommended him to Rettig after Gordon quit.
While Rettig testified that Still had "interviewed" Born and was satisfied with him,
there is no evidence of authority in Still to do more than what any other employee
might do: transmit a name and recommend hiring but without any indication
that such recommendation was or would be effective. In fact, Still testified without
contradiction that Rettig had told him to get some applications; this was no spon-
taneous act on Still's part. Rettig testified that he told Still to send him Born's
application, he looked it over in St. Louis, and then directed Still to put Born to
work. The latter, called as a witness by the Company, testified that he and Still
help one another: each "suggests" work to the other, neither tells the other what
to do.
In St. Louis, Still had been a rank-and-file employee, and a foreman was his
supervisor. In Decatur, there has been no foreman, and Rettig has been Still's
supervisor, as also Gordon's and Born's. Not only does the evidence concerning
Still's duties indicate that he is not a supervisor, but it is clear that Rettig does not
regard him as such. (This aside from the evidence that as late as June 8, 1956,
in connection with a grievance filed by the IUE on Still's behalf, he was recognized
as an employee and it was nowhere contended that he is a supervisor.) I find that
Still'is not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
Before Still's transfer to Decatur, Rettig had learned that the IBEW had Decatur
"tied up". potential repair customers would not give their business to a shop whose
employees were not members of that union. I credit Rettig's testimony that from
the first, Still complained to Rettig that the various companies would not give him
4 7 6 3 21-5 8-v of 119-116
1826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
their motors for repair because of the IBEW . To this, Rettig replied that it was up
to Still; he ( Rettig ) could not influence him on behalf of either the IBEW or the
IUE. Rettig did later tell Still that if he signed with the IBEW , he should make
certain that it would not lead to insistence that the Company accept that union's
construction type contract , which was not applicable to the repair shop . Else, said
Rettig , Still might be picketing his own shop.
On April 14, 1955 , Rettig asked Still what he thought about taking a permanent
job in Decatur, and told him to think it over so that they could talk about it on
Still's return from vacation . Still's return was delayed by an accident on his vacation,
and when he did get back about the middle of May, both the St. Louis and the
Decatur shops were closed because of a strike. Rettig and Still, in the former's office
in St. Louis , discussed transfer on a permanent basis, Rettig promising a one-step
increase in connection with such transfer and telling Still that he could end up
with a pretty good job if the shop grew . Rettig told Still to think it over for 2
weeks, and in the meantime gave him the one-step increase.
On June 1, Still asked about moving expenses and also what would become of him
if the Company closed the Decatur shop . To the latter, Rettig replied that he would
see to it that Still could return to St . Louis and not be hurt as far as wages were
concerned . I do not credit Still's testimony that it was some months after he
arrived at Decatur that he learned of the IBEW local there . He testified that over
the telephone Rettig told him that the IBEW had the work there under its thumb
and that he should make contact with that union . Contrariwise , he testified that
potential customers had previously indicated that they could not give him their repair
work because he was not working for an TBEW shop: "it was their policy maybe, to
send ( their work ) to a union shop." Still was certainly aware of the IBEW situa-
tion in Decatur before May. We are not here concerned with the consistency of
his stand for the IUE . The record indicates his acceptance of the permanent
job in Decatur and his own interest in joining the IBEW before any interference
by the Company with his right to engage in concerted activities.
According to Rettig, Still was willing to join the IBEW so that the shop might
receive more orders. With his own concern lest that union then insist on its
construction type contract instead of the industrial type which the General Electric
Company had with the IBEW elsewhere , Rettig told Still in August 1955, that he
would go to see Kohli, the IBEW business agent in Decatur. Kohli told Rettig
that he could not do anything about the form of the contract , but that Rettig could
see the union vice president in Chicago . Explaining again that Still said that he
could get work if the union matter were straightened out and the boycott ended,
and wanted to join the IBEW , but that he (Rettig) did not want to face a bad
contract , Rettig on October 17 saw the IBEW vice president in Chicago . The latter
telephoned Kohli and told him that the contract could be straightened out.
Having been told that the IBEW had a new supplementary type of contract for a
motor shop , Rettig, sometime between October 17 and December 8, asked Still to
get some copies for him. ( Still erroneously placed this request in September .) Still
then telephoned Rettig in St. Louis and told him that he had been to see Kohli,
who wanted $ 104 initiation fee and $6.75 per month dues. Rettig replied that
Still should have his head examined if he paid $ 104 to join the IBEW . This, of
course , is neither threat nor interrogation , but the exercise of the right of free
speech 2 Further indicating Still's desire to join, the latter asked Rettig whether
he could turn the union charges in on his expense account ( this is not denied ), Rettig
replying in the negative.
On December 8, Rettig went to Decatur, told Still that he would speak to Kohli
about the IBEW's fees , and did speak to Kohli , taking along the supplementary con-
tract. The discussion concerned dues and initiation fees and also the form of the
contract ; unable to solve these matters, Rettig and Kohli projected the problem to
the level of company employee relations representatives and IBEW headquarters
in Washineton . On January 12, 1956 , Rettig and Eakin , manager of employee rela-
tions in the Company 's service shop department, spoke with Kohli , who said that
he would take up the dues question with his superiors in Washington . Eakin and
Rettig went to the service shop later that morning, after their meeting with Kohli. I
find that Still was mistaken in his statement that Retig and Eakin visited the shop
before seeing Kohli that day
Thereafter , Still told Rettig that Kohli was after him and, according to Rettig,
Still was constantly after him to get the union mess straightened out, and for that
reason Rettig went to see Kohli on March 28, 1956 , as he had told Still that he would.
(We are now within the 6-month statutory period. ) From there he went to the
2 Cf The Juvenile Manufacturing Company, Inc ., 117 NLRB 1513.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 1827
shop and told Still that he had met Gordon and would probably employ him as it
would be necessary to hire a second man to get an election (this reflects on the issue
of Still's status) and establish a union shop.
Rettig's statement that it would be wise to get in touch with Kohli is not alleged
as a violation. The same can be said of the statement on April 2 by Shaw, a main-
tenance specialist out of St. Louis, that to have a successful shop the men would have
to join the IBEW. (It becomes unnecessary to point out that, although it was not
shown that Shaw is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act,3 he appeared with
and was sponsored by Rettig, who did not disavow his remarks.) On the latter date
Rettig allegedly said that Kohli would be over in a few days with cards for Still and
Gordon to sign. Rettig denied the latter portion, testifying rather that he said that
he had gotten Kohli to lower the dues and to submit a decent contract. These and
other instances of possible interference not alleged as violations are further noted
infra.
According to Still and Gordon, on May 3 Rettig asked in substance whether
Kohli had been there and whether they had signed up with him or planned to join.
According to Rettig, because he had told Still a month before that he had gotten
Kohli to lower the initiation fees, he now asked only whether Still and Gordon had
gotten together with Kohli. Whichever version we accept, Rettig inquired concern-
ing the employees' concerted activities. Because interrogation as a violation is
weighed in its context, this testimony will be adverted to in connection with Rettig's
further questioning on May 24.
On the latter date, a 4- or 5-hour discussion took place at the Decatur shop, during
which Rettig allegedly asked Still whether Kohli had been there to see him again
and what he and Gordon were going to do about joining the IBEW; when Still said
that he would not join since he was already a member of the IUE, threatened, "You
better listen to me"; and later said that Kohli had two qualified men who were
interested in the Decatur operation but that Rettig wanted to give Still "a first oppor-
tunity to get into the shop, to develop the shop, and get into Kohli's union." Quoting
further from Still's testimony: "At this meeting he gave me two weeks in order to
make up my mind if I wanted to join Mr. Kohli's union or not, and he didn't say
what the consequences would be." Thereafter, when Still said that he wanted to
return to his old job in St. Louis, Rettig allegedly threatened that, if he returned, he
would work for less than he was getting or had gotten in Decatur and that he would
never get any place with the Company. (Here, as elsewhere, Gordon corroborated
Still's testimony. But it is generally unnecessary to refer to Gordon in the analysis
of the testimony.)
Shelton, a company sales engineer, was in the shop during this discussion. Aside
from his inability to recall many items, I found him to be a loquacious and unreliable
witness who was too obviously trying to "help" counsel for the Company. (Cf. his
testimony concerning Still's alleged supervisory status.) According to Shelton,
Still explained to Rettig early in May 1956 (as if the latter had not known it for a
long time!) that IBEW pressure was limiting the shop's business. Rettig himself
denied that he made the threats charged to him. I have already indicated my belief
in his honesty. While minimizing the effect of what he said, as in connection with
Still's status, he admitted that he told Still that he seemed unhappy and always
brought up the subject of the IBEW, and that, if that continued, he (Rettig) might
have to look around and get someone else. We have seen that Still was not alone
in his concern; Rettig was also concerned, and with reason. Even Rettig's "better
listen to me" and his toned down version of a warning that he might get someone
else, in the context of discussion concerning membership in the IBEW and its con-
trol of the available business, certainly tended as a threat to interfere with Still's
rights under the Act. Rettig further testified that he said that, if Still went back to
St. Louis, he would not necessarily get the same job; the old job had been abolished
and, while there could be a job for him, it would "possibly" be not as good as that in
' Shaw's predecessor, Flarth, was inteiested in the operation of the Decatur shop before
he became a foreman in August 1955 In his earlier capacity, he recommended against
assignment of Still to Decatur, but his recommendation was not effective although Rettig
had consulted him. Rettig asked him to help Still get started in Decatur. Haith's
assignment was less to oversee the Decatur operation than to assist and instruct Still.
In any event, this was no mole than a special and temporary assignment it does not
indicate that Harth was at that time a supervisor within the meaning of the Act or that
Shaw has been a supervisor since coining to St Louis The allegation of the complaint,
as amended, is that Shaw is manager of the Decatur service shop, being there the counter-
part of Rettig, who is manager of the St. Louis shop. Shaw is not the manager of the
shop.
1828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Decatur. This admittedly indicates a possible loss to Still, and is a comedown from
what Rettig testified he said to Still on June 1, 1955, as noted supra. Here again we
must remember the context of discussion concerning Still's remaining in Decatur
and joining the IBEW. I further credit the testimony that this discussion was not
friendly or normal in tone, and I credit Still's and Gordon's version of the threat
concerning availability of two other qualified men if Still did not join the IBEW,
and future possibilities for Still in St. Louis. (I regard Rettig's statement that the
union situation would have to be straightened out before additional equipment was
obtained for the shop as a reminder of the fact which all recognized that work
requirements of additional equipment depended on the "union situation." It was no
threat or promise of benefit by the Company.)
After his recollection was refreshed, Still testified that Rettig also said that, if he
did not join the IBEW, he would have to get out of Decatur. In a later version,
Still declared that he thought that Rettig meant that Still would be returning to St.
Louis as he had for a long time wanted to do. Rettig denied that he had said this,
and I make no finding of violation here. Gordon corroborated that testimony by
Still, as he did when Still further testified that Rettig promised that if he joined the
IBEW and got busy, he (Rettig) would immediately hire another man and immedi-
ately give Still certain increases, with a further increase later in the year; but that he
(Still) replied that "there were too many principles involved for (him) to join any-
thing." Here Still mentioned "again" that the IUE was meeting concerning his
grievance. Still did not appear to be clear on the extent of the increase he had
earlier received or on the nature of the increase now allegedly promised.
I credit Rettig's denial that he ever promised a one-step increase except in May
1955 in connection with the permanent transfer, and his further denial that he
promised any benefits for joining the IBEW. Whether or not a statement of benefits
which would flow from increased business, which in turn depended on union mem-
bership, is interference within the meaning of the Act, such interference is not
alleged except as a promise of benefit. But this was not an unlawful promise of
benefit: we must distinguish between the benefits flowing from withdrawal of IBEW
opposition and benefits promised by the Company. As noted further, infra, Still
did not appear to be standing on principle: even while so declaring, he referred to
the more substantial processing of his grievance by the IUE.
With respect to the questions concerning a visit by Kohli and what the men were
going to do about joining, Rettig testified only, and without any appearance of
certainty, that he did not recall. I find that he did ask such questions. Rettig
at various times inquired about Still's contacts with Kohli as well as about the
IUE and its proposed actions. Whatever his understandable interest, such interro-
gation, and Rettig's admitted interrogation on May 3, 1956, constituted unlawful
interference. Rettig's further declaration in this connection, that he was "getting
tired" of the messing around, was certainly pressing Still and Gordon. But, if it
tended generally to interfere, it did not constitute a threat as alleged.
As for an alleged question, late in June or early in July, whether Still and Gordon
were making any progress with Kohli, I credit Rettig's testimony, based on his trip
notes, that he did not visit Decatur between May 24 and August 14, 1956. Still again
mentioned a meeting in June or July, but he now appeared to be referring to one on
August 14, which was attended by Shaw; of this we cannot be certain since he had in-
cluded Gordon among those present at the August meeting, but did not now.
The meeting or discussion of August 14 was a lengthy one. Again Still said that
he wanted to return to St. Louis, and Rettig replied that there was a good oppor-
tunity in Decatur if he got the shop rolling, but that Still knew that he would have
to join the IBEW. There is no threat here. As for promise of benefit, this was
no more than repetition. of the opinion which Rettig originally expressed to Still
concerning business possibilities and before the IBEW entered into their discussion.
That the opinion was now no longer privileged I am not prepared to find. (Still
later added an alleged urging by Rettig at this time, not alleged as a violation, that
Still "should get over there and join the union and get the pay increases " We have
already noted Rettig's denial of promise of benefit.) Here again there is no vio-
lation in Shaw's statement that, if Still joined the IBEW, he would benefit by
overtime on work which would then come in.
I construe Gordon's testimony that Shaw in June or July asked Still whether he
wanted to get ahead and told Still and Gordon that it looked as if the boss wanted
them to do something and that with the opportunity there presented they should
do it, as another version of Still's testimony concerning overtime and advancement
as the shop grew rather than as a threat or promise of benefit from the Company.
This is not quite clear, but it is in harmony with the other testimony received. At
this time, Shaw also asked Still and Gordon whether they had joined the IBEW_
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 1829
Aside from the fact that a finding here of violation by interrogation would add
little to the findings of unlawful interrogation already made,4 Rettig was not
present on this occasion. Shaw's authority to bind the Company has not been shown,
and the situation is not the same as when he appeared under Rettig's sponsorship.
Gordon further testified to a statement by Rettig on May 24 that the union
situation would have to be straightened out before anything else was done. This
was no more than Rettig's appraisal of the long existing situation- it was no threat
to either Still or Gordon. It may be pointed out that such statements, construed
as promising benefits and advancement for Still as the shop grew, and therefore
neither threats nor unlawful promises of benefit, have earlier been relied upon as
evidence that Still had not attained supervisory status.
Gordon testified also that Shaw referred to benefits which Still would receive
if there were an election or if he joined the IBEW and the shop grew. It is not
clear whether Gordon meant that any of these benefits were promised in return for
`Still's joining the IBEW and aside from an increase in the shop's business. I do
not rely on this testimony as proof of an unlawful promise of benefit. We have
already seen that urging, by Shaw or Rettig, is not alleged as a violation.
Nor do I find violation as alleged in the statements that Still would be a fool
not to join the IBEW, and that the IBEW was holding back both Still and Gordon.
But, in the context of other violation, I find unlawful Rettig's questions whether
Still had sent his dues to the IUE, the Company having discontinued his checkoff,
and whether the IUE had instructed him to do so.
The next discussion in Decatur took place on October 4. At that time Rettig
inquired of Still concerning Kohli and concerning the IUE. Such questions have
already been found to be violative.
On December 11, 1956, Rettig brought to the Decatur shop Doll, manager of
the manufacturing practices section of the service shops department of General
Electric Company, admittedly a supervisor. Doll asked Still, according to the
latter, to tell him about the union situation and, when Still replied that the IUE's
attorney had advised him not to discuss the case with anyone, Doll asked Still
whether he had any intention of joining another union, to which Still replied in the
negative; finally Doll attempted to question Still concerning Rettig's statement about
Still picketing his own shop if the IBEW insisted on other than "proper contracts."
Doll described only some casual remarks to Still. He did not deny the questions
which Still in his testimony had attributed to him. Such testimony indicates further
violative interrogation in this context, but it does not aggravate or add to the
violations found. That Doll did not further press the matter indicates that the
Company had not embarked on a campaign of intentional violation, although
violations have been found whether as part of a planned campaign or not.
It is argued that Still's own desires led him to raise these questions continually,
and that company representatives were quite passive, certainly not violating the
Act. The testimony indicates that Still wanted the opportunity which the transfer,
first temporary and then permanent, to Decatur offered, that he then concluded
that advancement of the business and for himself depended on membership in the
IBEW; that he was willing to submerge whatever organizational scruples he had but
balked at paying the high initiation fees and dues; and that, when he was told that
a reduction had been arranged, he was then unwilling to take the step because he
thought that, under a grievance filed on his behalf by the IUE, he might become
entitled to an award of 2 to 4 thousand dollars for expenses as a temporary trans-
feree to Decatur. However these successive reactions and attitudes may be charac-
terized, our concern is with the actions of company representatives and particularly
with any aspect thereof which violated the Act.
We need not further concern ourselves with Still's motives. Consideration of
his attitude has been relevant only as it cast light on the action of company
representatives. Whatever Still's attitude, the issue has been and is whether the
Company committed acts which are alleged and tend to interfere with employees'
concerted activities. We have seen that Rettig categorically denied making some
statements attributed to him. At other points, as he testified that he did not recall,
he appeared to realize that he had at times overstepped the limits of lawful action
as he continued to press Still after first undertaking to assist him in connection with
the IBEW. He declared his annoyance with the alleged change in Still's attitude
toward joining the IBEW. At first, Rettig was quite circumspect. We recall that
4 With respect to additional violations of the types found herein, it is unnecessary to
find cumulative violations which would not affect the remedial order herein. United
Steelworkers of America (Metal Fabricators & Finishers, Inc), 114 NLRB 532; South-
eastern Motor Truck Lines, 113 NLRB 1122, 1124.
183J DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
he had learned of the IBEW situation in Decatur from Harth and Gill. Still
evidently had no knowledge of this aspect until after he arrived in Decatur. But,
convinced that growth of the business apparently depended on IBEW favor, he
was willing to join as he had been earlier glad to go to Decatur. But whatever
motivated Still, and even if he shifted his position for immediate and mercenary
reasons, the Act forbids company interference in its employees' concerted activities.
Having observed and heard him, I am convinced that Rettig was generally careful
to observe the Act and that he is quite familiar with it; but anxious to improve business
at the Decatur shop and to avoid IBEW demand for a contract which he considered
inapplicable, he started by assisting Still and then continued by putting pressure on
him. It does not appear that Rettig had had any direct or personal interest in
pressing for union membership, either in the IUE or in the IBEW. But once
involved, he was here succumbing to IBEW pressure. Even if he had not in fact
sought to hire an employee through the IBEW, he was influenced by Kohli to the
extent of hiring Gordon, whose experience was indeed limited. (Rettig learned,
before he hired Gordon but after he had had him come to St. Louis, that Gordon
was not an IBEW member.)
In this analysis of the testimony and the points raised by counsel for the Company,
we return to the issue whether, whatever its interest, the Company or its representa-
tives, violated the Act as alleged. Nor are we here to concern ourselves with any
problem created by alleged IBEW control of business opportunities in Decatur.
Acts or threats by the IBEW as suggested would not justify violations by the
Company. On the further claim that the IUE allegedly convinced Still that he
would be entitled to back pay if he did not join the IBEW, there is no issue here of
loss of pay and no suggestion of illegality or improper action even if the IUE did so
convince Still. I fully understand Rettig's concern and I have credited his testimony
that Still had himself expressed the desire to join the IBEW. The evidence concerning
the early events which antedate the statutory 6-month period, received after that
concerning the alleged violations, explains Still's expressed desires and attitudes and
further explains, if it does not justify (more on this infra), company efforts or state-
ments in connection with IBEW dues and Still joining that union. But whatever the
value of such explanation, findings of violation herein are in the main based on
Rettig's testimony concerning discussions within the statutory period and his
admissions or failure to deny statements attributed to him.
The violations found indicate that Rettig did press Still when the latter changed his
mind. (Except for alleged interrogation of Gordon when Rettig hired him, no claim
of interference is urged in any situation which did not involve or include Still-)
Whatever the events which led up to Rettig's acts, and whatever the explanation,
the evidence indicates unlawful interrogation of employees and threats of loss to
encourage membership in the IBEW and to discourage membership in and activities
on behalf of the IUE. The allegations of unlawful interrogation of applicants for
employment and of promise of benefits to discourage union membership or activities
have not been sustained; Rettig did not unlawfully question Gordon in St. Louis.
(The hiring of Gordon after he was introduced by Kohli in the latter's office is no
violation, nor is any such alleged. If Rettig assumed from the very circumstances
of that introduction that Gordon was a member of the IBEW and hoped that his
problem might thus be eased, he was to be disappointed. But this, in whatever light
considered, is not our problem.)
I have not overlooked the testimony that shortly before the hearing, counsel for
the Company sought to discuss the case with Still; and that the latter said that he
had been advised not to discuss it except in the presence of counsel for the IUE;
but that he nevertheless did say that Rettig had not threatened him any more than
either union had, that the IUE had told him that he could never return to it in St.
Louis if he joined another union, and then that Rettig had never threatened him.
The first statement concerning comparative threats is equivocal at best. In any event,
it is not for Still to fudge whether remarks constitute interference. As for the remark
attributed to the IUE, we have no charge against that union, and the testimony
does not establish abuse of process.
Further by way of defense, in connection with Rettig's contacts with the IBEW
to get it to lower its dues and initiation fees, Rettig testified that these contacts were
at Still's request. This is a degree of what may euphemistically be called "cooperation"
with employees which is not permitted. Certainly employees might be led by such
efforts, which were no mere expressions of opinion, to choose one union over the
other. Although in the absence of allegation,5 no violation is found in this con-
5 The limitations in the complaint were specifically pointed out and agreed upon at the
hearing, and were again pointed out during closing argument It is not alleged that the
Act was violated when Gordon was hired so that there could be a two-man shop and
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 1831
nection, Rettig's discussion of initiation fees and dues with union representatives
reflects the extent of his interest and willingness to take action; and it offers a basis
for judging his intent or motive as we seek to determine whether he did or did not
violate the Act as alleged. His discussion of the form of the IBEW contract with
Kohli and with the IBEW vice president in Chicago in anticipation of the Decatur
employees' joining that union might be considered only a measure of self-protection;
it also indicates the importance of the matter to Rettig, although for this we have
his own statement to that effect in connection with his interest in increasing the
business at the Decatur shop.
Again, we have seen that the Company many times advised Still to join the
IBEW; it wanted an election, and it wanted representation by the IBEW. An
employer may express his preference for one union rather than another, and may
urge his employees to join the one 6 But it may be necessary in a given situation
to distinguish between the expression of views and the frequent repetition of such
views. Persistence may interfere even where a single or occasional statement is
lawful. An employee is not free to avoid an employer's urgings, and the im-
portunacy here might constitute interference with employees' rights to engage or
refrain from engaging in concerted activities But if there was unlawful tampering
and interference, it has not been alleged and is without the issues tried. This was
neither interrogation, threat, nor promise of benefit. As for it being part of a
pattern, the violations found are themselves sufficient and it is unnecessary to rely
on this element of claimed general course of conduct.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section II, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States,
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair
labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the purposes of
the Act. The recommendations will be addressed to the Decatur shop only since,
as noted at the hearing, the case involves only that shop. There is no claim
here of violation in connection with the operation of the shop in St. Louis or else-
where, and it is clear that the violations found developed only out of the desire
to enlarge the Decatur operation under the circumstances existing in that city
It has been found that the Company, by interrogation of employees concerning
their union membership and activities, and by threats to discourage union mem-
bership and activities, interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act I shall therefore recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and from any like or related conduct.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By interrogation and threats, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coerc-
ing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
the Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication ]
therefore an election ; nor that Rettig sent or said that he had sent Kohli to see Still, or
that he would do so ; nor that Rettig allegedly advised Still to go to see Kohli, or that he
advised Gordon, when he was hired in St Louis, that he and Still sign up with the IBEW
Gordon's employment was not conditioned on such signing, and there was no unlawful
interrogation, promise, or threat
ON. L R B v Corning Glass Works, 204 F 2d 422, 425-428 (C A 1).
1832 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that.
WE WILL NOT threaten or interrogate our employees concerning their union
membership or activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
All of our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from becoming or
remaining, members in good standing of International Union of Electrical, Radio
& Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization except to the extent
that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a)
(3) of the Act.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.-APPARATUS SERVICE SHOP,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
General Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
Local Union No. 697, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America I and R. O.
Wetz, d/b/a R . O. Wetz Transportation
General Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
Local Union No. 697 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America I and
McJunkin Corporation . Cases Nos. 9-CD-31 and 9-CD-32. Feb-
ruary 28, 1958
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
This consolidated proceeding arises under Section 10 (k) of the
Act, which provides that "Whenever it is charged that any person has
engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph
4 (D) of Section 8 (b), the Board is empowered to hear and determine
the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have
arisen. . .."
On July 30, 1957, R. O. Wetz, d/b/a Wetz Transportation, herein
called Wetz, filed with the Regional Director for the Ninth Region a
1 The Board having been notified by the AFL-CIO that it deems the Teamsters' certifi-
cate of affiliation revoked by convention action, the identification of this Union is hereby
amended.
119 NLRB No. 230.